

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES



2018

20th Edition. 2018.

The Journal of Political Studies has been produced in its entirety on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territories of the Coast Salish peoples. In particular, we recognize the Musqueam (x^wməθk^wəyəm), Squamish (sk̄w̄x̄wú7mesh) and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations.

UBC's Vancouver campus exists on x^wməθk^wəyəm territory. As guests who work, study, and live on these lands, the UBC community has a responsibility to use the skills and knowledge we develop here to give back to our hosts.

To learn more, please visit indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca.

All opinions expressed herein are solely those of the individual authors.

An annual publication of the University of British Columbia's Political Science Student Association.

Printed by Hemlock Printers.

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Letter from the Editors-in-Chief

Welcome to the 20th Edition of the Journal of Political Studies.

The JPS' mission has always been about instigating academic engagement. We aim, simply, to lift up the crème de la crème of undergraduate work in political studies. Amidst an often unforgiving and production-oriented academic environment, the JPS offers an opportunity for students to see the potential for their work, to have it taken seriously and critiqued through a blind editing process, and to enjoy the affirmation of finding themselves among the best undergraduate writers and researchers at UBC.

With the 20th Edition, we reaffirm the importance of undergraduate scholarship not only to the University of British Columbia, but to the world. Our editors, authors, and their ideas will no doubt continue to engage in the most challenging and interesting problems facing political studies and activism today. With the 20th Edition, we challenge you, our readers, to engage productively with the material you find within, and to remain ever-attentively politically aware and productive in your lives. We hope that this Journal will continue to spark political fires in our readers and students at UBC for many, many years to come.

The papers you will find within are the product of endless hours of tireless work by our authors, editorial team, and staff. Many thanks to Puneet Heer for her persistent vision and unwavering support, to our team of Editors for their insightful contributions and hours of attentive editing, and to the PSSA as well as our Department Head and Professor Barbara Arneil for their institutional support.

Tiago de Souza Jensen and Jack Jefferson
Editors-in-Chief

Editorial Staff

Tiago de Souza Jensen

Editor-in-Chief

Tiago is completing his double major in Geography and International Relations this year, which is also his third and final year with the Journal. His academic interests revolve around sustainable urban development and social justice. After graduation, Tiago will be further pursuing his Sommelier Diploma and a Master's Degree in sustainable urban planning. In his free time, he dabbles in languages and loves an espresso as dark as his favourite dystopian novels.

Jack Jefferson

Editor-in-Chief

Jack is in his fourth year at UBC, currently pursuing a double major in Economics and Political Science. His academic interests include international trade theory, international political economy, and the implications of issues such as international investment and monetary relations. After completing his degree, Jack intends to gain a few years of work experience and eventually pursue graduate studies. In his spare time Jack enjoys drinking far too much coffee, travelling, and scuba-diving any chance he can get.

Puneet Heer

Managing Editor

Puneet is in her fourth year at UBC, majoring in Political Science. This is her second year with the Journal of Political Studies and she could not be more excited. Puneet is passionate about the Canadian government and the International system. She is interested in understanding the implications of globalization and the global politics that dictate our system. After completing her degree, Puneet hopes to attend graduate school to obtain a Masters of Public Policy and Global Affairs and eventually work within the Canadian Government. In her spare time, Puneet enjoys drinking endless cups of chai, watching movies and taking a great nap.

Editorial Board

Senior Editors:

Felipe Alfaro is in his second year with the Journal of Political Studies and his third year at UBC. He is pursuing a major in International Relations with a minor in Political Science. Felipe is passionate about Latin American politics, especially in regards to gender and education. In his spare time, Felipe enjoys working out, playing soccer as a defender, listening to podcasts on politics and reading anything that comes his way. After graduation he intends to go to graduate school or go back to his home country, Panama, to pursue a career in Law.

Andrea Cruz is in her fourth and final year at UBC, majoring in Political Science and minoring in commerce. Her political interests include North American and Latin American politics particularly in the topics of immigration, education and income inequality. She is concerned with how the current US administration is handling immigration policies and its implications for policy prescription domestically and internationally. In her free time Andrea loves to travel, meet new people, watch documentaries and discuss current political affairs.

Amy Gill is in her third year with the Journal of Political Studies. She is currently completing a double major in Political Science and English Literature. Her interests in Political Science include human rights and postcolonial theory. She is currently researching the consumption of non-Western forms of popular culture by Western audiences and the effects of intercultural exchange.

Andy Holmes is a 4th-year Honours sociology student doing a minor in Critical Studies in Sexuality. His thesis involves studying the controversy of police marching in Vancouver's Pride parade in order to better make sense of the future of contemporary queer politics and social movements. He is currently Co-Editor-in-Chief for *Sojourners*, UBC's undergraduate sociology journal, a Wesbrook & Premier Undergraduate award recipient, a member of the City of Vancouver's LGBTQ2+

Advisory Committee, and a research and teaching assistant in UBC's Department of Sociology. Andy is particularly interested in researching social movements, identity politics, globalization, social inequalities particularly around race, queer/LGBTQ2+ issues, and absolutely anything controversial. In 2019 he will begin pursuing a PhD in Sociology.

Carolina Ortiz is in her fourth year at UBC and her second year with the Journal of Political Studies. She is a double major in Political Science and Creative Writing. Carolina loves to learn about the ocean and marine conservation, especially if it has to do with sharks. She is also interested in Latin American Politics, mostly pertaining to Indigenous women and children. As a Creative Writing major, Carolina is partial to writing for children and comics where she hopes to use these platforms to introduce children to political issues in a way that they can understand and relate to them. In her spare time, Carolina loves to be by the sea while she reads or crochets. She also likes to either cook or try new brunch spots with her friends on the weekends.

María José Valverde is a fourth year undergraduate student from the Dual Degree Programme between UBC and Sciences Po, which enabled her to do her first two years of study in France and her last two years in Vancouver. This is her second year as an editor for the Journal of Political Studies. María José is very passionate about discovering the well-known economic theories in unexpected everyday events and in pursuing her Japanese language studies. She deeply enjoys discussing current global issues, random theories on Martian colonization and reading fascinating pieces on the internet in general (from fiction and non-fiction to BuzzFeed articles). She hopes to continue her studies on development economics after graduation.

Junior Editors:

Alberto Alcaraz is in his last year of his Honours in Political Science degree at UBC. His academic interests include political theory and political philosophy. Specifically, critical theory, feminism, and how forms of domination and oppression shape people's

beliefs and self-conceptions. After completing his degree, Alberto intends to go into a Master's program in Political Science to continue to pursue his goal of working in academia. In his free time, Alberto enjoys checking out bougie coffee shops around Kits, listening to a lot of music, and watching binge-worthy shows on Netflix.

Benjamin Foster is in his fourth and final year of Political Science at UBC. His academic interests surround Canadian Politics, Public Opinion, and Parliamentary Party Strategy. Ben has been involved other organizations on campus, notably being the previous President of the PSSA, a Residence Advisor, and the VP Administration of the AUS. After completing his degree he intends to take a gap year to travel and apply to post-graduate schools. When he is not doing readings he spends time watching the Canucks, eating ramen, and talking about music, politics, and comedy over a beer with his friends.

Chrisanne Kouzas is in her fourth year at UBC, majoring in Political Science. This is her first year with the Journal. Her academic interests include international law, international security, defence policy, foreign policy, diplomacy, and development, with application to such topics as the rise of China, conflict and development in Sub-Saharan Africa, international trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, and the politics and law of outer space. After completing her degree, Chrisanne intends to pursue graduate studies in political science or international law.

Kathryn Leach is a third year student majoring in International Relations with a minor in History. Having traveled throughout her university years, Kathryn's research interests include security and diplomacy, gender and Middle Eastern studies. Hoping to continue these studies abroad in a post-grad setting, Kathryn's passion for activism continues to draw her towards human rights and foreign policy issues. She can be found arguing in classes across campus, cuddling with stray animals and pursuing her commitment to the perfect vinyl collection.

Emil Støvring Lauritsen is in his fourth and final year of the UBC-SciencesPo Dual Degree program. At UBC, he is pursuing an Honours degree in political science with international relations. He recently discovered his passion for political communication, and is currently researching the effects of uncivil campaign rhetoric on public perceptions of political candidates. If everything goes as planned, Emil will be going back to Europe to pursue a Masters degree in Politics and Communication after graduation. When not engaged with politics in one way or another, Emil enjoys discovering new wines, exercising, and reading old classics.

Emma Lodge is a fourth year Honours political science student. Her thesis involves studying refugee policy formation in low and middle-income states and she is passionate about immigration, addressing inequality and forming progressive social policy. After graduation, Emma intends to pursue graduate studies in social policy so she can help address inequities at home and abroad. When not studying, writing papers or working as a research assistant, you can find her mountain biking on the North Shore, hiking in the Sea to Sky corridor or reading at the public library.

Chelsea Pang is in her fourth year at UBC majoring in Political Science. She is interested in immigration policy, US and Canadian politics, as well as the role of nationalism in shaping policy and responses to global refugee crises. After graduating, she hopes to either pursue a Masters in Political Science or attend law school to study immigration law. Chelsea is excited to read a variety of different papers submitted to the journal and to work with fellow members of the editorial board. In her free time, Chelsea can be found either re-watching Stranger Things, working on her illustrations, or both at the same time.

Clara Roth is currently pursuing a major in Political Science and a Master of Management. Being from Germany, her interests in Political Science lie in European politics and International Relations, especially the relationship between Canada and Europe. She is very passionate about immigration, inequality and international

development, especially in relation to the refugee crisis following the Syrian Conflict. Pursuing the Master of Management has allowed her to gain insight into a very different world than the one prescribed in Political Science - she hopes that this will be an asset for her in the future. When she does not have to write papers herself, you can find her passionately reading Russian literature, teaching German to first graders or volunteering in the Contemporary Art Gallery.

Amelie Tolvin is in her third year as an undergraduate student at UBC. She is currently pursuing a major in Political Science and a minor in Russian. Her political interests include American foreign and domestic policy, security studies and conflict resolution, and the politics of Eastern European countries. After completing her undergraduate degree, Amelie intends to continue on to graduate studies and eventually law school.

Arian Zand is in his 3rd year at UBC pursuing his interests in Political Science and Economics. His academic focus is currently on micro analysis of political economy, comparison of rational and behavioural modeling of human decision making, public financial literacy and Middle Eastern politics. These days, he spends a small part of his spare time to study the development of mysticism and Islamic theology. To liberate himself from the sublunary nature of politics, economics and theology, Arian spends the majority of his free time delving into classical Persian literature, in which he finds the most rapturous experience of ascent.

Author Biographies

Andy Holmes is a settler with a mix of Chinese, British, and Scottish heritage who is privileged to be studying on the unceded territories of the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh peoples. He is a fourth-year honours Sociology student doing a minor in Critical Studies in Sexualities at UBC.

David How is proud to be graduating with a Bachelor of Arts as a Political Science Honours with International Relations and Sociology double major. A keen interest in intersectional and interdisciplinary approaches to queer topics led David to create and facilitate his own UBC course on queer experiences of Asian communities in his final year. Terrified to adult for real after school, David is excited to be starting law school next fall so he can procrastinate on that too.

Phebe Ferrer is a settler of Filipino heritage living and studying on the unceded territories of the Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh peoples. At UBC, she is a fourth year Arts student in the International Relations and Asian Canadian and Asian Migration studies (ACAM) programs. Her research interests include studying Philippine foreign relations, migration policy, identity formation within Filipino diasporic communities, and Indigenous-immigrant relations in Canada.

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Poonam Sandhu is a fourth year student in the International Relations program, with a focus on peace, conflict and security studies. Her research interests include sexual and gender-based violence in contemporary South Asia, the political economy of conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. She recently studied abroad at Sciences Po in Paris through which she was able to deepen her understanding of global issues

while exploring Europe. Upon graduating, she hopes to pursue graduate studies at the intersection of international affairs and law.

Sarah Siska is a 4th-year settler scholar in the First Nations and Indigenous Studies program. Born and raised in Thunder Bay, she is interested in the impacts of spatial violence on individual and communal well being and hopes to continue her studies in anti-violence work through a grassroots, community-planning lens. Outside of her studies, Sarah works to support food security and spends what free time she has with her books and plants.

Canadian Bill C-26: Decolonizing the Protection of Two-Spirit, Gender Non-Binary and Transgender People

by Andy Holmes and Phebe Ferrer

On June 15, 2017, Bill C-16, an amendment to add “gender identity and gender expression” to Canada’s Federal Human Rights Act and Criminal Code, passed the Senate. This article argues that Bill C-16 is a necessary step towards decolonizing the rigid European-imposed gender binary that has institutionally structured Canadian society. Due to the fact that cisheteronormativity (the normalization of cisgender and heterosexual identities) has enacted violence towards Two-Spirit, trans, and queer people, queer rights and Indigenous rights cannot be understood without analyzing how they are inextricably linked and constructed in direct relationship with each other.

On June 15, 2017, Bill C-16, an amendment to add “gender identity and gender expression” to Canada’s Federal Human Rights Act and Criminal Code, passed in the Senate.¹ The purpose of the amendment was to “extend the protection against hate propaganda set out in that Act to any section of the public that is distinguished by gender identity or expression.”² This allows for the consideration of hate crimes based on gender identity or expression. One outcome of this is that lawyers or judges can, for instance, convict discrimination that is based on the victim being transgender.³ Alongside the passage of this amendment came

fierce opposition to what some viewed as another consequence of Bill C-16, an attack on “freedom of speech.”⁴ Those who criticize Bill C-16 raise concern that there is uncertainty in how hate crimes that fall under “gender identity and gender expression” might be interpreted under Canadian law.⁵ For instance, critics of the Bill oppose what they perceive to be the possibility of one facing legal penalties for refusing to refer to someone’s gender pronouns outside of a male or female binary.⁶ Opposition to the bill has particularly proliferated under a University of Toronto Psychology professor named Jordan Peterson. He claims that having

¹ Canadian Human Rights Act: Adding “gender identity and gender expression” to the Federal Human Rights Act and Criminal Code is analogous to how identity categories are protected including “age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status” are already protected under Canadian law.

² Bill C-16, https://www.parl.ca/Content/Bills/421/Government/C-16/C-16_3/C-16_3.PDF.

³ Stryker, *Transgender History*, 20: A note on terminology. Throughout this paper we use the term transgender and trans interchangeably. We acknowledge and respect that the terms transgender and trans can have different interpretations. In this paper we use the word transgender as an all-encompassing term to refer to people whose gender does not align with the gender and sex they were assigned at birth.

⁴ *CBC Radio*, “I’m Not a Bigot’.”

⁵ Laurence, “Canada Passes Radical Law.”; Parly, “Meet the New ‘Human Rights’.”

⁶ Cossman, “Gender Identity,” 37.

“gender identity and gender expression” added as legal grounds for protection against discrimination and violence would violate his rights to freedom of speech regarding the pronouns used for gender non-binary people.

That being said, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the nuances of Bill C-16 itself. Considering opposition to Bill C-16, there is seldom discussion about implications Bill C-16 has for Indigenous and Two-Spirit peoples. Hidden in the backlash to Bill C-16 justified in the name of ‘freedom of speech’ is a deeply-ingrained colonial act of violence that attempts to deny trans, Two-Spirit, gender non-conforming, and queer people their right to safety and protection. Opponents of Bill C-16 state that there are only two gender categories make such claims uncritical of the erasure of Indigenous understandings of gender in what is now Canada. Bill C-16 is not solely about trans or non-binary people and their right to gender-affirming pronouns; backlash to the Bill demonstrates the social amnesia of many Canadians unaware of the history of Indigenous gender and sexuality prior to colonization. With this in mind, this paper argues that Bill C-16 is a necessary step towards decolonizing the rigid European-imposed gender binary that has institutionally structured Canadian

society. Due to the fact that cisheteronormativity⁷ has enacted violence towards Two-Spirit, trans, and queer people, queer rights are intertwined with de-colonial studies.⁸ Both queer rights and Indigenous rights cannot be understood without analyzing how they are inextricably linked and constructed in direct relationship with each other.⁹

This paper will first analyze opposition to Bill C-16, towards demonstrating its particular importance for people who identify as transgender. This paper will then outline the genealogy of the term Two-Spirit and demonstrate that erasure of Two-Spirit knowledge was necessary for the creation of the colonial nation-state. Furthermore, it will present evidence that this erasure of Indigenous Two-Spirit knowledge has created violence not only for Two-Spirit and Indigenous peoples, but also all those that do not conform to the cisheteronormative frameworks in Canada. Lastly, this paper will delve into a critical discussion of the potentiality of Bill C-16 to, in fact, reify the ongoing oppression of Indigenous peoples if we fail to decolonize our perspectives on gender and sexuality.

Opposition to Bill C-16

In a tumultuous one-year period since Bill C-16’s introduction, opposition to

⁷ Cisheteronormativity is a neologism of the terms cisnormativity and heteronormativity. Cisnormativity is a more recent term that refers to taken for granted notions that all people are cisgender. Cisnormativity is rooted in the term heteronormativity, which refers to the same logic but with the normativity of heterosexuality. Heteronormativity was first used in an article by Michael Warner in 1991, who built upon what feminist queer theorist Adrienne Rich famously termed as “compulsory heterosexuality.”

⁸ Ristock, et al., "Impacts of Colonization," 1.

⁹ Driskill, "Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques," 69; Hunt and Holmes, "Everyday Decolonization," 154.

the bill has premised the notion that the wording used delimits ‘freedom of speech’ and affords gender non-binary people legal protections that limit those of others.¹⁰ The term ‘gender non-binary’ refers to people whose gender cannot be categorized merely by the binary of male or female.¹¹ Proponents of this line of argument say that it is ‘factually’ incorrect to state there are more genders than the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female.’¹² For instance, in a CBC News interview in September 2016, Peterson stated that he refuses to call people by the gender-neutral pronoun ‘they,’ claiming that, “I reserve the right to use my own language...If it's the case that I can't use my language the way that I see fit, because I'm using my language to formulate and articulate the truth...and if that lands me in legal trouble well, so be it.”¹³ In other words, Peterson’s refusal to use the pronoun ‘they’ for gender non-binary people is telling of the fact that his conviction of ‘the truth’ entails that gender non-binary people are an invalid identity group.

Protecting people from discrimination based on their gender identity or gender expression is not only about gender non-binary issues, but about recognizing that transgender and Two-Spirit people face

discrimination and violence as a result of there being a lack of laws that explicitly protect them.¹⁴ The motivation behind this bill is in recognition of the fact that transgender people across the gender spectrum face disproportionate levels of violence and harassment. For example, a 2015 study done by the Stigma and Resilience among Vulnerable Youth Centre (SARAVYC) on health issues faced by Canadian trans youth found that 70% of participants reported sexual harassment, two thirds reported discrimination because of their gender identity, and 36% of participants aged 14-18 were physically threatened or injured in the past year of the study.¹⁵ Although those who disagree with Bill C-16 may claim it violates their freedom of speech to refer to gender non-binary people with the gender-neutral pronoun ‘they’, they also inadvertently deny transgender people that are not gender non-binary to be protected from hate crimes. Provided that Bill C-16 is to protect people from hate crimes that target one’s “gender identity or gender expression,” denying its potential to mitigate crimes against trans people is a subtle act of violence.

¹⁰ Blatchford, “If Gender Identity.”; Pardy, “Meet the New ‘Human Rights’.”

¹¹ Frohard-Dourlent et al., “I would have Preferred,” 1; Richards et al., “Non-Binary Or Genderqueer Genders,” 95.

¹² Various studies show that anywhere between 1-4% of adolescents identify as transgender (Clark et al.; Smith et al.) and that 41% of transgender-identified youth and adults identify as somewhere outside the gender binary of male and female (Harrison et al.; Veale et al.; Frohard-Dourlent et al.).

¹³ *CBC Radio*, “I’m Not a Bigot’.”

¹⁴ Lyons et al., “Negotiating Violence,” 184; “Memorializing 2017,” International Transgender Day of Remembrance, March 24, 2018, <https://tdor.info>.

¹⁵ Vaele et al., *Being Safe, Being Me*, 2.

Erasure of Two Spirit Peoples

Resistance to the passing and implementation of Bill C-16 is unsurprising. Those who have been socialized in Canada to believe there are only two genders rely on knowledge of a gender binary that purports to be factual. In fact, multiple Indigenous scholars argue prior to the colonization of Turtle Island (North America), many Indigenous groups conceptualized gender and sexuality differently than Western Europeans.¹⁶ Knowing the origins of the term Two-Spirit is critical in unpacking the purpose of Bill C-16 if one is to deeply engage in the understanding of where homophobia, transphobia, and more broadly, gender violence in the Canadian state comes from. The word Two-Spirit first gained popularity when used at an annual Indigenous gay and lesbian gathering near Winnipeg in 1990 when attendees discussed the Northern Algonquin¹⁷ word *niizh manitoag* (two-spirits), which signifies one's embodiment of having both feminine and masculine spiritual traits.¹⁸ Three years later, during an anthropology conference titled "Revisiting the 'North American

Berdache' Empirically and Theoretically" the word, *berdache*, a derogatory term French colonizers used to mischaracterize local Indigenous peoples who they read as gender and sexual 'anomalies', was challenged and replaced with the term Two-Spirit.¹⁹

Furthermore, Two-Spirit people were often revered in many Indigenous communities for their ability to perform multiple important gender roles, which allowed Indigenous societies to function.²⁰ For instance, Two-Spirit people were known to be "healers, matchmakers, counsellors, among many others"²¹ and have been documented in over 155 tribes across North America.²² In what is now Canada, various Indigenous groups with Two-Spirit people had terms used to explain gender and sexual identities: *ayahkwêw* (Cree), *sipiniq* (Inuit), *puoin* (Mi'kmaq), *ogowe* (Ojibwe), *sx'int*s (Nuxalk). Hence, prior to the colonization of Canada, such vocabulary demonstrates the existence of differently conceptualized understandings of gender and sexuality terms.²³

Today, Indigenous queer people who might not have the same roles

¹⁶ Justice, "Notes Toward a Theory of Anomaly," 207; Smith, "Queer Theory and Native Studies," 43; Driskill, "Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques," 73; Miranda, "Extermination of the Joyas," 253; Hunt and Holmes, "Everyday Decolonization," 154.

¹⁷ An Indigenous group who have historically and contemporarily lived in what is now both Ontario, Canada and Pennsylvania, United States.

¹⁸ Anguksuar, "A Postcolonial Colonial Perspective," 217.

¹⁹ Driskill, "Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques," 52.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 55; Miranda, "Extermination of the Joyas," 266.

²¹ Laframboise and Anhorn, "The Way of the Two Spirited People," March 7, 2018, <http://www.dancingtoeaglespiritsociety.org/twospirit.php>.

²² Roscoe, *Living the Spirit*, 20.

²³ Egale Canada Human Rights Trust "Two Spirits, One Voice," March 24, 2018, <https://egale.ca/portfolio/two-spirits-one-voice/>.

that Two-Spirit people held prior to colonization are still, nonetheless, identifying as Two-Spirit. Through this act of identification, Indigenous Two-Spirit people are challenging the understanding of what it means to be *queer* in the first place. In other words, considering that Bill C-16 has been debated for explicitly protecting trans and non-binary people from discrimination based on their gender identity and gender expression, Two-Spirit people further contest notions of gender and sexuality by reminding Canadians that they were not seen as queer until colonization.

Therefore, if we are to discuss about Bill C-16 in Canada on Indigenous lands, Cherokee Two-Spirit scholar Qwo Li Driskill states, “no understanding of sexual and gender constructions on colonized and occupied land can take place without an understanding of the ways colonial projects continually police sexual and gender lines.”²⁴ In “Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques: Building Alliances between Native and Queer Studies,” Driskill asserts the importance of understanding how queer studies are intrinsically woven into Indigenous studies, and that the two co-construct each other.²⁵ Yet Driskill also identifies how within queer studies, the ways in which Indigeneity intersect and lay foundations to queer studies are

hardly discussed. Similarly, the cisheteronormative influence of European colonizers towards Indigenous peoples has made it difficult for some Indigenous communities to reconcile with contemporary forms of homophobia and transphobia.²⁶ For these two reasons, Driskill draws upon a type of basket weaving in Cherokee culture called doubleweaving as a metaphor to bring queer and Indigenous studies into conversation with each other. Doubleweaving is the process of weaving one basket within another basket where both share a common rim. Driskill uses the metaphor of doubleweaving to state how queer studies and Indigenous studies, “two seemingly disparate rhetorical approaches,” do exist to simultaneously inform each other.²⁷ With this understanding of doubleweaving in mind, discussions of Bill C-16 must be incorporated with Indigenous scholarship, ways of thinking, and experiences.

Through this doubleweaving approach, Driskill engages with what queer of colour theorist, José Esteban Muñoz calls a form of “disidentification.”²⁸ To disidentify, according to Muñoz, is for marginalized queers of colour to re-work and transform the existing dominance of white queer culture to serve the interests of queer people of

²⁴ Driskill, “Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques,” 73.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 74.

²⁶ Driskill, “Stolen from our Bodies,” 52; Justice, “Notes Toward a Theory of Anomaly,” 236; Smith, “Queer Theory and Native Studies,” 46-47.

²⁷ Driskill, “Doubleweaving Two-Spirit Critiques,” 74.

²⁸ Muñoz, *Disidentifications*, 10.

colour who are often deliberately excluded from the mainstream. Similarly, Driskill uses this idea of doubleweaving as a way for Indigenous studies to disidentify with queer studies in order to centre the experiences of Indigenous peoples within queer frameworks. Taking this disidentificatory framework in mind, Bill C-16 must be analyzed as doubleweaving with Indigenous rights. Now a law existing within an occupying Canadian government, Bill C-16 has the potential to be interpreted to benefit not only trans and non-binary people, but also, Indigenous queers and Two-Spirit people. In queer studies we are forgetting the colonial roots of discourses regarding gender and sexuality, and this amnesia can in fact work to prevent decolonizing the struggles to self-determination, land redress, healing from historical trauma and the ongoing process of reconciliation. Hence, proponents and opponents to Bill C-16 who debate gender have a responsibility to know the historical underpinnings of where gender-based discrimination and violence stems from: colonization.²⁹ When European colonizers came to Turtle Island starting in the 15th century, colonizers encountered Indigenous peoples whose understanding of gender and sexuality varied from their own.³⁰ In an act of

ethnocentrism and genocide, European colonizers attempted to eradicate and assimilate Indigenous peoples whose gender and sexuality did not conform to cisheteronormative European models.³¹ For instance, in “Extermination of the *Joyas*: Gendercide in Spanish California,” Ohlone-Coastanoan Essele and Chumash Scholar Deborah A. Miranda document how Spanish colonizers massacred the *Joya* (Spanish term for third-gender), Indigenous people living in what is now the state of California. This violence is documented in an excerpt from Miranda’s article from a Spanish soldier in 1775 who encountered *Joya* people:

“I have substantial evidence that those Indian men who... in the dress, clothing, and character of women there being two or three such in each village pass as sodomites by profession (it being confirmed that all these Indians are much addicted to this abominable vice) and permit the heathen to practice the execrable, unnatural abuse of their bodies. They are called *joyas*, and are held in great esteem...we place our trust in God and expect that these accursed people will disappear with the growth of the missions. The abominable vice will be eliminated.”³²

²⁹ Hunt and Holmes, “Everyday Decolonization,” 159; Smith, “Queer Theory and Native Studies,” 64.

³⁰ Hunt and Holmes, “Everyday Decolonization,” 160; Miranda, “Extermination of the *Joyas*,” 256.

³¹ The act of colonization through the residential school system in Canada has been interpreted as a form of genocide, in accordance to the United Nations definitions of “genocide” referring to “forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” and for “causing serious bodily or mental harm” under Article 2 of the UN Convention on Genocide (1948).

³² Fages, A Historical, Political, and Natural Description of California, 33.

According to the Spanish soldier who encountered *Joya* people, the difference in clothing, character and sexuality (sodomy) to his own Catholic and European standard justified his intent to kill them. Miranda outlines, in fact, that the Spaniards violently killed the *Joyas* through brutal techniques including live-feeding them to large Mastiff dogs. Considering this example is taken from an American context, it is important to recognize that overarching discourses on gender and sexual normativity also impacted Canada through a colonizing logic irrespective of modern-day borders. This example is emblematic of the violence faced by Two-Spirit peoples across Turtle Island prior to the creation of modern borders that separate Canada from the United States.

Colonially-Imposed Cisheteronormative Violence:

If we are to fully understand the genealogy of Bill C-16's attempt to mitigate gender and sexuality-based violence in Canada, there is continuous need to learn where such violence stems from. One such example of how European colonizers enforced heteronormative gender binaries in Canada on Indigenous groups was through the residential school system.³³ Between 1863-1996 approximately eighty residential

schools in Canada were built with the purpose of destroying the future of Indigenous peoples by forcibly removing Indigenous children from their homes and placing them in boarding schools.³⁴ Residential schools were an institutionalized form of racism that sought to annihilate the social structure of Indigenous communities in order for the Canadian state to gain control over Indigenous peoples and their land. One way that the Canadian state tried to gain this control was through the imposition of cisheteronormativity as a way to 'civilize' Indigenous peoples. According to Richard Wagamese, an Ojibwe author whose parents were forced into residential schools, he writes of a young boy whose long hair was seen to be incompatible with the Canadian state's ideas of gender normativity,

"we sat in chairs with towels around our shoulders while the nuns shaved our hair down to nubby crew-cuts with electric clippers. I watched my long, straight hair land on the floor, and when I looked at the other boy he was crying. Huge, silent tears."³⁵

In this passage it is unknown if the boy whose long hair was cut would be Two-Spirit, but it is clear that long hair among boys was seen as unacceptable in residential schools. The reason why long hair would be seen as unacceptable reflects a gender

³³ Driskill, "Stolen from our Bodies," 225; Hunt and Holmes, "Everyday Decolonization," 165; Ristock, et al., "Impacts of Colonization," 4.

³⁴ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. "The Journey" in *The Survivors Speak*, 23-30.

³⁵ Wagamese, *Indian Horse*, 45.

normative idea rooted in the discourse of “kill the Indian in the child.”³⁶ To “kill the Indian in the child” with regards to gender norms refers to the idea of genocide with the intent of forcibly annihilating the ways in which Indigenous peoples lived prior to colonization.




Figure 1: Photography by Thomas Moore³⁷

Another prominent example of “killing in the Indian in the child” through Residential Schools in Canada is documented in the example of Thomas Moore (See Figure 1), whose Indigenous name is unknown. In the image on the left we see an Indigenous

child prior to their entry into the Regina Indian Industrial School. The image on the right demonstrates the imposition of Eurocentric gender norms upon Indigenous peoples, which has had a lasting legacy of violence.³⁸ This example of Thomas Moore demonstrates the construction of a particular type of gender normativity that has created a Canadian standard for the performance of gender that marginalizes those who are gender non-conforming. These standards are why Bill C-16 exists to protect people from violence on the grounds of gender identity and gender expression.

As scholars Sarah Hunt, a member of the Kwakwaka'wakw nation, and Cindy Holmes, a white settler with Scottish, Irish, and English heritage, state in “Everyday Decolonization: Living a Decolonizing Queer Politics,” “colonialism is, at its heart, a project intent on the erasure of Indigenous peoples.”³⁹ One way Indigenous peoples have been erased is through “dichotomous and binary thinking” where the colonial project in Canada sought to eliminate the structure of Indigenous societies by “suppressing Indigenous systems of gender that went far beyond the gender binary.”⁴⁰ Hunt and Holmes further argue that through residential

³⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. “Arrival” in *The Survivors Speak*, 31-45.

³⁷ Moore, “Regina Indian Industrial School,” photograph, 1874, http://education.historicacanada.ca/files/32/ResidentialSchools_English.pdf

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Hunt and Holmes, “Everyday Decolonization,” 159.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 159.

Spirit people in the descendants of residential school survivors.⁴¹ This enactment of gender normativity is indeed silent, insidious, and has seeped into the framework of the Canadian state's regulation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people's bodies to create colonial acts of violence.

Scholars including Chris Finley, a member of the Colville Confederate tribes, states that colonialism requires heteropatriarchy in order to maintain inequalities that benefit the state. In "Decolonizing the Queer Native Body," Finley argues that, "without heteronormative ideas about sexuality and gender relationships, heteropatriarchy, and therefore colonialism, would fall apart. Yet heteropatriarchy has become so natural in many Native communities that it is internalized and institutionalized as if it were traditional."⁴² In other words, the logic of heteropatriarchy, and by extension cisnormativity, within Indigenous communities damaged pre-existing social structures. Finley provides evidence of this violence in the form of Indigenous councils adopting heterosexual marriage acts⁴³ while being pressured to conform to the nuclear family.⁴⁴ As Finley states, "heterosexism and the structure of the

nuclear family need to be thought of as a colonial system of violence."⁴⁵ With that being said, heterosexism and the nuclear family allowed for Canada to put into power the 1876 Indian Act to implant settler-colonialism. The Indian Act is a law that restricted where Indigenous peoples living in Canada could reside, and significantly restricted their legal rights. Furthermore, the Indian Act instilled patriarchal values in order to undermine the power of Indigenous women in order to construct a Canadian nation based upon patriarchal whiteness.⁴⁶ For instance, Indigenous women lost their Indian status if they married a white man, and the Indian Act was carefully designed in a way through heteronormativity for Indigenous peoples to lose their rights in order to gain rights, such as the right to vote. Furthermore, as Bonita Lawrence, a Mi'kmaw scholar, discusses in "Gender, Race, and the Regulation of Native Identity," the Act created "a conceptual framework"⁴⁷ of dichotomous gender and heteronormativity that has "shaped contemporary Native life in ways that are now so familiar as to almost seem natural."⁴⁸ Evidently, the Indian Act proscribed the entrenchment of cisheteronormativity in many Canadian Indigenous communities.

⁴¹ Ibid., 164.

⁴² Finley, C. "Decolonizing the Queer," 34.

⁴³ Ibid., 32.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 34.

⁴⁵ Finley, C. "Decolonizing the Queer," 32.

⁴⁶ Sinha, Gender and Nation, 4-7.

⁴⁷ Lawrence, "Gender, Race, and the Regulation," 3.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 3.

With the Indian Act as an exemplary case of the institutionalization of cisheteronormativity in Canada in Indigenous communities, Finley is certainly not alone in her critique of this imposition; other Indigenous scholars share similar concerns. In “Notes Toward a Theory of Anomaly” Cherokee scholar Daniel Heath Justice outlines his critique of members of Cherokee Nation in their refusal to recognize same-sex relations and marriage under the rhetoric that it was ‘untraditional’. Justice describes how a legacy of colonially-imposed heteronormativity risked the Cherokee Nation of being perceived as anomalous among other Nations should they choose to allow same-sex marriages. In order to address this issue Justice turns to Indigenous Mississippian traditional stories of “hybrid beings”⁴⁹ that disrupt cisheteronormative colonial understandings of gender and sexuality. Understanding the decolonizing resistance that Justice makes is ultimately integral to unpacking colonially-imposed cisheteronormativity and its damaging effects on Indigenous communities today.

Implications of Bill C-16

Colonially-induced violence internal and external to Indigenous communities through gender and

sexual normativity necessitates why Bill C-16 exists in Canada. Researchers who study the relationship between colonial cisheteronormativity and violence find that transgender Indigenous and Two-Spirit people face considerably higher rates of violence compared to most Canadians.⁵⁰ In a qualitative study titled “Impacts of Colonization on Indigenous Two-Spirit/LGBTQ Canadians’ Experiences of Migration, Mobility and Relationship Violence” the researchers found that participants outlined concerns about violence rooted in the larger historical context of colonization.⁵¹ One of 50 Two-Spirit/LGBTQ participants from their study, a First Nations lesbian trans woman states:

“. . . at one time Two Spirited people, we had a special place in the community, but in modern times, we’re looked on as trash even by our people, ‘cause of the European mainstream influence...they’ve been Catholicized or assimilated by the Roman Catholic church, they’ve taken those values to heart and they look down on gender diversity and sexual diversity.”⁵²

In this quote, the connection between Two-Spirit people losing their status because of mainstream European values has created circumstances where Two-Spirit people are “looked on as trash.” In a separate research study titled, “Experiences of Trans

⁴⁹ Justice, “Notes Toward a Theory of Anomaly,” 220.

⁵⁰ Lyons et al., “Negotiating Violence,” 182; Ristock, et al., “Impacts of Colonization,” 14-15.

⁵¹ Ristock, et al., “Impacts of Colonization,” 14-15.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 10.

Women and Two-Spirit Persons Accessing Women-Specific Health and Housing Services in a Downtown Neighborhood of Vancouver, Canada,” Lyons et al. supply evidence of the violent effects of transphobia not only on Two-Spirit people, but also non-Indigenous trans women.⁵³ Lyons et al. found that Two-Spirit and trans women faced barriers accessing women-specific housing shelters, detoxification centers, and faced considerable discrimination by cisgender female staff at women support facilities. These findings show the necessity for laws such as the enactment of Bill C-16 to protect people facing gender-based discrimination because of their trans or Two-Spirit identities.

As Ristock et al. and Lyons et al. articulate, trans and Indigenous Two-Spirit people face violence when attempting to access women’s shelters, support groups, or when finding employment.⁵⁴ Knowledge of where cisheteronormative discrimination and violence can occur is crucial in linking Bill C-16 with decolonization, as the precarious situations outlined above are disproportionately experienced by Indigenous trans and Two-Spirit people. In other words, merely adding “gender identity and gender expression” to the Canadian Human Rights Act and Criminal Code as grounds prohibited from discrimination is not enough to end the violence faced by Indigenous trans and Two-Spirit people. Rather,

Indigenous trans, Two-Spirit, and non-Indigenous trans people of colour face discrimination and violence in the housing sector and job market, and these are issues that must be recognized as precursory experiences to why Bill C-16 exists in the first place.

To illustrate why the law of Bill C-16 must be in conversation with decolonizing the struggles of Two-Spirit, trans, Indigenous queer, and queer of colour people, one must look no further than to the public apology to LGBTQ2S+ Canadians Prime Minister Justin Trudeau delivered on November 28, 2017. While the apology was necessary to recognize and correct the legacy of cisheteronormative violence by the Canadian state, the discussion lacked emphasis on the colonial roots and ongoing struggles of Indigenous, Two-Spirit, and queers of colour, who persist not only through cisheteronormativity but also through racism and classism in the Canadian state. The concern with Bill C-16 and its enactment in law is that, similar to Trudeau’s apology, it will be used as evidence for Canada’s purported progressiveness while conveniently ignoring the regressive political decisions made against Indigenous queers and Two-Spirit people. Scholars who critique this political subterfuge include Jasbir Puar, a queer theorist, whose concept of “homonationalism” pieces together critiques of the state for supporting LGBTQ2 issues that reinforce

⁵³ Lyons et al., “Negotiating Violence,” 186.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 186; Ristock, et al., “Impacts of Colonization,” 11.

neoliberal white nationalism.⁵⁵ In Canada, we are concerned that Bill C-16 will be used to demonstrate Canada's supposed progressiveness while silencing the intersectional needs of Two-Spirit people, Indigenous sovereignty, and issues affecting racialized and poor communities.

Conclusion

As this paper outlines, the creation of cisheteronormative violence (the reason why Bill C-16 exists) is in direct relationship with the colonial imposition of the gender binary that has erased knowledge of Two-Spirit people. By first introducing dissenting opinions to Bill C-16 in regards to it violating "freedom of speech", this paper demonstrates how such thinking reflects the normalization of the gender binary imposed by European colonizers in the formation of the Canadian state. First, this paper outlined the genealogy of the term Two-Spirit and located it within colonial discourses that erased knowledge of Two-Spirit existence. Next, Indigenous scholars, particularly Qwo-Li Driskill, were presented to demonstrate the necessity of viewing queer studies and Indigenous studies as inter-woven in their simultaneous complexities. Then, an overview of colonially-imposed violence by the Canadian state in the form of residential schools and the Indian Act was put forward to provide context to contemporary struggles that

Indigenous queer, trans and Two-Spirit people face today. The paper concludes then, with a discussion on the benefits and critiques of Bill C-16 and its possibility to reify Canadian progressiveness while ignoring the continual needs of Indigenous, Two-Spirit, and racialized queer people. Thus it is of utmost importance that supporters and opponents to Bill C-16 must recognize how gender and sexual normativity are ultimately residual, and perhaps ongoing, structures of the colonial state of Canada.

⁵⁵ Puar, "Mapping US Homonormativities," 71-73.

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Queer-economics: The Economics of Legitimacy of Queer Identities in Singapore

by David How

Queer communities in Singapore are facing a stagnation in rights development and representation; although queer identities are tolerated, queer Singaporeans continue to face social and structural marginalization by the state and society. This paper examines the economics of queer collective action through an analysis of the intersection of the politics of legitimacy and the economy. The mobilization of local business sponsorship of queer organizing represents new significant pressure on the state to legitimize queer communities into mainstream Singaporean national identity.

Singapore is a queer country. Queer as in odd, but also queer as it refers to the political and theoretical identities of many Singaporeans. The state has a unique relationship with its citizens and an even more unique relationship with its queer citizens. This queer relationship can be characterized by an annual event called Pink Dot. On June 4, 2016, Pink Dot 2016 was held at Speaker's Corner in Hong Lim Park drawing over 30,000 people. Its purpose was an opportunity for LGBT¹ Singaporeans and their friends and families to congregate and openly support the freedom to love. There were also high profile corporate sponsors such as Google, JP Morgan, and Twitter. These sponsors not only provided financial contributions, but

participated in the event through boothing as well as having employees present both as participants and representatives. On June 6, 2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs released a statement that clarified that foreign entities would no longer be permitted to sponsor events that occur at Speaker's Corner. In response, a campaign for Pink Dot 2017 was launched to have local Singaporean businesses sponsor the event. This paper will explore the ramifications of this mobilization of the local economy for queer collective action and queer identities in Singapore.

Singapore's queer citizens experience marginalization by the state and society and are prevented from being incorporated into the national

¹ It is worth noting that most queer Singaporeans identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender rather than queer and Pink Dot employs the term LGBT, but for the purpose of this paper, queer is employed as a more inclusive umbrella term. Additionally, it incorporates the political and theoretical aspects of LGBT collective action.

identity.² Queer identities remain socially stigmatized and excluded by policy and infrastructure. Most importantly, homosexual acts remain criminalized by the state. Over decades, Singapore's queer collective organizing has been able to gain legitimacy and tolerance, but only to a limited extent. There has also been a long history of the government making small, incremental concessions to the queer community in Singapore for economic reasons. This paper argues that the mobilization of local businesses to sponsor Pink Dot 2017 represents new significant pressure on the state to legitimize queer identities and helps to incorporate them into the mainstream Singaporean national identity. Economic pressure in Singapore holds more clout with the state than direct social pressure and can reinvigorate a stagnating social movement in gaining widespread tolerance for queer Singaporeans through a legitimating association. This shift is achieved as a result of strategies of queer collective action that are informed by pragmatic resistance and represent the employment of the Singaporean queer community's cultural citizenship. The

paper will develop this claim through a thorough examination of the economics of queer collective action in Singapore and with special attention to corporate social responsibility and the strategies of queer social organizing.

Context and Theory of Queer Singapore

The island of Singapore was colonized by the British in 1819, under the guidance of Sir Stamford Raffles.³ The country's colonial history is largely summed up as that of a British trading entrepôt populated by Chinese, Malay, and Indian migrants and few Europeans, with a "social order [that] emerged as a highly diverse mosaic."⁴ From its beginnings, Singaporean society, culture, and politics have been products of the economy. In fact, economic imperatives are at the foundations of its very existence since it has always been a port, even before the British landed on its shores. Over time, Singapore began to develop its own sense of identity, which grew as trade flourished.⁵

Eventually, Singapore gained independence and, after a brief stint as

² Yue, "Queer Singapore," 1-26.

³ Trocki, Singapore, 8.

⁴ Ibid., 39.

⁵ Ibid., 8-38.

part of the Federation of Malaya, became a sovereign city-state in 1965. One party has ruled Singapore since the first General Election in 1959, the People's Action Party (PAP), which oversaw the country's rapid development. Although the PAP enjoys popular support from Singaporean citizens, it maintains a strictly controlled state. Freedoms of expression, association, and assembly are limited and the "major change that took place in Singapore with independence was the level of control that the government came to exercise over society."⁶ The PAP tolerates little dissent and encourages social cohesion through strict limits on mobilization. Despite the strong culture of control in Singapore, the citizens "benefit greatly from the country's economic success, so they do not make strong demands [for democracy and civil rights]."⁷ It is critical to understand what this consent by the citizenry means for the regime.

At the heart of determining the Singaporean regime's legitimacy is understanding the widespread public

approval of the PAP. This "popular perception and consent"⁸ is characteristic of Seok-Fang Sim's theory of legitimated authoritarian hegemony. Drawing on Gramsci's work on hegemony, Sim claims that the PAP exercises its legitimated authoritarian hegemony through the consensus of the population by winning elections by massive majorities, demonstrating its monopoly over popular support. Sim argues that this is characterized by the PAP's emphasis on Singapore's economic development.⁹

The PAP limits public dissent and employs soft repression techniques at the ballot box, such as gerrymandering and slander lawsuits against opposition candidates.¹⁰ Although these techniques are legal, the regime "may nonetheless attempt to secure consensus so as to *avoid* relying on coercive regulations."¹¹ This is achieved through astounding economic development and the incredible progress of the country from a small fledgling state with few economic resources to ranking in the top ten global GDPs per capita in the short span of half a century.

⁶ Trocki, *Singapore*, 137.

⁷ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, 37.

⁸ Sim, "Hegemonic Authoritarianism and Singapore," 147.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹⁰ Andrews, "Soft' Repression" February 6, 2015. <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/soft-repression-the-struggle-for-democracy-in-singapore/>

¹¹ Sim, "Hegemonic Authoritarianism and Singapore," 156.

Meritocracy and technocratic prowess of the elite were emphasized by the PAP and the government pursued rigorous reforms to nurture a cohesive and highly capable society. After rapidly industrializing and establishing infrastructure, the PAP began to cultivate Singapore as a service economy and the hub for trade and finance in the region. In order to secure an attractive investment environment, the PAP tightened its social control and limited the freedoms of its population, creating a socially and politically stable economic system. In turn, the economic transformation of Singapore enabled the PAP “to use the economy as a vehicle to establish a much higher level of control over the state and society.”¹² The Singaporean case is an example of a highly efficient government using economic prosperity to gain consensus from its population to continue to maintain tight social control as a trade-off for continued economic prosperity.¹³

The country’s conservative society and the mobilization of ‘Asian values’ rhetoric is critical to the hegemonic maintenance of PAP power in Singapore and the continued opposition to queer identities. Prime

Minister Lee Kuan Yew was a major proponent of ‘Asian values,’ which favoured “the interest of the community over those of the individual and placed stress on hierarchy, respect, consensus, discipline, obedience, hard work and frugality.”¹⁴ Lee and the PAP argued that in order to have a harmonious and secure society, Singaporeans were more than willing to concede their ‘unnecessary freedoms’ (such as speech, assembly, and association) to the state and to let the PAP continue in its benevolent authoritarian manner. Importantly, these arguments have also been employed to justify the marginalization of Singapore’s queer communities. Despite gaining independence in 1965, the government inherited much of the British Penal Code and one particular law, Section 377A, has been the primary point of contention between the queer community and the government. This law, entitled *Outrages on Decency*, criminalizes “any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male

¹² Ibid., 179.

¹³ Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore*, 29.

¹⁴ Ibid., 133.

person.”¹⁵ Although the government has softened its stance on homosexuality in recent years, the persistence of Section 377A demonstrates that the PAP is unwilling to fully permit and sanction queer Singaporeans’ freedom to live as they are. This pushes queer Singaporeans to both the political and social margins of Singapore.

Additionally, the queer community in Singapore faces discrimination at the societal level in a country where social conservatism is widespread and sexuality is taboo. The conservative stance of the government draws its justification from a perceived consensus of the population and thereby can fend off demands for gay rights as foreign and subversive of local interests. As Phil C.W. Chan writes, “the fact remains that the criminalisation of consensual male/male sexual activity in Singapore was implanted as part of British colonial rule and is not indigenous to Singapore society.”¹⁶ Therefore, the hurdles to societal acceptance that the queer community in Singapore face are not only made up of conservative values from Asian cultures but also foreign influence. Just as opposition to

homosexuality in Singapore can be understood in local and foreign terms, so too can its queer collective action.

Traditional models of social movements such as Tarrow’s idea of political opportunity structures¹⁷ assume and require certain freedoms of association, assembly, and speech that simply do not exist in Singapore, as well as a political culture that values regime criticism. Moreover, society and public opinion are unaccounted for, especially in terms of social mores and what is viewed as acceptable citizen behaviour. Therefore, traditional social movement models cannot be fully applied to Singapore’s political context. Rather than centring liberal democratic processes as necessary conditions for social mobilization, queer Singaporean activism is best explained through Lynette Chua’s model of pragmatic resistance.

In Singapore, where political opposition is stifled and the society is ostensibly conservative, the PAP deploys law to delegitimize dissent.¹⁸ Rather than directly challenging the PAP on queer issues, queer collective action takes a more calculated and deliberate approach informed by the socio-political conditions of Singapore

¹⁵ Penal Code, § 377A, 2008.

¹⁶ Chan, “Shared values of Singapore,” 286.

¹⁷ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 81-85.

¹⁸ Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore*, 4.

and experience. Chua calls this approach pragmatic resistance and characterizes it as a process by which “gay activists nimbly adjust, escalate, or scale back their tactics as formal law and political norms change and as the relationship between them changes. To survive, activists avoid blatantly breaking the law, directly confronting the state, and being seen as a threat to existing formal structures of power.”¹⁹ The emphasis is on the survival of the movement and this can only be achieved as long as it is tolerated by the state. Queer collective action makes concerted efforts to position itself in opposition to Section 377A and not to the PAP itself.

The PAP has created a socio-political environment where dissent is seen as subversive to harmony and therefore dangerous to society. In order to navigate these complicated political norms, where “exercising and claiming rights are nonconformist behaviors,”²⁰ queer activists must be very deliberate in their mobilization and must strive for “balance between pushing boundaries and toeing the line [for] the preservation of the ruling party’s hegemony.”²¹ This is the core of pragmatic resistance and it has been the dominant strategy of queer

collective organizing in Singapore since the queer community first began to mobilize.

The Queer Movement in Singapore

The queer social movement in Singapore has evolved significantly over the course of Singapore’s contemporary history. The history of queer social organizing in Singapore speaks to the ability of activists to strategically push boundaries when opportunities arise and to scale back action to avoid conflict with the state. Initially characterized by discreet and small community building, the movement slowly grew increasingly visible and vocal. Encouraged by a softening stance on homosexuality by the government, the catalyst for the culmination of decades of queer collective organizing was the lifting of restrictions of speech and assembly in Hong Lim Park. In 2000, Speakers’ Corner was created in Hong Lim Park where Singaporeans were exempt from applying for licenses for speeches and performances. In 2008, the regulations were tweaked again to no longer require organizers to seek licenses for events so long as the event was registered with the police.

¹⁹ Ibid., 5.

²⁰ Ibid., 7.

²¹ Ibid., 22.

The ramifications of these small changes were enormous. Now, queer organizers could be free to host events at Speakers' Corner without the fear of government bans for their content. In 2009, Pink Dot was held with great success alongside the message of "supporting the freedom to love." The organizers made special considerations to avoid being seen as confronting the PAP on Section 377A and deliberately positioned the event not as a protest. The pragmatics of queer collective action strategies inform Pink Dot as it avoids confrontation with the state and rather focuses on increasing queer visibility and preaching tolerance at the societal and political level. As pragmatic resistance is defined by cycles of toeing the line and pushing boundaries, it is important to note that Pink Dot SG has run annually since 2009 and has changed its objectives very minimally. Although support continues to grow, the event hardly pushed any legal boundaries after the first few iterations. What remains to be seen is how queer organizers will push the movement forward. An economic approach seems to be a likely direction.

Economics of Queer Collective Action

The Singaporean queer social movement has been intimately tied to the economy since its early beginnings. Since the economy is particularly vital to the survival of the country and also represents a critical aspect of the legitimated authoritarian hegemony of the PAP, it becomes of special concern for any queer collective organizing. The economy is frequently evoked as a justification for the continued existence of Section 377A, however it also represents a very unique arena where the queer community has seen significant progress on rights and acceptance. The PAP's legitimated authoritarian hegemony is staked in the government's ability to demonstrate that it alone is the best party to provide for Singaporeans. This is in no small part achieved through Singapore's strong economy and so it is understandable that the PAP seeks to maintain strong economic performance. The state's maintenance of strict social control restrictions on freedoms of association, assembly, and speech are justified by claiming that "social stability [ensures] Singapore's economic engine can run smoothly."²² A highly stable political environment is critical for the economy and the

²² Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore*, 34.

government claims queer collective action can threaten this as it divides the population and encourages dissent and criticism of the government. However, historical precedent demonstrates economic justifications in softening the government stance on homosexuality and granting the queer community some limited concessions.

While queer Singaporeans may face social and political marginalization, the exclusion of a whole subset of potential workers was sufficient to encourage the government to open up space for queer identities in Singapore. One particular statement by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong informs the current position of the government on queer identities in society. While Lee Kuan Yew had previously recognized the existence of queer Singaporeans, Goh stepped in a new direction during an interview with *Time* in 2003 where he stated that the civil service had ended its ban on employing queer Singaporeans. This was a major milestone and Goh followed up with a statement at his National Day Rally:

“In every society, there are gay people. We should accept those in our midst as fellow human beings, and as fellow

Singaporeans. If the public sector refuses to employ gays, the private sector might also refuse. But gays too, need to make a living.”²³

This shift in government attitude towards queer Singaporeans is largely attributed to the work of Richard Florida. His work on global cities notes that the most successful economies are those that incorporate their creative classes, which include individuals capable of innovating and thinking critically and creatively in their work. The PAP recognized the tendencies of both local and foreign queer workers to fit into this creative class. Simon Obendorf and Meredith Weiss argue that the PAP was inspired by Florida’s work to seek to boost Singapore’s status as a global city through a more tolerant stance on the role of queer Singaporeans in the workforce.

The PAP recognized that successful and competitive global cities incorporated diversity and inclusion in their workforces and tended towards cosmopolitanism. These cities not only created space for queer culture and politics, but even necessitated them at times.²⁴ Weiss suggests that “the state’s economic identity and efforts to

²³ Goh Chok Tong, quoted in Chan, “Shared Values of Singapore,” 288.

²⁴ Obendorf, “Both Contagion and Cure,” 102.

cultivate a comparative advantage as a flexible metropole constrain its autonomy to remain inflexible in other areas, thus indirectly empowering certain marginalized constituencies.”²⁵ Although the government desires to maintain social control and to limit the organizing potential of queer Singaporeans in order to keep conservative values, it must also recognize the important role that queer identities play in the economy. Not only do queer Singaporeans need to feel included in the workforce, but foreign talent must be wooed through a perceived open-mindedness as well.²⁶ This has created a political climate where queer identity is seen as a necessary part of society due to their economic significance, yet is still marginal. Current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has spoken on this topic:

“If this is the way the world is going [towards global-cities that demand creative classes] and Singapore is part of that interconnected world and I think it is, then I see no option for Singapore but to be part of it. They tell me and anyway it is probably half-true that homosexuals are creative writers, dancers, et cetera. If we want creative people, then we have got to put up

with their idiosyncrasies so long as they don’t infect the heartland.”²⁷

Lee admits that there is a necessity to incorporate queer Singaporeans into society to the extent that they can contribute to the economy. However, there is an important distinction that is made where Lee limits the extent to which queer Singaporeans can be understood to play a role in society. They are not to become part of the mainstream dominant Singaporean society. Obendorf interprets this as a fine balance between the state recognizing queer identities as valuable for their economic contributions while simultaneously devaluing them culturally. Queer Singaporeans are tolerated insofar as they contribute to the economy, but are discouraged from seeking more positive visibility and recognition. The relegation of queer identities to the margins of society and their inability to receive full recognition represents the current hurdle that the queer social movement faces in Singapore.

The marginality of queer identities is a deliberate status that the government maintains despite increasing tolerance for economic purposes. This position is maintained

²⁵ Weiss, “Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis,” 268.

²⁶ Tan, “Imagining the Gay Community,” 184.

²⁷ Lee Hsien Loong, quoted in Obendorf, “Both Contagion and Cure,” 110.

through what Audrey Yue calls illiberal pragmatism and informs “the contradictions between the continued policing of homosexuality on the one hand, and economically driven social liberalisation on the other.”²⁸ Illiberal pragmatism is characterized by the contradiction of tolerating queer participation in the economy, while restricting positive representations of queer identities in larger society. These conditions have made the queer social movement stagnate somewhat since queer identities in Singapore rarely face state violence and prosecution, but are merely prevented from thriving. Due to a lack of hard oppression, current conditions are tolerated by queer Singaporeans and mobilization for change faces great inertia. Although the state has pledged to no longer actively enforce Section 377A, these and other “gains that have been made, including administrative policies and bureaucratic practise here and there, do not come with recourse to accountability or formal protection from arbitrariness.”²⁹ The strategy of pragmatic resistance has produced many positive changes in a legitimated authoritarian hegemony, where “ambivalence forms the foundation for the emergence of a queer Singapore,

not one based on the Western post-Stonewall emancipation discourse of rights, but through the illiberal pragmatics of survival.”³⁰ Despite this progress and the incorporation of queer Singaporeans into the workforce, they are actively prevented from participating in national identity building and continue to face social and political stigma. If the movement is to continue to improve the conditions of queer Singaporeans, then it must work to legitimize queer identities beyond their productive capacities and as a part of the economy, and therefore body politic, more holistically.

Harnessing the Legitimizing Force of the Economy

The queer social movement in Singapore has had some success, through the strategy of pragmatic resistance, in pushing boundaries and building tolerance for queer identities both in the state and in society. Additionally, queer Singaporeans have been recognized for their productive capacity as part of the economy. However, the government’s statement on foreign participation at Pink Dot

²⁸ Yue, “Queer Singapore,” 8-9.

²⁹ Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore* 139-140.

³⁰ Yue, “Queer Singapore,” 5.

2016 and the response by local Singaporean businesses demonstrates the possibility of economically derived legitimacy for queer identities in Singapore that is congruent with cultural citizenship and incorporation into the national identity.

Every year the number of participants at Pink Dot increases and 2016 was no exception. Additionally, there were many high profile corporate sponsors, most of whom were foreign. The second day after Pink Dot 2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs released the following statement:

The Government's general position has always been that foreign entities should not interfere in our domestic issues, especially political issues or controversial social issues with political overtones. These are political, social or moral choices for Singaporeans to decide for ourselves. LGBT issues are one such example. The Ministry of Home Affairs will take steps to make it clear that foreign entities should not fund, support or influence such events held at the Speakers' Corner. In the context of LGBT issues, this will apply both to events that advocate the LGBT cause such as the Pink Dot, as well as events

whose purpose is to oppose the LGBT cause.

Although the PAP's new policy of restricting foreign MNCs from participating in and sponsoring Pink Dot may seem indicative of the government feeling pressure from critical economic stakeholders to grant the queer community more rights, this behaviour is actually quite in line with the state's adversity to foreign interference in domestic matters. Any situations where the PAP might be seen to be weak or easily influenced threaten its legitimated authoritarian hegemony and undermine its stability. Due to this fear of erosion of power, the PAP rarely accedes to international pressure on domestic issues. In fact, any perceptions of international interference in domestic affairs is met with great resistance by the government.³¹

The MNCs who sponsored Pink Dot likely did not intend to antagonize the PAP, or at least only intended to pressure them to be more tolerant towards the queer community. Rather, their actions were informed by their corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. CSR refers to the increasingly widespread "notion that corporations ought to be socially responsible" and

³¹ Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore*, 36-37.

the policies and actions that occur as a result of their being held accountable, either explicitly or by consumer decisions, for their actions.³² CSR in Singapore is another means for government to encourage a foreign investor environment.³³ The PAP, unsurprisingly, thus attempts to control and regulate the way that it manifests itself in the economy. The state is keenly aware that “economic activity is of fundamental importance to Singapore’s survival, corporate governance in the economic realm is critical, and CSR is viewed as an integral part of economic governance and part and parcel of the value creation process.”³⁴ Critically, it is important to note that the PAP is not keen to see CSR focused around notions of human rights, rather it would prefer a CSR that is in line with Singaporean status quo.³⁵ This obsession with control and adversity towards rights issues provides much insight into why the MHA tightened restrictions on corporate participation at Pink Dot in 2016.

The government’s long-standing opposition to international pressure,

especially towards internal domestic matters, also informs their response to Pink Dot. Chua notes that Singaporean queer activists seldom associate with transnational human rights activists as this causes state backlash and allegations of western cultural imperialism. Instead, they try to avoid being perceived as having foreign influence.³⁶ The extent of international association with the queer social movement is based on personal connections. Occasionally, “gay activists typically try to shame top political leaders through international connections - those pushing boundaries - by playing to the normative concern with Singapore’s international legitimacy.”³⁷ Up until the state’s limitation on foreign corporate sponsorship of Pink Dot, activists courted relationships with “multinational corporations that have offices in Singapore and are known to have nondiscrimination policies.”³⁸ Given the recent developments, it is likely that these international connections will recede.

What the foreign corporate sponsorship of Pink Dot did do to the

³² Sriramesh, “Corporate Social Responsibility,” 3-4.

³³ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁴ Tan, “Molding,” 194.

³⁵ Tan, “Imagining the Gay Community,” 191-192.

³⁶ Chua, *Mobilizing Gay Singapore*, 21.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 131.

great benefit of queer identities is legitimize them in the larger Singaporean society. Since many of the MNCs sponsoring Pink Dot were high profile and popular they help with the recognition of queer identities through their association with the queer community. Although the participation of foreign MNCs in Pink Dot was important and significant to the queer social movement, it is insufficient to view their discontinuation by the state as indicative of any pressure felt by the PAP or legitimizing force for queer identities. Rather, what happened after is much more significant.

For Pink Dot 2017, the high profile foreign corporate sponsors were replaced by local businesses in a campaign entitled *Red Dot for Pink Dot* (RDPD). Over 100 local businesses came forward in support of Pink Dot and this support represents a much more impactful and significant legitimation of queer identities through economics than the foreign MNC sponsorship.³⁹ Since RDPD mobilized local businesses, the PAP cannot diminish and discredit the participation as foreign interference in domestic issues. More importantly, it signals that there is support for the

queer community in Singapore from an incredibly influential and mainstream source, the economic elite. The involvement of local businesses critically changes the stakeholders in queer issues and legitimizes queer identities as well. Although the foreign MNCs were very influential and carry more brand recognition, small to medium enterprises (SMEs) actually constitute a larger portion of the Singaporean economy and therefore the state is very concerned with their behaviour. RDPD mobilizes this influence and harnesses it to the queer social movement, legitimizing it and creating a much more impactful queer collective action. Pink Dot exerts much more pressure on the PAP with the support of local businesses.

The pressure that is exerted on the government to legitimize queer identities is not the only effect of the RDPD campaign. It also ostensibly helps to incorporate queer identities into the mainstream Singaporean society and national identity. By associating a marginal group with the dominant group in a very conspicuous and deliberate way, the marginality of the group is reduced and it begins to possess a more legitimate status. Since RDPD constitutes the support of a

³⁹ Pink Dot SG, "Red Dot for Pink Dot Launches with 50 Local Corporate Sponsors," 31 March 2017. <https://pinkdot.sg/2017/03/red-dot-for-pink-dot-launches-with-50-local-corporate-sponsors/>.

very influential portion of Singapore's national identity, economic elitism, it de facto lends this legitimacy to the queer community by association. If the queer social movement can continue to harness the legitimizing force of the economy in this way, it can increase the extent to which it is part of dominant society and national identity.

Perhaps one caveat is the fact that CSR is often motivated by the interests of the corporation and is often employed to increase favourable public image. Pink Dot enjoys the support of thousands of Singaporeans and being a sponsor could be a very lucrative investment. The nature of the consumer economy means that corporate support of social movements are always suspect because they are for the profit of corporations, which can sometimes be responsible for perpetuating social injustices in other areas, and more importantly can make the social movement "be as exclusive as inclusive, if 'gay' is seen as an identity reserved for those with actual purchasing power."⁴⁰ Despite these issues, whether or not the SMEs of RDPD are acting for profit is inconsequential to the legitimizing effect of their sponsorship. In fact, the profit nature is precisely the reason it

does have an impact, because the SMEs represent a key stakeholder to the PAP.

Although there is still much to do to legitimize queer Singaporeans rather than "relating them to the status of anomalies to be tolerated due to the desirability of their contributions to state economic objectives,"⁴¹ an understanding of the pragmatic resistance of queer collective organizing in Singapore suggests that economically derived legitimacy is still valuable as it is an arena where boundaries can be pushed to successfully produce change. The RDPD campaign is the epitome of pragmatic resistance in action. Not only does it deliberately follow all regulations and laws to push boundaries, but it actually takes state policy aimed to restrict and limit the queer social movement and mobilizes it against the intended result. The legitimacy and recognition that is being gained through the legitimating force of the economic significance of RDPD means that queer identities in Singapore are gaining space in mainstream society and the greater Singaporean national identity.

⁴⁰ Weiss, "Who Sets Social Policy in Metropolis," 287.

⁴¹ Obendorf, "Both Contagion and Cure," 113-114.

Conclusion and Looking to the Future

The strategy of pragmatic resistance is employed by the queer social movement in Singapore both as a strategy of survival and as a strategy for accomplishing its goals of tolerance and representation of queer identity. There has been significant progress made since queer collective organizing began, but the current challenge is incorporating queer identities into the mainstream national identity. The economic significance of the Red Dot for Pink Dot campaign represents a new direction, informed by pragmatic resistance, that queer collective action in Singapore is taking to address the marginality of the queer community. There is a long history of economically motivated legitimation of queer identities by the government, and the People's Action Party approaches queer issues from an illiberal pragmatic frame, which informs the seemingly contradictory tolerance for queer identities for their economic productivity, while simultaneously relegating them to a marginal position in society and excluding them from the national identity. However, queer Singaporeans are harnessing the legitimizing force of the economy to

become incorporated into Singapore's national identity.

It is too early to be able to tell if the strategies of mobilizing the economy to lend queer identities in Singapore legitimacy through local business sponsors at Pink Dot will truly help to incorporate the queer community into mainstream Singaporean national identity. However, the progress that has been made through pragmatic resistance and economically motivated tolerance suggests that there is a strong likelihood that there is something to be said for the power of the economy in making Singapore queerer.

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Militarized Conservation and the Struggle to Save South Africa's Rhinos

by Chrisanne Kouzas

In response to a surge in rhino poaching in its national parks, the South African government has implemented a militarized anti-poaching strategy which has had little success in stopping poaching syndicates. I argue that the primary obstacle in efforts to curb rhino poaching in South Africa is the ambiguity that exists within the government over whether rhino poaching is a security issue or an environmental conservation issue. I show how this ambiguity reduces the amount of funding and resources allocated towards stopping poaching; hampers efforts to create new policy to prevent poaching; and negatively impacts collaborative efforts between countries to disrupt the activities of international poaching syndicates.

South Africa has seen a surge in rhino poaching over the past decade,¹ with over 7100 rhino killed for their horn in the country since 2007.² The South African government has responded to this problem by designating rhino poaching as both a “national priority crime”³ and a “national security issue.”⁴ Central to this response is the government’s implementation of a militarized anti-poaching strategy in which the South African Army is deployed to patrol national parks, with

soldiers and park rangers armed and instructed to shoot poachers on sight.⁵ This militarized approach is commonly referred to by the government and general public as “the war on poaching,”⁶ and by scholars as “the ‘rhinofication’ of South African security.”⁷ These terms are misleading, however, because in South Africa rhino poaching is officially classified as an environmental issue, an area for which the Department of Environmental Affairs - not the State

¹ “Rhino Poaching Statistics Update,” Department of Environmental Affairs, March 1, 2018, https://www.environment.gov.za/projectsprogrammes/rhinodialogues/poaching_statistics#2016. ; Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 6.

² “South Africa: Rhino Poaching in 2017 Almost Matches 2016 Figure, with KwaZulu Natal Now Bearing the Brunt,” TRAFFIC: Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network, January, 25 2018, <http://www.traffic.org/home/2018/1/25/south-africa-rhino-poaching-in-2017-almost-matches-2016-figu.html>.

³ “Minister Edna Molewa Highlights Progress in the Fight Against Rhino Poaching,” Department of Environmental Affairs, September 11, 2016, https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlightsprogress_onrhino-poaching2016.

⁴ Humphreys and Smith, “The ‘Rhinofication’ of South African Security,” 800.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 806.

⁶ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 9.

⁷ Humphreys and Smith, “The ‘Rhinofication’ of South African security,” 796.

Security Agency - is responsible.⁸ Despite the Department of Environmental Affairs strengthening anti-poaching efforts since 2009, the number of rhino attacked for their horn continues to rise each year.⁹ This raises the question of why an increase in militarized anti-poaching efforts has not translated to a decrease in poaching activity. I argue that the primary obstacle in efforts to curb rhino poaching in South Africa is the ambiguity that exists within the government over whether rhino poaching is a security issue or an environmental conservation issue. I show how this ambiguity reduces the amount of funding and resources allocated towards anti-poaching efforts; hampers efforts to create new policy to prevent poaching; and negatively impacts collaborative efforts between countries to disrupt the activities of international poaching syndicates. These challenges are exacerbated by deeply entrenched

corruption within the South African government.¹⁰

Causes of Rhino Poaching in South Africa: Supply and Demand

Approximately 70% of the world's rhino live in South Africa, which is home to an estimated 18 000 white and 1800 black rhino.¹¹ Over the past decade, the country has seen a surge in rhino poaching, with at least 7100 rhino killed since January 2007.¹² Incidents of rhino poaching are increasing at an exponential rate, with an increase in deaths of over 9000% from 2007 to 2017.¹³ These aggressive rates are driven by a demand for rhino horn in Southeast Asia and China,¹⁴ supported by thriving regional economies and a growing middle class with high disposable incomes.¹⁵ Initially, demand for rhino horn was fueled by its use in traditional medicines, and in particular, the widely-held belief that it could cure cancer.¹⁶ However, in recent years,

⁸ "About Us," South African National Parks, <https://www.sanparks.org/about/>; Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 20.

⁹ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 6.

¹⁰ *Al Jazeera*, "S African Minister.," Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 27.

¹¹ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 6.

¹² "Minister Edna Molewa Highlights Progress in the Fight Against Rhino Poaching," Department of Environmental Affairs, September 11, 2016, https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlightsprogress_onrhinopoaching2016.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Ayling, "What Sustains Wildlife Crime?" 61.

¹⁵ Truong, et al., "The Marketplace Management," 3.

¹⁶ Ayling, "What Sustains Wildlife Crime?" 61.

increasing demand for rhino horn is due to its value as a symbol of wealth, with the horn being carved into jewellery or ornaments for those who can afford it.¹⁷

This unquenched demand for rhino horn, coupled with restricted supply due to a CITES¹⁸ ban on the international trade in rhino products,¹⁹ has resulted in an estimated black market price of \$65 000 per kilogram (with a single horn weighing 6-7kg),²⁰ making it more expensive in weight than gold or cocaine.²¹ These high black market prices in combination with increasing economic ties between Asia and Africa²² have created a sophisticated transnational criminal network specializing in the illicit trade of rhino horn.²³ At the lowest level of these networks are the poachers who enter South African game parks in the

middle of the night to search for rhino.²⁴

Sites of Rhino Poaching: The Kruger National Park

South Africa's Kruger National Park (KNP) holds approximately 50% of the world's remaining rhinos,²⁵ making it both "the world's single most important site of rhino conservation,"²⁶ and "the world's most concentrated site of commercial rhino poaching,"²⁷ with an average of 2-3 rhino killed per night in the Park since 2012.²⁸ The KNP is at the centre of the battle against rhino poaching, not only because it is home to the world's largest concentration of rhinos, but also because it is part of a larger transfrontier conservation area (the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park)²⁹ spanning over the borders with

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is a multilateral treaty that protects endangered plants and animals. CITES works by subjecting international trade in specimens of selected species to certain controls; "What is CITES?" Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php>.

¹⁹ Truong, et al., "The Marketplace Management," 3.

²⁰ Ayling, "What Sustains Wildlife Crime?" 64; Child, "The Sustainable Use Approach," 1.

²¹ Truong, et al., "The Marketplace Management," 3.

²² Bennett, "Legal Ivory Trade," 55.

²³ Ayling, "What Sustains Wildlife Crime?" 64.

²⁴ *Al Jazeera*, "The Poachers Pipeline."

²⁵ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 7.

²⁶ Lunstrum, "Green Militarization," 820.

²⁷ Ibid., 816.

²⁸ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 8.

²⁹ "Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park," Peace Parks Foundation, <http://www.peaceparks.org/tfca.php?pid=27&mid=1005>.

Zimbabwe and Mozambique.³⁰ Within this area, the borders between South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are unfenced to allow the free movement of animals along their natural migratory paths and prevent the islandization³¹ of species.³² The unfenced border between South Africa and Mozambique is approximately 400 km long,³³ and the size of the KNP is 19 485 km² (the size of Israel).³⁴ At any given time, there are approximately 220 rangers patrolling this area, which equates to roughly one ranger for every 90 km².³⁵ The combination of these factors - the high concentration of rhino on the South African side of the park, the large size of the area that needs to be monitored for poachers, a severe shortage of rangers, and the length of the open border between South Africa and Mozambique - creates a unique set of challenges in the struggle to prevent rhino-

poaching, and significantly hampers counter-poaching efforts.

The main challenge is the open border with Mozambique. Most of the poachers who operate in the KNP are Mozambican,³⁶ and enter the Park at night in groups of three or four³⁷ by crossing over from Mozambique into South Africa via the open border in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park.³⁸ It is estimated that at least 7500 poachers entered the KNP in 2015,³⁹ with 5-15 groups of poachers operating in the park at any given time.⁴⁰ The poachers arm themselves against both animals and humans: “one man will carry a rifle fitted with a silencer, a second an axe or machete and a third...will be armed with an AK-47 assault rifle.”⁴¹ Poachers have also been found carrying pistols, hand grenades and even RPG-7 rocket grenades.⁴² Of these weapons, only the rifle and the axe/machete are used to

³⁰ Büscher and Ramutsindela, “Green Violence,” 6; Duffy, “The Potential and Pitfalls,” 90-91.

³¹ Islandization or habitat fragmentation is the subdivision of a previous continuous habitat either by natural or artificial barriers (e.g. roads); Hanski and Triantis, “Habitat Fragmentation,” 989.

³² Duffy, “The Potential and Pitfalls,” 95.

³³ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 6.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁶ Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 822.

³⁷ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 11.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴² Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 822.

shoot and dehorn the rhino,⁴³ the rest are used for defense against park rangers.⁴⁴ Once they have shot the rhino and removed its horns - a process which only takes a few minutes⁴⁵ - the poachers run back over the border into Mozambique where they cannot be pursued by South African rangers.⁴⁶ This problem is perhaps best described by the former head of South African National Parks (SANParks), David Mabunda, who referred to the cooperation between the two countries on anti-poaching efforts as “dismal,”⁴⁷ adding that “a poacher will run across the border and fire victory shots...he will sit in sight of the ranger and smoke because rangers dare not cross that line...should a SANParks official or a soldier shoot a poacher across the border it would create a serious international incident and might be seen as an act of war.”⁴⁸ Once back in Mozambique, the poachers, along with the rhino horn, can essentially disappear.⁴⁹ This is not only because “especially compared to South Africa, Mozambique has

extremely lax wildlife legislation that is poorly enforced”⁵⁰ but also because the poachers are protected by local Mozambican communities bordering the park who have not benefited from the conservation economy but have been enriched through poaching activities, with poachers being paid up to \$20 000/rhino by criminal syndicates.⁵¹ Efforts to stop poachers once they have entered Mozambique are further hampered by the fact that South Africa and Mozambique do not have an extradition treaty, and that smugglers are able to use Mozambique’s ports to move the horn out of the country.⁵² This amounts to a situation in which there is a great need for South Africa to catch poachers while they are still in the KNP.

Government Response: Militarized Conservation and Securitized Rhetoric

SANParks, the body of the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) responsible for

⁴³ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 12.

⁴⁴ Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 823.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 824.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 822-823.

⁴⁷ Humphreys and Smith, “The ‘Rhinofication’ of South African Security,” 808.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 808.

⁴⁹ Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 823.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 822.

⁵¹ Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 830; Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 12.

⁵² Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 823.

managing the country's national parks,⁵³ has responded to the challenges posed by the open border with Mozambique and the associated increase in poaching activity in the KNP with a militarized counter-poaching campaign.⁵⁴ The government justifies this approach with the argument that "the problem, to which the militarization of Kruger and the international border is the solution, is not merely one of poachers killing rhinos. Instead, the problem is one of armed foreign nationals transgressing the international border and violating national sovereignty to decimate South Africa's natural heritage."⁵⁵ In line with this view, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has deployed troops to patrol the Mozambique border in the KNP as part of 'Operation Rhino' since 2009,⁵⁶ and retired army Major-General of the SANDF, Johan Jooste, was appointed to head up the KNP's counter-poaching unit in 2012.⁵⁷ The anti-poaching campaign was also extended on the ground with the addition of a

canine unit,⁵⁸ and in the air with drones and a spotter-plane provided by South Africa's state-owned arms corporation.⁵⁹

The implementation of this militarized anti-poaching campaign in the KNP has been accompanied by the government's adoption of anti-poaching rhetoric strongly infused with military terminology.⁶⁰ Most notably, General Jooste's first statement in his capacity as head of SANPark's counter-poaching unit was: "The battle lines have been drawn and it is up to my team and me to forcefully push back the frontiers of poaching. It is a fact that South Africa, a sovereign country, is under attack from armed foreign nationals. This should be seen as a declaration of war...We are going to take the war to these armed bandits and we aim to win it."⁶¹ This type of talk has become typical of SANParks and government officials, for example, in 2010 David Mabunda (then head of SANParks) referred to anti-poaching efforts in the KNP as a "low intensity war";⁶² in 2012

⁵³ "About Us," South African National Parks, <https://www.sanparks.org/about/>.

⁵⁴ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 10.

⁵⁵ Lunstrum, "Green Militarization," 827.

⁵⁶ Humphreys and Smith, "The 'Rhinofication' of South African Security," 805.

⁵⁷ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 9.

⁵⁸ Avery, "Anti-Poaching Pooches."

⁵⁹ Humphreys and Smith, "The 'Rhinofication' of South African Security," 806.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 807.

⁶¹ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 9.

⁶² Humphreys and Smith, "The 'Rhinofication' of South African Security," 807.

Fundisile Mketeni (then deputy director-general for biodiversity and conservation in the DEA) stated that “we are now at war” with rhino poachers;⁶³ in 2013 Ike Phaahla (a SANParks spokesperson) called it a “military incursion”;⁶⁴ and in 2016 Edna Molewa (South Africa’s Environment Minister) referred to the counter-poaching campaign in the KNP as “the war on poaching”⁶⁵ and stated that “we see it as a war and will fight it as such.”⁶⁶ This common use of warlike rhetoric by the DEA and SANParks officials to frame the issue of rhino poaching makes a lack of similar statements, or indeed *any* statements regarding rhino poaching at all, from the South African State Security Agency (SSA) conspicuous in its absence. This is reflective of a broader problem in South Africa’s anti-poaching campaign, that is, the ambiguity that exists within the government over whether the ‘war on poaching’ is a state security issue or an environmental conservation issue.

Ambiguity and Diffusion of Responsibility: The DEA and SSA

Officially, rhino poaching is classified as a conservation issue, which falls under the umbrella of the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA). However, rhino poaching has also become a security issue, because of the need to secure South Africa’s borders, deploy the army, and prevent incursions from groups of armed foreign nationals who attack both rhinos and rangers. For these reasons, rhino poaching is also a concern of the State Security Agency (SSA). Because it has become a dual-agency concern, rhino poaching falls into a grey area where neither the DEA or SSA is fully responsible for dealing with the problem. On one hand, the actual strategies being employed on the ground involve the use of military personnel and expensive military equipment, but on the other hand, the burden of funding and policy creation lies with an environmental agency that is relatively small and powerless. This ambiguity has an overall negative impact on the success of rhino conservation efforts for four main reasons: (1) it reduces the amount of

⁶³ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 9.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

funding and resources allocated towards anti-poaching efforts; (2) negatively impacts the priority rhino poaching is assigned on the national agenda; (3) obstructs collaborative efforts between countries to disrupt the activities of international poaching syndicates; and (4) hampers efforts to create new policy to prevent poaching. These challenges are exacerbated by deeply entrenched corruption within the South African government.⁶⁷

1. Funding and Resources:

Despite the war-charged rhetoric from SANParks and DEA officials, and the situation on the ground in the KNP being warlike, anti-poaching efforts are funded entirely by the DEA and not the SSA.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the DEA “received less than 1% of the total government budget in 2015 (R5.68 billion) of which funding to SANParks represented only 5% of the environmental ministry’s budget.”⁶⁹ In comparison to this, the defence budget for the same year was R172 billion⁷⁰ but none of this was allocated towards the fight against rhino poaching, or even border protection in the KNP.

The fact that the DEA, which has a much smaller budget than the SSA, has to pay to secure the country’s borders is both irregular and counterproductive, and takes away funding that could be used, for example, to hire more rangers, expand the canine unit, or transport rhinos into safer areas within the KNP.⁷¹ The ambiguity surrounding the status of rhino conservation has thus had a negative effect on the amount of funding directed towards rhino conservation efforts, and by extension on the success of the rhino conservation program.

2. Prioritization of Rhino Poaching on the National Agenda

The differences in funding received by the DEA compared to the SSA, also hint that, “if budgets are an indicator of the importance of a portfolio, then environmental and conservation concerns are among the least of the government’s worries”⁷² This points to an ambiguity in the priority of rhino conservation on the national agenda: on one hand government officials from the DEA and SANParks are making statements about how there is a full-

⁶⁷ *AlJazeera*, “S African Minister.”; Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 27.

⁶⁸ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 17.

⁶⁹ Shaw and Rademeyer, “A Flawed War,” 179.

⁷⁰ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 17.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 17.

blown “insurgency war”⁷³ occurring in the KNP, and how rhino poaching has become a “National Priority Crime,”⁷⁴ but on the other hand the South African government has many other larger priorities including “rising levels of violent crime, a stagnant economy, widespread unemployment, labour unrest, service delivery protests, a failing schooling system, a lack of housing, entrenched corruption and dysfunctional police, defence, intelligence and prosecutions structures.”⁷⁵ This problem is not unique to South Africa, but forms part of a global trend in which many countries, particularly in the Global South, are weakened in their ability to tackle wildlife crime by small conservation budgets and environmental concerns ranking low on the list of government priorities.⁷⁶ This is somewhat paradoxical, because wildlife conservation in general is an important sector for tourism and job creation, and in this way it is a mechanism through which governments in developing countries,

including South Africa, can begin to address key issues like unemployment, poverty and economic development.⁷⁷

3. International Efforts to Disrupt Transnational Poaching Syndicates

Mirroring government ambiguity in South Africa over whether rhino poaching in an environmental or a security issue is the fact that there has been, until fairly recently, a lack of international consensus on the threat of wildlife crime to national security, with the “links between transnational organised crime, wildlife trafficking and regional security”⁷⁸ only acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly for the first time in 2012.⁷⁹ This continues to impact both the priority given to wildlife crime on an international level, and the ability of countries to cooperate in the fight against transnational organized crime networks specializing in the trade of rhino horn, elephant ivory and products from other endangered species.⁸⁰ This is significant because for every poacher shot or arrested by a

⁷³ Humphreys and Smith, “The ‘Rhinofication’ of South African Security,” 807.

⁷⁴ “Minister Edna Molewa Highlights Progress in the Fight Against Rhino Poaching,” Department of Environmental Affairs, September 11, 2016, https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/molewa_highlightsprogress_onrhinopoaching2016.

⁷⁵ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 17.

⁷⁶ “CITES CoP17: Untouchable? Criminal Networks, Traffickers and the Illicit Trade in Rhino Horn,” YouTube.

⁷⁷ Aylward and Lutz, *Nature Tourism*, 14; Barbee, “World’s First All-Female.”

⁷⁸ Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 18.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁸⁰ “CITES CoP17: Untouchable? Criminal Networks, Traffickers and the Illicit Trade in Rhino Horn,” YouTube.

ranger in the KNP, there are many more willing to take his place.⁸¹ Thus, while the militarized approach on the ground is necessary for the immediate protection of the rhinos given the number of poachers operating in the park, in order to truly weaken the transnational crime networks behind rhino poaching, countries around the world, and particularly along the supply chain for rhino horn (e.g. Vietnam), need to be able to share information and coordinate against poaching networks in the same way that they do in efforts to curb the international drug trade. Thus, as long as the ambiguity over the status of wildlife crime on a domestic and international level persists, so too will the criminal syndicates behind it.

4. Policy Creation

Ambiguity concerning the status of poaching as an environmental versus a security concern impacts policy creation and security coordination against poaching syndicates on a domestic level in a similar way to how it does on an international level. A report presented at the 2011 United Nations Climate Change Conference (CoP17) in South Africa last year describes how “for much of the last decade, the DEA has been the de facto

lead agency in developing and driving the country’s strategic and policy responses to rhino poaching and organised wildlife crime. It was the DEA – not law enforcement and security agencies – that, together with SANParks, drafted the first ‘safety and security strategy’ for the country’s rhino populations. It was the DEA – not the police or justice ministries – that negotiated bilateral agreements with Vietnam, China and Mozambique.”⁸² While this in itself is impressive given the lack of funding and resources allocated to the DEA, it seems strange that the DEA is solely responsible for this type of policy creation given the status of rhino poaching as a ‘national priority crime’ and the apparent threat of poaching syndicates to national security. Ultimately, ambiguity in the classification of rhino conservation efforts has prevented the expertise of law enforcement agencies, the police, and justice ministries from being harnessed to create policy in the fight against poaching syndicates.

Despite the progress that the DEA has made in creating policy and agreements to assist conservation efforts, a problem that has stemmed from ambiguity regarding whether

⁸¹ Lunstrum, “Green Militarization,” 821.

⁸² Rademeyer, “Tipping Point,” 17.

rhino conservation is an environmental or security issue, is the relative weakness of SANParks vis à vis the SSA in determining security policy.⁸³ Shaw and Rademeyer provide an example that illustrates this problem well:

“An American university made contact in January 2014 to ask advice for the implementation of an intelligence collection and collation project on rhino poaching. The project was to be funded by the US State Department and involved support for intelligence sharing, analysis and the creation of a database. An application was made to the relevant structures of the South African state and after a long period of deliberation and an initial agreement and encouragement from SANParks that it could go ahead, it was turned down.”⁸⁴

Here, the decision on whether to authorize a project which could significantly help rhino conservation efforts, and that would allow for information sharing between countries in the fight against the transnational criminal syndicates behind the illicit

poaching business, which was approved by SANParks ultimately did not go ahead because it was blocked by the SSA. In this case, the negative impact on anti-poaching efforts caused by the ambiguity over who should be able to have the final say on security decisions regarding conservation efforts is striking. This case also casts doubt over whether ‘the war on rhino poaching’ is really a priority of the SSA. Indeed, Shaw and Rademeyer point out that the decision to block SANParks’ decision “is the opposite of the ‘rhinofication’ of the security agenda.”⁸⁵

While Shaw and Rademeyer attribute this to the government having “very real suspicions of western and external interference in South African security issues,”⁸⁶ the possible role of corruption having an impact on decisions like these should not be discounted. An Al Jazeera in-depth investigation into the rhino horn trade published in November 2016, exposed deep-rooted connections between the South African Minister of State Security, David Mahlobo, and the illegal rhino horn trade.⁸⁷ With corruption present at every level of the

⁸³ Shaw and Rademeyer “A Flawed War,” 181.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ *AlJazeera*, “S African Minister.”

South African government,⁸⁸ including the police and SANDF,⁸⁹ it is not inconceivable that Mahlobo, in his capacity as head of the SSA, could have blocked the decision to approve the USA-South Africa information and intelligence sharing project to protect his own interests. Corruption in South Africa in general has hampered efforts to counter-poaching activity there have been multiple incidents in which corrupt park rangers, SANDF soldiers, government officials, diplomats, private game farm owners, police officers, and customs and border officials have been implicated in rhino poaching syndicates.⁹⁰

Conclusion

Government ambiguity over whether the problem of rhino conservation in South Africa is an environmental conservation issue or a security issue has an overall negative impact on the amount of funding that is allocated to anti-poaching efforts, the ability of government to create new policy to curb poaching, the priority rhino poaching is assigned on the national

agenda, and efforts between countries to collaborate to disrupt the activities of international poaching syndicates. This has significantly hampered efforts to stop rhino poaching in the country's national parks by creating a situation in which the militarized counter-poaching campaign implemented on the ground in the KNP is not supported by a transparent, integrated strategy in government to fight the resilient transnational crime networks behind poaching. The growing global trend⁹¹ in militarizing conservation efforts means that the challenges South Africa faces in preventing poaching are significant beyond the country's own borders. As other developing countries, such as Kenya,⁹² Namibia,⁹³ and India,⁹⁴ share similar problems to South Africa in achieving their conservation goals, there is both a need and an opportunity for information sharing, policy creation, and more international agreements between countries to aid conservation efforts and reduce wildlife crime globally.

⁸⁸ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 27.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁹⁰ Rademeyer, "Tipping Point," 14.

⁹¹ Duffy, "Waging a War to Save Biodiversity," 819.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 826.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 826.

⁹⁴ Lopes, "Civil Unrest," 20.

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Creating Space for Radical Feminism in Mainstream Television: Gender, Sexuality, and Power in *Penny Dreadful* by Chrisanne Kouzas

How can political discussions on radical feminism be brought out of academic institutions and into the mainstream? In this paper, I show how the gothic horror television series, *Penny Dreadful*, uses tongue-in-cheek misandry and angry feminism to communicate the political ideas of radical feminist thought in a format that is fit for mass consumption by the general public. In particular, I argue that the show's portrayal of the character Lily Frankenstein deconstructs the negative societal image of an angry feminist, and in doing so, enables the viewing public to critically engage with radical feminist politics they would not otherwise encounter.

We are not women who crawl. We are not women who kneel. And for this we will be branded radicals. Revolutionists. Women who are strong and refuse to be degraded and chose to protect themselves are called monsters. That is the world's crime. Not ours.
~ Lily Frankenstein.¹

Feminist scholars have generally criticized horror films and television shows for promoting gender roles, gender stereotypes, and sexism which perpetuate the patriarchal discourse of compulsory heterosexuality and heteronormativity.² A show which stands out for breaking these trends is *Penny Dreadful*. In her analysis of the show's first season, Lauren Rocha argues that "*Penny Dreadful* depicts an unstable society where gender order is unable to be restored as men fail to save women who in turn threaten to derail and reconstruct society."³ Similarly, in his in-depth analysis of

female agency and female acts of transgression in *Penny Dreadful*'s first episode, Dennis Schaefer illustrates how the series shows that "no longer must the destruction of the vampiristic monster entail a return to patriarchal order."⁴ Both of these analyses are based on characters and events which occur in *Penny Dreadful*'s first season, and focus on the show's central character, Vanessa Ives. In this essay, I use these analyses as a point of departure to examine another character, Lily Frankenstein (also known as Brona Croft), who only comes to prominence in the show's

¹ "No Beast So Fierce," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Paco Cabezas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

² Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality," 632.

³ Rocha, "Angel in the House," 38.

⁴ Schaefer, "*Nosferatu* Revisited," 53.

second and third seasons. In examining her character, I argue that the inclusion of Lily in the series is an important example of how radical feminism - and in particular, angry feminism - can be made accessible to the public through mainstream television programmes. I make my argument in two parts. First, I provide a character sketch of Brona/Lily and show how she is a radical feminist. This incorporates an exploration into the theoretical and ideological underpinnings of both radical feminism and the political uses of anger. Second, I explain the broader importance of including characters like Lily in mainstream television shows.

As radical feminism encompasses a vibrant and diverse theoretical field, it is hard to formulate one singular, concrete definition that fully encapsulates the term. For the purposes of this essay, radical feminism is broadly defined as unapologetic, angry, misandrist feminism that calls for a radical reordering of society, in which

patriarchy⁵ is completely eliminated.⁶ The variety of radical feminism portrayed in *Penny Dreadful* specifically is not meant to be interpreted literally, but is purposefully subversive in order to draw attention to oppressive patriarchal structures in society. In my analysis of the show, I will draw on multiple different examples of radical feminism to paint a picture of Lily as a radical feminist, but suffice to say for now, like Valerie Solanas' satirical *SCUM (Society for Cutting Up Men) Manifesto*,⁷ the extreme misandry in *Penny Dreadful* is meant to be interpreted as tongue-in-cheek, and is used as a tool to make audiences question oppressive societal norms.

Penny Dreadful is a gothic horror television series which “features a cast of monstrous characters whose lives intersect with one another in the metropolis of Victorian London.”⁸ These “monstrous characters” are drawn from famous works of Gothic fiction and include: Mina Harker, Abraham Van Helsing, Dr. Seward, Renfield, and Count Dracula (from *Dracula*, by Bram Stoker); Dorian Gray (from *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, by

⁵ For the purposes of this essay, I use bell hooks' definition of patriarchy as “institutionalized sexism”; bell hooks, *Feminism is for Everybody*, xiii.

⁶ This definition draws on the works of radical feminist scholars including, but not limited to, Valerie Solanas, Joanna Russ, Barbara Crow, Joreen Freeman, Marilyn Frye, Donna Haraway, bell hooks and Audre Lorde.

⁷ The *SCUM Manifesto* is a radical feminist manifesto written by Valerie Solanas, in which she argues that because men have ruined the world with patriarchy, women must “overthrow the government, eliminate the money system, institute complete automation and destroy the male sex”; Solanas, “SCUM,” 201.

⁸ Rocha, “Angel in the House,” 30.

Oscar Wilde); Victor Frankenstein and his Monster (from *Frankenstein*, by Mary Shelley); Justine (from *Justine*, by Marquis de Sade); and Dr. Henry Jekyll (from *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, by Robert Louis Stevenson). While the overarching plot in the show is Dracula's pursuit of Vanessa Ives, there are various subplots which feed into it, one of which is the storyline of Brona/Lily.

Brona/Lily's character undergoes a major transformation from *Penny Dreadful's* first season to its third. In season one, Brona Croft is a sex worker living in London, suffering from consumption.⁹ She is repeatedly referred to as "a lost cause," and wears the pendant of St. Jude, "the patron saint of lost causes."¹⁰ She dies, and, in season two, is reanimated and domesticated as a docile Lily Frankenstein, with no memory of her previous life. By the end of the second season, however, she has regained her memories, and declared that she will "never again...kneel to any man."¹¹ In season three, she assembles an army of sex workers and downtrodden women, and instructs them to "rise up" and kill all the men in London.¹² This

character arc deconstructs stereotypical television tropes, and fits into one of the main themes of the show - the idea of the hunter becoming the hunted. It also represents a gender-role reversal; a disruption to the gendered norms of Victorian society. Lily is no longer a powerless 'lost cause', hunted by men, but rather, an unapologetic misandrist huntress, leading a militantly feminist movement. Instead of falling prey to the men of London, the men are now hers to prey upon.

The most crucial driving force in Lily's transformation is her anger. In this way, *Penny Dreadful* illustrates one of the core elements of radical feminism: the idea that anger - especially politicized anger - can be both constructive and empowering.¹³ Audre Lorde argues that, "every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change."¹⁴ In *Penny Dreadful*, the audience witnesses Lily's stockpile of anger

⁹ "Seance," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by J. A. Bayona (Showtime, 2014), DVD.

¹⁰ "What Death Can Join Together," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Coky Geidroyc (Showtime, 2014), DVD.

¹¹ "Memento Mori," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Kari Skogland (Showtime, 2015), DVD.

¹² "Ebb Tide," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Paco Cabezas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

¹³ Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 110; Lorde, "The Uses of Anger," 278.

¹⁴ Lorde, "The Uses of Anger," 280.

grow larger and larger throughout the first and second seasons of the show, as she is subjected to one injustice after another. Eventually, that anger becomes a source of empowerment that she can tap into for energy and use to emancipate herself from the oppressive patriarchal structures that have dominated her life. Harnessing this anger enables Lily to come into her own as an unapologetic, angry feminist, and lead a misandrist revolution to overthrow male supremacy.

In recent years, feminism - especially angry, unapologetic feminism - has garnered a negative reputation in mainstream society. As a result of this, young people are increasingly reluctant to associate themselves with the feminist movement, and the label of “feminist” has become tainted.¹⁵ In the opening chapter of *Fight Like A Girl*, Megan Seely observes how the word feminist “has been distorted, diluted, misrepresented, stolen.”¹⁶ Those who perpetuate oppressive patriarchal structures have vilified feminists, and women who are unafraid to use their anger as a political tool are commonly

labelled as “femi-nazis.”¹⁷ It is for precisely this reason that *Penny Dreadful* needs to be applauded for not shying away from portraying angry, feminist characters in a positive light. The show deconstructs the negative societal image of an angry feminist by communicating feminist ideas in a format that is fit for mass consumption by the general public.

In *Radical Feminism: A Documentary Reader*, Barbara A. Crow notes that, “the key distinguishing feature of radical feminism is its refusal to accept the traditional category of woman as it has been defined in the West.”¹⁸ Similarly, Lily is defined as a radical feminist by her refusal to accept the traditional gender role of a woman in Victorian society. This refusal begins early on in Brona’s life, and is amplified when she regains her memories as Lily. In season one, in a conversation with her friend Ethan Chandler, Brona reveals that prior to living in London, she resided in Belfast where she was engaged to marry “a brutal man with brutal hands.”¹⁹ She fled to London to escape this relationship and start a new life, after her mother demanded she marry

¹⁵ Seely, *Fight Like a Girl*, 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹⁸ Crow, “Introduction,” 2.

¹⁹ “Demimonde,” *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Dearbhla Walsh (Showtime, 2014), DVD.

the man regardless of his abusive nature. When Ethan asks her why she was engaged to this man in the first place, Brona explains that “there was no money. It’s what you did.”²⁰ Thus, even before she is reborn as Lily, Brona rejects the patriarchal heteronormative institution of marriage. In refusing to marry, she refuses to conform to the assigned role of ‘woman’ that society has decided she must have. This the first indicator of Brona/Lily’s nascent radical thoughts, which go on to develop into a fully-fledged ideology in season three.

The tragedy in choosing not to marry, however, is that Brona does not escape the oppression of patriarchal society, instead, she is forced to become a sex worker²¹ in order to make ends meet. Choosing not to accept the traditional role of a woman in Victorian society, is not enough to free her of her obligations from this role. In this way, Brona is in a classic “double bind - situations in which options are reduced to very few, and all of them expose one to penalty, censure

or deprivation.”²² If she chooses not to marry, she has to resort to sex work to earn money. If she does not want to be a sex worker, she has to marry. These are the only two options for an impoverished woman living in Victorian society, and both carry heavy penalties. In either scenario, Brona has to suffer, quite literally, at the hands of men.

Indeed, Brona is oppressed by men to the point that even her death is not her own. When she is on her deathbed in the final episode of season one, Victor Frankenstein smothers her with a pillow and steals her body to create a mate for his Monster, John Clare.²³ This is reminiscent of Brona’s earlier mention of “a brutal man with brutal hands.”²⁴ She cannot escape the “brutal hands” of men, even in death. This is significant because this extreme oppression is the productive source of Brona/Lily’s anger, which, “loaded with information and energy,”²⁵ serves as the fuel for her feminist revolution in season three.

In the second season of the show, Victor Frankenstein reanimates Brona.

²⁰ Ibid.,

²¹ I acknowledge that sex work can be an empowering choice for women, however, in the context of this show, it is a traumatizing and unwanted experience for the character Brona. Due to extreme poverty, lack of opportunity, and past trauma, Brona has no other choice but to resort to sex work to survive. From an intersectional perspective, the coercive nature of this sex work is exacerbated by Brona’s social status in Victorian society as a working-class Irish woman.

²² Frye, *The Politics of Reality*, 2.

²³ “Grand Guignol,” *Penny Dreadful*, directed by James Hawes (Showtime, 2014), DVD.

²⁴ “Demimonde,” *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Dearbhla Walsh (Showtime, 2014), DVD.

²⁵ Lorde, “The Uses of Anger,” 280.

She is reborn as Lily Frankenstein, and has no recollection of her past.²⁶ Victor's aim is to groom Lily for marriage. He attempts to domesticate her by teaching her how to speak with the correct accent, and how to cook and clean. He buys her clothes and makeup, and dresses her up like his own personal doll.²⁷ He teaches her how to perform gender in ways which conform to the ideals of patriarchal Victorian high society.²⁸ Through this domestication, Lily is unknowingly forced to submit to same oppressive patriarchal structures she so vehemently rejected in her previous life. This is purposefully sickening to watch, and is a perfect juxtaposition to the later version of Lily that emerges once she regains her memories.

When Lily does regain her memories, the first thing she does is visit a bar alone, where she approaches a man, has sex with him, and then strangles him to death, revealing her anger, misandry, and superhuman strength.²⁹ The following day, Lily has an altercation with John Clare during which she reveals that she has regained her past memories and

declares that she will never again submit to a man:

We flatter our men with our pain, we bow before them. We make ourselves dolls for their amusement. We lose our dignity in corsets, and high shoes, and gossip, and the slavery of marriage. And our award for this service ? The back of their bloody hand...Never again, will I kneel to any man. Now they shall kneel to me.³⁰

This moment is a turning point for Lily. For the first time in the show, she vocalizes her anger, and her suffering is made manifest. This is a radical statement. Her anger over gender norms is a complete rejection of the traditional role of a woman in Victorian society. In this moment, Lily is fully aware of her own circumstances - how she suffered at the hands of men in her previous life as Brona, and how she was paraded around like a "doll" as Lily Frankenstein, her mind and body stolen to become the property of men. She owns her anger and allows it to direct her and give her agency. Her rejection of the traditional norms in

²⁶ "Verbis Diablo," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by James Hawes (Showtime, 2015), DVD.

²⁷ "Evil Spirits in Heavenly Places," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Damon Thomas (Showtime, 2015), DVD.

²⁸ Butler, "Performative Acts," 519; West and Zimmerman, "Doing Gender," 125.

²⁹ "Little Scorpion," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Brian Kirk (Showtime, 2015), DVD.

³⁰ "Memento Mori," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Kari Skogland (Showtime, 2015), DVD.

Victorian society are radical and absolute - “never again” will she submit to men, instead men, will submit to her. Stereotypical gender roles are rejected, reversed. The hunter becomes the hunted.

In season three, Lily becomes even more radical. She rescues a sex worker named Justine from a torture house,³¹ who becomes the first recruit to the misandrist army Lily assembles.³² In a scene from the season’s third episode, Lily and Justine encounter a small group of suffragettes in a London square who are holding placards and shouting “Sisters, rise up! Rise up for equality.” The following exchange between Lily and Justine ensues:

Justine: They think as you do, the suffragettes.

Lily: No. Our enemies are the same but they seek equality.

Justine: And we?

Lily: Mastery.³³

Through presenting this parallel between Lily’s radical movement on one hand, and the suffragettes on the other, the show enables its viewers to

clearly distinguish between the two types of feminism, and identify Lily’s feminism as a particularly revolutionary, angry, and radical strand, especially given the Victorian setting. While the suffragettes, who are trying to work within the established patriarchal system to achieve equality, are still placing the onus for change upon men, Lily uses her anger as a source of emancipatory power to break the system itself.

While, through her own lived experiences in the show, Lily is her own radical feminist, she channels a super mix of radical feminist thought. As a monster brought to life by machine, possessing immortality and superhuman strength, but also very real human suffering and anger, she is Donna Haraway’s “cyborg” - “a hybrid machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”³⁴ She owns her monstrosity, and uses it to recruit women to her cause. Standing in front of her new recruits, she tells them:

We are not women who crawl. We are not women who kneel. And for this we will be branded radicals.

³¹ In *Penny Dreadful*, a torture house is an underground venue where men can pay to torture, maim, or kill women, or to watch this happen. In this scene, Justine is brought into a room where a group of male spectators have each paid £10 to watch her be killed.

³² “Predators Far and Near,” *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Damon Thomas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

³³ “Good and Evil Braided Be,” *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Damon Thomas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

³⁴ Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 149.

Revolutionists. Women who are strong and refuse to be degraded and chose to protect themselves are called monsters. That is the world's crime. Not ours.³⁵

Simultaneously, she epitomizes Joreen Freeman's "Superbitch,"³⁶ both in personality and in physical appearance. In vocally rejecting the traditional gender role of a woman in Victorian society, Lily "rudely violate[s] conceptions of proper sex role behavior"³⁷ and "incorporates within herself qualities traditionally defined as 'masculine' as well as 'feminine.'"³⁸ As a Monstrous-Cyborg-Superbitch, she assembles an army of sex workers, and with them carries out her misandrist plans to "destroy the male sex" à la Valerie Solanas.³⁹ Crawling along a banquet table, she tells her army of sex workers to:

Rise up! Go into those dark streets you know so well, those foul alleys and secret back lanes, and find me a bad man! A faithless husband, a cruel lover, a rich despot, a scrofulous john, fucking some girl, just like you...Find him, and bring me his right hand ! Cut

it off, and hold it bleeding to your breast ! Bring it here, fling it on this table, and we shall sing out our joy!⁴⁰

In a later scene, the same banquet table is covered with a pile of bloody severed hands. While these scenes have serious undertones, in the context of the horror genre, they are fun to watch, and despite Lily's extreme misandry (or perhaps, because of it) the viewer sides with her. We like her angry, radical feminism. We want her to succeed. This is important, because it illustrates that radical feminism can be made accessible to the public through mainstream television programmes.

Penny Dreadful's success in bringing radical feminist ideas into the mainstream is evident not only from the fact that the show has created a radical feminist who the viewer roots for, but also through the positive reviews and conversation generated around the show, which bring radical feminism into the spotlight. For example, online television critic, Lauren Sarner, wrote a review of the show entitled "*Penny Dreadful* Is Proving That Misandry In Feminism

³⁵ "No Beast So Fierce," *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Paco Cabezas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

³⁶ Freeman, "The Bitch Manifesto," 227.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Solanas, "SCUM," 201.

⁴⁰ "Ebb Tide." *Penny Dreadful*, directed by Paco Cabezas (Showtime, 2016), DVD.

Can Be Fun” in which she notes that “by mixing real rhetoric with its pulpy misandry, *Penny Dreadful* is cleverly making militant feminism compelling.” She concludes that “Feminism doesn’t need to be pleasant and easy to swallow for a show to comment on it. Angry feminism doesn’t need to be a drag or a killjoy, either....The rest of television could learn a thing or two from *Penny Dreadful’s* approach.”⁴¹ In a similar vein, online television critic, Julianne Shepherd, refers to *Penny Dreadful* as being “Gloriously Misandrist.”⁴² These reviews are significant because they show that including a radical feminist character like Lily on a mainstream television show, generates conversation about radical feminism in popular culture, thus bringing conversations on feminism into the mainstream.

In *Feminism Is For Everybody*, bell hooks argues that to make feminism more accessible to the general public, there is a need to bring feminist discussions out of academic institutions and into the mass media.⁴³ This paper is of import to political science because it shows how an often neglected but important nexus of everyday life, television, can be a powerful medium for bringing critical

and radical feminist ideas usually only discussed in academia into the mainstream. *Penny Dreadful* illustrates how the popular media can make radical feminism available to the public, and how the fantasy genre in particular, is a powerful medium for communicating politically marginalized ideas. *Penny Dreadful* does the political work of feminism through the medium of television, and allows the viewing public to critically engage with radical ideas they would not otherwise encounter because of constraints created by the oppressive patriarchal forces which shape society.

⁴¹ Sarner, “Penny Dreadful Is Proving.”

⁴² Shepherd, “Penny Dreadful Has Been.”

⁴³ bell hooks, *Feminism is for Everybody*, 4.

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The Poppy Problem: How Eradication Failed to Promote Negative and Positive Peace in Afghanistan

by Poonam Sandhu

Drawing on Galtung's theoretical framework, I analyze the relationship between peace and poppy eradication policy in Afghanistan. I argue that the eradication policy employed by NATO/ISAF failed to build a sustainable negative and positive peace as it seriously undermined counter-insurgency attempts, failed to improve the economic conditions of Afghan farmers and overlooked the problem of opiate addiction and HIV transmission domestically. I conclude by emphasizing that where illicit economies are deeply embedded within the lives of local actors, as exemplified in the case of Afghanistan, it is imperative that policy makers design policies which take into account both physical and structural violence.

The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has been an important area of study for peace and conflict scholars and political economists as it a key example the intersection between illicit drug economies and counterinsurgency attempts. Within this field of study, there is an overwhelming consensus among scholars that despite the billions of dollars that have been invested in poppy eradication, this policy has been a major failure in Afghanistan.¹ Research on this subject has primarily been concerned with how poppy eradication in Afghanistan failed to deliver on its goal of decreasing opium production. However, there is relatively less

literature pertaining to how poppy eradication was critically flawed as it ignored the economic and social needs of the Afghan people. Drawing on Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung's theoretical framework, this essay will examine a few of the ways in which the poppy eradication program failed to build a sustainable negative and positive peace in Afghanistan.² In relation to negative peace, defined as the absence of physical conflict, I argue that poppy eradication undermined the goal of counterinsurgency, which is defined in this essay as defeating the Taliban.³ Second, in relation to positive peace, defined as the absence of structural

¹ See more detailed works by Vanda Felbab-Brown; Ekaterina Stepanova; Christopher J. Coyne; Barnett R. Rubin; and Jake Sherman.

² Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," 167-191.

³ Ibid.

violence, I argue that the eradication policy (1) failed to improve the economic conditions of Afghan farmers or recognize the need for economic reform, and (2) address the issues of domestic opiate addiction and HIV transmission.⁴ In order to understand the failures of this policy, it is important to first examine how the poppy economy developed in Afghanistan and what the eradication policy aimed to achieve.

Background and the Eradication Program

The body of scholarship pertaining to poppy cultivation in Afghanistan focuses overwhelmingly on the Soviet and post-Soviet eras in Afghan history. This is exemplified by the fact that both Rubin and Sherman and Goodhand overlook the significance, or insignificance, of poppy as a crop prior to the Soviet invasion and instead begin their analyses of the drug economy within the context of the Cold War.⁵ This western-centric approach to Afghan history overlooks the fact that poppy was only *one* of key

cultivated crops in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion.

In fact, before 1978 Afghanistan was “nearly self-sufficient in food” as the country’s agricultural sector consisted of a variety of crops such as “wheat, rice, fruits, cotton...and a large variety of vegetables.”⁶ Poppy cultivation, in particular, began growing exponentially in the 1979 and throughout the 1980s when Soviet invaders destroyed rural agriculture in order to drive local populations into the cities where they could be easier controlled.⁷ The Soviet destruction of agricultural economic opportunities left few options for Afghan farmers.

Consequently, poppy cultivation boomed as it was one of the few crops that could be cultivated to guarantee a livable economic profit for farmers.⁸ The poppy economy continued to prosper throughout the 1990s and brought economic gains to Afghan farmers as well as the Taliban rulers who began to levy a “10-20 percent *zakat*, or tax, on cultivation and processing.”⁹ With opium production showing no signs of slowing down in the early 2000s, and the Taliban

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Rubin, “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan,” 1789-1803.; Goodhand, “Corrupting Or Consolidating the Peace?” 417.; Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars” 191-216.

⁶ Wahab and Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, 7.

⁷ Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan” 56.

⁸ van Ham, Peter and Kamminga, “Poppies for Peace” 72.

⁹ Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan,” 56.

receiving a large profit from cultivation, there was an increasing concern among the international community, notably Western states, that poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and the export of opioids to foreign markets was posing a serious threat to counterinsurgency aims. In the summer of 2004, NATO/ISAF, led by the United States, launched a program aimed at systematically eradicating poppy within Afghanistan.¹⁰ According to political scientist Vanda Felbab-Brown, eradication is a policy which “seeks to disrupt the drug trade by destroying the illicit crops.”¹¹ Felbab-Brown highlights the fact that eradication is “traditionally the U.S. government’s preferred counternarcotics policy” which is “predicated on the belief that if peasants face the destruction of their crops, they will have greater incentive to abandon their illicit cultivation and grow legal products.”¹²

Within the Afghan context in particular, U.S. objectives were that the eradication policy would “bankrupt and hence physically weaken the Taliban and also reduce the level of poppy cultivation and drug trafficking

in Afghanistan.”¹³ In other words, the Western allies pursued poppy eradication with the hope that it would be key to ending counterinsurgency and pursuing a sustainable negative peace. However, poppy eradication efforts between 2004-2009 have seriously undermined counterinsurgency goals and have largely ignored structural issues within Afghan society that are necessary to achieving positive peace.

Poppy Eradication and Negative Peace: Undermining Counterinsurgency

Although it was designed to bankrupt and thus weaken insurgents, poppy eradication was counterproductive as it strengthened the Taliban’s political position. With the poppy fields being destroyed by Western powers, the Taliban began to condemn the policy and “protect the opium fields of the farmers” that were next for eradication.¹⁴ Not only did they show their support for poppy farmers by protecting the fields but rather, the Taliban also strengthened their political support by offering

¹⁰ Ibid., 61.

¹¹ Ibid., 61.

¹² Ibid., 61.

¹³ Felbab-Brown and Riedel. “Counternarcotics and Economic Development Policies,” 164.

¹⁴ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Among Poppies” 108.

“agricultural necessities such as seeds and fertilizer” to the victims of eradication.¹⁵ Felbab-Brown argues that as they rallied the support of “the antagonized poppy farmers,” the Taliban was successful in accumulating “political capital” within the region.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the Taliban’s gains came at the cost of further alienating Afghan farmers from their central government and NATO/ISAF. With the Afghan state unable to deliver on the promise of post-eradication economic support, farmers became “unwilling to provide intelligence on the Taliban to NATO and the Afghan National Army.”¹⁷ Research demonstrates that in the aftermath of eradication attempts, U.S. troops returned from intelligence missions having collected little information which was of use to their counterinsurgency objectives.¹⁸ This is significant as “accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence [was]...a lynchpin of counterinsurgency,” in Afghanistan.¹⁹ Without local intelligence, NATO/ISAF’s objectives of weakening the Taliban, thus building negative peace, were made much harder to achieve.

The primary reason that eradication hindered the negative peace process was because the weak Afghan government was unable to protect and provide for its citizens. This reality has led many scholars, such as Ekaterina Stepanova, to argue that moving forward, there needs to be a “peace first” policy before any counternarcotics can be pursued.²⁰ More specifically, Stepanova’s “peace first” policy advocates for the strengthening and legitimization of the Afghan government and not the pursuit of the international war/counterinsurgency agenda.²¹ Emphasizing statebuilding prior to counternarcotics in Afghanistan would have arguably increased the chances of the state’s ability to meet the post-eradication needs of farmers. Consequently, this would have potentially mitigated the Taliban’s ability to gain the confidence and support of local farmers, as they did in the remnants of the poppy eradication failure.

One less-explored idea within the literature pertaining to poppy eradication and counterinsurgency is

¹⁵ van Ham and Kamminga, “Poppies for Peace,” 78.

¹⁶ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers Among Poppies,” 108, 102.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Stepanova, “Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” 14.

²¹ *Ibid.*

the idea that eradication can create new counterinsurgent groups that pose a threat to Afghanistan's long term security. Research by Felbab-Brown; Riedel; Stepanova; Rubin and Sherman; Coyne and others is focused on how poppy eradication strengthened pre-existing insurgents, such as the Taliban. However, equally concerning is the idea that poppy eradication, or any similar anti-narcotics policy, has the potential to create more rebel groups who claim 'anti-Westernism' as their driving ideology. Increasing anti-Western sentiment could seriously impact the negative peace process domestically, become a serious security threat to the West, and most importantly, undermine eradication's primary agenda of combating insurgency.

Positive Peace: Increasing Economic Hardship While Ignoring The Need For Reform

Another failure of the poppy eradication policy was its inability to ameliorate the economic conditions faced by Afghan farmers. The policy was meant to be implemented in tandem with the 'alternative

livelihoods' program, which was aimed at assisting farmers' transition from cultivating poppy to licit crops.²² As Rubin and Sherman argued in their 2008 report for the Centre on International Cooperation, it was clear within the policy that alternative livelihoods had to be available *prior* to engaging in eradication. Nevertheless, "there was no definition given of what this entailed or how it was to be implemented in practice."²³ In reality, poppy was eradicated by coercion while the proposed alternative livelihoods "never materialized."²⁴ It is unclear what caused the alternative livelihoods program to fail, however, the inability of this program to materialize left thousands of farmers without a source of income to meet their basic needs. In turn, farmers became increasingly reliant on the Taliban for economic assistance and protection. As a result, attempts to combat counterinsurgency were deeply undermined.

However, even if alternative livelihoods had materialized during the peak eradication efforts between 2004-2009, Rubin and Sherman explain that "many of the crops that were being suggested for substitution by the USAID Alternative Livelihoods

²² Goodhand, "Corrupting Or Consolidating the Peace," 417.

²³ Rubin and Sherman, "Counter-narcotics to Stabilize Afghanistan," 25.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.

Program (ALP) and others, such as saffron, pomegranates, apricots, and roses, have maturation periods of several years during which they [do] not provide income.”²⁵ Furthermore, there was no effective interim policy articulated that would meet the needs of the farmers whose only means of livelihood were destroyed. A more successful approach would have been to recognize that a major overhaul of Afghanistan’s economy could not be implemented overnight. If poppy eradication was approached as a gradual process which was complemented by crop substitution and the development of other economic opportunities, it could have facilitated a relatively more sustainable economic transformation. However, the eradication effort that was pursued was forceful and swift and did not account for the time needed to transition towards building licit economies. As the eradication effort was pursued, Afghan farmers’ long term economic security was severely undermined.

Additionally, the critical flaw of the alternative livelihoods program was its failure to “address the structural drivers of poppy cultivation.”²⁶ Although Felbab-Brown

mentions this comment in her writings, she does little to elaborate on what she means by this assertion. However, through original analysis of the aforementioned policies, I suggest that poppy eradication and alternative livelihoods programs both fail to recognize the root causes that drive farmers into poppy cultivation as opposed to other crops. Instead of addressing the urgent need for economic reform and diversification in Afghanistan, these policies have attempted to act as a temporary solution to larger developmental issues that have been ignored. While it is clear that economic development is not easily feasible within a state that has continually struggled against counterinsurgency, there needs to be more emphasis on policies that have the potential to *transform* Afghanistan’s economy.

One such example is a legal microcredit program where Afghan farmers would be able to gain entrepreneurial skills while stimulating the economy with the establishment of small, diversified businesses.²⁷ Nonetheless, given the lack of political will and funding, any legal microcredit program “continues

²⁵ Ibid., 14.

²⁶ Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers among Poppies,” 109.

²⁷ Felbab-Brown and Riedel, “Counter narcotics and Economic Development Policies,” 172.

to be non-existent in Afghanistan.”²⁸ It is imperative that any policy prescribed in the future seek to diversify the Afghan economy as over reliance on one crop or means of production makes Afghans more vulnerable to disparity.

Overall, the poppy eradication effort seriously disregarded the need for a deeper economic reform that would ultimately contribute to positive peace building in Afghanistan. Eradication further destabilized the region as alternative livelihood policies failed, leaving farmers with few other options but to turn to the Taliban for economic aid and protection.

The Positive Peace of Harm Reduction: Turning a Blind Eye to a Public Health Crisis

An overlooked feature of the poppy eradication policy has been its failure to address increasing opium dependence and HIV transmission within Afghanistan. Official data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows that despite efforts to disrupt the poppy economy, opiate addiction persists among adults in Afghanistan.

According to a report released in 2015, 12.6% of the adult population of Afghanistan are drug users, which is “more than double the global drug use rate of 5.2%.”²⁹ Not only is the drug use rate significantly higher than the global average, but the report also asserts that “there are only 123 treatment centres in the country which is sufficient for treating 10.7% of the opium and heroin users.”³⁰

Despite the aforementioned data, there is an overwhelming lack of discussion as to how opium production affects Afghan public health within the body of scholarship related to Afghanistan’s illicit economy. Instead, most of the scholarship related to Afghanistan is concerned with how opium production affects foreign markets, particularly European consumers. Thus far within the research, there has been an overemphasis on examining the macro level implications of opium production at the expense of turning a blind eye to the effects that poppy cultivation, economic disparity and decades of conflict have had on local populations. Researchers such as Todd et al. have interrogated this knowledge gap and contested that factors such as increased opium production, low cost,

²⁸ Ibid., 172.

²⁹ UNODC Research, “Afghanistan Drug Report,” 23.

³⁰ Ibid.,

and rising levels of population displacement “have arguably increased propensity towards drug use and dependency.”³¹ The increase in opiate use and addiction has been coupled with increased HIV diagnoses and transmission throughout Afghanistan. Comprehensively, there remains a fundamental lack of public health awareness and services aimed at supporting opiate users and the communities in which they live.

Albeit the lack of academic scholarship on this public health crisis, investigative journalists and documentary film makers have made significant contributions to increasing awareness on this issue. An example of this is Al Jazeera’s short film “101 East - Afghanistan’s Billion Dollar Drug War” which illustrates the severity of the drug epidemic in urban centres, such as Kabul, as well as in the countryside.³² The film highlights the fact that despite high level international counterinsurgency and counternarcotics efforts, little attention has been given to the public health crisis that has been caused by the development of the illicit opium economy.³³ The poppy eradication campaign is a key example of a policy that has been committed to a high

level anti-drug agenda and has failed to support those who are opiate dependent and/or HIV positive. By not addressing substance abuse and the need for increased drug rehabilitation programs, it is further evident that poppy eradication has failed to facilitate positive peace building in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

This essay has argued that poppy eradication failed to promote the negative and positive peace building in Afghanistan as it undermined counterinsurgency, failed to provide economic alternatives and reform, and ignored the domestic public health crisis of opiate addiction. An assessment of poppy eradication in Afghanistan demonstrates that where illicit economies are so deeply embedded within the social and political lives of local actors, policy makers cannot ignore structural violence in order to pursue their own internationalized agendas. As exemplified in the case of Afghanistan, policies that are designed to resolve international issues, in this case the export of opium to foreign markets and counterinsurgency, are not

³¹ S. Todd et al., “Opiate Use, Treatment, and Harm Reduction in Afghanistan,” 342.

³² Al Jazeera. “101 East - Afghanistan's Billion Dollar Drug War.” YouTube.

³³ Ibid.,

designed to meet the long term needs of local peoples. Instead, these policies have had serious counterproductive effects on the objective of counterinsurgency and, more broadly, the overall peace process. A high degree of caution must be exercised by international actors when implementing peace policies within an international context. If not, the legitimacy of institutions which enforce these policies, such as NATO, could rightfully be called into question, thus hindering future peace operations.

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Growing in NAFTA's Shadow: An Examination of Mexico's Narco-Economy

by **Poonam Sandhu**

This paper examines the impact of neoliberal economic reforms, notably the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on cartel activity and drug cultivation in Mexico. It argues that NAFTA facilitated the growth of the narco economy in Mexico as it devastated small-scale agriculture, particularly corn production, and failed to provide sustainable economic opportunities in the country's manufacturing sector. The final result was the increased cultivation of illicit crops and deepened influence of cartels. The paper concludes by suggesting that any growth created by NAFTA has come at the expense of corn farmers and the development of an independent Mexican industry.

On January 1st, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Canada, Mexico and the United States came into effect in an attempt to promote regional trade and mutual economic prosperity. The narrative developed by then-Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari was that NAFTA would transform Mexico into a first-world country. At his MIT commencement address in the spring of 1993, for example, Salinas introduced NAFTA as a “job creating agreement...a wage-increasing agreement...a migration reduction agreement.”¹ However, the idea that NAFTA would propel Mexico into the First World was a naive assumption which did not anticipate the adverse

impacts of the neoliberal market reforms that were being consolidated through this agreement. Instead, this essay will argue that NAFTA inadvertently facilitated the rapid growth of the illicit drug economy through its devastation of small-scale agriculture and its failure to provide sustainable economic opportunities in the country's manufacturing sector. The economic hardships created by NAFTA's mandate were further aggravated by the Mexican state's unwillingness to provide adequate protections and social programs for small-scale farmers. While the factors underlying the development and the prosperity of the drug economy are multidimensional, this essay will only

¹ Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, “Transcript of Commencement Address by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico,” *The Tech*, June 23, 1993., <http://tech.mit.edu/V113/N29/salinas.29n.html>.

examine the impact of NAFTA and the absence of adequate state sponsored social programs. It posits that NAFTA was not a novel idea, but rather a point of no return in Mexico's economic restructuring. This essay will first provide key background information on the origins of neoliberal market reforms. Second, it will demonstrate that the devastation of small-scale agriculture and the failure of the state to provide social services to primarily rural farmers ultimately incentivized them to cultivate illicit crops such as heroin and marijuana. Consequently, the influence of drug cartels in Mexico deepened. This work concludes by arguing that the manufacturing growth that was promised under NAFTA failed to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for rural farmers. Instead, the influx of farmers to the Northern region of Mexico provided cartels with the opportunity to recruit job seekers as narco traffickers within the region.

Background

Mexico had been experimenting with neoliberal market reforms before NAFTA became a tangible reality. In

this essay, neoliberalism is defined as an economic model designed to “increase the GDP through prioritizing exports and freeing the market (liberalization) to attract direct foreign investment and transnational corporations.”² Like many other Latin American countries, Mexico did not historically have a culture of neoliberalism prior to the policy changes that were undertaken in response to the economic turmoil of the 1980s. Instead, Mexico had pursued an inward-oriented growth policy since the 1930s, referred to as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). This ultimately led the country to manufacture its own goods for domestic consumption in an attempt to “free itself from dependency on foreign markets and offset declining terms of trade.”³ ISI in Mexico was particularly pursued through “raised tariffs, multiple exchange rates, controlled imports [and] subsidizing domestic manufacturing.”⁴ While ISI was initially a success in terms of decreasing Mexican dependency on foreign imports, Mexico’s economy began to stagnate in the 1960s and by 1982, the government declared that it was unable to make payments on its

² Isbester, “The Paradox of Democracy”, 46.

³ Ibid., 41.

⁴ Ibid.

foreign debt, which as of 1981 stood at \$84 billion.⁵ This major debt crisis, as well as the continued economic downturn in 1985-86, coincided with the rise of a new group of Mexican technocrats who were trained in U.S. institutions and promoted free market economics as an alternative development strategy.⁶ Among those technocrats was Carlos Salinas de Gortari who came to power in 1989 and pursued a campaign of rapid trade liberalization and privatization, which ultimately sought to drastically reduce state expenditures.⁷ An example of this is Salinas' acceptance of a "two-stage orthodox IMF prescription" which was the first major step towards Mexico's neoliberalization.⁸ From this perspective, NAFTA was not a completely novel idea but rather an opportunity for Mexico's ruling elites to consolidate the pre-existing neoliberal market reforms in order to modernize the state.

While modernizing Mexico and deepening preexisting neoliberal reforms was among the Mexican objectives to negotiate NAFTA, the U.S. objectives were primarily related

to securing their borders. Just as Salinas had promised that NAFTA would ensure that Mexico "[exported] goods not people," Bill Clinton affirmed that NAFTA "would eliminate the problem of undocumented Mexican immigration by creating more jobs at higher wages in Mexico."⁹ The formal narrative, however, was that NAFTA would allow Mexico, Canada and the U.S. to mutually prosper. While Clinton highlighted NAFTA as the solution to long term migration issues on the U.S.-Mexico border, he also promised that the trade deal would "[increase] employment in U.S. industries that would take advantage of a prosperous Mexican market."¹⁰ Underlying the formal narrative was the belief that by creating more jobs at higher wages, Mexicans would be less likely to engage into the U.S. labour market without authorization and abandon illicit economic activities, such as smuggling drugs across the border.¹¹ This was significant to the Clinton administration as contraband had historically been smuggled into the U.S. from and by way of Mexico. During Prohibition, for example,

⁵ Ibid., 115.

⁶ Ibid., 116.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Laurell, "Three Decades of Neoliberalism in Mexico", 250.

⁹ Blecker, "The Mexican and U.S. Economies After Twenty Years of NAFTA," 6.

¹⁰ Ibid., 6.

¹¹ Ibid., 6.

alcohol was smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico while the post-Prohibition era saw an increase in heroin and marijuana being the key smuggled commodities.¹² However, emphasis on Mexico's history as a major country of origin and transit point for contraband does not account for the fact that before NAFTA, the U.S. was also smuggling various goods to Mexico such as "color televisions ... refrigerators ... stolen cars and computers."¹³ Simply put, the drug problem did not appear after the signing of NAFTA. Instead, the porous nature of the U.S.-Mexican border resulted in goods being smuggled in both directions both prior to and following the implementation of the agreement. Nevertheless, the nature of Mexico's drug economy changed drastically with the introduction of NAFTA.

NAFTA's Impact on Mexico's Agricultural Sector

Mexico's agriculture sector has historically been dominated by corn production.¹⁴ Results from the 1990

census show that four years before NAFTA came into effect, approximately 29% of agriculturalists (representing 14% of all workers) were identified as corn workers.¹⁵ Not only were these farmers partially dependent on corn production, but the vast majority of them were poor in comparison to non-agricultural workers. Dube et al. estimate that 27% of the agricultural workers report earning zero income, which reflects the fact that many of these individuals typically do unpaid work on family farms.¹⁶ Regardless of exact figures, Mexican agriculturalists have a long history of cultivating corn in abundance. This extensive history is reflected in the fact that Mexico is often referred to as the "birthplace of corn," alluding to the fact that the crop originates from central Mexico.¹⁷ At the same time, small-scale farmers have remained among the poorest sectors of Mexican society and have few transferable skills which are of use in capital-intensive industries.

With trade liberalization encouraged by NAFTA, Mexico's small-scale agriculture sector suffered

¹² Patenostro, "Mexico as a Narco-Democracy," 44.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁴ Dube et al., "From Maize to Haze," 1189.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Becker, "U.S. Corn Subsidies Said to Damage Mexico," *The New York Times*, August 27, 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/27/business/us-corn-subsidies-said-to-damage-mexico.html>.

immensely. For example, under NAFTA's mandate of trade liberalization, "tariffs and quotas on agricultural imports, which to an extent protected [Mexican] farmers from foreign competition, were removed."¹⁸ Simultaneously, the National Company of Popular Subsistence (CONASUPO), a Mexican Parastatal Enterprise which was previously vested with the responsibility to increase the income of small-scale subsistence farmers, continually removed subsidies to farmers.¹⁹ It is important to note that although fundamental reforms to CONASUPO began a few years prior to NAFTA's implementation, Yunez-Naude and Barceinas Paredes' research shows that NAFTA *accelerated* the dismantling of this parastatal in an effort to liberalize trade.²⁰ This was ultimately detrimental to small-scale farmers.

While Mexico was complying with the tenets of neoliberalism and decreasing state intervention in its agriculture sector, as exemplified by the two aforementioned examples, U.S. capital-intensive agribusiness

continued to receive federal support in spite of NAFTA.²¹ The decrease of trade barriers by Mexico was juxtaposed by the U.S. increase in mass agricultural subsidies which meant that U.S. products, notably corn, could now be purchased at a lower cost than those produced by domestic farmers. Economist Timothy Wise's research, indexed and adjusted for inflation, demonstrates that since 1994, Mexico has *reduced* the value of its subsidy payments by approximately 40% while U.S. corn subsidies have been as much as 80% their pre-NAFTA levels.²² The increase in U.S. subsidies resulted in a massive influx of corn and other crops which were "dumped" in Mexico and sold at a price that at times [was] lower than the cost of production."²³ A study conducted by the Wilson Centre demonstrates that from the early 1990s to 2005, U.S. corn exports to Mexico increased by 413% with the overall dumping margin estimated to be 19%.²⁴ The net effect of U.S. dumping was the reduction of the price of corn that was cultivated by Mexican farmers. The exact value by which the price of corn dropped after

¹⁸ Watt and Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 124.

¹⁹ Yunez Naude, "The Dismantling of CONASUPO," 98; Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 124.

²⁰ Yúnez-Naude and Barceinas Paredes, "The Agriculture of Mexico After Ten Years of NAFTA Implementation," 15.

²¹ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 124.

²² Wise, T., Policy Space for Mexican Maize, 12.

²³ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 124.

²⁴ Wise, T., "The Impacts of US Agricultural Policies on Mexican Producers," 168.

NAFTA varies among economists. For example, a study conducted by Avalos-Sartorio suggests “that the provisions of NAFTA effected a 20% reduction in the [corn] price faced by Mexican producers.”²⁵ Peter Watt and Roberto Zepeda Martínez, by contrast, suggest that “the price of corn dropped by around 50% following the NAFTA agreement.”²⁶ Despite discrepancies between the exact percentage value by which corn prices dropped in the face of U.S. “dumping,” the influx of U.S. corn made it significantly more difficult for small-scale farmers to meet their basic economic needs. This is best exemplified by Wise’s research for the Wilson Centre which argues that during the period 1997-2005, corn producers suffered losses estimated at \$6.6 billion (USD) as compared to the aggregate losses for Mexico’s eight largest crop and livestock sectors which were estimated to be \$12.8 billion (USD).²⁷ By demonstrating that corn producers incurred approximately 51% of the total losses between 1997-2005 due to U.S. corn dumping, Wise illuminates the human cost which was endured by farmers in the decade after the agreement was

ratified. With corn livelihoods compromised, it is not surprising that approximately 2.3 million jobs were lost in the agricultural sector due to the market reforms promoted under NAFTA.²⁸ As of 2016, corn remains the top U.S. agricultural export received by Mexico with total corn imports valued at \$2,533 (Millions of USD) at the expense of Mexican corn self-sufficiency.

Mexico’s (Non) Response to Agricultural Devastation

The Mexican government’s response to the destruction of farming livelihoods as a result of NAFTA’s trade liberalization mandate was largely inadequate. In October 1993, the Salinas administration implemented PROCAMPO, a fifteen year program designed to provide direct subsidies for producers of corn and other basic crops who were likely to suffer from NAFTA-related trade competition.²⁹ However, as political scientist Peter Andreas notes, the direct subsidy program “primarily served as a limited form of welfare rather than providing the kind of public investment

²⁵ Ávalos-Sartorio, "What Can We Learn From Past Price Stabilization Policies and Market Reform in Mexico?," 313-327.

²⁶ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 125.

²⁷ Wise, T., “The impacts of US agricultural policies,” 166.

²⁸ Mercille, "Violent Narco-Cartels Or US Hegemony?," 1642.

²⁹ Wise, C., *The Post-NAFTA Political Economy: Mexico and the Western Hemisphere* (University Park, Penn: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 69.

necessary to modernize Mexican agriculture and make small scale farmers more productive and competitive.”³⁰ This was combined with the fact that Mexico did not, and still does not, have unemployment insurance or any social assistance programs for those whose livelihood suffered from trade liberalization.³¹ Overall, attempts to provide social services for small-scale farmers who were affected by NAFTA has been inadequate, if not virtually non-existent.

A Turn Towards Drug Cultivation and Increased Cartel Activity

With the agriculture industry devastated by the trade liberalization promoted under NAFTA, compounded by the central government's inadequate response to the devastation of livelihoods, many Mexican farmers had to find new ways of meeting their basic needs. The two main survival strategies that were adopted in response to NAFTA were migration, mainly to urban centres and the U.S, and engaging in informal activities,

such as the illicit drug economy.³² It was within this context that many of the small-scale farmers who remained in Mexico turned towards the cultivation of illicit drugs. Unlike basic crops such as corn, coffee and beans which had been predominantly cultivated prior to NAFTA, illicit drugs such as heroin, marijuana and methamphetamines are subject to less price fluctuation while their demand in foreign markets (notably the U.S.) remains stable.³³ By 2007, for example, “a kilo of illicit drugs fetched 300 times more than one of [corn] and a kilo of marijuana or poppy was worth more than a ton of beans.”³⁴ Therefore, it was a rational response for farmers to shift towards cultivating illicit drugs which could provide a stable source of income. The movement towards the cultivation of illicit crops in response to declining corn prices is best illuminated in northern state of Sinaloa which, prior to the implementation of NAFTA, was heavily dependent on the price of corn for their welfare.³⁵ Today, Sinaloa accounts for approximately 45-48% of all narcotics destined for the U.S. and has

³⁰ Friman and Andreas, *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 132.

³¹ Laurell, "Three Decades of Neoliberalism in Mexico", 258.

³² Ibid.

³³ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 166.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ de Janvry et al., "NAFTA and Mexico's Maize Producers," *World Development* 23, no. 8 (1995): 1361.

suffered from increasing amounts of drug related violence.³⁶ Between 2006 and 2011, for example, Watt and Zepeda Martínez estimate that there were 5,464 narco trafficking related deaths in Sinaloa, making it the second state most impacted by drug related violence during the period examined.³⁷ It is important to stress that for many Mexican farmers, the movement towards cultivating illicit crops was one of the few solutions to neoliberal reforms and the failure of the state to create substantial social assistance for those who did not benefit from NAFTA.

Not only did drug production expand in Mexico's more remote regions post-NAFTA but rather, recent research by Dube et al. has found that the entire narco-trafficking chain benefitted as a result of NAFTA.³⁸ For example, in the same study, Dube et al. shows that cartels are found to be more likely to move into "economically depressed territories where farmers are willing to supply illicit crops."³⁹ It is important to note however, that cartels did not suddenly appeared when neoliberal reforms were being consolidated. Nevertheless, NAFTA policies and their aftermath allowed

drug cartels to grow and also influenced their behaviour. Had the Mexican state's social programs been more robust and committed not only to meeting the basic needs for farmers but also providing sustainable alternative livelihoods, perhaps the rise of the cartels could have been somewhat mitigated. However, in the absence of state programs to protect farmers and promote alternative livelihoods, NAFTA provided cartels with the ripe moment to expand their networks. The final result was the deepening of 'drug-as-industry.' This hindered the licit Mexican 'modernization through industrialization' economic strategy that NAFTA was designed to facilitate.

The Maquiladora Industry and Cartel Recruitment

One of NAFTA's most echoed promises was that it would increase employment opportunities in Mexico's manufacturing sector in order to discourage immigration to the U.S. and engagement in illicit economic activities. As a consequence of declining corn prices, many of the farmers who did not emigrate to the

³⁶ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 212.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁸ Wise, *The Post-NAFTA Political Economy*, 211; Dube et al., "From Maize to Haze," 1205.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1183.

U.S. were forced to abandon their land and seek work in *maquiladoras*, or foreign-owned plants, located primarily on the U.S.-Mexico border.⁴⁰ The *maquiladora* industry had been growing since the implementation of neoliberal reforms, which is reflected in the fact that from 1980 to 1997, the *maquiladora* share of national manufacturing employment in Mexico rose from 5.6% to 25.1%.⁴¹ However, the long term increase in *maquiladora* employment was smaller than anticipated: from 1993 to 2013 there was a net increase of only about 400,000 jobs.⁴² This is in part due to the fact that a majority of the exported final goods were assembled from intermediate goods which were imported from foreign markets.⁴³ Political sociologist John Ackerman argues that development left at the *maquiladora* industry level, in conjunction with little emphasis on the development of national industry, made Mexico a subordinate economic partner in relation to the U.S.⁴⁴ Overall, the *maquiladora* industry did

not promote the type of sustainable economic development that was needed in Mexico and promised by NAFTA.

However, as thousands of unemployed farmers migrated to Northern Mexico throughout the 1990s in search of work, an opportunity arose for the cartels to recruit from this newly arrived labour pool.⁴⁵ With female labourers preferred in the apparel and electronics plants, there was a large surplus of men who were either underemployed or unemployed.⁴⁶ For the cartels that were already operating in northern Mexico, NAFTA provided a new opportunity to recruit and kidnap vulnerable unemployed workers who would facilitate the smuggling of their final products to the U.S.⁴⁷ Mexican sociologist Luis Astorga, for example, recounts that by the mid 1980s, traffickers were already recruiting workers to engage in what was referred to as “apple picking,” or drug smuggling.⁴⁸ According to Watt and Zepeda Martínez, traffickers would

⁴⁰ Mercille, “Violent Narco-Cartels Or US Hegemony?,” 1642.

⁴¹ Hanson, “What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico Since NAFTA?,” 7.

⁴² Blecker, “The Mexican and U.S. Economies,” 14.

⁴³ Ibid., 15.

⁴⁴ Ackerman and Faux, “The Connection Between the Drug War In Mexico and Neoliberal Policies,” February 19, 2014, <http://therealnews.com/t2/story:11507:The-Connection-Between-the-Drug-War-I>.

⁴⁵ Watt and Zepeda Martínez, *Drug War Mexico*, 160.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 160.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 161.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 79.

drive around in trucks and announce that workers could earn “between four and five thousand pesos per day” as compared to the relatively low wages that they were making in manufacturing.⁴⁹ While it is evident that the cartels began recruiting before NAFTA came into effect, the rural to urban migration, primarily from southern to northern Mexico, provided a larger material base for cartels to recruit smugglers who further contributed to the expansion of the drug economy.

Nevertheless, it was not only unemployed *maquiladora* job seekers who were vulnerable to cartel recruitment. Poor working conditions and consistently low wages within the *maquiladora* industry meant that even those who were employed were likely to be attractive targets for recruitment by cartels. Following the 1982 debt crisis, Mexico relaxed restrictions on *maquiladoras* in an effort to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and induce growth.⁵⁰ This meant that foreign-plant owners were now able to employ workers at relatively lower wages to work long hours under poor conditions. Official data suggests that in the decade after NAFTA came into

effect (1994 to 2004), the minimum wage decreased by 26%.⁵¹ The reality of deteriorating wages and working conditions was another aspect of NAFTA reforms from which cartels were able to profit. With the prospect of superior wages, it is rational that many *maquiladora* workers were more easily inclined to join the illicit economy. This is reflected in the fact that according to the national employment survey, approximately “58% of the economically active population was employed in the informal sector in 2014.”⁵²

Overall, evidence suggests that the economic growth promised by NAFTA fell short in the *maquiladora* industry, which primarily served U.S. markets, and added very little value to Mexico’s domestic market. Underemployment and unemployment caused by the lack of opportunities in the manufacturing sector provided cartels with the material base to recruit smugglers in order to expand their presence. For those who were now engaged in the illicit economy out of desperation, the promise of rapid modernization under NAFTA had clearly failed.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Hanson, “What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico Since NAFTA?,” 4.

⁵¹ Laurell, “Three Decades of Neoliberalism in Mexico,” 258.

⁵² Ibid., 258.

Conclusion

While NAFTA was designed to propel Mexico into the First World, its results have been to inadvertently promote the growth of the illicit drug economy. NAFTA's effect on the agriculture industry, coupled with the inadequate state response to rapid trade liberalization, ultimately led to increased drug cultivation and cartel activity. The country's manufacturing sector, by contrast, failed to deliver the employment opportunities it promised and instead reinforced Mexico's subordinate position in relation to trade with the U.S.

Despite NAFTA's failures, Mexican political elites since Salinas have continuously praised NAFTA and perceived the country's drug problem as one of greed rather than genuine economic grievance caused by failed neoliberal policies. This is exemplified by former Mexican president Felipe Calderon's declaration of the War on Drugs, which began in 2006 and has radically increased the levels of violence throughout regions in which cartels operate. The demonization of those involved in the drug economy has provided little impetus for a deeper examination of the structural conditions which have allowed the narco-economy to prosper. This paper

has served as a critical interruption to the notion that Mexico, as a whole, has gained from NAFTA. Any growth that has been created by NAFTA has come at the expense of Mexican farmers and the establishment of independent Mexican industry. The critical disconnect between the ruling class and Mexico's non-elites created the illusion that NAFTA would transform the Mexican economy overnight. For some, this has held true. For others, such as corn farmers, NAFTA never stood the chance of propelling *them* into the First World.

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The James Street Swing Bridge: Segregation, Capitalism, and Burnt Bridges

by Sarah Siska

On Tuesday, October 29th, 2013 the James Street Swing Bridge, one of two points of access connecting Thunder Bay and Fort William First Nation (FWFN), was engulfed by six-foot-tall flames. Four years later, the bridge remains closed. In this paper, I argue that failing to rebuild the James Street Swing bridge is an act of capitalistic environmental violence, and evidence of systemic neglect. Thunder Bay, the Crown, and Crown corporations continue to fail FWFN by perpetuating and entrenching the socio-spatial segregation between the communities, exposing FWFN community members to heightened violence resulting from storied and structural racism.

Acknowledgement

I write this paper as a second-generation settler living and learning on the unceded, ancestral, traditional, and occupied territories of the *hənǰəmīnəm* speaking *xʷməθkʷəyʷəm* people. I also acknowledge the Ojibwe of the north shore of Lake Superior, whose land I grew up on and am lucky enough to call home. My intention is to use my skills to help navigate my position as an uninvited visitor on these lands in a way that is anti-oppressive, decolonial, and works to hold up the voices, knowledges, and stories that settler-colonial power dynamics have worked so hard to silence. As the exclusionary nature of academic publishing serves to devalue and delegitimize local and Indigenous knowledge, as a form of decolonial methodology I seek to actively center community sources for intimate knowledge on the subject.

The James Street Swing Bridge was built over the Kaministiquia River following the settlement of separate 1905 and 1906 agreements between the Town for Fort William and Grand Trunk Pacific Railway, now CN Rail.¹ Following the 1970 amalgamation of Fort William and Port Arthur into Thunder Bay the use of the bridge

skyrocketed; in the years leading up to the fire, over 8,000 vehicles crossed the bridge daily.² This ease of access had the dual impact of promoting over a century's worth of economic development and access to both emergency and social services, while emboldening settler violence through its facilitation of asymmetrical mobility.

¹ Porter, "Deal Signed in Horse and Cart Era Cannot be Applied to Today."

² Ibid.



Figure 1: James St. Swing Bridge.³

Modern-day Thunder Bay is built on the displacement and exclusion of Indigenous peoples, including members of adjacent Fort William First Nation [FWFN], and has gained national attention for its systemic racism, institutional corruption, and indifference in relation to Indigenous bodies. With a population of roughly 120,000 people, 90% of which are white, Thunder Bay is one of Ontario's least diverse cities and "accounted for 29% of the total anti-Aboriginal hate crimes reported in Canada in 2015."⁴ Thunder Bay had the most homicides per capita in Canada in 2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016 and the most opioid related deaths in Ontario from

2013-16.⁵ Furthermore, the Thunder Bay Police Services Board (TBPSB) is currently under investigation for systemic racism and discrimination in policing with 39 missing/murdered investigations under review by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director-Ontario's police review board.⁶ Even after October 2015-June 2016's Seven Youth Inquest into the circumstances surrounding the deaths of seven Indigenous youth, Indigenous bodies are still being pulled from Thunder Bay rivers, including Thunder Bay's "river of tears."⁷ In the early months of 2017 both the Thunder Bay Chief of Police J.P. Levesque and the Thunder Bay Mayor Keith Hobbs, himself an ex-cop, were criminally charged; Levesque with breach of trust and obstruction of justice (which were dropped late January 2018) and Hobbs with extortion and obstruction of justice -- both decreasing community faith in policing and governance. The Nishnawbe Aski Nation (NAN), a political organization representing communities in Treaty 5 and 9, issued a statement of lack of confidence in the TBPSB, stating that:

³ Bryan Groulx, "James Street Swing Bridge - Thunder Bay - Winter 2006," photograph.

⁴ Macdonald, "A River of Tears"; *CBC News* online, "Thunder Bay had almost one-third of Canada's reported anti-Indigenous hate crimes in 2015."

⁵ *CBC News* online, "Thunder Bay, Ontario has highest homicide rate in Canada for 2016."

⁶ Sinclair, "Interim Report"; *CBC News* online, "Almost 40 Thunder Bay police investigations."

⁷ Macdonald, "A River of Tears."

“despite irrefutable examples of chronic problems in the Thunder Bay Police Service (TBPS) the overseeing Police Services Board steadfastly refuses to acknowledge any problems with its delivery of services respecting our community members.”⁸

This paper is not one that is easy to write. As a settler, delving into the black heart of my community is ugly, but necessary for disrupting the resistance many Thunder Bay settlers have towards recognizing the violence they inflict through their actions and narratives. To unlearn Thunder Bay’s racism requires resisting the spatial processes of colonialism that serve to segregate, and acknowledging the discourses that reproduce distance. In this paper, I argue that the burning of the James Street Swing bridge serves as another example of how Thunder Bay, the Crown, and Crown corporations have failed FWFN by allowing four years of socio-spatial segregation through their indifference. Failing to rebuild the bridge is an act of capitalistic environmental violence, directly placing FWFN community members in harm's way while a profit-over-people mentality led to concerns

over costs taking precedence over concerns about Indigenous lives. I show this by first giving a background into the burning of the bridge, delving into colonial geographies, and then exploring the ties between colonial segregation and capitalism. This paper will use the example of the burning of the James Street Bridge as an event to highlight systemic settler racism that FWFN community members are experiencing more broadly.

On Tuesday, October 29th, 2013, the Thunder Bay Police Service (TBPS) received a call shortly after 7 pm alerting them to the fact that the James Street Swing Bridge was engulfed by six-foot-tall flames.⁹ Some passersby claimed to hear a loud bang prior to the blaze; even still, it did not take long for TBPS to classify the incident as undetermined.¹⁰ Three days after the blaze, CN repaired the rail line but kept vehicular access closed despite the stipulation in the 1905 agreement that they “maintain the bridge in perpetuity.”¹¹ October 29th, 2017 marked the four-year anniversary of the blaze. The bridge is still closed.

⁸ Fiddler, Kavanaugh, and Leonard, “Re: Application for Inquiry and Appointment.”

⁹ Burns, “Fire Closes James Street Bridge.”

¹⁰ *TBNewsWatch* online, “Bridge Blaze”; *CBCNews* online, 2016, “Cause of James Street Bridge.”

¹¹ Porter, “Deal Signed in Horse and Cart Era Cannot be Applied to Today.”

I was in grade twelve when this happened and, as all Thunder Bay residents, I witnessed the explosion of settler racism that happened in the aftermath of the blaze. FWFN was worried about access to emergency services and the issue of their children and elders having to walk along unlit roads and highways to access the town, whereas residents of Thunder Bay were predominantly worried about their access to cheap gas, cigarettes, and hockey arenas. Members of FWFN worried that this would further spatially and socially segregate them from Thunder Bay, while certain members of Thunder Bay were emboldened by the blaze -- tweeting excitedly about this possibility, archived by Damien Lee, a scholar who belongs in the FWFN community and an Assistant Professor in the Department of Indigenous Studies at the University of Saskatchewan:

“With the res[erve] bridge on fire, we just need to find a way to block off the other entrances so the res and this town will be saved!#FenceItUp”

“That fire on the bridge could just keep travelling towards the rest of the reserve. #justsaying #saveTBay”¹²

Reminiscent of a pre-Trumpian ‘build the wall’ discourse, these comments ghettoize FWFN and bring forward the hateful, but unfortunately active, Thunder Bay belief that Indigenous peoples “should be locked up like animals and left to burn to death in [their] own cage.”¹³ This hatred deepened the socio-spatial divide, further fracturing the already fraught relationship between the two communities. The above posts were written by Thunder Bay youth who are “well versed in how to demonize Indigenous communities” through exposure to adults and systems of power such as policing, who openly spread their racism to the non-Indigenous youth creating a culture where acts of anti-Indigeneity are entertaining ways to pass the time.¹⁴ Included at length is the reaction of an anonymous Indigenous youth to the blaze:

“The James Street swing bridge burning down not only showed a perfect example of the racism that has

¹² While these tweets have since been deleted, posting records of them from Lee here is an act of archiving, a witnessing of the structural violence that they express. These tweets were deleted for a reason, and allowing them to stay hidden is permitting the violence to continue.; Lee, “Burning Bridges.”

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

been going on for uncounted years, but also stirred up many emotions for the women in my community who feel unsafe in Thunder Bay. For many of us, the [James Street] bridge is the only way to get out of the city and back to a place where we feel a sense of safety, among our families on the reserve. To be ridiculed for losing that safety route only made me feel less safe.”¹⁵

Thunder Bay’s refusal to acknowledge the issues along with the spatial segregation stemming from the burnt bridge is an active relationship that produces FWFN’s vulnerability to increased violence from Thunder Bay. The physical separation of fences and bridges along with the psychosocial separation of entrenched systemic racism gives settler society the power to turn Indigenous people into legal and social trespassers within their own territories and thereby deserving of violence, as seen in Colten Boushie’s court case. As trespassers, Indigeneity is constructed as being inherently worthy of police violence to show the consequences of this trespass. Police violence against Indigenous bodies makes white residents feel safer; allowing them to freely claim the city as their own while ignoring the

systems they create and enforce. Thunder Bayites silence accusations of racism by raising their voices, shouting that they are not responsible for histories of colonization. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, a Michi Saagig Nishnaabeg theorist, states that:

“Very few Canadians will directly proclaim they are in favor of the position of Indigenous peoples in Canada, but a very large number of Canadians will do everything they can to preserve the social, cultural, and economic systems of the country, even though this system is predicated on violence and dispossession of Indigenous lands and bodies.”¹⁶

Lack of historical context paired with the inheritance of knowledge leads to, as Damien Lee describes, the youth of Thunder Bay “throw[ing] racism at my community because they’ve been taught by their parents and society at large that its okay to do so.”¹⁷ From a young age, Thunder Bay youth are taught that anti-Indigeneity is as normal as our bitter winters, without understanding the impact generations of being left out in the cold has on a body and psyche.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*, 101.

¹⁷ Lee, “Burning Bridges.”

Colonial Geographies

“When whites say they’re not responsible for past racialized violence, they’re invisibilizing how they *benefit* from the actions of their ancestors that *structured* today’s society in a way that whiteness opens more doors than any other skin colour.”¹⁸

The proximity of Thunder Bay to FWFN means that anti-Indigenous racism is not so much expressed as erasure but violent exposure. Reserve imaginaries, as a spatial expression of colonial ideology, “naturali[ze] widespread poverty and state neglect” through permitting the projection of settler racism on to Indigenous bodies by conceiving of Indigenous peoples as “subjects of reserved spaces in which violence is expected.”¹⁹ As settler colonialism “relies on a logic of racial disappearance and spatial seclusion” this normalization entrenched the spatial and social segregation of Indigenous peoples within Canadian society.²⁰ Sarah Hunt, a Kwagiulth legal geographer, describes how “colonial power

operated in favour of settlers and the expansion of capitalist ideologies of empire, and law was used to construct, enforce and normalize power relations literally on the ground through separating ‘Indian’ spaces from settler spaces.”²¹ Colonial spatial imaginaries dispossess Indigenous peoples of the land while simultaneously erasing the violence of dispossession itself; settler inheritance of violence in a colonial society is erased when invasion is naturalized and “a sense of settler ‘indigeneity’ is produced.”²²

Violent racialized logics underpin colonialism and capitalism, which serve to commodify the environment by viewing it solely as “an inexhaustible resource to be sold, purchased and exploited.”²³ Glen Coulthard, Dene political theorist, shows how settler-colonialism derives its reproductive force through both “its strictly repressive or violent features [and] its ability to produce *forms of life* that makes settler-colonialism’s constitutive hierarchies seem natural.”²⁴ These hierarchies are seen when the burden of ecological protection falls on Indigenous bodies,

¹⁸ Lee, “Recovering From Racism.”

¹⁹ Hunt, “Witnessing the Colonialscape,” 80.

²⁰ Altamirano-Jimenez, *Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism*, 8.

²¹ Hunt, “Witnessing the Colonialscape,” 62-3.

²² Cameron, *Far Off Metal River*, 17.

²³ Women’s Earth Alliance, “Violence on the Land Violence on our Bodies,” 60.

²⁴ Coulthard, *Red Skin White Masks*, 152.

placing them in the path of direct violence be it physical, legal, or reproductive by the neoliberal pursuits of resource-driven governments.²⁵ Just as racism is a structuring logic of capitalism; environmental racism is a function of racial capitalism and is indeed state-sanctioned racial violence.²⁶ Capitalism and neoliberal ideology infuse the land with racism by commodifying and privatizing land while embedding racialized questions of access to land and services.²⁷ The conflation of Indigeneity with nature, and the capitalist view of ‘nature’ as a resource has led to an acceptance of violence against the earth and violence against Indigenous bodies due to the environment, women, and people of colour being discursively and legally conceptualized as being worth *less* than urbanity, progress, the comfort of propertied white men, and of property itself.

Cartography, along with the international law and standards that support its primacy, are “shaped by Western knowledge, actors and values,”²⁸ giving maps the power to

socially and discursively create understandings of land and community. Indigenous people are “drawn out of the geography of law,” through spatial segregation and the erasure of Indigenous knowledge systems from “the philosophical maps that guide our legal imagination.”²⁹ Looking at who is comfortable taking up space in different areas reveals the embedded hierarchies within and the policing of space; defined by both the physical location and the sense of belonging to the place.³⁰ Thunder Bay’s social identity is formed through the assertions of racism and violence against Indigenous bodies that are an important aspect of how the city and its population is governed. Thunder Bayites freely go to FWFN for cheap gas, cigarettes, hockey games, and the odd hike up Anemki Wajiw; but when in Thunder Bay, the people of FWFN experience violent and overt racism with little hope of aid. The non-Indigenous community rejects them, and the police cannot be counted on for help.

²⁵ Altamirano-Jimenez, *Indigenous Encounters with Neoliberalism*, 2.

²⁶ Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity II,” 524, 526.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 528.

²⁸ Altamirano-Jimenez & Parker, “Mapping, Knowledge, and Gender,” 102.

²⁹ Borrows, “Living Between Water and Rocks,” 446.

³⁰ Altamirano-Jimenez & Parker, “Mapping, Knowledge, and Gender,” 89.

Segregation, Capitalism and Colonialism

For the last four years, there has been a single vehicle point of access connecting FWFN and Thunder Bay; in 2015 a guardrail was erected for pedestrians to use although the frigid winter conditions make walking over the remains of the bridge a dangerous choice. Spatial segregation restricts community access to care in Thunder Bay, reinforcing de Leeuw et al.'s analysis of how social determinants of health are "deeply affected by access, or lack of access, to systems of health care, which, in turn, reflect various hierarchies of social, cultural, political, and economic power."³¹ By restricting the access Indigenous people have to the city, its social consciousness is imagined without Indigenous people, erasing them from the community and marking their presence outside the reserve as alien. Or, even worse; as pathological, criminal, and worthy of systemic violence.

Reserves, as a spatial expression of colonial ideology, are a means to contain and control both the land and the psyche through an entrenchment of Otherness. Anti-Indigenous racism in Thunder Bay deepens the social

divide between communities; the racism fuels the segregation, which in turn, fuels more racism. Tanya Talaga wrote in *Seven Fallen Feathers* that you can "ask any Indigenous high school students in Thunder Bay if they have experienced racism and they'll undoubtedly tell you about racial slurs and garbage or rotten eggs being thrown at them from passing cars."³² The violence of these racist acts are erased through shifting the blame from the perpetrators onto Indigenous bodies. Social and spatial mobility in Thunder Bay shows the psychosocial segregation between FWFN and Thunder Bay; not only are FWFN community members physically restricted in their access to Thunder Bay but once there, they face insidious and overt racism (effectively restricting their mobility even further).

The spatial segregation resulting from the burnt bridge has led to unacceptable issues of access to care. The reserve was constructed in a way that residents depend on city resources but are denied access to them; a deathly dependence that is not accidental, but constructed into the colonial logics that underpin reserve imaginaries.³³ The single access point

³¹ De Leeuw, Maurice, Holyk, Greenwood & Adam, "With Reserves," 908.

³² Talaga, *Seven Fallen Feathers*, 141.

³³ Hunt, "Witnessing the Colonialscape," 135.

to FWFN, the turnoff from Highway 61 to Chippewa Road has been described as a ‘race lane’; the significance of which can only be truly understood by those familiar with Thunder Bay’s reckless drivers. Community unanswerd pleas for increased safety measures due to concern over unsafe driving were brought to the fore when Rachel Legarde, from FWFN, was killed in a three-vehicle collision in January of 2017. This accident closed the highway cutting off access to emergency vehicles just as another young woman was found unresponsive. It took over an hour for the ambulance to reach FWFN at this critical time.³⁴

FWFN is, understandably, concerned about the well-being of the community members in the face of social, police, and institutional violence. FWFN was assured they would have a partner in Thunder Bay to ensure City Road would be lit, but the city has taken no action aside from stating it would be too expensive to properly light the way. Failure to address this issue has left children and elders walking through the cold on unlit roads and highways.³⁵ Statements such as this show how capitalism’s

“trail of devastation functions to desocialize spatial violence; city statements about cost feed the belief that this, along with every Indigenous issue, is a money-grabbing ploy.”³⁶

Anxieties around money and a lack of understanding of the history of displacement and Indigenous-settler relations adds fuel to the fire. Disinterest in Indigenous history has led to Thunder Bay settlers arguing that the single expropriation was settled twice, “constructing FWFN as overcompensated for their lost land and even ‘spoiled’ by the federal government.”³⁷ This struggle is about money only for the Thunder Bay residents who feel inconvenienced about a detour to save a few dollars with the ‘rez discounts’. For FWFN, this is about safety.

Moving Forward

CN Rail and the three levels of Canadian government have responsibilities and obligations to “be reasonable to the First Nations people to give them safe access to the city.”³⁸ Yet it took until July 2016 for the city of Thunder Bay engineers to be granted access onto the structure to

³⁴ *CBC News* online, “Fatal Highway 61 Crash.”

³⁵ Thompson, “City Building Bridges.”

³⁶ Harvey, “The ‘New’ Imperialism,” 66.

³⁷ Hay, “How Thunder Bay Was Made.”

³⁸ *Wawatay News* online, “Fort William Businesses Losing \$50k.”

inspect the bridge seven months after a judge ruled that CN had to, and nearly three full years after the bridge burned.³⁹ The three-year delay left FWFN with increased safety concerns for the youth who were being bussed to the city; with Ontario Regional Chief Stan Beardy remarking how “if Fort William First Nation was a municipality this closure would not be tolerated.”⁴⁰ This, unfortunately, echoes other reactions to incidences of violence in Thunder Bay; when Dora Morris phoned the police concerned about the whereabouts of her nephew Jethro Anderson, 15, the officer replied, “He’s just out there partying like every other Native kid” and waited six days to start the missing persons investigation, despite Dora’s daily calls.⁴¹ If Jethro was white, would it have taken so long to start looking for him? If the situation was reversed and Thunder Bay bore the brunt of the bridge closure, would it have stayed closed for four years? Incidences such as these show how the neglect of Indigenous bodies in Thunder Bay is not a patchwork of isolated incidents; rather examples of systemic, ingrained racism.

In June of 2017, the dispute reached the Supreme Court of Ontario where the judge dismissed the City of Thunder Bay’s application for an order requiring CN to maintain the bridge.⁴² The CN lawyer stated that “reasonable people would not have struck a deal to maintain a bridge in perpetuity” and used this to argue their way out of paying for the bridge.⁴³ If CN can successfully argue that it is ridiculous to maintain a deal in perpetuity, what precedent does that set for treaties? CN calls for breaking the agreement because the times have changed while refusing to give the Indigenous community the same opportunity. This asymmetrical power to reformulate consent on the use of land denies Indigenous peoples’ voices and agency in the face of violence. Underscored in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, projects affecting the land of Indigenous peoples must obtain the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of those same people. CN and the varying levels of Canadian Government have denied FWFN the opportunity to

³⁹ Ketonen, *CBC News* online, “City of Thunder Bay, Fort William First Nation to Inspect James Street Swing Bridge.”; Prokupchuk, *CBC News* online, “CN Bridge Dispute: Thunder Bay Engineers Still Don’t Have Access.”

⁴⁰ *Wawatay News* online. “Fort William Businesses Losing \$50k Daily Due to Bridge Closure.”

⁴¹ Talaga, *Seven Fallen Feathers*, 110.

⁴² *CBC News* online. “CN Bridge Dispute”.

⁴³ Porter, “Deal Signed in Horse and Cart Era Cannot be Applied to Today, CN Argues in Thunder Bay Case.”

renew their consent.⁴⁴ North of Superior Regional Chief Peter Collins speaks to this asymmetry, “CN helped to expropriate FWFN land for the benefit of CN and now it’s time for them to repay all the money they gained off those lands back to FWFN...One of those payments is looking after that bridge.”⁴⁵

CNs suggestion to fix the situation is particularly concerning; proposing that they would reopen the bridge permanently limiting traffic to a one-way flow if in return Thunder Bay surrendered the 1906 agreement with the railway and FWFN gives up all current and future land claims rights.⁴⁶ A Crown corporation trying to manipulate the city’s interest in the bridge and FWFN’s access to care “as leverage to require the First Nation to relinquish its inherent rights” is unacceptable but unfortunately, not uncommon.⁴⁷ Even Thunder Bay Mayor Keith Hobbs, recently criminally charged with extortion and obstruction of justice, accused this of being unconscionable, “a bad offer, made in bad faith.”⁴⁸ Former Chief of FWFN Georjann Morriseau replies:

“FWFN is offended at CN’s latest ‘take it or leave it’ offer in which the First Nation would have to relinquish our inherent land rights and give up any historical current or future claims to those lands... FWFN is the community most affected by the James Street Bridge, both historically in terms of our land being expropriated, and today in the form of not being allowed to use the bridge that facilitated the occupation of our lands.”⁴⁹

Conclusion

The proximity of FWFN and Thunder Bay with restricted points of access has created an environment where Indigenous peoples in Thunder Bay face both violent erasure and exposure their humanity is invisibilized, but their bodies remain as targets. This dehumanization was particularly explicit in Barbara Kentner’s widely-publicized attack and death in Thunder Bay; after she was struck by a trailer hitch thrown from a moving vehicle, the attackers allegedly yelled,

⁴⁴ UN General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfi/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.

⁴⁵ *Wawatay News* online. “Fort William Businesses Losing \$50k Daily Due to Bridge Closure.”

⁴⁶ *CBC News* online. “Fort William Chief Wants to Solve Bridge Issue Without Court.”

⁴⁷ Northern Ontario Business Staff. “See ya in court, CN.”

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

laughing, “I got one.”⁵⁰ Barbara was stripped of her humanity and turned into an object: nothing more than a target deserving of violence based solely on her lack of whiteness.

Reserves, as expressions of colonial ideology, normalize and invisibilize oppressive practices through establishing Indigenous peoples as legal Others who are targeted by social policing of space. The reserve has been actively constructed as impoverished and lacking in resources, which allows Thunder Bay to imagine itself as the opposite. The people and spaces of both communities are relationally constructed, making the bridge over the Kaministiquia a space that reinforces this binary. Yet, as this paper argues, reserves like FWFN that are imagined as impoverished are in fact constructed as such through structural forms of racism, exemplified in the burning of the James Street Bridge.

The creation of the James Street swing bridge facilitated historical occupation and dispossession of Indigenous lands, and the failure to rebuild is facilitating segregation and violence against the people of FWFN. CN Rail, the City of Thunder Bay, and the varying levels of government involved have failed

FWFN with their messy handling of the James Street Swing Bridge. Jurisdictional squabbles overshadowed the urgency of this act of environmental violence, deepening the socio-spatial between FWFN and Thunder Bay while failing to address the institutional, social, and police violence against community members. As the settler-colonial state is invested in environmental racism, the problem FWFN faces is “not a lack of knowledge or skill, but a lack of political will that must be attributed to racial capitalism.”⁵¹ The unnerving ties between the “undetermined” ruling on the bridge and the “no evidence of foul play” rulings for Indigenous youth shows how Thunder Bay and the varying levels of colonial government and corporations do not consider the violence against the Indigenous peoples living amongst and alongside them. This problematic history and current reality of disinterest leaves me with a sinking feeling in my stomach, wondering what has been left undisclosed.

⁵⁰ Macdonald, “A River of Tears.”

⁵¹ Pulido, “Geographies of Race and Ethnicity II,” 529.

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