The Journal of Political Studies

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

This edition of the UBC Journal of Political Studies is the product of many hours of work. First, we have our instructors designing and teaching courses that challenge and intrigue our students. Then students work many hours to research and write a course paper and consider feedback from their teachers. The next step is critical, a considerable number of students take the risk to have their work reviewed by their peers and perhaps published for a broader audience. Next comes our team of all volunteer student editors who read through and evaluate every submitted paper. This step is time-consuming, challenging, and involves multiple stages of review and discussion. After much time and effort, the editorial team produces a short-list of papers and each is then reviewed by a faculty member from the department. Authors then work with editors and the feedback they have received to improve and polish their work. Only a slim number of originally submitted papers get to the final stage – publication.

In short, students volunteer their time, effort, and work over the course of a year to produce the volume you may now read. This journal is a wonderful opportunity for student editors and authors to develop their research, writing, and teamwork skills. The end result is a compelling compilation of research that reflects the interests and hard work of many students.

I am honoured to represent our broader department in congratulating the authors, editors, and, especially, the editorial executives Elif Kayali and Sara Sanabria on a wonderful accomplishment.

Sincerely,

Andrew Owen
Director of Undergraduate Programs
Department of Political Science

Letter from the Editor-in-Chief

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the 22nd edition of the UBC Journal of Political Studies(JPS)! It is my utmost honour and privilege to share with you the amazing work of both our authors and this year's Editorial Board. I feel confident that in the following pages, you will find, once again, the great undergraduate research that takes place at UBC.

As an undergraduate publication, we, now more than ever, feel the need to give undergraduate voices a platform where they can share their work with their peers. Getting published in academia is not an easy undertaking and providing the opportunity to undergraduate students has been at the core of the JPS's vision. We have worked to grow as a journal while maintaining the high quality we seek to achieve; as a result, the JPS has adopted the theme "Changing the Lens" for its 22nd publication. Our goal was to highlight narratives that are often overlooked or understated in academic and political discussions, and to underline new approaches of thinking towards well developed topics. In this edition you will find nine papers exploring a great variety of topics, ready to start insightful, unusual and meaningful conversations.

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic has cut our academic year short and we did not get a chance to launch this year's edition as we would like. Therefore, I would like to take this opportunity to first thank our authors for their wonderful work and dedication; without them, none of this would be possible. Second, I want to acknowledge our Editorial Board for their hard work, and invaluable insights; I could not have asked for a better team. Moreover, I would like to thank our faculty reviewers for their time and invaluable feedback, as well as the Director of Undergraduate Programs Professor Andrew Owen and the Department Head Professor Richard Price for believing in undergraduate research and their support. Finally, I also want to thank our Managing Editor Sara Sanabria, without whose hard work and passion this edition would not be possible, and our designer Daniela Buitrago for her creativity and intriguing designs.

It was my privilege to work with such a thoughtful, dedicated, and hard working team, and I am honoured to present what they have created to you. I hope that in these uncertain times that call for critical political discussions, you will find our 22nd edition as inspiring and as challenging as I do.

Elif Kayali
Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Staff

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Elif Kayali is a fourth year international student double majoring in Political Science and Economics. She is especially interested in security studies, political and economic development, Middle Eastern studies, gender studies, and international law. In her free time, Elif likes to watch movies, learn more about film production, and read. After graduating she hopes to either explore investigative journalism or frontline social work. Elif is super excited to be a part of the 2020 edition of the JPS and is looking forward to a year working with amazing people.

MANAGING EDITOR

Sara Sanabria is in the dual BA program between Sciencespo Paris and UBC. At SciencesPo she pursued the Euro-American program with a concentration in International Law. At UBC she double majors in Political Science and International Relations. Sara's main interests include Latin American Politics and International Law, She hopes to pursue a career in International Arbitration after graduating from the McGill faculty of Law.

PUBLISHING DIRECTOR

Sabeeha A Manji is a fourth year student majoring in Political Science and minoring in Law and Society. She is interested in a wide range of human rights issues including women's health and human rights, the politics of humanitarianism and forced displacement in the context of migration, ethics in world politics, international security and national security policy with a regional focus on East Africa. She intends to pursue a masters in political science/public policy and global affairs after her graduation.

DESIGNER

Daniela Buitrago is a Vancouver-based designer, inspired by the world of Art history, books and technology. To see more of her work, you can visit www.danielabuitrago.com

Will Curtain is a fourth year student majoring in Political Science with a minor in German Studies. He has undertaken political activity both in his native UK and in Canada, where he completed the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions' Summer Institute for Future Legislators, gaining invaluable insight into legislative processes in Westminster systems. Outside of school he enjoys keeping fit takes a keen interest in soccer and is an avid fan of Tottenham Hotspur.

Carson Debert is a fourth year Political Science and Canadian Studies major from Regina, Saskatchewan. Involved in activism and politics from an early age, they have volunteered on political campaigns on the Municipal, Provincial, and Federal level across the country. In their degree, they have focused largely on Canadian Politics vis a vis federalism, regionalism, elections, and Canadian nationalisms. Their work in Canadian Studies largely focuses on gay, colonial, and constitutional histroy. They're hoping to continue their education, and after graduating they hope to move à Montréal pour améliorer son français! Other activities they enjoy include: eating, sleeping, and drinking water.

Jaanam Jaswani is a fourth year Political Science major and English literature minor. Her political interests are in global climate policy, Southeast Asian relations, political theory, and public policy. In her spare time she enjoys performing slam poetry, figure skating, afro-latin social dance, and creating recipes. She's keen on exploring journalism and social impact after graduating, and she's incredibly grateful to have this opportunity to work in such a marvelous team!

Luca di Prata is a fourth year student working toward a double major in political science and philosophy. In his spare time, Luca enjoys writing for his Star Wars blog, writing and performing with his band, and demonstrates an enthusiasm for culinary. Regarding political science and further academic pursuits, Luca's interests include contemporary political theory and political economics in the context of public policy in democratic countries. Since reading the works of John Maynard Keynes, Milton Friedman, and John Rawls in high-school, his combined passion for politics, economics, and philosophy have since led him to write on the topics of Bitcoin regulation in Canada (2018), a study on the proportional relationship between hate crime statistics and broadcasts (2018), and a comparative analysis of Public-Private Partnerships in Canada (2019). Further, Luca's interests extend to philosophy of religion, and the intellectual history of western thought.

Isabella Preite is a third year student majoring in Political Science. In her senior year of high school, she represented students at the Vancouver School Board, which fed her curiosity and enthusiasm for the field. She is passionate about the intersection of media and political engagement, and is currently embarking on her own project about how social media is shifting political landscapes. In her free time, Isabella enjoys perusing through vintage clothing stores and considers herself an avid music nerd. Isabella is incredibly excited about working with the JPS team this year and to contribute to this year's edition.

Claire Sarson is a fourth year Political Science and Canadian Studies major. Her primary interests include comparative politics, security studies, decolonization, and security and migration trends in settler states. In her free time, Claire likes to read, half-complete crossword puzzles, and excitedly point out dogs on the street. Following graduation, Claire would like to pursue a graduate degree in Political Science focusing on comparative politics. She is looking forward to an enjoyable and inspiring year with the JPS.

Aleena Sharma is a fourth year student pursuing a combined major in Economics and Political Science. Academically, her particular areas of interest include international relations, political and economic development, inequality, and public health. In her spare time, she enjoys watching documentaries, reading mystery novels and volunteering at the Downtown Eastside Women's Centre. Aleena is excited to help students share their research interests and is looking forward to being a part of the JPS editorial board.

Christina Dasom Song is a fourth year majoring in Political Science and Economics. She is delighted whenever there is a print version of anything anymore although she also likes trees. Her specific interest within political science is how religion shapes politics as well as how one's sense of the past informs one's sense of the possible.

Bingjun Tang is a third year student attending the Honours Program in Political Science. His interest in the discipline is currently China-focused, including the characteristics of the country's meritocratic institutions in facilitating governance, as well as the rise of the Chinese state in an international context and its impact to the liberal world order. Due to the recent rise of populism across Western states, Bingjun has also taken up an interest in critically examining the aspects of liberal democracy that have allowed populist sentiments to thrive. He looks forward to a fulfilling year working with fellow editors of the Journal.

Kevin Wong is a third year Political Science major with a minor in Law and Society. He has worked for both the provincial and federal governments, and currently works on two different research projects, one of which focuses on analysis of language used in news reporting and reactions. In research, he is particularly interested in Canadian federalism, political theory, public policy, methods of governance, and collective identity. In his free time, he reads light novels and tries to sleep.

Julian Yau is a third year student majoring in Political Science, with a minor in Law and Society. His areas of focus include security studies, international law, and political theory. In his free time, he enjoys watching football, biking around Vancouver, and watching Designated Survivor.

Author Biographies

Madeleine Bedford is a third year BA student majoring in Law & Society and Political Science and International Relations. Whilst completing her degree at the University of Western Australia in her hometown of Perth, Maddy spent 6 months studying in Vancouver through the UBC exchange program. Through this experience she was able to deepen her understanding and passion for international conflict resolution, as well as ignite a love and admiration for the beautiful British Columbia where she hopes to return to after graduation.

Sadie Cameron is a fourth year BA student pursuing a combined major in Political Science and Economics, with a minor in Environment and Society. Her academic interests include environmental governance and the political theory of climate change. In her spare time, Sadie likes to ski, hike, and read, and she intends to take a year off after graduation to do just that.

Jamie Cin Yee Leung is currently a fifth year Honours Political Science student at UBC and a Junior Research Scholar with the Asia Pacific Foundation. Her academic interests include popular culture, new media, contentious politics, and diaspora studies. Jamie's undergraduate thesis is a case study on a Chinese danmei media franchise, and how its transnational dissemination is constituted by officially sanctioned commercialization and subversive fan activity. When not participating in online fan projects, Jamie enjoys reading xianxia novels and listening to audio dramas. Following graduation, she will be conducting her master's thesis on the convergence between fandom and civic organization.

Emma Ettinger is a settler-colonizer of Slavic descent, in their fourth year of studies on the stolen territory of the Musqueam Peoples. They are a First Nations and Indigenous Studies major, and Political Science minor, with a particular interest in decolonial Marxist theory. Emma hopes to pursue a career in law, and continue fighting for the community to which they are accountable, Vancouver's Downtown Eastside, where they now work as a support worker.

Andrew Falle is in his final year of study at UBC, majoring in Political Science and minoring in Law and Society. His academic interests include topics concerning the law and governance of outer space, international maritime law and Arctic environmental governance in relation to resource extraction and shipping. After graduation he plans on taking a year off to work and focus on applications for graduate programs in either law or political science.

Nicolo Jimenez is a fifth-year student completing an Honours Bachelor of Arts in Geography and Political Science at the University of British Columbia. His research interests explore the nexus between urban studies, economic geography, political ecology, and environmental governance. He is passionate about building community through student leadership and scholarship, and currently serves

as a Collegia Advisor and Student Representative on the President's Awards Committee. Nico is excited to pursue graduate studies at the University of Cambridge this fall.

Julian Lam is a second-year BA student seeking to pursue a major in International Relations, with a minor in Economics. Besides enjoying a good book or political documentary, you can find Julian at the beach or one of Vancouver's hiking trails. His academic interests fall into the topics of international trade flows and identity politics, particularly nationalist movements. After graduation, Julian hopes to pursue a law degree and eventually, to work as a diplomat.

Njoki Mburu is in her final year specializing in International Development, within the Global Resource Systems Program, housed in the Faculty of Land and Food Systems. She grew up in Ol-Rongai, Kenya, where she lived on her grandparents' farm and came to value community food security and environmental health. She is excited to pursue a career in Public Policy, with a focus on improving self-sufficiency and supporting in securing land-rights for small-holder farmers throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.

Daanish Sayani is in his third year at UBC, and is pursuing an Honours in Geography with a minor in Sociology. His academic interests at present include urban politics, technocratization, and critical geographies of political expertise (particularly with an eye towards South Asia). After graduating, he plans to pursue postgraduate programs in Geography. He hopes to eventually do research, whether inside or outside of academia.

Why International Intervention Will Not Resolve the Libyan Civil War

MADELEINE BEDFORD

The internationalization of intrastate conflicts is a common trend within the field of contemporary security studies. This paper aims to examine the impact of international intervention on the second Libyan Civil War, an ongoing violent conflict plaguing the state since 2014. Due to its important economic, geographical and political position in the world, Libya has become a battleground for international influence in multiple spheres of interest. The addition of these international rivalries has done nothing but increase the complexity and duration of the war; the outcome of which will have a profound impact on the current state of international relations.

The Libyan Civil War is perhaps one of the most complex conflicts of the 21st century. Waging in a fragile North African state, the fight for control over territory and resources has left thousands of soldiers and civilians dead, with hundreds of thousands more forced to flee from their homes, with no clear end in sight.[1] Whilst international intervention has been a frequent player in the history of the nation, achieving significant change such as the fall of long-running dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, recent attempts at such involvement have been far less effective in creating meaningful and necessary progress. Rather than achieving stability, the prioritization of self-interest by members of the international community and ongoing attempts to gain influence within the region has worked to prove the ineffectiveness of interstate intervention in contemporary sub-national conflicts. Due to regional rivalries stemming from the Arab Spring uprisings, the allure of the Libyan oil industry, counterterrorism policy of the West and the current divide within the UN, current forms of international intervention have resulted in increased polarization and complexity throughout Libya rather than aiding in conflict resolution.

CONTEXTUALIZING THE CONFLICT

The current phase of the Libyan Civil War, beginning in 2014, finds its origins in the fall of dictator Gaddafi in late 2011.[2] Ruling for a total of 42 years, Gaddafi ran a strict anti-Islamic, authoritarian campaign characterized by the rejection of

Islamic fundamentalism in favour of a form of socialism. Revolts during the Arab Spring uprisings of late 2010 led to a widespread reprisal of democracy throughout the region. With the help of NATO, Gaddafi was overthrown and the responsibility of establishing a secure state seceded to a transitional government.[3] Since then, attempts to create and maintain stability have been numerous as elections have failed to create a majority government equipped to deal with the fractured state and its many rival groups. The ongoing battle between formerly repressed Islamists and nationalists turned into a full scale war following a controversial election in 2014, in which Islamists suffered heavy losses.[4] As a result, a second government was created, with the two groups vying for control of territory, oil and influence. The new government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), was recognized by the UN and Libya's allies as the sole legitimate authority of Libya almost immediately.[5] The originally elected government, known as the Tobruk government, however, rejected this and has been launching aggressive campaigns in an attempt to reestablish control over the country ever since.[6] These offences have been led by Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, head of the Libyan National Army (LNA)—the armed forces in support of the Tobruk government.[7]

LEGACY OF THE ARAB SPRING

Due to the lack of cohesive religious and political alignment in Libya since 2011, the state has become a battleground of influence from either side of the former Arab

Spring movement. Both regional and global actors have become involved in attempts to influence the future of the state. Qatar and Turkey have sponsored the Muslim Brotherhood, attempting to spread Shari'a law throughout the region.[8] Libya, therefore, could increase the geopolitical influence of Doha. These countries have allied with the internationally recognized GNA, due to their role as a transitional government in creating a democratic state within Libya—one of the Muslim Brotherhood's transnational goals, alongside the implementation of Shari'a law and unification of Islamic countries.[9] Contrastingly, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Egypt, all supported by France, have adopted strict anti-Islamist international policies and have subsequently aligned with Haftar's offence against the Islamist parties and militias within Libya.[10] As a former ally to Gaddafi, who forbade all forms of Islam, Haftar is seen as the strongest vehicle to counter this revolution. He advances with the rhetoric that military dictatorship is the only way to bring stability to the fragile state and end the ongoing battle for influence throughout the country's numerous religious, ethnic and geographical groups, including the Islamic State.[11] Though his methods are not necessarily popular, the proven inability of the GNA to counter Islamist threats to national stability have earned him support from numerous international actors, both politically and militarily.[12] Through the provision of resources such as war technology, weapons, soldiers, and propaganda to both sides of the conflict,[13] these international rivalries have only increased the degree and length of the civil war rather than bring about any potential solution.

The international competition for influence has not only prolonged the conflict, but resulted in the emergence of a new dimension taking place in the air. Due to technology provided by foreign allies, air and drone strikes have become a defining and dangerous tactic used against militant groups,[14] resulting in a more complicated and more lethal fight. This trend emerged in 2014, when Emrati pilots began conducting air strikes against Islamist militant groups seeking to take control of Tripoli.[15] The UAE military was acting without international authorization;[16] the strikes underscored the UAE's degree of commitment to the anti-Islamic regime and sparked the ongoing trend of states' refusal to align with the UN's position to support the GNA.[17] Since this incident, the use of airstrikes and armed drones by all parties to the conflict has increased exponentially; Haftar's most recent assault on Tripoli in April 2019 was largely reliant on the use of Chinese-made Wing Loong drones provided by the UAE.[18] The GNA, meanwhile, has been supplied by Turkey with several Bayraktar TB2 craft used for surveillance and long distance strikes on arms depots.[19] According to the the United Nations Special Representative for Libya, the conflict has seen over 900 drone missions flown, with increasing in frequency in recent months,[20] cementing their strategic importance and relevance for military clashes.

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The increased use of drones, which are cheaper and more precise than human-manned attack aircrafts, has allowed foreign actors to increasingly fight proxy wars without endangering their own personnel. Turkey and the UAE have both been discovered targeting the other's assets.[21] The LNA and GNA both openly blame them for major attacks on civilians and control rooms throughout Libya, further internationalizing the conflict and adding complexity beyond the fundamental fight for stability.[22] The battle to establish regional hegemony in the wake of the Arab Spring is thus being fought out on Libyan soil, at the expense of Libyan lives through the use of drones and other advanced military technology. Instead of helping to solve the conflict, as international intervention purportedly intends, this involvement is only intensifying it, making it harder to maintain accountability and find sustainable solutions.

Another role these Arab Spring actors play in the Libyan civil war is the emergence of a media war that has increased the polarity of the conflict between the East and the West. Cyber attacks and social media propaganda have become an effective tool to advance the political goals of both sides.[23] Participants use hacking, document leaking and social media posting used to promote their own agendas. The most recent example of this is the hacking of the GNA Twitter page, whereby a false statement was posted that the GNA had stepped down and left security arrangements to be handled by Haftar's forces.[24] This tweet led only to confusion, and highlights the importance of social media for governments to communicate with their citizens and danger this presents for future incidents. Foreign actors like the UAE have participated in waging this cyber war. According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, Abu Dhabi is widely viewed as being key to the creation of several television stations and news websites behind the pro-Haftar propaganda machine that dominates the Libyan media landscape. This machine has been crucial to strengthening Haftar's public image, generating public support for his military advances, and slandering his opponents.[25]

Both traditional media and new media are used to reshape public opinion. Social media such as Facebook and Twitter to receive information in Libya have proven to be powerful propaganda tools as false news spreads quickly throughout the state. For example, posts detail proclaimed seizures of territory, battle victories, and reports of brutality by military groups combat and towards civilians.[26] This false information has made it difficult for citizens to make informed decisions and has fuelled further polarization, manifesting in more violent conflict for all. Much of this social media content is generated overseas. One third of all pro-Haftar material published between March and September 2019 originated from Saudi Arabia,[27] cementing international influence on the outcomes of the conflict in real time.

The legacy of the Arab Spring has thus created a new battleground for the fight for geopolitical influence in North Africa. Ongoing disputes between the UAE and Turkey (and

their corresponding allies) as a result of the democratic uprisings in 2011 has led to the modernization of combat in Libya, alongside increased polarization and the spread of misinformation. The continuous funding of both sides of the war through drones, weapons, personnel and propaganda by foreign actors shows that international intervention in the Libyan Civil War will only work to make each party stronger and able to continue their fight for governance rather than pacifying the conflict.

INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN OIL

As the primary source of national income,[28] control of Libya's oil industry is the most important pursuit for both the GNA and LNA in order to establish influence over the country. Libya's abundance of oil reserves—the largest in Africa[29]—and geographical position on the Mediterranean make it highly desirable to foreign actors who seek to gain dominance over extraction companies and ports. Ports are primarily owned and run by multinational companies such as Italy's Eni, France's Total, and Britain's BP,[30] making it difficult to separate the conflict from foreign partners operating within the changing political environment. Since the beginning of the conflict, control of oil reserves has flipped between the GNA and Haftar's forces, with Haftar seizing more and more territory as the conflict continues.[31] The battle for control over this important economic resource not only impacts actors already involved in the Libyan industry, but attracts new players looking to invest in the region. Thus, Libya becomes an environment

within which cohesive and enforceable international solutions are almost impossible to achieve.

The largest international rivalry for this oil is between France and Italy, who were both involved in the Libyan oil industry years before the overthrow of Gaddafi, and have been fighting for influence ever since.[32] As Haftar has progressed into the South, contracts between the GNA and Italy fell through, effectively "nullifying their advantageous position" and denying them access to the extensive oil fields they once held.[33] France (who has provided Haftar with military assistance and aided the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt) has been the largest beneficiary of the southern reserves.[34] France's backing of Haftar for his anti-Islamic policies is thus coupled with a further incentive to support him in order to gain relative power over Italy in the oil industry and to guarantee their access to reserves throughout Libya for the foreseeable future.[35] This involvement in Libya, contrary to the diplomatic position advertised by French officials who recognize the GNA as the government,[36] presents a double game that weakens the international community's power in presenting a united front against Haftar and his military regime. Not only does France's hypocrisy damage international unity, their dealings with Haftar also present a challenge to the economic and security interests of former colonial power Italy. The threat to EU unity presents further consequences of choosing sides in the Libyan Civil War, tempting states to adopt unclear positions and participate in backdoor deals instead of vying for a collective solution to end the conflict. These two

ramifications are yet another reason why current forms of international involvement in the Libyan Civil War will not help in bringing about an end to the conflict; states are incentivized to choose sides in service of their own interests rather than to bring about stability as a whole.

Whilst many international actors involved have decided to back one party in order to advance their interests, there are several states that have benefitted from the lack of stability altogether, incentivizing them to abstain from providing international solutions at all. The status quo, whereby different territories are controlled by different groups, has proven to be beneficial for the economic interests of China and Russia, two major players in the international dispute resolution system. Neither Russia nor China has aligned with a single group, instead opting to liaise with multiple parties in order to guarantee their influence in the region,[37] no matter who ends up in power. Russia's strategy has been to provide Haftar indirect assistance, by printing Libyan currency[38] for example, whilst still engaging in economic deals with the GNA to secure investments in oil controlled by either party.[39] China, on the other hand, sees nonalignment as an advantageous strategy to secure important reconstruction projects in the region. In pursuit of greater influence in Libya, "China has taken steps to entrench itself as a major force in Libya's oil industry and construction sector—both that controlled by the LNA and that controlled by the GNA".[40] China's 'Belt and Road Initiative' prompts infrastructure projects in order to become

increasingly important in establishing hegemonic power across the globe, and Libya's important geopolitical position and large oil reserves and economic potential make it an attractive target to enhance the project throughout Northern Africa. The decision not to take action opposing any participant thus benefits China, who wants to guarantee Libya's participation in its quest for regional power regardless of who gains control of the government at the end.

This pattern of liaising with both armies makes it far more difficult for the international community to provide a resolution to the ongoing civil war. The economic potential of the oil industry in Libya has attracted some of the most powerful international actors to take interest in the outcome, however with a clear lack of direction in the conflict, none of them are incentivized to bring about an end to it. Instead, to guarantee future influence over the region, China and Russia are opting to aid all parties to the conflict which results in the continuation of the conflict through the increased supply of combat resources. Thus, the international community is unable to come together to enforce any effective sanctions or methods to bring about an end to the conflict, making any attempt at intervention functionally useless.

COUNTERTERRORISM AS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE GNA

The 'war on terror' is a popular foreign policy initiative for many Western democracies in the post 9/11 era. Many have prioritized the fight against Islamic extremism abroad in order to

maintain global peace and security, and have initiated and supported foreign intervention in the name of counterterrorism. However, in Libya, counterterrorist rhetoric complicates the current UN strategy of supporting the GNA.[41] Alongside the Turkish and Qatari public support of jihadist terror groups such as al-Qaeda, states are divided by the discovery of radical jihadist fighters amongst the ranks of the GNA.[42] Choosing between supporting a terrorist-supported government or a military dictator is dissonant with the policies of Western democracies who view both options as a threat to the international order. Governments such as the United States thus present mixed messages as to where their allegiance lies.[43] Global counterterrorism efforts thus present another reason why international intervention in Libya is only further complicating the conflict, and turning Libyan soil into a battleground for international disputes to be played out.

Since 2014, Haftar has used the rubric of counterterrorism to garner international support for his advances against the GNA.[44] Since the rise of ISIS, Haftar and other authoritarian leaders have gained sympathy from Western democracies, arguing that only an authoritarian regime can bring stability, stop the spread of extremism and minimize migration out of fragile states such as Libya.[45] The rise of populism throughout the world in response to ongoing crises like the Libyan Civil War has marked a movement away from the trend of democratization, and raises the question of whether or not an elected government is the most effective way of governing a state in crisis.

This, alongside the collective fear of terrorism, has led to an increase in popular support for Haftar's forces.[46] This has created a different dimension within the conflict; not only is the civil war between the GNA and the LNA, but also between LNA and radical jihadists opposing the resurrection of the anti-Islamist policies of the Gaddafi era.[47] As fractured jihadist groups gather in Tripoli, the city becomes "a magnet for extremist groups who themselves oppose Hafter, rendering his vows to fight terrorists a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy".[48] GNA resources that would be used to counter ISIS have been diverted to fight the intensified battle with Haftar. This combination has helped Haftar appear as though he is fighting for the interests of the Western world, rather than Libya's, and has led to a reduction in popular support for the GNA despite their international legitimacy.

Historically, the US has supported the establishment of a democratic regime in Libya and has taken an active role in doing so through its involvement in the NATO intervention,[49] funding of United Nations peacekeeping missions[50] and public support for the GNA as the legitimate governing body of Libya.[51] Whilst the Department of Homeland Security has maintained this position throughout the increase in terrorist activity,[52] other US government institutions present a different policy position on the matter. In April of 2019, news emerged of a phone call between President Trump and Haftar, in which Trump praised Haftar's "significant role in fighting terrorism and securing Libya's oil resources," and the two "discussed a shared vision

for Libya's transition to a stable, democratic political system".[53] Taken by many as a green light to continue Haftar's offensives in Tripoli, this marked an apparent reversal of US policy which only days earlier released a statement demanding Haftar to stand down and cease fighting in the capital.[54] Counterterrorism has been used on multiple occasions to justify US foreign policy that supports undemocratic rulers,[55] making the US's position on the matter blurrier as time goes on. Humanitarians have criticized this policy as empowering groups that have contradicted criminal and international humanitarian law, and prioritizing 'security' over the protection of democratic and humanitarian principles.[56] The lack of clarity in policy direction for this very reason has been reflected in unilateral policy in the US, but also in multilateral negotiations on Libya in the UN Security Council.

Global counterterrorism policies endorsed by the West have therefore added a new split between the factions of the Libyan Civil War, causing resistance from the international community to act decisively and divert resources effectively. Whilst the GNA upholds the ideal of promoting democracy throughout developing nations, their association with terrorists threatens the global regime against terrorism and blurs the line between the support for human rights and the need for stability. Whilst Haftar's authoritarianism goes against what many consider to be the normatively 'right' way to govern, his use of counterterrorism as a justification for his actions has earned

him sympathy throughout the West, further delaying an international consensus.

FRICTION WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has attempted to establish stability in Libya. Their policy to present united international support for the GNA was only the beginning of their involvement in the conflict, as multiple resolutions have since been presented to the Security Council concerning the provision of political and humanitarian aid to the country.[57] Whilst initially able to enforce these measures, the recent divide between members of the Security Council have led to a stagnation of progress due to conflicting interests. Important members of the Security Council (namely Russia and the US) can block resolutions that privilege one party to the conflict over another.[58]

Russia's lack of ideological consistency in the Libyan conflict has changed in recent months. As Haftar's forces gain control of more territory and resources, Russian military forces have begun to actively intervene in support of him through the provision of jets, coordinated missile strikes, artillery, and advanced snipers to the conflict.[59] This increased involvement has changed their position in the UN from proclaiming support for the GNA alongside the rest of the international community, to actively ensuring the protection of Haftar's regime. In April 2019, Britain brought forth a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Tripoli, whereby Haftar's forces had launched an offensive campaign to gain control earlier that

week, which was subsequently blocked from passing.[60] Russia's justification for blocking the resolution centred around the use of language that "criticized Haftar's offensive as a threat to Libyan stability,"[61] highlighting Russia's increased support and involvement. Due to the UN being in favour of democratic institutions, it is unlikely to promote any resolution in support of Haftar, creating a stalemate within the Security Council. As long as the veto power is in practice, it is improbable that the Security Council will create any effective and enforceable measures in support of the GNA, leaving them reliant on unilateral support which is inferior to the advanced technologies and support of the LNA.

The history of intervention by the US and France has shaped the rhetoric surrounding intervention in the Libyan Civil War, particularly in the wake of the 2011 NATO intervention. NATO's failure to fulfill political commitments after the fall of Gaddafi has been widely criticized as a primary reason for the complex nature of the current Libyan conflict.[62] France and the US thus see it as "their responsibility" to intervene and establish the originally intended democratic government they have attempted to support ever since,[63] primarily by way of the United Nations. However, as highlighted by contentions explored previously in this paper, such as interests in the Libyan oil industry and counterterrorism, neither of these states have committed to a coherent position, let alone presented themselves as avid supporters of the UN-supported GNA. The US also blocked the draft resolution brought forth by Britain in order to buy time and figure out its position following developments in the conflict.[64] The lack of support from two actors with a perceived responsibility to provide a solution to the civil war highlights the inability of the UN Security Council to bring about meaningful change and resolution to the conflict, as internal divisions only weaken the appearance of the international coalition against Haftar.

CONCLUSION

The Libyan Civil War is a highly complicated conflict involving numerous domestic, regional and global actors. Though the international community has attempted to relieve the country from its violent circumstances through calls for support, ceasefires, and humanitarian aid, deep divides between rivalling allies have led to a stagnation. The political turmoil in the wake of the Arab Spring created Libya into a battlefield for Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to vie for influence, allowing them and their allies to further fuel the conflict through the distribution of weapons, technology, personnel and propaganda. Aid to multiple parties prohibits the victory of one party to the conflict, and is a primary reason why the war is able to continue with such ferocity, only to falter in intensity over the past six years. Their rivalry, coupled with international influence in the Libyan oil industry, means that the rest of the international community is unable to take a coherent position and support a single side of the conflict. Attempted

sanctions and deals are ineffective due to the competition amongst states for influence over Libya.

The use of counterterrorism as a justification for the reintroduction of authoritarian rule by Haftar further complicates the positions of Western democracies on the conflict, which must decide whether or not to prioritize stability within Libya over supporting actors who compromise global security. Rather than resulting in a united front against or in favour of any party, blurred lines between vested interests have created a preference for nonalignment by global powers such as the US. With a lack of direction from these important countries, the international community is left without a guiding strategy, making it difficult to have any significant influence over the conflict. This, coupled with the inability of the UN Security Council to pass any binding resolutions, has meant that international intervention is not only exacerbating the situation in Libya and is unlikely to provide a solution in the near future. It is clear that the Libyan Civil War is not easily resolvable, and despite being the preferred global response, the involvement of international actors is a source of complication within all aspects of the conflict.

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Flat Earth: Two-dimensional Territory, the Sovereign State System, and Climate Change

SADIE CAMERON

Considering Simon Dalby's statement that "competitive state rivalries in a flat world is the problem to be tackled, not the given implicit context for the human drama,"[1] this paper asks: how can the sovereign state system be rethought and reformatted to confront climate change effectively? I propose that conceiving of territory as three-dimensional can dismantle several assumptions of the sovereign state system that lead to climate change, and enable decision-makers to better address it. In this paper, I provide a synthesis of the current literature on three-dimensional territory and climate change to set the foundation for conceptualizing a three-dimensional model.

INTRODUCTION

The term "anthropocene" is often applied to the period of time we are living in to signify the drastic impact that humans have on ecosystems and environmental processes, compared to other species and even our own species in the past. As we continue conducting our daily lives on a planet that is continuously getting hotter—both the past five years and the past decade are the hottest on record in 150 years[2]—the term seems fitting. Scientists have known for decades that human activity causes average global temperatures to rise over time, and this appears to be proving true at an alarming rate. Yet the international community has failed to conduct a decisive response to climate change, and temperatures continue to rise. Perhaps the greatest disappointment is the 2015 Paris Agreement, an international environmental agreement that was intended to limit global warming to well below 2°C and which has instead seen the vast majority of countries shirk their climate goals. Why is inefficacy an acceptable standard for state action in the face of a crisis this existential and time-sensitive?

I propose that the two-dimensional sovereign state system is built on principles and norms that undermine effective climate action, and that a reimagining of the state system is necessary to create meaningful solutions to combat climate change. I begin with an analysis of several ways that the sovereign state perpetuates and aggravates climate change. I examine the selective ethics of states, how states obscure the class relations and modes of production that drive climate change, issues with the concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and how the state can work against principles of sovereignty. I then examine how these issues are enabled by a two-dimensional understanding of territory, which is an understanding of territory as inanimate and static matter, and a solely political and historical rather than natural space. Following this critique, I present the "three-dimensional" model of territory: a method of conceptualizing the world not in anthropocentric political terms but natural, physical ones, as a non-static, unpredictable and unconquerable living environment.

WESTPHALIAN NORMS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

The international community's inability to present an effective, lasting global solution to the problem of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions is a key problem which stems from the shortcomings of the sovereign, territorially bounded state system. The sovereign state system is a set of rules and norms that govern what modern states are, how they behave, and how they interact with each other. These include the concept of state sovereignty over all that occurs within a country's borders, including permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and the idea of states as competitors on an international stage. The shortcomings of this system include such things as states' incentive to consider only the short-term; states' moral preference for the good of their own citizens over the global good; borders concealing emissions responsibility; how the state works to obscure capitalism as a root cause

of climate change when international solutions are discussed; and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.

THE SELECTIVE ETHICS OF STATES

Paul Harris summarizes the impact of the international system on environmental governance in the following quotation:

> Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the world has been guided by, and governments have sought to reinforce, international norms of state recognition, sovereignty, and non-intervention[...] Westphalian international norms have been so powerful as to result in a doctrine of international environmental justice...This doctrine...mitigates against cooperation for the common good, instead encouraging promotion of narrow and short-term perceived interests of states.[3]

The "narrow and short-term" objectives of states, particularly maximizing the economic value derived from the extraction of natural resources, are a feature of an international state system where power and hegemony are the ultimate objectives. What is good for a state in a system where it must compete against other states for influence, power, and the resources that create this influence and power is far from the common good of all people. Instead, it is the good of the individual state and its citizens that is often pursued at the expense of other states' citizens and the global good. In sum, Westphalian norms encourage "selective ethics of nation states[...which] prioritize some territories, environments, and ecosystems over others."[4] These selective ethics are liable to harm those who are most vulnerable and privilege the most culpable, as the wealthiest countries and people who contribute the most to global emissions are able to adapt to climate change, while the poorest who contribute the least do not have the means or power to do so.[5]

Furthermore, the most powerful states in the international system who have the most ability to push forward drastic action on climate change have the least incentive to do so. Currently, "international law on climate change [constitutes] a definition of rights of property over the 'earth's carbon-cycling capacity'[...and] these rights are devised and distributed in a highly unequal manner, in line with the relative powers of [...] states."[6] International law on climate change is built on the interests of powerful states who derive their power from the economic value which often comes from the industries that cause climate change, and thus, the international system consistently fails to produce meaningful solutions to climate change. This demonstrates that the "assumption that economic progress leads to more power in the international system, and that power is the key to peace and prosperity, is now hopelessly ill fitted to shaping the future of the Anthropocene."[7] In the pursuit of short-term economic progress and the international power that accompanies it, states work against their own long-term interests by aggravating the climate crisis and shirking their duties to solve it. This myopia on the part of states harms the most vulnerable and privileges the

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most culpable, by encouraging inaction on climate change for the states which are most capable of taking action.

HOW THE STATE OBSCURES UNEQUAL EMISSIONS

Harris also critiques Westphalian norms for their role in simplifying responsibility for climate change down to the singular, reductive level of the state:

> [A] fundamental flaw in the international management of climate change [is the] underlying norms and ethics that give overriding importance to states and their national interests, rather than to the people and groups who ultimately cause and are most affected by climate change... think[ing] only in terms of states... fail[s] to account for rising greenhouse gas emissions among affluent people in the historically less responsible countries of the developing world.[8]

The international system confines the allocation of responsibility for climate change to the state level,[9] because the state is the main international actor, and consequently where most large-scale climate policy is made. When the per capita level of emissions in a given state is the most widely referenced metric of analysis, a level of nuance in the assessment of culpability for climate change is lost, which enables certain groups to continue emitting at levels that are incompatible with climate goals. There is an implicit assumption within international climate governance that "all citizens of a given state equally are emitting a share of the total emissions and therefore equally are responsible for the production of global warming."[10] This assumption is untrue; under the capitalist mode of production that is the norm in most of the world, more affluent people emit far more than lower income people, and are therefore more responsible for climate change. Confining considerations of culpability to the state level "erases the deep class inequalities and therefore also the capitalist relations of production that ultimately drive the climate crisis."[11] This results in bluntly crafted and ineffective climate policy, and precludes potentially transformative solutions that do engage with class inequalities from reaching the international stage. Climate policy should instead be informed by a recognition of who within states is really doing the majority of emitting and what mode of production enables them to do so, allowing for targeted, effective climate action.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES

The current state system also worsens climate change through its principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR). Petra Gümplová explains the principle of PSNR as "a firmly established standard of international law that authorizes states to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over natural resources and all components of the natural environment within their national boundaries."[12] This principle undermines efforts to protect the environment, because ecosystems and other natural systems operate without

consideration of the historically contingent territorial boundaries of states.[13] The aforementioned selective ethics of nation states which prioritize the good of the state's own environment and people over the global good encourage states to employ PSNR and over-extract their resources, to the detriment of other states' environments. It is often argued that PSNR is required for the efficient management of natural resources, but as Chris Armstrong asserts, "far from state control being a boon to efficient or effective use, granting states control over resources which correspond poorly at best with state boundaries has often intensified their exploitation."[14] PSNR fails to give a decision-making role over natural resource projects to all parties who may be affected by them, and it can thereby result in inefficient and environmentally destructive over-use of that resource, as those who are harmed by natural resource projects have little power to stop them.

When the exploitation of the environment in one state leads to the degradation of the environment in another state, perhaps via forest fires or flooding, the degraded state's exercise of total jurisdiction over "all components of the natural environment" within its borders is impossible. In that sense, environmental destruction from the over-use of fossil fuels, because it transcends borders, implies that the exercise of PSNR actually violates PSNR. This is a challenge to self-determination, of which PSNR is often considered to be a key component. Because "the exploitation of natural resources in one state can cause

significant harms in others,"[15] PSNR causes interstate injustice and diminishes the democratic right to self-determination and state sovereignty over territory while it intensifies climate change. This is particularly true when environmental destruction amounts to the death of a culture and traditional way of life; for example, for peoples who rely on healthy coral reefs to fish, or sea ice to go sealing. Far from the state being the protector of democracy and self-determination which statists champion, the state and its principle of PSNR leave citizens vulnerable to the unaccountable environmental influence of other states, and the consequent diminishment of self-determination. The world under climate change is fraught with the "political uncertainties of a post-Westphalian world, one where states are not even theoretically 'free' and 'equal' to enjoy 'ultimate authority over all objects and subjects within a prescribed territory.'"[16]

GEOENGINEERING, SOVEREIGNTY, AND DEMOCRACY

The sovereign state system is further implicated in degrading democracy in its facilitation of technocratic, apolitical solutions to climate change. Carl Schmitt theorizes the sovereign as "he [who] decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it… he must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety."[17] Simply put, the "sovereign is he who decides on the exception."[18] Under a state of exception, the threat to the common good is so great that the sovereign must override the law for the

survival of the state and its citizens. Climate change constitutes this type of extreme, all-encompassing threat to survival of citizens and the state in many places, and consequently the state of exception underlies several popular solutions in climate change theory, particularly geoengineering, which is a category of climate solutions that seek to intervene in Earth's natural systems and/or atmospheric processes. One example is stratospheric aerosol injection, in which gasses are purposely released into the atmosphere to reflect the sun's heat, thereby cooling the climate.[19]

The state of exception is implicit in geoengineering, because it is an action that can be unilaterally taken by a single actor (perhaps a state), that by definition alters the climate and environment of the entire planet and therefore impacts every state, though it need only be enacted by a single state. That one state becomes the "sovereign," in that it decides that there is an emergency, and suspends norms of self-determination to rectify the situation, imposing its will on people who lie outside of its constitutional powers. Mick Smith criticizes the use of the sovereign state of exception to advance apolitical solutions like geoengineering, arguing that "emergency state responsiveness would not only undermine other states' political sovereignty but also… effectively suspend the space for politics altogether both within and beyond the state's boundaries."[20] State sovereignty in this context is not a safeguard but a hindrance to democracy; since state sovereignty is "linked directly to the declaration of…'states of emergency' and anti-

political technocratic solution[s]… there is a very real sense in which the principle of sovereignty is, ultimately, not a political but an anti-political concept."[21] Furthermore, geoengineering only addresses the effects of climate change; it does nothing to stop the proximate cause (fossil fuel emissions) or the ultimate cause of climate change: an unsustainable mode of production and exploitative way of relating to the natural environment.

THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL BORDERS

The sovereign state system is also problematic because the borders it relies upon have little meaning in the context of climate change, and can become a hindrance to climate governance. Climate change is a naturally uncontainable phenomenon, as greenhouse gases permeate state borders and the effects of these greenhouse gases are not felt solely in the area where they were produced. National borders can even obstruct effective cooperative solutions, as they give the false impression of confining climate change based on a state's own efforts to cut emissions, which is misleading; the only emissions level that truly matters for climate change is the overall global emissions level.

Borders also allow for the export of culpability for climate change. Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, only domestically emitted greenhouse gases are recorded on a state's emissions account.[22] If a state produces large amounts of fossil fuels and exports those products for use within another state, the emissions from the use of these products does not appear on

the exporter's emissions account. Similarly, states can import products which involve high emissions in their production, such as steel and concrete, and avoid the emissions from those products appearing on their accounts. These goods are often imported by countries with seemingly strict rules on emissions, from countries with lax pollution rules and less efficient technology,[23] further aggravating the climate crisis. The ability to tinker with exports and imports to give the appearance of emissions reductions can absolve states of responsibility for emissions for which they are responsible and from which they benefit.

This method of emissions accounting allows states to take incremental, low-impact, but highly visible action to be implemented domestically for political gain, while refraining from pursuing meaningful solutions to the climate crisis that may be less politically expedient. Their climate goals are met on paper, but no real progress is made. Norway, for example, has crafted an image as a sustainability leader,[24] due to its dramatic goals under the Paris Agreement. Among the steps it has taken to reach those goals is the complete phaseout of petroleum powered cars, to be replaced by electric cars, by 2025.[25] This is a highly visible initiative, and gives the appearance of radical action to combat climate change; however, Norway is also the fifteenth largest petroleum producer worldwide, and the eleventh largest oil exporter.[26] Norway therefore contributes significantly to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change; however, this fact is obscured under

the Paris Agreement, because only emissions produced within a country's borders are considered in emissions accounts under the agreement. Under this emissions accounting process, states are able and incentivized to pass culpability for global warming across their borders. Borders, as they are constructed under the current state system, therefore work to weaken global climate change policy by turning climate action into a mere accounting exercise and obscuring states' true environmental impact.

TOWARDS A THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF TERRITORY

Part of the problem I have described in the state system is its inability to confront the uncontainable nature of climate change, and how its borders can mislead in several ways, from arbitrarily dividing ecosystems which do not operate according to borders, to allowing the export of culpability. Many of these issues stem from our current conceptualization of states as "two-dimensional", in which territory is thought of in static terms and human power over territory is considered absolute. This way of knowing territory influences how we relate to our environments, and thereby our ideas about how they may be controlled.

TWO-DIMENSIONAL TERRITORY

Under the current state system and its corresponding geopolitics, there is a "'flat' surface assumed in much international relations thinking,"[27] which is the pre-determined and static table upon which the billiard balls of

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states act. Territory is represented in maps, which are generally two-dimensional and display the political borders of states. The importance of an understanding of territory built upon maps should not be understated, because by "attempting to represent reality on two-dimensional surfaces, [maps] not only mirror it but also have the thing they represent. As much as describing the world, they create it."[28] The concept of the world (and more specifically, the territories) which maps create is flat, unchanging, and pre-determined, not unlike the maps themselves. Creating a world is also knowing a world; as Simon Dalby states, "geopolitics is...about the modes of knowledge, of ways of representing the world that have political consequences...Geopolitics is quite literally about how the world is made known."[29] The knowledge from world creation via maps is a two-dimensional geopolitics, where the physicality of territory disappears, but the political and historical designations we give to territory alone remain.

Two-dimensional geopolitics where states' territories are imagined in terms of their political borders reframes territory from a physical, contingent environment to a politically and historically pre-determined space. Two-dimensional territories and anthropocentric conceptions of the environment are the framework for the current geopolitical system, and this is shown in several conventions of that system. For example, with regards to the state system's principle of PSNR, Jurkevics notes that a "problem with invoking the permanent right to natural resources is the language of 'permanence' with regard

to resources and the environment."[30] This language fails to account for the constant changes occurring in the environment, and the fact that many natural resources are nonrenewable and therefore especially impermanent. Instead of territory being imagined as a complex, dynamic environment, which is *especially* true under climate change as the earth changes more dramatically and quickly, two-dimensional territory encourages an understanding of "the geographic feature[s] of the earth's surface [as] relatively stable, the stage as it were for the political dramas to unfold."[31] When territory is considered in this stable way, it creates a feeling of invulnerability to climate change, because states often have difficulty imagining their seemingly fixed territory someday being underwater, or uninhabitable. Two-dimensional territory also gives the impression that humans have been emancipated from nature's influences, which is untrue *especially* in the anthropocene, where humankind's relationship to the climate is now bidirectional, and therefore more interrelated than ever.

Finally, two-dimensional territory is an understanding of the land as "dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter [which] feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of conquest and consumption."[32] In essence, two-dimensional territory creates ample space for inaction on climate change by giving the false impression that it can be territorially contained and successfully managed via human intervention in natural systems. Considering how poorly human intervention often turns out even when intentional, the idea that we

may be able to save ourselves in the eleventh hour through interventionism is foolhardy. To combat the two-dimensional understanding of territory that exacerbates climate change and gives us a false impression of impunity, the underlying assumptions about humans' relationship to the earth must be rethought: "the Earth itself must be understood as much more than a mere surface or stage on which political contests take place: it must acquire a volumetric or vertical dimension."[33] If territory is reconsidered in this manner, climate change will be better understood as a cross-boundary, uncontainable phenomenon with grave physical consequences. This new understanding could reveal new ways of addressing climate change and inspire a less anthropocentric understanding of humans' place in the world.

THREE-DIMENSIONAL TERRITORY

In contrast to a two-dimensional understanding of the world, a three-dimensional understanding appreciates the volumes of territory. Territory becomes not a geopolitical stage, but a physical, natural environment that is constantly changing, and climate change becomes a more knowable physical reality. I propose that conceiving of territory as three-dimensional can aid in re-centering the physical and environmental aspects of territory, as opposed to the political, largely human-constructed aspects. This in turn can open new ways of thinking about and addressing climate change, which are more focused on its environmental impacts rather than the interstate struggles it causes.

Three-dimensional understandings of territory can aid in understanding climate change because climate change itself is highly volume-centric. By volume-centric, I mean that it is best understood and expressed in terms of volume, such as sea level rise, volume of sea ice remaining, and carbon ppmv (parts per million by volume).[34]

Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions building up in the earth's atmosphere are the direct cause of climate change, and therefore the 350ppmv volumetric of carbon concentration is especially "key to the climate change discussion, and to the political strategies advocating a change of course to leave those fossil fuels in the ground."[35] It encourages an understanding of the carbon in our atmosphere as a material, calculable entity, whose increases and decreases can be measured and linked back to policy. This is especially important because "represent[ing] this volume of carbon dioxide and visualiz[ing] just how much gas is involved is not easy, a matter that has a long history in human attempts to understand air. The difficulty with carbon dioxide is that while it is ubiquitous—we exhale it all the time—it is odourless and invisible… not a sensuous matter of direct human experience." The 350ppmv volumetric actualizes the otherwise nebulous atmospheric carbon into a more "direct human experience"[36] and consequently makes it visible to the policymaker's eye. Similarly, limiting sea level rise is important for the fate of many small island states whose territories are liable to be underwater by 2100 if climate change is not rapidly

and effectively addressed.[37] By adding a sense of volume and volumetrics into territory, the physical reality of climate change is centred, and made more visible to the policymaker. A more serious and materially grounded understanding of its processes and outcomes is gained, which highlights the urgency of constructing effective climate change policy.

The three-dimensional model of territory also works to challenge the idea of national borders as a clear delineation between jurisdictions over the natural environment. By considering the natural features that compose territory (such as ecosystems or watersheds) before the political boundaries of territory, the cross-boundary nature of natural systems and climate change is made clear. Tactics to address climate change must also be cross-boundary if they are to effectively address the problem. Solutions that begin and end at a state's borders, such as the accounting-based solutions discussed above that seek to "export" a state's culpability for its emissions, cease to be an option under the three-dimensional model.

The potential of the three-dimensional model of territory when considering the problem of climate change is multifold. Conceiving of territory in physical terms could be part of a remedy to inaction, as states realize the futility of stopping climate change at their borders, and thereby the fallacy of arguments for climate inaction that are based on national emissions accounting exercises. Furthermore, as three-dimensional territory allows policymakers to imagine the key volumes of climate change, perhaps inaction will no

longer seem like an option. Three-dimensional territory may also steer the policymaker away from solutions that are ecologically risky and democratically limited such as geoengineering, by exposing the limitations of human interventionism. This is because the three-dimensional model disrupts the assumptions of humankind's domination over the natural world that are implicit to these types of solutions. Three-dimensional territory puts aside the political and anthropocentric way of understanding the world that is prevalent under the sovereign state system's two-dimensional territory, in favour of a physical one, which is far better suited to the challenges of climate change.

CONCLUSION

Evidently, existing methods of addressing climate change are severely limited by our current conceptualizations of the state, sovereignty, territory, and jurisdiction. Though I have chosen only four areas in which to examine the limitations afforded by the two-dimensional model of territory, there are many more arenas in which this concept affects policy-making around climate change. Hence, the proposition of a three-dimensional model of the state allows states and policymakers alike to escape the frame that two-dimensional territory forces upon all thinking around climate change, and allows for new ideas that exceed political boundaries.

While the three-dimensional model of territory clearly has potential for confronting some conventions within the two-dimensional sovereign

state system that cause climate change, it is important to note that other problems of this system go unaddressed in a three-dimensional model. The three-dimensional model of territory is a good starting point for recentering territory within nature and making the un-containability and urgency of addressing climate change more clear, but it cannot actually address climate change and its implications for self-determination without some accompanying reconsideration of sovereignty itself. It may lay bare the problems of the sovereign state system, but further work is needed to actually reconstruct this system to fix these problems. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to present a comprehensive alternative to the sovereign state system, I will conclude by suggesting that further scholarship explore alternatives to exclusive territorial state sovereignty to grapple with the problems of climate change.

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[4] Paul G. Harris, "Introduction: cosmopolitanism and climate change policy," in *Ethics and Global Environmental Policy*, ed. Paul G. Harris (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011), 1.

[5] Harris, "Cosmopolitan diplomacy," 176

[6] Romain Felli, "Cosmopolitan solutions 'from below,'" in *Ethics and Global Environmental Policy,* ed. Paul G. Harris (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2011), 94.

[7] Simon Dalby, "Realism and geopolitics," in K. Dodds, M. Kuus, and J. Sharp (Eds.), *The Ashgate research companion to critical geopolitics* (pp. 33-47). Farnham: Ashgate Publishers, quoted in Simon Dalby, "The geopolitics of climate change," 45.

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[9] Felli, "Cosmopolitan solutions," 100.

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[11] Felli, "Cosmopolitan solutions," 101.

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[13] Gümplová, "Restraining permanent sovereignty," 95.

[14] Chris Armstrong, "Against Permanent Sovereignty," in *Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 17.

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[32] Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010): ix.

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[34] Simon Dalby, "The geopolitics of climate change," 46.

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Gaming the Nation:
Massive Multiplayer Online Gaming Platforms as a
Site of Chinese Party-State Stabilization and Subversion

JAMIE CIN YEE LEUNG

This paper evaluates how Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) are both sanctioned for nation-building purposes and employed contentiously against media censorship in China. Discourses of online gaming as pathological are under reconsideration, especially as MMOGs increasingly become state-sponsored vehicles of commercialized nationalism and ideology. Conversely, MMOGs are also appropriated creatively by gaming fans, in order to subversively criticize censorship restrictions and collectively disseminate social commentary. Ultimately, MMOGs in China are sites of complex negotiation amongst commercial, state, and fan actors, in which the boundary between repression and resistance within the Chinese cyberspace is unstable and contested.

UNDERSTANDING MMOGS BEYOND REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE

Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOGs) are graphical two-dimensional or three-dimensional video games[1] that involve comprehensive "world[s] characterized by their ability to enable thousands of geographically distributed players to simultaneously play on the internet."[2] Players are networked online in order to complete virtual in-game tasks, such as undergoing quests to develop their digital avatars, slaying monsters and beasts for rewards, and constructing assets such as villages.[3] As players generally engage in forms of interpersonal socialization through gameplay, MMOGs have the capacity to facilitate social interaction and relationships, and can expose individuals to different players' perspectives and worldviews.[4] MMOGs can therefore be considered as important public spaces, in which interactions that may create a "civil sphere whose presence may not be welcome by the Chinese government or may seem pathological,"[5] can potentially be expressed and disseminated.

MMOGs have been criticized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for fostering moral decay because of violent content, the propensity to encourage excessive hours of play, and for distracting youth from productive activities.[6] However, to adopt a stance whereby China's sole approach to online gaming is repression is too limiting. Such an understanding undermines the fact that China's methods of censorship can be creative, and that forms of media control do not solely involve

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policing. Censorship approaches can be transformative over time, in order to both encourage and promote positive state-associated objectives.

This essay analyses how online gaming is both a site of sponsorship for, and subversion against the Chinese party-state, by focusing on two objectives. First, by illustrating how the online gaming industry is commercialized to promote officially-sanctioned nationalist narratives and ideology. Second, by addressing how online gaming can also be understood as a potential site of subversion, because of how players use the socialization features of MMOGs to facilitate the development of counterdiscourses critical of the party-state. I argue that online gaming is a site of complex negotiation amongst commercial, party-state, and fan actors, in which the commercialization of MMOGs are simultaneously incentivized to promote state-sanctioned nationalism, but can also be appropriated to express criticism towards the party-state's activities.

NATIONALISM MADE DAILY

The increasing popularity of MMOGs in China is subject to the sophisticated and changing ways in which party-state censorship is facilitated online. Robert Deibert describes several ways in which the CCP extends its internet controls to the private sector, which include licensing functionalities, state policies, and encouraging the preconfiguration of censorship and surveillance in social media.[7] Indeed, due to the growing consumption of foreign MMOGs in the mid-2000s, the Chinese government implemented

regulatory strategies to expand the party-state's ability in controlling internet content.[8] Legislation passed from 1996 to 2002 limited operating licenses issued to wangba 网吧 (internet cafés), many of which ironically did not provide internet service, but instead had Local Area Network connections in order to run PC games such as *Warcraft III* and *Counterstrike*.[9] Restrictions, such as the creation of the 2007 fatigue system, sought to curb overtime gaming through warning limits and messages within game systems.[10] Most notably in 2010, regulations enforced real-name registration in games, which "link[ed] players' game accounts to their ID cards."[11] Not only did these measures seek to associate gameplay with pathological narratives of mental illness, but they also reconstructed social norms of acceptability to the public regarding online gaming in China.[12] Moreover, such strategies also targeted stakeholders in the online gaming industry, particularly by enforcing greater compliance with broader party-state controls over the internet. As a result, the regulations enacted by the CCP informed internet service providers, content developers, and multinational technology conglomerates that their ability to operate was directly associated with whether their censorship practices were in accordance with party-state approval.[13]

While party-state restrictions towards China's cyberspace are well-documented, focus must also be accorded to how online gaming can be a site of sponsorship for the CCP's authoritarian regime. One way this is facilitated is through the incentivization of the online gaming industry to promote state-sanctioned nationalist narratives that align with the party-state's objectives. Benedict Anderson canonically defines nationalism as a form of identification in which the nation is "an imagined political community...[in which] people who define themselves as members... will never know most of their fellow-members...yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[14] Anderson indicates that nationalism is a modern consciousness that is constructed rather than primordial, as well as a form of political legitimization to the extent that it represents the popular masses on a cultural level.[15] Michael Billig also emphasizes how nationalism is effectively reproduced in everyday activities, symbols, and media content.[16] Popular culture products that individuals engage with on a daily basis in China must therefore not only be assessed in terms of restriction, but also as an area of active government involvement to "shape cultural industries to embrace state-socialist ideology, resist foreign content, and influence mass cultural consumption."[17]

CREATING NATIONALISM THROUGH CONSUMERISM

The CCP has not only limited youth engagement with online games, but has also sought to support online gaming in order to build strong domestic cultural industries. Online gaming is currently a multi-billion dollar industry, with 2012 semi-annual sales revenue in China reaching US $3.73 billion, and 71.6% of these profits arising from domestically

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produced games.[18] This is because of the CCP's efforts in creating a "policy environment advantageous to the domestic gaming industry over foreign companies,"[19] such as legislating new requirements for imported online games, and encouraging foreign firms to establish joint ventures with Chinese game development companies.[20] These actions also stem from fears of cultural invasion through the consumption of foreign cultural products, particularly because during this period the Chinese market was dominated by Japanese and American video game imports.[21] Steps to remedy government concerns can be seen by how in 2004, China's General Administration of Press and Publication used initiatives such as taxation and funding to not only support technological advances for gaming and animation, but to also create university programs that strengthened plans for online game development.[22] While associated with a broader general interest in proliferating domestic information and communication technologies,[23] such initiatives can also be seen as a means to "recapture some of [the state's] propaganda authority from the commercial force."[24] Consequently, the CCP's changing approaches to MMOGs are negotiated in relation to the importance of online gaming as an economic driver of technological development, the profits that game developers seek to accumulate, and the role of cultural products as potential extensions of the party-state apparatus.

Furthermore, online gaming is also used in order to convey state ideology, and teach officially sanctioned interpretations of culture and history.[25] Anderson illustrated how capitalist enterprises have cultivated new ways for people to think about themselves and relate to others, by focusing on the avenues print capitalism created for national identity to be disseminated.[26] In this sense, online games are not only evidence of China's capability for technological innovation, but also constitute a point of cultural security in which games themselves become a "battlefield for presenting cultural values that can bolster the security of the Chinese state."[27] This is because of the growing popularity of online games as a leisure activity,[28] especially for urban youth born under the one-child policy who seek greater social interaction opportunities, and increasingly consider gaming as a significant part of their daily lives.[29] One example includes the 2008 game *Resistance War Online*, an online role-playing game that depicts Japan's defeat against China during the second Sino-Japanese war.[30] By reifying a reinterpretation of the war amongst youth who lack a direct connection to this historical event, this demonstrates how MMOGs can be used to encourage new generations to find solidarity in state ideology, especially through the propagation of officially-sanctioned nationalist values.[31] Gameplay is therefore considered as a way to commercialize narratives of national memory that can "unify the divided forces of Chinese society under the banner of patriotism," particularly by serving as a method of reaffirming and transmitting state-approved interpretations of history.[32]

Moreover, the success of nationalist-themed games illustrates

how cooperation with the private sector becomes both an avenue for maximizing profit, and "minimiz[es] the need for direct political and/or policing intervention."[33] Such possibilities include indirect ways of control by encouraging Chinese citizens to not only support, but also self-manage their own congruence to the party-state's activities.[34] However, it is not to say that this occurs through indoctrination via party propaganda. Instead, the CCP can both empower individuals through the expansion of the Chinese cyberspace,[35] while simultaneously directing public opinion towards party-sanctioned discourse and cultural products.[36] By having the act of online gaming "translated into a productive practice of patriotism and self-cultivation,"[37] such activities align with Anderson's idea of how "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship," thereby illustrating how online games can be a viable site for the CCP to effectively mass-construct and homogenize national identity.[38]

RECREATING AND COMMERCIALIZING NATIONALISM FROM THE BOTTOM-UP
Nationalism is not only imbued in MMOGs through party-state efforts, but is also influenced by the convergence of commercial and fan interests. Baogang He and Yingjie Guo indicate that popular nationalism "comes from below and represents unsystematic, popular national sentiments."[39] In this sense, popular nationalism can be incongruent with state-sponsored nationalist

policies in which the Chinese party-state "claims that its goals embody those of the nation and are essential to its nationhood."[40] This can be seen through the incorporation of nationalist sentiments in online games, which did not solely emerge due to top-down efforts.[41] For example, the mid-1990s featured a worsening in Sino-Japanese relations due to events that are still contentious to this day. Controversies included official visits to the Imperial Shrine of Yasukuni,[42] the glorification of Japanese war criminals, as well as disputes regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands.[43] However, initial games that featured nationalist elements made during 1998 to 2005 were not created out of government involvement, but instead were used by corporate firms to "leverage the rising popular nationalism...into the creation of profitable games that reflected this anti-Japanese sentiment."[44] When the console video game Anti Japan I: Mine Warfare was launched in 1998 on the 61st anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre "in a gesture that, according to the producer, cautioned the Chinese people to never forget history and national humiliation,"[45] the game's appeal was in its ability to capture widespread popular nationalist sentiment by combining anti-Imperialist themes and Chinese traditional culture.[46] In this case, nationalist sentiments were not directly state-sponsored. Instead, they were encouraged through both profit-driven commercialization, and the "active cooperation of a wider population to create the sense of commonality that nations rely on," suggesting how nationalism is not strictly a tool for top-down ideological

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transmission.[47]

Most notably, interests in nationalist games were compounded by players who were attempting to find new ways to frame discourses regarding online gaming, especially during a period of increasing medicalization towards internet addiction in China. Fears over immoral behaviour relating to video gaming have been well-documented in Chinese media since 2002, with stories particularly focusing on the bizarre behaviour of individuals due to the internet.[48] Ranging from news such as murders over virtual goods, to deaths over marathon gaming sessions,[49] sensationalist examples of the pathological impact of online gaming were also propagated by official public television networks such as China Central Television (CCTV).[50] Notably, such anxieties are also part of a broader concern with the role of MMOGs as part of a burgeoning moral crisis, particularly in light of changing technologies and forms of self-expression and consumption amongst youth.[51] With internet addiction being considered as "the electronic opium of the twenty-first century," especially in a context where importation of the drug directly related to the demise of the Qing Empire,[52] MMOGs were seen as a threat to not only the individual player, but also to their parents and society as a broader whole.[53] Consequently, despite ambivalent scientific and psychological literature on internet addiction, clinics adopted treatment models similar to that of gambling and drug addiction, with cures sometimes combining carceral methods of treatment such as intravenous drips and electroshock

therapy.[54] As a result, game enthusiasts held vested interests in finding other ways to represent MMOGs, particularly in order to alter perceptions of online gaming. For example, by suggesting the need for games that were made in China which "suited Chinese tastes and preserved indigenous cultural traditions,"[55] an emphasis on online games as being pathological due to foreign content rather than gameplay sought to illustrate how online gaming was instead an unrealized area of Chinese productivity.[56] Popular nationalism thus became not only a way of contending with and justifying desires currently unfulfilled by existing state discourses on online games, but also a means of informing the state towards the potential of MMOGs as a site of commercialization and future development.

APPROPRIATING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES TO DISSEMINATE COUNTERDISCOURSES

Online gaming can also be a potential site of subversion because of how in-game socialization mechanisms can facilitate the development of counterdiscourses critical of the party-state's activities. Gaming fans have appropriated the fact that "video games, as opposed to other traditional media such as press and TV, are not seen as central and indispensable to its priorities by the party-state's ideological apparatus."[57] This suggests that online gaming may provide a platform for contentious perspectives to be expressed, especially because of how the party-state is still currently negotiating its response to the relative newness of online gaming as a medium. Furthermore,

how online gaming combines "interactivity, rapid technological updates, and bridging of virtual and physical space," can be contextualized as a broader appropriation of the internet to disseminate government criticisms.[58] For example, the use of digital technologies by Chinese citizens to satirize and resist party-state regulations is not a novel phenomenon. In 2006, the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television announced that regulations would be made over the phenomenon of *e'gao* 恶 搞 (evil work).[59] E'gao is a grassroots subculture that seeks to creatively respond to media censorship,[60] and is characterized by its combination of humour and the "appropriation of multiple texts and codes from different mediums, genres, and discourses."[61] The subculture is most famously associated with the creation of the 2006 *Baidu shi da shenshou* 百度十大 神兽 (Baidu Ten Mythical Creatures), a set of fictional beings named after obscene puns that were created as hoax vandalism entries in the Baidu Baike encyclopedia. Entries include the *Cao Ni Ma* 草泥马 (Grass Mud Horse), which is similar sounding to the curse 操你妈 (f*** your mother), and is described as the natural enemy of the *He Xie* 河蟹 (River Crab), which is nearly homonymic to the word 和谐 (Harmonious) in Chinese.[63] Such entries arose amidst increasing government censorship of the internet, particularly under Hu Jintao's ideological Harmonious Society, which was used to justify state censorship for the purpose of "harmonization" online.[64] In this sense, the significance of viral e'gao memes is in how they are transgressively used

in order to criticize state campaigns to protect public morality and official discourse.[64] While the use of satire and parody in China for social commentary is therefore not new in and of itself, appropriation of online mediums to disseminate e'gao demonstrates the innovative methods by which protest can be digitally networked in the Chinese cyberspace.[66] One way in which online gaming features have been used as part of e'gao culture includes the 2010 user-generated video *wang yin zhanzheng* 网瘾战争 (War of Internet Addiction), which is a 64-minute Machinima video filmed within the virtual setting of the MMOG *World of Warcraft* (WoW). Containing "allusions to contemporary social and political controversies and pop culture references, the video vented gamers' mounting anger at their victimization by…Internet addiction treatment experts."[68] Players also created a storyline of struggle in the video, by depicting the fight to protect the spiritual homeland of WoW between a resistance organization called the Skeleton Party, and "a villain sent by the Green Overlord."[69] The use of the game to ultimately dramatize the complex relationships amongst the party-state, the corporations seeking to commercialize online games, and public perceptions of gaming illustrate how fans attempted to challenge the stakeholders involved in the development and facilitation of MMOGs.[70] In the context of Zeynep Tufekci's work on how protest movements use digital strategies to mobilize, pleasure in discussing ordinary topics is not necessarily inconsequential, as it can also potentially be transformative.[71] Tufekci

emphasizes how such discussions enable individuals to "explore a sense of self and belonging and [have] their perspective of what [is] acceptable move beyond societal norms.... because being willing to transcend social limitations sometimes [also leads to] transcendence in their political imaginations."[72] As online spaces can be appropriated in order to convey larger discussions on contested political issues, online interactions are therefore not necessarily separate from, but instead can in fact inform and impact, offline activities. Tufecki's emphasis on the value of networked spaces can also be seen by how the *War of Internet Addiction* was initially created by a group of over one hundred volunteer WoW gaming fans,[73] in order to protest game-specific concerns such as the long approval processes for the licensing of game extension packages.[74] Not all fans of the MMOG used the video for explicitly political purposes — many members of the group primarily sought to acquire greater societal respect instead of demonization towards their enjoyment of WoW.[75] However, the cultural puns imbued in the narrative by scriptwriter *xinggan yumi* 性感玉米 (Corndog) have also become recognized as an overall articulation of the frustrations against Chinese internet restrictions. Green Overlord, for example, was a criticism of the *Lu Ba* 绿坝 (Green Dam) project which enforced that "all PCs sold in China install a software package to filter vulgar content...[such as] politically sensitive material."[76] The villain, an "evil money maker who...uses electric shock treatment to torture young computer addicts," has also "come to

represent a medical establishment in collusion with the authoritarian state."[77] Consequently, while the video initially emerged as a way to defend the community that WoW had created for gaming fans, online gaming also became a site where "broader issues of social injustice find representation in the creative contentious discourses," illustrating how online gaming technologies can both provide creative tools and new avenues for the dissemination of state criticism.[78] With the knowledge that popular sentiments can "turn against the Party-state if their rising expectations of a stronger China fail to be fulfilled," this suggests how MMOGs can be appropriated to navigate around officially state-sanctioned ideology, and potentially seek a Chinese society that transcends political restrictions under the party-state's governance.[79] As a result, MMOGs can be sites for the development of critical expression and encourage the germination of counterdiscourses, because of the subversive potential of gaming fans in challenging the party-state's activities.

MMOGS WITHIN AND BEYOND CHINA: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
As this essay has explored, the boundary between repression and resistance regarding online gaming can be conceptualized as dynamic and complex, particularly because of the negotiations amongst state, commercial, and fan actors. I have demonstrated how MMOGs can be a site of stabilization for the CCP's authoritarian regime, because of how the party-state can incentivize the sponsorship of domestic gaming

industries as part of the party-state apparatus, and use online games as vehicles of ideological state-sanctioned nationalism. At the same time, I have also emphasized how MMOGs can be a potential site of subversion, particularly as an area for the germination of dissenting criticisms that seek to resist government regulations. In light of these findings, several aspects that were not addressed in this essay must also be considered. One is how the disparity between local and national governments in China can sometimes be appropriated by individuals in order to create favourable political outcomes. To see the ways in which online gaming differs between nationalist rhetoric and regional policies may illustrate both the success of nationalist-based initiatives for cultural products, as well as the potential for individuals and grassroots organizations to undermine these objectives. Second is the potential impact of cultural products transmitting state-sanctioned narratives to alternative audiences, particularly that of the Chinese diaspora. As nationalism can often be exclusionary in its homogenization of an imagined community, investigating how identity is mediated and negotiated using digital technologies will be an important area in understanding the transnational impact of nationalist-based cultural products. Last is the consideration of MMOGs as a transnational soft power, which is not only limited to international eSports competitions, but also in its depiction through other forms of popular entertainment, such as web series and online novels. Investigating how online gaming

becomes a locus of transnational consumption, as well as a field where different stakeholders converge, will be vital in understanding how gameplay and nationalism are normalized on a transnational level. Consequently, the limitations of this essay do not only illustrate additional ways in which online gaming can be a site of both stabilization for, and subversion against the CCP's regime, but also imply the need for future research on MMOGs as online gaming in China continues to be a site of political contention.

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A Food Source is More than Food: The Impacts of Caribou Population Decline on Dene Culture

EMMA ETTINGER

This paper discusses the impact of depleted caribou populations on Dene hunters, and social structure. As climate change and territory loss have threatened the species, the colonial government has created legislation which bans or restricts the hunting capabilities of Indigenous Peoples. Many aspects of Indigenous culture are connected to food sources, and land based practices such as hunting, therefore the banning of partaking in such practices enacts an impediment to decolonization and Indigenous sovereignty. Championing a conservationist approach rooted in Dene ontologies, this paper addresses how hunting bans fail to address the root cause of caribou population decline: extractive industry.

To many Indigenous nations across Turtle Island, a food source is more than food. For the Dene Peoples, the relation to caribou is inextricable from kinship systems, economy, and spirituality. Caribou hunting, distribution, and eating is integral to their culture. Restricted hunting capacities—through hunting bans or scarcity—threaten Dene social structures, and force assimilation into mainstream colonial capitalism. This paper will highlight the ways in which the colonial environmentalist movement is in contention with Indigenous rights and sovereignty, and champion a Dene approach to caribou conservation that recognizes animal personhood and consent.[1]

References to Indigeneity often enter the discourse of environmentalism and climate justice. After all, the Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island (so-called North America), have been sustainably feeding themselves off the land since time immemorial. In spite of this, settler scientists and environmental activists seldom turn to Indigenous ways of knowing in their conservation efforts. In 2009, the Government of the Northwest Territories imposed a total ban on caribou hunting in an expansive swath of Dene traditional territory. Although the no-hunting zone is smaller for Indigenous Peoples than for settler hunters, the Dene Peoples, who rely on their traditional food source for sustenance, are burdened by this policy that threatens their sovereignty, way of life, traditions and social structures.

Some caribou herds, such as the Bathurst herd, have decreased in size by 60 % in the last three years.[2] The primary reason for the near collapse of some herds is intervention with their habitat and migration routes, caused by mining and logging developments, and climate change.[3] Yet, colonial policy often targets hunting, rather than resource development. Contrastingly, Dene Traditional Knowledge provides a framework for caribou conservation that has been overlooked by colonial environmentalism, which has been accused of "scapegoating" Indigenous hunters rather than focusing on the impact of global warming and extractive industry in the North.[4] Both settler scientists and Indigenous Peoples agree that caribou must be preserved and action should be taken, the contention is what this action should be.

Dene ontologies naturally allow for a framework for caribou hunting which respects the animal's personhood, and allows for sustainable harvest.[5] Settler sport hunting practices and climate change have led to species decline, yet hunting bans imposed by colonial institutions impact Dene Peoples. Impediments to caribou hunting not only threaten Dene food systems, social structure, economy and culture, but further prevent decolonization and sovereignty by erasing Indigenous ontologies and ethics.[6] In order to preserve caribou, we must follow the lead of Dene nations, who have sustainably hunted caribou since time immemorial.

DENE CULTURAL SURVIVANCE AND CARIBOU SURVIVANCE

The Dene Peoples exercise deep respect for the animals as equals.

Karyn and Henry Sharp explain that "the Denésuliné exist as partners within a triadic relationship between themselves, the wolf, and the caribou. [...] A disruption to any one of the three has consequences for the survival of the other two."[7] The sustenance of Dene Peoples is no longer entirely dependent on caribou, due to increased food imports to the North, however, these imports are a result of the integration of capitalism. Nevertheless, "harvesting continues to provide residents with a significant proportion of their food"[8], and provides Northern Indigenous peoples an alternative to partaking in colonial capitalist structure. Further still, many elements of Dene culture, social structure and identity, rest on the future of the species.

Roger McMillan and Brenda Parlee share the ways by which caribou hunting is interlaced with Dene society. In regards to the K'asho Got'ine Dene people, they write that decreased caribou populations have increased the prevalence of "formal community hunts," as opposed to "household hunts" as technologies such as snowmobiles are becoming increasingly necessary to find animals which are fewer, and farther between."[9] Community hunts are an expression of Dene communalism but household hunts have been made increasingly difficult due to population collapse. Although not new to K'asho Got'ine Dene way of life, which in the past has used community hunting to mitigate the hardships of northern seasons, community hunts are now often sponsored by the band council therefore helping to pool resources and coordinate efforts to find food.[10]

Community based hunting practices ensure those who cannot hunt such as Elders, single mothers, and those who lack means to hunt independently, or buy overpriced grocery imports, are still able to survive.[11] When the hunts are funded by the community, the meat belongs to the community rather than solely the hunters. Nevertheless, food redistribution is not a response to caribou population collapse. It is a widespread Dene ethic, and placed-based demonstration of relationality between humans and the land, and humans and their kin.

Food-sharing is deeply ingrained in Dene society and culture. It is a coping mechanism to overcome the challenges of the northern climate, yet it is K'asho Got'ine Dene law.[12] This law exists as "the implementation of generosity as a cultural value [... and] maximizes the wellbeing of all concerned."[13] As thanks to the animal which gave itself over, the meat does not belong solely to the person who hunted it, but rather is shared amongst the community as a whole to honour the "reciprocity that guides human relationships."[14] Food sharing practices are a part of a complex economic structure which is reflective of a communist system. Impediments to caribou hunting not only undermine the Dene food practices, but also Dene social and economic structures which are rooted in the distribution of caribou meat.

The caribou also provides the materials for many traditional belongings such as tools, art, clothing and items needed for ceremony. Caribou sinew is particularly strong and used for footwear.[15] The babiche can be used to make snowshoes,

essential for Arctic life, and the hide is used to make clothing, shelters, sleds, and toys.[16] Caribou hide is also used to make drums, which hold deep cultural and spiritual significance. Global capitalism presents the Dene Peoples with alternatives to their traditional lifeways, but at the cost traditional social and food systems, leaving few options other than assimilation into global capitalism.

CONSERVATIONISM AND COLONIAL DISPOSSESSION

In 1921, The Canadian Government signed Treaty 11 with the Dene nation, expecting them to make the switch from subsistence hunting to agriculture.[17] The Dene Peoples had no such intention, and continued living off the land "as [they] have always done".[18]

Northern Indigenous Peoples saw their lands altered beyond recognition by the impacts of global warming and extractive industry. The dramatic decline of caribou populations in Northern Canada has been evident to the people Indigenous to the land. In a series of interviews with Dene Elders from numerous regions, Kendrick and Lyver learned that the elders and hunters were very conscious of declining caribou populations, and altered migration routes.[19]

Colonial science also acknowledges the decline in caribou populations. In the last 150 years, since the establishment of so-called Canada, the range of the species has been drastically reduced. In response, colonial policy has banned and restricted hunting caribou. Despite the policy focus on hunting, note "the underlying causes of caribou declines are cumulative changes to its habitats."[20] Caribou are sensitive to habitat changes, and change the course of their migratory patterns in response to logging, mining, infrastructure development, wind farms, and warming climate.[21] Changes in migratory patterns result in a decline of offspring.[22] Indigenous hunting is a part of caribou ecology; historically, it was a mechanism by which populations were regulated, however, it may pose a threat "when a population is already declining because of other causes."[23] Thus, Indigenous harvesting is considerably less threatening than the growing caribou hunt tourism industry, which often uses satellite and GPS technologies that are often not available to or desired by Indigenous hunters.[24]

The decline of caribou herds is a direct product of settler coloniality and capitalist exploitation, yet policy intended to conserve caribou almost entirely implicates Indigenous hunters by restricting and banning their activities. Caribou biologist Brenda Parlee asserts that "the scapegoat is the Indigenous person who depends on caribou for subsistence [...] It's easier to point the finger at somebody with a gun than it is to look at the more complicated problem of habitat disturbance."[25] It is particularly challenging for the state to create policy which aims to address habitat disturbance and disrupt capitalist structures, as these policies would be in contention with resource extraction, foundational to settler society and economy. Rather than threaten corporate interests, colonial policy makers incidentally threaten Dene culture, sovereignty and futurity.

Through her conception of "relational geographies" Cree scholar Michelle Daigle articulates the importance of land-based practice to self-determination.[26] She asserts that land-based practices, such as hunting traditional food sources, ensures the futurity of Indigenous ontologies. They are an expression of self-determination on occupied lands, within a state that actively promotes Indigenous erasure. The continuation of Indigenous ontologies is dependent on "continual engagement with their kinship networks, including their kin the land. This includes food harvesting and sharing."[27] Particularly relevant to the context of Dene peoples, this concept can be used to understand how hunting restrictions undermine decolonization efforts (reliant on self-determined relations to land), and the futurity of Dene lifeways. The more inaccessible caribou become, the more elements of cultural identity are lost, and the more difficult it becomes for Indigenous Peoples to exercise autonomy as sovereign nations, partaking in global capitalism on their own terms. Without the ability to engage in land-based practice, state "reconciliation" is futile as it relies on Indigenous erasure.[28]

The Canadian government anticipated a rapid transition from Indigenous lifeways to agriculture.[29] Attempts to force Indigenous Peoples into agricultural practices have historically been used as a mechanism of assimilation. The Cree and Blackfoot Peoples had been reliant on bison as their primary food source, which were systemically forced into extinction upon colonization of the land. In the absence of bison, the colonial government encouraged them to assimilate into colonial agricultural practice, or become reliant on food rations provided by the state.[30] This not only led to the starvation of many, but undermined food sovereignty and formed dependency on the colonial state. Similarly, upon early colonization of the North, the Canadian state promoted the "replacement of Native hunting economy with a rational and efficient herd management program designed to exploit caribou as a resource."[31] This program resulted in the reduction of Dene sovereignty and increased the legibility and manageability of Indigenous Peoples, so as to assimilate them into the Canadian state and undermine their nationhood. Now, as extractive industry decimates caribou populations, the Canadian state continues to minimize food sovereignty through legislation. Indigenous Peoples were once forcibly assimilated into agriculture and dependency on the state, and are now assimilated into a capitalist system of dependency.

DENE CONSERVATIONISM

In response to decreased caribou herd sizes, and altered migration routes, Elders recounted that these changes occur when the animals are not properly respected, so they make themselves unavailable to humans who rely on them.[32] Indigenous ontologies are realized through land-based practices; the reciprocal relationality between Dene peoples and the caribou is realized through their hunting practices.[33] This emphasis on land-based practice is reflective of Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard and Nishnaabeg scholar

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Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, who define their similar concept of *"grounded normativity"* as, "the ethical frameworks provided by Indigenous place-based practices and associated forms of knowledge."[34] This epistemology acknowledges how Dene ethics and conservationism are demonstrated by their hunting practices, and that reconciliation and decoloniality are dependent on this understanding.

Both Indigenous Peoples and colonial environmentalists agree, caribou need protection. The Tłı̨chǫ Dene Peoples understand that they "must demonstrate respectful reciprocity so that the caribou will give their flesh to hunters."[35] The people of this nation view the relationship between hunter and caribou to be one of consent, which requires respect for both the individual animal, and the future of the species. As we understand from Simpson and Coulthard's work this ethic and sense of respect is demonstrated in the way the animal is hunted, the way the meat is shared, and the way the remains are discarded. Dene laws and ethics of hunting as "social conventions as guiding personal relationships."[36] Such conventions include resisting boasting following a kill, so as not to reframe the animal's consent as skill, and the way in which the animal is killed—it would be wrong to hit a caribou over the head, or prolong its suffering.[37] Additionally, as the animal gifted itself to the hunter to nourish not the individual hunter, but the people of the nation, sharing is essential to demonstrate reciprocity.[38] This aspect of hunting convention not only forms a sharing economy which ensures community

wellbeing, it also prevents any of the animal from going to waste, which would show disrespect by negating the importance of the animal's sacrifice. All that is usable of an animal must be used, and the remains must be handled considerately, so they can be reabsorbed by the earth and encourage the birth of new life.[39] The animal's head in particular requires proper consideration and care, as it connects the animal to the spirit. Therefore, it is typically left away from the other remains, protected by a bush or branches, contrasting starkly with the trophy hunter's practice mounting the heads of their kills.[40] Thus, the Dene Peoples have built in mechanisms of conservation within their protocol. [41]

The hunting practices of the Tłı̨chǫ Dene, look radically different from those of sport hunters, who visit the North in search of caribou.[42] Whereas Dene hunters aim to take what is needed for community subsistence, sport hunters take twenty to thirty animals at a time, as reported by members of the Lutsel K'e Dene nation.[43] For the same reason, this nation has implemented a stewardship plan wherein community members monitor poachers, and population size and range. The intention of the program isn't to restrict hunting, but to teach sustainability and respect.[44] Members of the Lutsel K'e Dene nation believe that teaching traditionalism, and reciprocity with animal relations is far more effective than banning traditional hunting practices.[45]

Within Dene communities "hunting is more than the acts associated with killing an animal... hunting is an entire complex of values, practices, and social relations that give

meaning to Indigenous relationships with animals."[46] Land-based practices also carry an ontology and ethic which centres sustainability and respect.[47] These practices are a keystone of decolonization and self-determination, both of which are undermined by caribou decline and colonial hunting bans.[48] Simpson and Coulthard acknowledge that should we threaten food sources, we threaten Indigenous cultural survivance. Indigenous nations' "relationship to the land itself generates the processes, practices, and knowledges that inform our political systems, and through which we practice solidarity. To willfully abandon them would amount to a form of auto-genocide."[49]

Impediments to caribou hunting not only threaten Dene food systems, social structure, economy and culture, but further prevent decolonization and sovereignty. Due to strong correlations between caribou species decline and extractive industry development, governments attempting to meaningfully protect caribou must consider the impact of mining and forestry, rather than restricting those who have been respectful and reciprocally existing in relation to the caribou since time immemorial.[50] Rather than forcing the Dene Peoples into the same capitalist system that has threatened their territory, and that of the caribou, it is imperative to integrate caribou conservation.

NOTES

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[6] Michelle Daigle, "Awawanenitakik: The Spatial Politics of Recognition and Relational Geographies of Indigenous Self-determination," *The Canadian Geographer* 60, no. 2 (2016): 260.

[7] Karyn Sharp and Henry S. Sharp, *Hunting Caribou: Subsistence Hunting Along the Northern Edge of the Boreal Forest* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015): 31.

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[22] Festa-Bianchet et al., "Conservation of caribou (Rangifer tarandus) in Canada," 425.

[23] Festa-Bianchet et al., "Conservation of caribou (Rangifer tarandus) in Canada," 427.

[24] Festa-Bianchet et al., *Conservation of caribou (Rangifer tarandus) in Canada*, 427.

[25] Weber, "Caribou Hunting Quotas."

[26] Daigle, "Awawanenitakik," 261.

[27] Daigle, "Awawanenitakik," 261.

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[30] Donna Feir, Rob Gillezeau and Maggie Jones, *The Slaughter of the Bison and the Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains,* University of Victoria: Economics, July 31, 2017, 1.

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Whose Space Debris is it Anyway? The 1972 Liability Convention and Challenges to Incentivize Sustainable Commercial Sector Activities in Outer Space

ANDREW FALLE

International law governing outer space activity is lagging behind the development of the commercial space sector and the increased risk of accidents that come with it. I argue that the 1972 Liability Convention yields insufficient incentive for states and the commercial sector to reduce accidents involving space objects. I show that vague terminology and deficient dispute mechanisms within the Convention complicate the addressing of liability in the case of an accident; and that a flag of convenience issue concerning outer space activities may be exacerbated through inadequate international means of establishing liability. Solutions to these issues are then explored.

INTRODUCTION

The activities of states and private entities in the realm of outer space have substantially grown in the twenty-first century. Private spaceflight companies are pursuing ambitious goals to embark on everything from space tourism to asteroid mining in the near future;[1] however, the investment of billions of dollars into new technologies that enable ventures into the unknown does not come without consequences that may impact people and property on Earth and in Earth's orbits.[2] The above may prompt one to ask: what legal mechanisms exist to mitigate space activities that may result in damages to individuals and property? The answer would be in the five conventions currently outlining jurisprudence in space: The Outer Space Treaty 1967, Rescue Agreement 1969, Liability Convention 1972, Registration Convention 1975, and the Moon Treaty of 1979.[3] However, each of these conventions is decades old and the rapid advancements in technology and private sector activity have outpaced the existing outer space legal regime.[4] This has yielded many concerns over whether existing space law can adequately protect environments and humans by incentivizing actors to proceed into this extreme expedition with caution.

The focus of this paper will be an analysis of existing issues within the 1972 Liability Convention and its application regarding the recent developments in space activities. Within the Liability Convention, broad definitions[5] and a lack of a functioning dispute mechanism[6] create many shortcomings when applying the Convention to current and future scenarios. This paper argues that the 1972 Liability Convention lacks the capacity to incentivize the development of safe and sustainable commercial sector activities in outer space. First, the 1972 Liability Convention is briefly outlined with an example of its only application. Second, this paper will give a background on the recent growth of competitive private sector activity in outer space. The following four sections—Defining "Damages," Rethinking "Space Objects," Liability Convention and Potential 'Flag of Convenience' issues, and 'Dispute Mechanisms'—will go into detail as to why the Liability Convention lacks the scope to incentivize the private sector to carry out sustainable activities in outer space. Finally, this paper will outline potential solutions that may counteract the shortcomings of the Liability Convention.

THE 1972 LIABILITY CONVENTION

In 1972, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects was added to the existing Outer Space Treaty of 1967, and as of January 2019, ninety-six nations have ratified the Liability Convention.[7] In the wake of increasing space activity, the Convention addressed the need for liability if damages occurred as a result of accidents involving space objects.[8] In the event of such an accident, strict liability can be imposed on states if their space object causes damage in airspace or on the surface of Earth. The term 'damage' covered in Article I of the Liability Convention includes

"loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of states or of persons, natural or judicial, or property of international intergovernmental organizations."[9]

States can be held liable under the Liability Convention if damages occur when they engage in a launch "or procure the launch of a space object."[10] The action of 'procurement' is generally accepted as causing a launch to occur.[11] In other words, if states jointly launch a space object, wherein one state has its space object launched from the facilities of a second state, and the launch results in an accident, they can both be held liable for damages. The term 'space object' then also includes the "component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof."[12] The dispute mechanisms provided by the Liability Convention allow both public and private parties impacted by damages involving space objects to bring such claims and receive compensation.[13] Dispute mechanisms are outlined in Article IX and Article XIV.[14] Article IX provides that "a claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a launching State through diplomatic channels.[15] Further, Article XIV outlines what should take place if claims do not reach an agreement through "diplomatic negotiations," stating that:

If no settlement of a claim is arrived at through diplomatic negotiations as provided for in Article IX, within one year from the date on which the claimant State notifies the launching State that it has submitted the documentation of its claim, the parties concerned shall establish a Claims Commission at the request of either party.[16]

The Liability Convention provides very little precedent as it has only been applied on one occasion in the event of Cosmos 954 in January of 1978.[17] In the event, Canada brought a claim resting on the Liability Convention in relation to damages after a radioactive reconnaissance satellite operated by the former USSR fell across the northern parts of the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan.[18] However, The Liability Convention played a very limited role in this case.[19] The USSR agreed to compensate Canada for the damages but never expressed their liability under the Liability Convention or any other legal responsibility.[20] The Canadian government requested a payment of $6 million from the USSR but was only paid $3 million at the end of the dispute.[21]

The Liability Convention served as a necessary step in the development of outer space law by providing a framework for attributing liability in case of damage.[22] However, the Liability Convention, along with the existing legal regime guiding outer space activities, came about during a period when most of the activities taking place were carried out by governments.[23] The expansion of private activities in space is sure to provide many new challenges concerning existing space law. The increasing frequency of actors involved in space activity will bring with it a higher likelihood of damages occurring and new complexities for attributing liability in such events.[24]

EXPANSION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SPACE

In 2018, commercial space industries represented approximately 79% of the $414.8 billion global space economy.[25] They include satellite service providers, launch providers, component manufacturers, and emerging ventures such as space resource utilization and space tourism.[26] Goldman Sachs has projected that by 2040 the global space economy will grow to $1 trillion globally.[27] Historically, much of the commercial sector activity took place in the European Union, which has been a world-class provider in the market for satellite and telecommunications, as well as being home to Ariane Space, the world's first commercial launch provider. However, over the past decades the US has fostered some of the most competitive commercial companies. The emerging commercial space companies are largely attributed to National Space Policy directives under the Bush and Obama administrations that sought to promote competition and innovation in the commercial space industry while also encouraging public-private partnerships with government agencies such as NASA.[28] Funding from contract work through NASA has contributed in part to the growth of commercial companies which now include SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, and Rocket Lab.

Private space companies have fostered new technologies that are pioneering the industry and drastically reducing costs, benefiting both government and commercial actors that use space-related services. The most significant achievement has arguably been the transition to reusable rocket stages, which were initially developed by SpaceX, and have now drastically lowered the cost of launching objects into orbit. Reusable rockets have lowered the cost of launching an object (e.g. a satellite) into orbit from $18,500 per kilogram to roughly $2,720 per kilogram.[29] The substantial cost reduction of launches has opened Earth's orbits to a range of new government and private industry players seeking to access an increasingly profitable region and has made SpaceX one of the fastest growing commercial launch providers in the world. SpaceX currently receives revenue of approximately $3 billion a year by providing launch services.[30] In 2018, North America alone had a launch services market valued at $8.9 billion and it is projected to hit $30 billion globally by 2026.[31] Government space agencies are also reaping benefits from private sector technologies. For example, NASA has partnered with a number of private companies including SpaceX and Virgin Galactic to take advantage of low-cost alternative shuttle and launch services to the International Space Station.[32] SpaceX has also provided launch services and facilities for other governments, including Argentina, Taiwan, and a recent launch service for the CSA's (Canadian Space Agency) RADARSAT satellite constellation.[33]

In addition to public-private partnerships, private companies are interested in other profitable ventures. The emerging space tourism industry is entirely operated by private companies, with Virgin Galactic currently at the forefront after successfully testing a craft able to transport humans to the

edge of outer space, as well as investing $209 million in the construction and licensing of a spaceport in New Mexico.[34] Space tourism is estimated to be a $3 billion industry by 2030.[35] Although investment into asteroid mining has experienced a slight decline over the past couple of years—as prospective space miners such as Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries were acquired by firms with a lesser focus on asteroid mining—new technological advancements in the coming decades will likely reignite excitement in the industry which has a potential value in the trillions of dollars.[36] SpaceX is currently establishing a satellite mega-constellation in low-Earth orbit to provide global internet coverage at double the speed of existing ground-based infrastructure, which has a potential valuation of over $30 billion.[37] Starting in January 2020, SpaceX began conducting bi-weekly launches each with a payload of approximately sixty satellites, and will continue throughout the year adding approximately 1,000 new satellites to the existing 2,200 in Earth's orbits, making SpaceX the single largest satellite operator.[38] Furthermore, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has approved an additional 12,000 satellites that SpaceX plans to launch in the coming years, and the total amount could reach 30,000 by the end of the project.[39]

There are also increasing concerns from government space agencies and organizations over the number of objects and activities in outer space as a result of private sector growth. NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) have expressed concern over the added congestion that mega-constellations will bring to Earth's orbits, which could lead to more frequent accidents resulting in orbital debris.[40] Additionally, astronomers worry that light pollution resulting from mega-constellations will thwart the operations of ground-based telescopes.[41] The prospect of asteroid mining has sparked wide debate as to whether or not it will constitute national appropriation of a celestial object, which is prohibited in the Outer Space Treaty.[42] Debris resulting from asteroid mining could also threaten assets and humans operating in Earth's orbits. In relation to space tourism, some concerns have arisen over the feasibility of an insurance and liability regime that would provide adequate protection for space tourists.[43] All of these concerns are a result of commercial sector activity which has been moving quickly to capture new markets in the realm of outer space activities.

The legal framework concerning outer space activities—including the Liability Convention of 1972—was drafted decades ago, and it is clear that space activities are more frequent and complicated today than ever before.[44] Therefore, we must consider the challenges commercial space activity poses to the Liability Convention because of the crucial role it will play in creating incentives for the private sector to avoid potentially catastrophic events, such as debris creation when operating in outer space. While considering aspects of the previously highlighted expansion of outer space activity, the following sections will explore deficiencies with the Liability Convention that limit its ability to

incentivize safe and sustainable behavior in an increasingly congested environment.

DEFINING "DAMAGES"

Issues relating to the term "damages" within the Liability Convention pertain in part to the broad scope of the definition if the Liability Convention were to be applied.[45] With increased space activity comes a higher potential for crash landings from spacecraft and spent rocket stages resulting in damages on Earth.[46] Furthermore, the establishment of mega-constellations will increase the number of satellites operating in orbit by thousands, increasing the risk of collisions and debris creation resulting in damages in orbit. The definition of "damages" in the Liability Convention becomes a point of interest because there is no existing clarification concerning "indirect" and "direct damages."[47] In the recovery of "direct damages" there must be a "direct relationship between the cause of the harm and the harmed individual or property."[48] However, in the case of "indirect damages" "no statutory or jurisprudential guidance exists to help decide exact recoverable damages in the context of space tort."[49] With satellite mega-constellations, the distinction between "direct" and "indirect damages" becomes concerning. If satellites from a mega-constellation were involved in collisions resulting in debris that congested orbits, endangering or interrupting other operators, the event may avoid legal consequences because polluting orbits is not considered "damage" in a way that would trigger the Liability Convention.[50] Moreover,

if two objects that did not belong to a mega-constellation collided as a result of crowded orbits generated from a mega-constellation, the operator of the mega-constellation may not be directly liable, while still having logically contributed to the collision. As a result, a company like SpaceX that will crowd orbits with a satellite mega-constellation could increase the frequency of collisions but may not face responsibility for "damages" under the Liability Convention.

Without any clarification, the bringing about of claims by parties that suffer loss as a result of space activities would remain difficult. Potentially catastrophic events resulting in death or injury to humans or damage to satellites may occur in a gray area outside of what is considered "direct damage,"[51] leading to a scenario where fair compensation may not be awarded to victims. Broad definitions without any existing precedent to help define or encompass what are considered "damages" will likely fail to incentivize the private sector to reduce the limit and strictly monitor the creation of debris and congestion by objects potentially resulting in accidents.

RETHINKING "SPACE OBJECTS"

An issue that may further the problematic status of "damages" when addressing liability is the existing scope of the term "space object" in the Liability Convention. Similar to "damages," The term "space object" lacks any clear definition as to what it encompasses.[52] The definition in Article I of the Liability Convention currently stands in full as "(d) The term 'space object' includes component

parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof."[53]

The lack of a more concise definition as to what constitutes a "space object" is due to the fact that during the drafting of the Liability Convention of 1972 it was somewhat concluded that the term "space object" was quite obvious in what it referred to.[54] Today, with more objects, actors, and activities in space, the context is less clear. If we consider a collision where debris from a "space object" is created and results in damages, it may fall under the broad definition of "space object" in the Liability Convention.[55] However, it remains vague and does not consider future harm that may arise concerning the type of debris created. The possibility of asteroid mining in particular presents a scenario that may rely heavily on whether a better definition of "space object" is adapted. Private companies have already outlined plans to mine near-Earth asteroids for valuable resources including water to provide in-orbit fueling services for spacecraft and precious metals.[56] As asteroids are dismantled through a mining process, they have the potential to increase the frequency of debris, accidents and the overall pollution of orbits.[57] If small meteorites and other debris were to be generated from an asteroid mining operation and resulted in damages to a satellite in LEO or people and property on Earth, the term 'space object' in the Liability Convention may not apply to it.

The above issue arises because the debris may be considered: (1) a 'useless' space object, which may fail to fall under the scope of 'space object';[58] and: (2) the existing definition focuses primarily on "...parts thereof "[59] which relates to spacecraft and does not consider something from the natural environment that is created as a 'result of' potential space mining, such as meteorites and other natural debris.[60] Reconsidering what constitutes a "space object" is vital to establish before resource extraction takes off in near-Earth orbit.[61] Creating incentives to limit space debris through the Convention by better defining "space object" would be crucial in the context of outer space mining, and as it currently stands such an incentive is lacking.

LIABILITY AND POTENTIAL 'FLAG OF CONVENIENCE' ISSUES

The issues above pertaining to "space objects" and "damages" in the Liability Convention may accelerate other problems arising in the competitive space sector. Within any competitive industry comes the need to carry out operations at the lowest costs possible, allowing the development of new technologies that are available at a lower cost than the competitor, incentivizing further innovation, and so on. Maintaining a legal sphere in outer space that encourages competitive development of new technology is important for our future on Earth and in outer space.[62] However, an issue of cost avoidance may emerge, and companies may find ways of avoiding taxes, safety standards, high wages or environmental obligations that lead to high operating costs. In international law of the sea, the above is commonly referred to as a flag of convenience issue, in which private companies

register vessels in states with lax labour, safety, and environmental standards to lower their operational costs.[63]

A flag of convenience issue with respect to outer space activities could emerge due to the nature of registration outlined in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which allows the country of registration to apply its national laws to a space object.[64] Space objects are required to be registered in a country, yet companies can choose whatever country they wish.[65] Flag of convenience states aiming to attract space companies through lax regulatory environments may be well on their way to doing so. For example, Luxembourg, a country with no history of space-related activities, has recently created a space agency to shape an economic and legal environment aimed at attracting space-related businesses. In this initiative, Luxembourg passed a domestic space resources law that would allow asteroid mining companies registered there to keep one hundred percent of the profits earned in a space mining operation.[66] Luxembourg's law would allow companies registered there to effectively bypass existing controversy and debate over the legal, environmental, economic, and safety concerns related to asteroid mining that have not been adequately addressed.

A flag of convenience issue may further develop into one that perpetuates debris creation in Earth's orbit. In the case of holding states liable for damage, the "registration of a space object is a means of channeling responsibility and liability onto a

single state,"[67] and private companies are not directly held liable under the Liability Convention. Instead, the state in which the space object is registered takes on responsibility for accidents that occur.[68] Considering that there are no binding requirements and only suggested "voluntary action(s)" for states to reduce the likelihood of accidents and creation of orbital debris,[69] states may begin competing with each other to develop domestic legal environments that take little aim at preventing such events to lower operational costs and attract private companies, resulting in a flag of convenience issue.[70] The Liability Convention may further incentivize the aforementioned scenario of low standard regulation in two ways: (1) the aforementioned issue of "damages" being broadly defined would create difficulty in the case of a state being held liable in a dispute related to "damages;" and: (2) the broad definition of "space object" may exclude that of "space debris" that are "useless"[71] or considered natural objects.[72] These issues would make it easier for states to implement lax regulation because holding states liable who enable dangerous practices resulting in the creation of many "space debris" or "indirect damages," such as the pollution of Earth's orbits, would remain challenging. Therefore, legal incentive in the Liability Convention remains weak for states who may seek to attract private companies through lax regulatory regimes.[73] If flag states with low regulatory environments such as Luxembourg continue to emerge on the international stage, the Liability

Convention would fail to incentivize those states and the private companies registered within them to reduce potential damages, accidents and debris creation in the outer space environment.

DISPUTE MECHANISMS

When considering the increase in space activities, it is easy to imagine the subsequent increase in the risk of accidents in orbit and on Earth.[74] An increase in accidents for which liability must be assigned would require a sufficient dispute mechanism able to award damages to a claimant. However, the current framework for dispute resolution outlined in the Convention remains flawed.[75]

Earlier, this paper highlighted that registration and liability would operate through the state bearing responsibility for private entities registered under them in a case where damages occur. The aforementioned process described how a dispute may proceed if a state's space object, or one operated by a private entity registered within that state, was involved in an incident causing damages; that of which is inherently flawed.[76] For example, no binding obligations exist for states who are found liable for damages.[77] States' obligations to pay damages are only binding if states come to an agreement.[78] As Article XIX states: "The decision of the commission shall be final and binding if the parties have so agreed;…"[79] If both parties do not come to an agreement over the damages "the Claims Commission shall decide the merits of the claim for compensation and determine the amount of compensation payable, if

any."[80] Non-binding obligations leave the dispute process as one where "the only procedure really assured is one of conciliation,"[81] as financial compensation is not guaranteed for companies who may see their multi-million dollar space objects destroyed in the event of a collision resulting from another space object or debris.

A lacking dispute mechanism in place during a time when the number of space objects launched by the commercial sector is increasing will do little to absorb the growing number of claims and disputes that may arise from accidents.[82] Nor does it provide regulation that would incentivize actors to reduce the likelihood of accidents resulting in damages. For example, if we consider the flag of convenience issue emerging in relation to space activities,[83] companies may register their space objects in launch states that have created a history of avoiding such claims through the current dispute process by not 'agreeing' on claims of damages presented against them and instead pushing for the next available option. That second option would be deferring to the claims commission to provide "…compensation and determining the amount of compensation payable, if any,"[84] which is a vague procedure in the Convention through which receiving compensation is uncertain for the injured party.[85]

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

Solutions to the aforementioned issues with the Liability Convention have been widely explored by scholars. The following section will attempt

to evaluate the feasibility of some of these solutions while considering the examples of asteroid mining and the rapid increase in the number of objects in Earth's orbits through the emergence of mega-constellations.

As a solution to the dispute mechanism issues, Firestone (1985) applies "Comprehensive Interest Analysis," a legal theory founded by Professor Luther McDougal, in relation to space law disputes, which would provide a platform that would consider all affected individuals and nations in a dispute regarding space law.[86] The comprehensive interest analysis can develop its own relevant rules concerning space law disputes and "can be codified and incorporated in a multi-national space law agreement."[87] Mechanisms such as this may help avoid issues arising due to the lack of binding obligations in the Liability Convention. Another solution pertaining specifically to the commercial sector and dispute resolution includes using international commercial arbitration instead of a dispute mechanism, which is preferred by private parties.[88] International commercial arbitration resolves disputes based on previously signed international contracts, which frequently contain resolution clauses steering any arising disputes towards arbitration and not litigation.[89] Considering this is favoured by commercial actors,[90] if a collision involving two commercial actors object's resulted in "damages," negotiations over reasonable compensation and fault can be discussed between the involved parties instead of relying on the non-binding

dispute mechanism for states in the Liability Convention.[91]

Issues relating to "space objects" and "damages" may be overcome by better clarifying their definitions.[92] The creation of debris must be avoided to prevent a scenario where orbits become crowded and therefore unusable, and clarifying what these terms encompass may incentivize the commercial sector to reduce the likelihood of accidents, advancing a safer and more sustainable outer space environment. For example, revising the terms to provide a clearer scope as to what constitutes a "space object" could serve as a solution to this issue.[94] In this, debris related to mining, such as natural objects such as pieces of dismantled asteroids, could be included under the definition of 'debris.' This would likely incentivize prospective mining companies to ensure the safest practices because natural debris from their operation that results in damages would be included under "space object," therefore making them liable under the Convention. Additionally, better defining these terms may also help prevent a flag of convenience issue because holding state parties accountable for actions that result in debris causing damages would become easier under a revised Liability Convention.

Dunk (1998) provides a similar solution for the vague definition of "indirect damages," in suggesting that it could be clarified through an "authoritative interpretation, for example by way of a UNCOPUOS-guided resolution."[95] In this definition, the interruptions that thousands of

satellites in mega-constellations may create for existing satellite operators, for example, through having to engage in expensive collision avoidance maneuvers, could be considered as "indirect damage" if they result in financial loss. However, keeping track of potentially millions of pieces of debris resulting from asteroid mining or collisions between the increasing number of satellites and attributing it to a particular operator or state will remain challenging without enhanced debris tracking efforts. If debris cannot be traced back to an operator or state responsible for its creation, liability is unable to be attached.[96] For indirect damages that may prove hard to trace back to original accidents, the creation of an international guarantee fund could provide compensation for those suffering from untraceable or unidentifiable space debris.[97]

Further solutions to incentivize safe and sustainable commercial sector behaviour lie outside of the technicalities within the Liability Convention. For instance, strengthening the insurance regime for outer space activities has been explored by scholars.[98] Wang (2015) proposes that fault for damages can be established by increased international data-sharing of trackable space debris, allowing debris resulting in a collision to be traced back to an operator.[99] In this, operators would purchase insurance to cover the potential costs of a collision involving debris they created, which would financially incentivize companies and states to limit the amount of debris they create to keep their insurance costs low.[100] This proposed system could incentivize

companies involved in hazardous ventures such as asteroid mining or the establishment of mega-constellations to operate sustainably and limit the risk of debris creation or collisions involving their objects. Additionally, enhancing debris tracking and data sharing, allowing debris to be traced back to the original object, also provides a second solution to the vagueness of "indirect damages" in the Liability Convention. In particular, knowing and tracing where debris has originated would draw a necessary "direct relationship between the cause of the harm and the harmed individual or property," which could constitute 'direct' rather than 'indirect' "damages."[101]

CONCLUSION

Access to the outer space environment has become crucial in assisting daily activities carried out on Earth. Increased activity by the private sector in outer space poses many new challenges. As highlighted in this paper, one of those challenges is ensuring that the existing legal regime governing space activities is in pace with the advancement of new technologies and the competitive private sector. The Liability Convention currently exists as dated guidelines that will likely fail to incentive the safe and sustainable development of private sector activities in space. The lack of incentive is due in part to broad definitions of terms in the Liability Convention, such as that of "space objects" and "damages," which remain vague in what they encompass. The Vague definitions may

further exacerbate other issues such as a flag of convenience issue concerning outer space activities. Furthermore, the Liability Convention provides an inefficient dispute mechanism for resolving issues pertaining to a state or parties attempting to claim damages resulting from space activities. Scholars have outlined solutions in relation to the issues concerning the Liability Convention, which may enhance the ability of international law to incentivize safe practices. The future of humanity lies in our ability to further explore outer space, whether it be resource extraction that can benefit humans on Earth or the potential colonization of neighbouring planets to ensure the survival of the species. While science works to take us to new limits in outer space, legal regimes must develop alongside these advancements to ensure that commercial space activity remains safe and sustainable in the coming decades.

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Engineering a National Disaster: Spaces of Exception and Environmental (In)justice in Flint, Michigan

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the events that led to the Flint Water Crisis through the lens of Giorgio Agamben's thesis on the state of exception and theories of environmental (in)justice. I argue that the tragedy was not only decades in the making and largely preventable, but made permissible by constructing a state of exception in Flint, Michigan. This article underscores the historical production of bare life in the city as a function of the (1) uninterrupted dumping of waste in the Flint River during seasons of economic boom, (2) waves of abandonment which shaped the trajectory of the city, and (3) fiscal austerity measures ushered in by government officials to save money over lives. This work contributes to existing literature on political ecology while adding nuance to further debates on environmental justice and the state of exception.

INTRODUCTION

Exposure to lead at any level is unacceptable. As a deadly neurotoxin, lead unapologetically infiltrates the body and has profound effects associated with many development and biological processes especially among children.[1] Home to a population where 42 percent of residents live below the poverty line and 57 percent are African-American, the city of Flint, Michigan decided to change its water supply from Detroit's Lake Huron to the untreated Flint River in April 2014.[2] To cut costs and balance budgets state-appointed emergency finance managers engineered the fatal switch in source water to the corrosive Flint River. These tragic events culminated in the poisoning of 90 innocent civilians and deaths of at least 12 individuals.[3] An ongoing investigation claims the number of deaths during the eighteen month period when residents drew from the Flint River could be up to 119 as a result of legionella induced pneumonia.[4] To analyze these events, I frame this essay with two central questions: What policies and practices fueled the Flint Water Crisis, and what role does sovereign power and state decisions play in making these injustices permissible?

In response, this essay explores environmental injustice theory in concert with Giorgio Agamben's thesis on the state of exception and bare life, a precarious life without rights subject to sovereign abandonment and exposure to death, to better understand the Flint water crisis.[5] It emphasizes the role of key state actors and policies in engineering a national disaster and maps the ways in which power is operationalized and exercised in relation to life in Flint, Michigan. I argue that the Flint water crisis was not only decades in the making and largely preventable, but made *permissible* by constructing a state of exception in Flint, Michigan.

This essay proceeds in four sections. First, I build on Agamben's theoretical framework and extend his argument to incorporate streams of environmental injustice as the basis for subsequent inquiries. Second, I analyze the uninterrupted dumping of waste in the Flint River during seasons of economic boom as a function of market externalities and a political economy premised on capitalist logics of profit accumulation. Third, I highlight the waves of abandonment which shaped the trajectory of the city. Finally, I examine fiscal austerity measures government officials ushered in under a state of emergency to save money over people. The (re)production of Flint as a space of exception did not occur overnight and must be seen in light of struggles for environmental justice. To begin, it is imperative to introduce and define key concepts used in this essay to ground this analysis in context with the scholarly literature.

AGAMBEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL (IN)JUSTICE

Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben speaks to the production of bare life and spaces of exception in his seminal works *Homo Sacer*[6] (1998) and *The State of Exception* (2015).[7] *Homo sacer* (sacred man) is an individual in Roman law, who is stripped of their rights as a citizen and "may be killed but not sacrificed"

[8] This duality of being both inside and outside of the law leads to a sovereign, often taking the form of the state, to lawfully discriminate against and abandon certain groups. Sovereign power goes beyond banning individuals from participating in functions of the state or being granted certain legal protections as seen in Flint. State decisions activate this legal framework. *Homo sacer*—the embodiment of bare life—is caught up in a state of exception: a zone of indistinction reducing *homo sacer* to bare life through the willful exposure to violence, injury, or death.[9]

While great attention on spaces of exception has rightly been directed to expand the paradigmatic space of Auschwitz beyond the doors of the concentration camp, little has been done to operationalize systemic environmental injustices within this framework.[10] Not only is there a need to explore this theoretical application, but it proves particularly helpful when examining environmental injustices directed towards minorities and people below the poverty line.

Examining Flint proves a useful case study as it shows how environmental injustices produce a space of exception. Residents of Flint are reduced to bare life as they experience disproportionate negative impacts to their health and prosperity stemming from these environmental vulnerabilities. In this analysis, I have chosen the term 'environmental injustice' over 'environmental justice' to emphasize the absence of fair treatment in Flint. 'Environmental injustice' is used to emphasize the current institutional negligence and failure to protect

the most vulnerable populations.[11] The connotations of injustice evokes a sense of accountability to the conversation as "poisoning suggests a deliberate and indeed evil act" and calls into question whether this could have all been prevented.[12] This is consistent with the production of *homo sacer*—the embodiment of bare life. Like the production of *homo sacer*, environmental injustices are an inherently relational process where, "life and death are not properly scientific concepts but rather political concepts, which as such acquire a political meaning precisely only through a decision."[13] The first of these deliberate acts is the uninterrupted dumping of waste in the Flint River during seasons of economic boom.

UNREGULATED GROWTH AND POLLUTION

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The roots of environmental injustice and production of bare life in Flint, Michigan can be traced back to the economic boom in the automobile industry. With the historical introduction of lead into a host of products dating from the industrial revolution, the automobile sector became very dependent on this toxic product as a common staple put into batteries, paints, enamels, lacquers, and gasoline. The by-products of these processes were released into the air, water, and soil. By the 1930s, Flint and the area surrounding the robust city had become just as bad as any industrially polluted landscape.[14] This resulted in the Flint River carrying all of the toxic effluent of the city. Home to the international manufacturing headquarters of General Motors (GM),

the automotive giant was born in Flint, Michigan more than 100 years ago crowning the region as 'Vehicle City.'[16]

Following World War II, Flint's automotive industry was riding another successive economic boom cycle. A new 235-acre factory used to produce Buicks, coined 'Buick City,' symbolized GM's achievements of the era in 1966.[17] Buick City was not only a symbolic addition to the blossoming industry, but an example of environmental injustice as it stirred up thick clouds of smoke, which floated over the predominantly black and poverty-stricken North End neighborhood.[18] Also in 1966, data from the U.S Department of Interior reported that Buick City dumped over 2.2 million gallons of waste per day into the Flint River and 26.5 million gallons of waste per day the year before across eight GM plants.[19] Reaching its peak in the 1980s, nearly all of GM's plants were flagged for not complying to EPA regulations.[20] Immediately following the passage of the Clean Water Act in 1972, a study underscores a significant amount of toxin build up downstream in the Flint River stemming from GM plants. This, coupled with the long history of factories dumping sewage, chemicals, and road salt in the Flint River has been well documented. In the 1960s, Flint hosted a population of over 200,000 residents to fuel the engine of industry boom. That number was slashed in half to under 98,000 in 2015.[21] This historical and economic geography of abandonment set a dangerous precedent of neglect for the community of Flint.

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION, DEPOPULATION, DISINVESTMENT

Changing global markets lead to the abandonment of capital, people, and the state. Such processes left vulnerable residents, especially those subject to systemic racism, increasingly susceptible to the environmental harms of Flint's industrial past. Individuals, who remained in the city, were forced to fend for themselves in a rapidly eroding environmental, political, and economic landscape. The link between the historical and economic geography of the Flint water crisis shows that this tragedy was decades in the making. Beginning with the first wave of abandonment, Flint was vulnerable to exogenous shocks in an increasingly globalized market and at the mercy of unpredictable boom and bust cycles as manufacturing belts contract over time. A notable feature of these economic changes is the shift from the production of goods to the provision of services. With regards to depopulation, GM began to turn its gaze overseas for work under global competition, which led to approximately 70,000 jobs shed in Flint by the early 1980s.[22] As companies began to migrate abroad, those with wealth—often white, middle to upper class families—had the means to move away from pollution and harmful toxins. Communities of colour and low income groups who were stuck in place in contrast to mobile white affluent groups. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) largely excluded minorities from issuing mortgages in these neighborhoods or participating

in programs to obtain a loan.[23] The reduction and abandonment of *homo sacer* to bare life is symbolic of the sovereign's decision to enact a state of exception. Within Agamben's framework, the state, through the policies of the FHA and HOLC, had the power "to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant."[24] Flint became much poorer and home to a greater proportion of minorities as those with more options left the city.[25]

With a smaller and poorer population, Flint was no longer able to rely on a robust tax base to pay for city services or maintain the critical infrastructure built for 200,000 individuals.[26] Unable to raise taxes or generate new revenues, politicians in Flint began to borrow money instead of compelling the wealthy and corporations to pay their fair share under EPA guidelines. The ripple effects of capital and population abandonment gave way to infrastructural disinvestment.[27] The state ignored potential health hazards and environmental consequences of using contaminated water from the Flint River in the name of fiscal austerity.[28] Flint's Representative Dan Kildee revealed that there is a "philosophy of government that has been writing these places off – places like Flint get written off."[29] This is central to the logic of sacrifice zones and the production of bare life where the act of abandonment, or being "written off," takes the form of an intimate decision and political calculation. The decision over the value of life makes it so states of exception include "entire categories of citizens who for some reason

cannot be integrated into the political system."[30] In the case of Flint, these 'categories of citizens' were people of colour and low income individuals systematically discriminated against. Ensnared in a state of exception, "human life is politicized only through an abandonment to an unconditional power of death."[31] As a deadly neurotoxin, lead unapologetically infiltrates the body and has led to the death of at least 18 innocent individuals.[32] The state abandonment of individuals is a function of being relegated to a sacrifice zone. Cities like Flint are considered out-of-the-way spaces where residents lack political power and are considered disposable and devalued.[33] The state actively abandons people who live in these spaces.

While big companies, privileged individuals, and heavy polluters were able to leave the city freely, the legacy of toxic pollution left behind in the Flint River still remains. After facing multiple environmental assessments and cleanups, GM's flagship factory on the Flint River was demolished in 2004, and subsequently, sold five years later to the city for $1.[34] Contaminants left behind from this site include "heavy metals like arsenic, mercury, and lead, toxic solvents, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and polynuclear aromatics (PNAs) including petroleum compounds."[35] The terms of GM's federally assisted bankruptcy settlements with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) meant that neither GM nor the federal government would have to answer to the health issues related to the Flint River. This ultimately

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culminates in a series of state decisions and inactions contributing directly to negative health impacts. None of GM's former factory sites were held responsible for any health problems or deleterious effects suffered during their tenure.[36] The poorest residents of Flint bore the burden of environmental degradation and increased living costs. The acquisition of benefits and avoidance of hazards at the expense of others and the environment draws on the central tenets of environmental injustice. [37]

SAVING MONEY OVER SAVING LIVES

The production of Flint as a space of exception and environmental injustice is exhibited as minority and low-income communities were knowingly and deliberately exposed to violence, injury, or death through the removal of state protection through the declaration of a state of emergency. Engineering a national, human-made disaster requires a series of failures on multiple levels of government. Of particular interest here is the withdrawal of the state and removal rights made possible through the declaration of a state of emergency. This results in the suspension of the rule of law where governments are empowered to perform exceptional actions in a crisis. In the case of Flint, citizens were removed from legal protections based on fundamental human rights granted to them while being held both inside a new law and outside of the old law. Agamben emphasizes that, "he who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned

by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable."[38] The financial crisis triggered a state of emergency where vulnerable populations were deliberately exposed to injustices while simultaneously being subject to the law, but unable to call upon it. The decision by Michigan Governor Rick Snyder to declare a financial state of emergency set in motion a series of catastrophic events with severe consequences.[39] Reacting to a dilapidated tax base and the inability to generate any funds to maintain critical services, Governor Snyder looked for solutions within the austerity toolkit. This culminated in the hiring a series of four, unelected emergency managers, tasked with managing Flint's expenditures and little democratic oversight in 2011.[40]

Cutting costs and balancing budgets until the city was solvent, these emergency managers wielded a significant amount of power and enjoyed considerable control over the municipal government for several years.[41] Chief among these austerity reforms was the switch in water supply from Detroit's Lake Huron to the Flint River. It was promised that a new pipeline being built to Lake Huron would save the city $18 million over eight years. Subsequent delays resulted in pushing the completion date far past 2016.[42] What was intended to be a temporary solution to meet immediate needs resulted in emergency managers making the decision to use the polluted Flint River. This would have profound unintended consequences as residents began to complain about the smell, taste, and discoloured look of the water

and operated as a type of slow violence in the following months.

Water tests confirm just how toxic and corrosive the Flint River had become. Data reveals a "shocking disregard for human life [as] testing indicated alarming lead levels seven times over the federal legal limit, while others were 10,000 times over."[43] Coupled with toxic water, the aging water distribution in Flint contained a "high percentage of lead pipes and lead plumbing, with estimates of lead service lines ranging from 10 percent to 80 percent."[44] Aware of the dangerous pollutant levels, the GM plant soon complained that water from the Flint River was so corrosive that it caused engine parts to rust and was allowed to return to the Detroit River.[45] This should have been a red flag to the emergency managers and if the deleterious effects of lead were so potent to corroding engine parts, how would they impact individual bodies. Fiscal austerity and saving money proved to be a salient factor over saving lives despite complaints from residents and serious medical incidents. A report by CNN notes that simply adding an anti-corrosive would have o-nly cost $100 a day and "90 percent of the problems with Flint's water could have been avoided."[46] All of this was preventable yet permissible. Borrowing from Agamben, "it is the sovereign who, insofar as he decides on the state of exception, has the power to decide which life may be killed without the commission of homicide."[47] Through a state of exception, Flint residents are "rendered to bare life and legally abandoned," which allows for the active discrimination, displacement,

and death of already vulnerable communities.[48] This exposure to violence on individual bodies and communities has resulted in 119 cases of pneumonia and culminated in the poisoning of 90 innocent civilians and deaths of at least 12 individuals. The exposure to violence, injury, or death to those relegated to the space of exception was justified under the state of emergency.

BARE LIFE AND ABANDONMENT

The Flint water crisis was decades in the making. Giorgio Agamben's work has paved the way for a new understanding of sovereign power. The state of exception is projected upon individuals where they are subject to abandonment and reduced to bare life. While Agamben limits his scope to the concentration camp in Auschwitz, this paper extends the space of exception to Flint, Michigan. This case provides a nuanced way to analyze spaces of exception and its relation to environmental injustice. The construction of Flint as a space of exception did not happen overnight, but is the product of political processes and systemic practices. Seen through this lens, these catastrophic events are by no means simply natural, but rather national disasters. Sovereign abandonment is an inherently relational and political move that leaves vulnerable populations "abandoned by the law yet subject to it" in a state of exception.[49]

Taking into account the production of spaces of exception and deep roots of environmental injustice, it is imperative to examine the decisions and events that culminated

in Flint's latest fiasco. Engineered by state-appointed emergency finance managers mandated to cut costs and save money, the switch in source water from Lake Huron to the corrosive Flint River had an immediate impact and profound consequences on the most vulnerable populations. The context of environmental injustice in Flint, Michigan must be seen through the lens of continuous growth and dumping of waste in the Flint River during seasons of economic boom, waves of abandonment that shaped the trajectory of the city, and prioritizing fiscal austerity over social welfare. Rather than define the water crisis as the absence of fair treatment in the case of Flint, environmental injustice is used to emphasize the current state of affairs and to focus on the negligence and failure to protect the most vulnerable populations. Flint is part of a larger narrative of cities who are shaped by the trajectory of systemic and discriminatory power relations. It is through this argument that *homo sacer* and the production of bare life can be applied to residents of Flint, Michigan.

NOTES

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[46] Julia Craven, Tyler Tynes, "The Racist Roots Of Flint's Water Crisis," para. 37.

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The Face of a Hegemon:
The Role of the Ramayana's Gender Narratives in Shaping the Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party

JULIAN LAM

This paper seeks to uncover the dynamic nature of the Ramayana as a tool used in the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. With a framework from the works of Bottici (2011) and Gramsci, the paper argues that the BJP facilitated its pre—eminence in Indian politics through a unique conflation of the moral and juridical; specifically analyzing gender norms from the religious narrative. Ultimately, the BJP case highlights the implications of political myth as a means of social organization and as a tool to promote hegemonic interpretations of moral and ethical values through a nation—building project.

INTRODUCTION

Amidst a crisis of state legitimacy during the late 1980s, a movement emerged that sought to radically reconstruct meanings of national identity. Propelled by middle—class insecurities of status decline, the Hindutva movement was principally born out of a rightward shift in political and ideological sentiments seeking a return to traditional Hindu values.

Hindutva (an essentialized form of Hinduism) served as a reformational cultural framework focused on reinterpreting the Hindu identity through an operationalization of moral imperatives. With both centralized and decentralized political machinery, the movement's agenda has worked to achieve political domination grounded in an appeal to religious tradition, and in a retrivialist fashion, myths of societal origin. To achieve this, nationally held religious based narratives, such as the Ramayana (Tale of Rama), have been operationalized to lay claim to traditional societal values, especially those of gender. Binding injunctions of gender for the Indian collective have been legitimated through careful interpretation of the Ramayana tradition. This, therefore, reflects a broader phenomenon of nationalist based projects actively and passively perpetuating univocal understandings of religion as a means of constructing hegemonic discourses on moral imperatives in South Asia.

Amongst the advocates of Hindutva, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has remained one of its strongest supporters from inception. Since the 1980s, the BJP has gained significant political relevance and has worked to establish a hegemonic position as a purveyor of traditional cultural practice through a unique conflation of Hindu values and party beliefs.[1]

This paper will argue that the BJP's usage of the Ramayana's gender narratives has allowed it to develop hegemonic interpretations of gender constructs during the party's rise to power.

This paper will first use Bottici's tripartite approach to establish the broader philosophy behind political myth and associated narrative development as a possible framework to understand the BJP's efforts. Next, it will present Gramsci's thesis on the operationalization of religion to produce hegemonic discourses on moral imperatives as a potential mechanism for the BJP's development of dominating gender constructs. The paper will then examine specific gender constructs promoted by the party, their purpose and their associated Ramayan interpretations. Finally, it will contextualize these constructs by exploring practical cases whereby the BJP actively employed narrative strategy to develop hegemonic gender discourses during their rise to power.

POLITICAL MYTH AND NARRATIVE DEVELOPMENT

The philosophy of political myth can be understood fundamentally through three distinguishing features: 1) nature to produce significance, 2) group participation, and 3) relevancy within the lives and political experiences of a group.[2] As opposed to a clearly defined object, Bottici (2011) highlights the process of common narrative building that political myth engenders through these features,

making it an incredibly powerful tool in mobilizing political movements.

Feature 1: Producing Significance

The "significance" that myths produce originates from a fundamental pursuit to be "grounded".[3] Their specific nature reflects a human aspiration that seeks to ascertain meaning within a world of shifting context and circumstances. While a common narrative may provide relevance within certain situations, a myth responds to a greater need for a common "significance" within contexts of uncertainty and instability; a tool that can be relied upon to essentially "ground" an individual. The "significance" it produces is intended to be adaptable and encompassing, enabling it to be consistently employed by individuals in response to particular conditions. When woven into narratives, political myths in particular produce a strong foothold for individuals within various political and social circumstances.[4] The myth fulfills the varying exigencies of the individual in different contexts—such as a moral focal-point to make a difficult decision—allowing it to be consistently re-appropriated and employed.

Feature 2: Group Participation

Bottici highlights how "political myths are not usually learned once and for all, but rather are apprehended through a cumulative exposure to them."[5] The "significance" that these political myths engender must be shared and reinforced through consistent usage within a larger social collective. Though they may be explicitly learnt, an underlying unconscious apprehension contributes, one could argue, to a greater attribution of "significance" to the myth, enabling the myth to be more commonly used.[6] Persistent integration of these myths in diverse settings, such as from the arts to social practices, help with their legitimation and producing of "significance" for the larger collective. Group participation in reinforcing myth applicability leads to wide—scale integration, thus facilitating a collective conscious and unconscious apprehension.

Feature 3: Myth Relevancy

Consistent usage of these myths is predicated upon their ability to contribute "significance" within the lives and political experiences of the social group. Wittgenstein (as cited in Bottici), argues that political myth does not aim to describe the world but rather "create" a world to be "fulfilled".[7] It does not necessarily claim to represent the truth, but rather must hold a "significance" that can be used to "ground" oneself in present social and political circumstances. Without the constraint of truth for these myths, their applicability is much more dynamic in producing "significance", allowing for easier appropriation for different contexts. So long as this "significance" criteria is met such that it holds relevance in the face of present conditions, the myth survives.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF RELIGION: A GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON HEGEMONIC PROCESSES

In 'State and Civil Society', Gramsci locates a key cultural function of the state that seeks to establish moral and ethical imperatives for its population. The politics of culture exemplifies

an intimisation of the state and civil society through a gradual process of reproduction to both actively and passively organize society under dominating moral touchstones.[8] Instead of playing a static role, the state consistently perpetuates these touchstones as part of a greater attempt to achieve cultural absorption amongst its population. The state arrogates both a political and social role upon itself, enabling the fusion of the moral and the juridical.

Religion offers itself as a practical tool for this end as it already holds a "juridical—moral form of authority". The non-secular state conceives law under the greater moral authority of religion, bringing together politics and culture to form a fused practice of power. This establishes the hegemonic rule of a religious majority.[9] Through the efforts of key initiators, known as "intellectuals" by Gramsci, making religious injunctions accepted as law requires some sort of unconscious apprehension by the larger ruled collective, such that it becomes "common sense." The normalization of moral imperatives by the population is needed to produce a unity of conception in instituting a prevailing hegemonic discourse. Thus, the importance conferred to "common sense" relates to the internalization of moral and ethical imperatives produced by religion, such that it becomes a state of consciousness driving one's conception of the world. By achieving this, the legitimacy afforded to judicial aspects of the state derives from an appeal to a greater moral authority found in religion that has been internalized by the

larger social collective. This signifies a completion in its operationalization to institute hegemonic discourses.[10]

GENDER CONSTRUCTS

In the era of post-independence and particularly during the 1980s, nationalist Hindu discourse worked to develop two distinct "worlds" to be "fulfilled" concerning feminine and masculine constructs of both inner and outer identity. The two notable gender constructs that arise are that of Pativrata—the conjugal wife—and Sat-Pursua—the ideal man. These binary gender conceptions were legitimated through the Ramayana tradition. However, they could be seen as fashioned to create morally and ethically defined roles for men and women to be relegated to within the larger Indian collective.

Pativrata—The Conjugal Wife

This concept essentially worked to confine the woman's role to a domestic sphere in defining her in relation to a "conjugal familial" responsibility.[11] By defining her *dharmic* duty as one revolving around fulfilling a devotion to her husband while also accepting his privileging of certain interests, this would essentially allow his pursuit of the "greater interest" of the nation over his husbandly duties.[12] Particularly drawn from the Ramayana episode of Rama choosing to banish Sita due to gossip amongst his citizens, this relationship seeks to define a subordinate role for a woman in heeding to the greater "national interests" the man has to fulfill[13]—in the way Sita respects Rama's privileging of his Rajadarmic

duties as king. Furthermore, the woman's role is also specifically confined to the domestic sphere, which draws from some Ramayan depictions whereby Sita is abducted after she crosses the *lakshman-rekha*.[14] This symbolizes the consequences of a woman's attempt to enter the public sphere from the domestic, serving as a means to justify their confinement.[15] The usage of Pativrata could be seen as a sidelining of femininity in the face of nation building efforts working to actively reinforce dominating patriarchal definitions concerning the role of the woman, thus relegating their role as subordinate in a male dominated discourse. Furthermore, the concept of Pativrata specifically emphasizes the need to protect the purity of women by keeping them in the domestic space. The woman metaphorically serves as a repository of Hindu tradition, and therefore must be protected even at the expense of her own self—expression.[16]

Sat-Pursua—The Ideal Man

As Manghram highlights, the creation of a strong "ideal man" was originally born out of an "opposition to colonial discourse's idea of the weak, effeminate Bengali male."[17] The portrayal of a Rama-like figure for the Hindu man is meant to not only to show his privileging of greater interests above his own, but to also serve as a focal point of "righteousness" in the community.[18] In the Ramayana, this is exemplified when Rama urges Lakshmana to choose a path of non-violence when the verdict of Rama's exile is declared, advising Bharata to follow his dharma as a son when he condemns Kaikeyi

and guiding his mother to not privilege her duties as a mother over Dasaratha's duties as a king.[19] They all look towards Rama as knowing the moral right from wrong. This image is what is perpetuated in Hindu nationalist discourse to capture the role the man must embody to morally guide his community. This could be understood in how the patriarchal interpretation of society-building essentially arrogates the responsibility to dictate moral imperatives to the man for his community. This makes him the purveyor of correct practice— the ultimate arbiter of the morally right and wrong.

RISE OF THE BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY

Through a nationally held narrative of the Ramayana, the Hindutva movement, and more notably the BJP, have worked, as this paper argues, to manipulate its interpretation to install a hegemonic discourse concerned with defining a clear heterosexual matrix of relations among femities and masculinities in India. Their operationalization of the Ramayana can be seen as a tool helping to legitimate the creation of binding injunctions of gender in particular. This in turn has facilitated a larger nation-building project seeking to actively fuse political and cultural practice.

Producing Significance and the Operationalisation of Rama: Hindu Hyper—Masculinity

Throughout its rise to power, the BJP moved away from traditional depictions of Rama as an androgynous figure to one embodying a "strident

militarism of a hyper hegemonic masculinity."[20] Rama has essentially been fashioned by the party in such a way that his form intends to depict a force of strength against Islam and as a valiant protector of Hindu values. The political myth embodied in Rama's image through this depiction could be seen as the BJP effectively operationalizing the Ramayana narrative to provide "significance" during times of instability.[21] One notable example in 1992 was when party posters depicting Rama as a muscled figure "tower[ing] over a Hindu temple, protecting it against aggressor[s]"[22][23] covered the walls of Indian cities in the aftermath of the Babri Masjid Mosque destruction[24] that called for the creation of a Ram *mandir*[25] to be built. This use of Rama's image could be seen as an active effort to operationalize a cultural imperative for a political end by the BJP. Using the works of Gramsci, the party's imagery of Rama could be understood as an attempt to re-imagine a religious figure and its values towards a modern problem faced by society. Through a persistent and collective reinforcement of a modern interpretation of Rama, the party sought to institute a hegemonic discourse on gender by normalising a hyper-masculine depiction of him. Therefore, political opposition to the Babri Masjid Mosque and a drive to build a Ram mandir were legitimized by the usage of Rama as a focal-point of righteousness and as a dominating male figure protecting Hinduism against Islamic values.

The political myth engendered in the hyper masculine depiction of Rama through the manipulation of the Ramayana narrative satisfies the three features of political myth that Bottici highlights. Not only does Rama's image produce "significance" in his fortitude and strength during a time of "crisis", he is already deeply ingrained in the collective imaginations of a shared religious (Hindu) collective. The manipulation of Sat-Pursua (that revolves around Rama's depiction) is implicitly tapped into through the party's speeches and emotive rhetoric during this particular time of crisis, but also throughout its rise to power, emphasizing a "masculine Hinduism as expressed by the form of the Hindu warrior."[26] Not only is he used to express this, but it can be seen that he has been fashioned to become highly "significant" as a rallying point during times of unstable circumstances, or as a protector of the morally "right". Furthermore, the party has actively used the image of Rama and drawn from the gender construct of Sat-Pursua to mobilize resistance against Muslims in India. Particularly referencing their inhuman and lustful nature, BJP members have often employed emotive rhetoric calling for Indian men to actively defend women from a perceived Muslim threat.[27] This operationalization of Rama could be seen once again, as highlighting the fusion of the moral and political spheres by the BJP to legitimize calls against Muslims during their rise to power, and later, within laws that they institute.

Group Participation and Normalising Gender Constructs: Sagar's Ramayan

This 78-episode television series provides a key source for a widespread depiction of the Ramayana

in India during the mid to late 1980s. Sagar's series situates itself among one of the most effectual means by which political and moral principles were disseminated to characterize the "ideal" Hindu state. The series was widely popular and claimed to present an authentic depiction of the Ramayana. Viewed by millions across India, the power and reach of the show even lead to wide scale strikes upon a premature ending of the series, leading to the government sponsoring Sagar to complete it.[28] However, as critiqued in Manghram, the popularity of the series allowed for a "dangerous and unprecedented authority to fix the stories in harmful ways".[29] Not only converging parts of several Ramayanas, the series promoted specific heternormative and conservative depictions that reinforced hegemonic discourses on gender promoted by the BJP.[30] Through a collective cumulative exposure from media, meta-narrative strategies of the serial could be seen as helping to facilitate the promotion of various gender constructs in line with BJP values,[31] facilitating the "unconscious apprehension" that Bottici discusses. Furthermore, through the works of Gramsci, this television series can be seen as a means to effectively facilitate a normalization of specific conceptions of gender. Internalizing common moral constructs through widespread viewing of Sagar's show provides a unique avenue to produce an essential "common sense" regarding the roles and relations between genders in the Ramayana. Henceforth, these moral and cultural imperatives can operate in the consciousness of the larger Indian collective, and can aid

in deriving legitimacy for hegemonic interpretations of gender by the BJP.

Myth Relevancy & Fusing the Moral and Cultural: Protecting the Hindu Woman

Throughout the rise of the BJP, party members have both directly and indirectly cited from Ramayana tradition to maintain a depiction of the Hindu woman in line with conceptions of *Pativrata*. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, implicit references[32] to the sanctity of women in the domestic sphere were made in order to inspire a hegemonic Hindu discourse against an Islamic consciousness.[33] Similar to the emotive rhetoric used concerning hyper-masculinity, the BJP has shifted away from explicit to implicit references since their rise to power. Now less right wing, the party still activates undertones concerning gender constructs that they have helped to build from the inception of the Hindutva movement. With political power aspirations, the hegemonic discourses intended to be achieved have required a transition from active efforts to reorganize society to more implicit forms.[34]

Though more nuanced in modern contexts, an example that could be seen as a surfacing of this hegemonic discourse was when Madhya Pradesh Minister Kailash Vijayvargiya cited that "just like Sita was abducted by Ravana, a woman will be punished if she crosses her limits"[35] amidst a horrific rape and murder of a woman in New Delhi in 2012. Though asked to retract his statement by the BJP formally, this explicit reference could highlight the attitudes and underlying beliefs that drive a hegemonic discourse by the BJP concerning gender. This reference

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specifically relies on the promotion of *Pativrata* in the sense that a woman stepping outside the *Lakshman Rekha* would face dire consequences, and thus, justifying the need for her to be confined within the domestic sphere. Though the statement was denounced, and could be argued as a spurious case, these discourses still permeate thanks to the political narrative development from the beginning of the Hindutva movement by the BJP. Not only has the Ramayana been referred to regarding gender, it has persistently been used as a focal-point to drive various political proposals in society. From asking for millions to spend on Sanjeevani development (a special herb based in Ramayan lore), to calling for a Ram temple to be built in Ayodhya, the Ramayana tradition appears to remain incredibly important in the minds of politicians and scholars throughout India.[36]

Furthermore in modern contexts, the conflation of the moral and juridical can be seen clearly during the BJP's wielding of power. By strongly advocating for a non—secular, Hindu majoritarian state, the BJP has gradually fused moral imperatives with law to promote hegemonic discourses on various dynamic issues affecting India. Thus, though not explicit, based in the work of Gramsci, we can see that the party seeks to derive legitimacy from internalized understandings of gender constructs advocated throughout its rise to power from the larger Indian collective, especially femininities. Through an operationalization of religion, the BJP has been able to shape its interpretations for political ends, thus engineering its rise to power.

CONCLUSION

The power of political myth through narrative development holds strong implications in creating hegemonic discourses. Through its ability to produce significance, manipulated Ramayan gender constructs can be seen as allowing the BJP to create a stable "grounding" amidst periods of crisis and to create nationally defined gender binaries. Furthermore, using Bottici's and Gramsci's frameworks, cumulative exposure and " unconscious apprehension" have been achieved through narrative development found particularly in Sagar's series espousing conservative Hindu values and gender constructs. The "significance" engendered in concepts of *sat-pursua* and *pativrata* found traditionally in depictions of Rama and Sita can be seen as ingraining themselves deeply in the Indian psyche through their consistent usage by the BJP and their maintenance in reinforcing nationally encompassing hegemonic discourses on gender. Using Gramsci's work in particular, we can understand the BJP's efforts as intending to merge cultural and political spheres to legitimate their platforms and install laws based in the moralities of religious tradition. By applying Bottici and Gramsci's frameworks to the case study of the BJP, the power of nation-building efforts through the conflation of gender and political myth becomes clearly apparent.

NOTES

[1] Uma Chakravarti, "Saffroning the Past: Of Myths, Histories and Right-Wing Agendas." *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no. 5 (1998): 225.

[2] Chiara Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth" *Iris* 3, no. 5 (04, 2011): 39.

[3] Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth", 38.

[4] Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth", 38-41.

[5] Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth", 40.

[6] Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth", 40.

[7] Bottici, "Towards a Philosophy of Political Myth", 34.

[8] Bannerji, *Making India Hindu and Male,* 367.

[9] Bannerji, *Making India Hindu and Male*, 369.

[10] Bannerji, *Making India Hindu and Male,* 375.

[11] Mangharam, Muktilakhi. ""Rama, Must I Remind You Of Your Divinity?" Locating a Sexualized, Feminist, And Queer Dharma in The Ramayana." *Diacritics* 39, no. 1 (2009): 80-82.

[12] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 81.

[13] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 77.

[14] This refers to a protective line drawn around Rama, Lakshmana and Sita's dwelling in the forest of Dandakaranya by Lakshmana. This line is essentially meant to protect Sita while Lakshmana is out searching for Rama, and crossing it basically leaves her unprotected.

[15] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 81.

[16] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 77.

[17] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 77.

[18] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 83.

[19] A. Śrīnivāsa and Vālmīki, *The Ramayana of Valmiki* (Madras, 1991, Little Flower Co.), select readings.

[20] Sikata Banerjee, *Make Me a Man!: Masculinity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India*, (New York, 2005, State University of New York Press), 96.

[21] S. P. Udayakumar, "Historicizing Myth and Mythologizing History: The 'Ram Temple' Drama" *Social Scientist* 25, no. 7/8, (1997): 17.

[22] Banerjee, *Make Me a Man*, 96.

[23] "An apocalyptic leader is silhouetted against a purple sky, his torso and legs uncovered, his hair and loincloth flow-ing against a raging storm. This is Ram the disinherited, radiating a mood of elemental anger." (Basu et al. as cited in Banerjee, 2005, p. 96.)

[24] This was carried out by members of the Vishva Hindu Parishad Party (a right—wing Hindutva inspired organisation).

[25] A temple devoted to Rama.

[26] Sikita, *Make Me a Man*, 97.

[27] Runa Das, *Nation, Gender and Representations of (In)Securities in Indian Politics*, (Newbury Park, 2008, Sage Publications), 214.

[28] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 87.

[29] Mangharam, "Rama, Must I Remind You", 99.

[30] *Ramayan*, Directed by Ramanand Sagar, IST, 1987—1988, select episodes.

[31] Chakravarti, "Saffroning the Past", 28.

[32] Reference example: "In the history of all violence against our women either the Indian Muslims or their extended hand Pakistan has been the abductor community/country that has revealed a lustful behaviour of its males towards our women." (Ram Kumar, BJP member, as cited in Das 2008)

[33] Runa Das, *Nation, Gender and Representations,* 214.

[34] Himani Bannerji, *Making India Hindu and Male: Cultural Nationalism and the Emergence of the Ethnic Citizen in Contemporary India*, (Newbury Park, 2006, Sage Publications), 379.

[35] India Today Online, "MP BJP leader says women who cross Laxman—Rekha will be punished," India Today, January 4th, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/delhi-gangrape-kailash-vijayvargiya-madhya-pradesh-bjp-ramayana-sita-cross-limits-150751-2013-01-04.

[36] Priyanka Pathak, "Why is a 2,500—year—old epic dominating polls in modern India?" BBC, April 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47944411.

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Uprooting People to Plant Trees: How the Implementation of REDD+ in Sub-Saharan Africa Impacts the Livelihood of Local Communities

NJOKI MBURU

UN-REDD+, *an international market-based conservation program primarily funded by donations from Europe, purposes to protect tropical forests, mitigate impacts of climate change, and support livelihoods of forest-reliant communities in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Unfortunately, this performance-based, financial-incentive program has resulted in dispossession of land, restricted access to forest resources, increased food insecurity, and exacerbated wealth gaps for participating communities in Kenya and Tanzania. While local elites benefit from corruption, Indigenous communities are denied land-titles and placed in precarious economic and ecological conditions. Still, unmitigated deforestation of tropical forests intensifies the impacts of climate change for the most economically-disadvantaged.*

Forests are a significant means of sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, with approximately 6.7 billion tonnes of carbon reduced annually; a third of this is as a result of sequestration by forests in tropical countries.[1] The loss in forest biomass is estimated to lead to an approximate 12% to 17% increase in annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.[2] Forest biomass is lost either through the burning of forest matter or decomposition of forest material.[3] In tropical and subtropical countries, deforestation for wood fuel is a significant cause of emissions, ranking second after the global industrial sector, which primarily uses fossil fuels.[4] For these reasons, projects to mitigate GHG emissions through reforestation have been designed and implemented, primarily in developing countries.[5] In 2008, the UNFCCC launched a global emissions-mitigation mechanism known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+). Ten years following its inception, I seek to explore how the design and implementation of international market-based forest conservation programs, with a focus on REDD+, impacts the livelihoods of local communities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

In this paper, I will argue that the implementation of REDD+ dispossesses local communities of their land, restricts access to forests and forest resources, and reproduces inequity in developing countries, thereby threatening the livelihoods of local communities while benefiting local elites. I will begin by presenting the rationale behind the establishment of REDD+ as a carbon-offsetting mechanism, followed by some arguments given in support of REDD+ in developing countries. I will then present my main arguments against REDD+, going into detail using two case studies from SSA. Following this, I will present some recommendations on how REDD+ can be improved to mitigate the harms, as mentioned earlier. Finally, I conclude by summarising the key arguments in this paper and then present potential topics for further research.

SEEDLINGS OF HOPE: RATIONALE AND SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS FOR REDD+

REDD+ has become increasingly popular in developing countries due to its incentivizing procedure, which has enabled economically-disadvantaged states to have adequate funds for national forest conservation programs.[6] International market-based forest conservation programs are a cost-effective means of carbon sequestration for many developing countries.[7] The primary objective of REDD+ is to "provide performance-based financial incentives for developing countries, with the major benefit of mitigating [GHG] emissions, particularly from the forest sector".[8] One of its foundational principles is that countries that voluntarily implement REDD+ programs are compensated.[9] Few developed countries, namely Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Japan, Spain, and the European Commission, contribute to REDD+ finances through significant donations. Developing countries in Africa, South America, and Asia receive funds from these

developed countries, which are calculated based on the changing value of carbon markets and on the estimated cost of activities and income that are foregone due to reforestation programs.[10] I have chosen to focus on Africa because this continent will potentially experience the highest and fastest loss of forests over the next 40 years.[11] Additionally, Africa is home to the largest share of the world's forest-dependent households that practice subsistence agriculture.[12]

Those supporting REDD+ argue that when developing countries participate, they become more involved and engaged in global negotiations on climate change compared to previous years where their views and experiences were often overlooked.[13] Noting that climate change considerably impacts the most economically-disadvantaged groups, engaging developing countries in such negotiations enables more informed planning for improved resilience and mitigation.[14] Financial incentives received through implementing REDD+ projects also attract governments that previously had little motivation to invest in the conservation of their forests.[15] Therefore, through participating in REDD+, African governments are not only better integrated into international environmental agreements, but also take more responsibility in their national environmental policies. In the 1980s, preservationist policies often took precedence in environmental affairs, resulting in exclusion and penalties upon local communities.[16] This "fences and fines" approach is what REDD+ seeks to redress, by promoting the

social and economic development of marginalized communities alongside environmental conservation.[17] Supporters of REDD+ suggest that the global community will experience a win-win-win situation: protecting forests in tropical areas, mitigating climate change through carbon sequestration, and improving the livelihoods of local communities through payments from carbon revenues.[18] Nonetheless, while donors cite carbon offsets as the primary goal of REDD+, African countries prioritize non-carbon benefits, promote poverty alleviation, and focus less on reducing carbon emissions.[19]

LAND DISPOSSESSION AND RESTRICTED ACCESS: THE CASE OF THE WARUFIJI IN TANZANIA

Despite the arguments in support of REDD+, there are increasing concerns that REDD+ has led to the exclusion of local communities in different parts of SSA from forests and forest resources, thereby having negative consequences on the livelihoods of community members.[20] Governance of forests involves not only numerous resources but also multiple stakeholders, including forest-dependent and indigenous communities, smallholder farmers, and timber industries amongst others.[21] Over the past 25 years, countries in SSA have increased their efforts to decentralize forest conservation as a means of increasing the engagement of local stakeholders in the management and use of forest resources.[22] Through decentralization, governments aim to reduce the costs of managing forests by diversifying responsibilities and upholding the

rights of indigenous groups and local communities.[23] However, with strong financial incentives, as is the case with REDD+, and with the need to provide reliable and regular monitoring and evaluation of conservation projects, national governments return to the role of being primary managers of forests and forest resources.[24] Consequently, some "governments (...) justify re-centralization by portraying themselves as more capable and reliable than local communities at protecting national interest".[25] As a result, states may choose to militarise their forests, resulting in the exclusion of local communities from accessing forest resources and, consequently, threatening the livelihoods of members of these communities.[26]

In Tanzania, the Warufiji community is represented as carrying out activities that are destructive to the local mangrove forests, while REDD+ is promoted as a more sustainable alternative to indigenous practices.[27] The modern legal framework of REDD+ conflicts with the traditional institutions, resulting in strict restriction of access to the mangrove forests, thereby facilitating resurgent protectionism.[28] The Rufiji Delta in Tanzania is considered to have high ecological and economic value, as it hosts Africa's most abundant and most continuous growth of estuarine mangrove.[29] In 1998, the Republic of Tanzania co-signed to manage the mangrove forests in the Rufiji Delta with members of the Warufiji community.[30] This co-management approach meant that village-level governments were primary owners and managers of these forests, with the state government receiving some

benefits and covering some costs.[31] Due to its significance, the Rufiji Delta has received global attention from institutions such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).[32]

Consequently, the Rufiji Delta was listed as one of the six WWF-supported REDD+ Pilot Projects and, shortly after, rice farming by the local Warufiji community was identified as a threat to the health of mangrove forests and was cited as illegal.[33] The government of Tanzania, which set up the Mangrove Management Project (MMP), ordered the Warufiji to halt any activities in the mangrove forests, including rice farming, and later forced the community to evacuate from the forest land.[34] Furthermore, portraying the Warufiji as invaders and unsustainable users of mangrove forests portrays the Rufiji delta as an Edenic space that has historically been free of the influences of people.[35] Interviews with villagers revealed that they were forced to plant mangrove seedlings in place of rice on their farms, contributing to food insecurity.[36] Restricted access to mangrove forests and forced reforestation demonstrates the failure of REDD+, where more emphasis was directed towards project outcomes while overlooking the need for justice and equity for forest communities.[37]

UNEQUAL BENEFIT-SHARING: THE CASE OF THE WATAITA IN KENYA

Another negative consequence of the design and implementation of REDD+ projects in SSA is that the financial benefits derived from the

implementation of REDD+ are not always fairly distributed, leading to inequity amongst stakeholders.[38] Since REDD+ funds are first transferred to state governments and later distributed at the individual, household, or community levels, equity in access and distribution of these funds depends on the transparency at the state level.[39] In SSA, the national financial institutions are often beset with mismanagement and corruption, which results in the inefficient allocation and use of resources.[40] According to research by the Indian Law Resource Centre on the legal responsibilities of national governments and international actors involved in REDD+ implementation, local communities that participate in REDD+ projects have the right to a fair share of any financial benefits obtained from both donor funds and the sale of carbon credits.[41] The lack of acknowledgment of the rights of local communities to forests, carbon, and land, creates inequity between local REDD+ stakeholders, resulting in unfair benefit sharing and exacerbated inequalities.[42] For decades, international market-based forest conservation programs have benefitted local elites by securing their access to forests and forest resources at the detriment of poor and marginalized populations that also rely on the same resources.[43]

Chomba et al. (2016), researched the Kasigau Corridor REDD+ Project (KCRP) in Kenya, and demonstrated how unfair benefit-distribution amongst project stakeholders resulted in increased marginalization of local communities. The KCRP area under study is divided to accommodate a total of 13 ranches: five of these being individually-owned and managed, four belonging to private companies, and the remainder being under traditional ownership by the Wataita.[44] The Wataita are an ethnic group in eastern Kenya practicing smallholder farming and livestock production and currently living in the ranches mentioned above under the protection of traditional land rights and ancestral ties.[45] The KCRP protects Kenyan dryland forests from deforestation since these forests are a seasonal migratory route for wild animals between two major national parks.[46] When community members living in the traditionally-owned ranches stop felling trees, the KCRP project managers can claim more payments from the REDD+ program and, consequently, can sell more carbon credits on the international market. The funds received from REDD+ can then be distributed amongst the stakeholders, incentivizing them against further deforestation.[47] According to findings by Chomba et al. (2016), the distribution of the revenue from the sale of carbon credits is unequal, such that individual and corporate ranch owners receive 33% of the total revenue, the Wataita receive 14%, and the remainder (56%) finances project implementation costs such as paying wildlife guards. The private ranch owners receive significantly more benefits than members of the Wataita community who live on communal land, despite all parties implementing the KCRP.[48] In addition, inadequate compensation for the indigenous Wataita bear means that they bear more substantial opportunity costs of avoiding the deforestation of and access to the dryland forests,

which they would otherwise use for agriculture, hunting and income-generating activities.[49] This case of the KCRP in Kenya demonstrates the continued lack of recognition of traditional land rights for indigenous communities in SSA, affirming that the unequal playing field amongst REDD+ project stakeholders often has more significant negative consequences for local communities than it does to local elites.[50] Despite REDD+ projects providing funding to incentivize for less ecologically harmful livelihood alternatives, there persists a sizable gap in protecting the rights of local communities, as well as in ensuring that corrupt local elite capture of carbon revenues does not exacerbate existing marginalization.[51]

ROOTS FOR GROWTH:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
OF THE REDD+ PROGRAM

Alleviating the negative impacts of REDD+ projects on local communities, although difficult, is possible. The degree of impact on local communities is dependent on both local needs and on decision-making at national and international levels.[52] It is crucial to restructure REDD+ such that the intended ecological outcomes do not compromise the livelihoods and agency of local forest-dependent communities.[53] Clarifying on the rights of local communities to land, carbon, forest resources, and any other related ecosystem services before the implementation of any REDD+ project enables community members to participate in decision-making throughout the process, consequently giving them more

agency in negotiation and increasing the likelihood of long-term success of the projects.[54] In order for local communities to be more engaged in REDD+ projects, opportunities for their involvement must be accessible and must allow for equal representation. Some ways to increase accessibility include, giving timely notice to community members on any local REDD+ meetings, translating resources into local languages, and allowing adequate time for feedback on REDD+ reports.[55]

The lack of consideration for local needs by REDD+ project developers exacerbates inequity, which contributes to national governments and local elites benefiting at the expense of local communities.[56] As the Accra Caucus notes in their report on eight select REDD+ case studies from around the world, "(…) policies to tackle deforestation must be based on a genuine intention to establish consent, rather than to legitimize processes with predetermined conclusions."[57] In terms of benefit distribution, alternatives such as directly investing in local infrastructure, providing additional employment opportunities to community members, and establishing community funds may prove more equitable than having national governments as the principal fund managers.[58] Evidence from the Nhambita community in Mozambique shows how the establishment of a community fund resulted in the construction of two schools and a health clinic, as well as increased incomes for community members who were guarding designated forests.[59] Moving forward, REDD+ projects should be better focused on local

conditions rather than on generalized project outcomes.[60] Generalized outcomes in REDD+ project design exacerbate existing inequalities by ignoring local conditions.[61] National governments and local communities must collaborate and participate equally at all stages of decision-making while immersing themselves in changing local conditions.[62]

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
International market-based forest conservation mechanisms, including REDD+, continue to produce winners and losers globally.[63] Noting that deforestation rates in Africa remain alarmingly high, with approximately 3.4 million hectares of forests being cleared between 2000-2010, the relevance of REDD+ is undisputed.[64] With climate change being a global concern, international market-based forest conservation programs, such as REDD+ continue to gain traction since they provide financial incentives to participating local communities while simultaneously contributing to reforestation and carbon offsetting.[65] In its exploration of REDD+ as a means of simultaneously promoting social and ecological benefits in SSA through the sale of carbon revenues from reforestation programs, this paper has demonstrated that REDD+ projects have contributed to dispossession of land, restricted access to forests for subsistence use, and disproportionate benefits for local elites at the expense of already marginalized communities, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities.[66] Mitigating these negative impacts on communities in SSA is crucial since

there is a need to protect traditional land rights of local and marginalized communities, particularly in SSA, which is home to the largest share of the world's forest-dependent households.[67] In addition, all stakeholders should equally and freely participate in discussion and decision-making.[68] Projects must be suited to local conditions, without pre-conceived and generalized outcomes since this often leads to an increased imbalance in power dynamics between project developers and participating local communities.[69] In order to reduce the mismanagement of funds, alternatives such as direct contributions to community funds should be considered.[70] Further research on the extent to which REDD+ perpetuates historical colonialist narratives and the impact of this on the global relations between developed and developing countries would be interesting to explore. Additionally, it would be worthwhile to examine how the commodification of nature through international market-based forest conservation programs perpetuates anthropocentrism and the consequences that this has on human-nature relationships.

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Cyberspace Geopolitics: The Embodied Production of Nationalisms in Intimate Cyberspaces

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While there has been both popular and scholarly discussion around the geopolitical role of cyberspaces, this discussion has generally focused on large scale processes and actors. This paper synthesizes empirical and theoretical literature across disciplines to illustrate some micro- and trans-scale processes through which geopolitical discourses are produced and moved between online and offline spaces. I propose that cyberspaces are embodied and performed by political subjects, and that discourses produced within them have material implications as they are brought into 'traditional' spaces by those subjects. I also argue that embodiment is critical to understanding the political connections between online and offline.

'Cyberspace' broadly refers to the "network space" in which data is shared and accessed through computing devices over communications networks.[1] The Internet – and the various forms of quick, long-distance interaction that it enables – is the largest and most popular contemporary example of cyberspace, and has become increasingly central to global flows of information and capital. Consequently, cyberspace has also become significant in terms of its consequences for geopolitics and geopolitical processes. Early work around the geopolitics of cyberspace often conceptualized it as a uniform and transcendent realm that was destructive towards 'traditional' space and geopolitical forms (especially nation-states). Under this view, cyberspace would undermine traditional geopolitics due to a larger "collapse of space-time relations" resulting from the "decentralization and globalization" it would allow.[2] This was thought to "dissolve" and integrate spatially distinct political formations in favour of "areal uniformity."[3]

In contrast to this, subsequent criticism has pointed to the ways traditional space and cyberspace are closely tied to one another. Such scholarship has discussed how cyberspace is itself *constrained* by geopolitical actors (such as states or private corporations, through censorship and 'cyberborders'), as well as by geopolitical processes and relationships (such as global inequalities, which guide how access and infrastructure are distributed).[4] Additionally, research has pointed out some of the ways cyberspace has been *incorporated* into geopolitics,

such as through its widespread use in public and private bureaucracies.[5] While it is valuable to understand cyberspace geopolitics at these scales, it has been noted that geopolitical representations of nationalism and territory also take shape at the scale of everyday performance.[6] Arguably then, it is also important to understand traditional spaces and cyberspaces as closely bound together through embodiment. The subjects that participate in and move between these spaces embody each of them and, consequently, embody the geopolitical discourses that exist within them, including discourses of territoriality and nationalism. Examining intimate arenas within cyberspace (such as gaming servers and forums) in this light shows that nationalisms are not simply a result of external imposition or incorporation, but also organically reproduced there through performance and interaction. Furthermore, such spaces can reproduce nationalisms and identities in novel ways that can have material implications as participants carry these productions into traditional space.

CYBERSPACES AS EMBODIED AND PERFORMED PRODUCTIONS

While concepts like nationhood, territoriality, and boundaries do take form in and through large organizations like states, they also take shape in individual and group subjectivities through social norms and interactions. As Paasi articulates, "individual actors and collectivities are socialized as members of specific territorially bounded spatial entities, participate in their reproduction and

'learn' collective territorial identities, narratives of shared traditions and inherent spatial images."[7] People that access the Internet, then, do not do so as detached and self-contained subjects. Rather, users embody social, spatial, and political contexts, and bring the normativities of these contexts into the cyberspaces they construct. This can be seen, for instance, in the way nationalisms are circulated in many forums and gaming servers.

One specific example of this is the game *Nusantra Online*, which is popular among Indonesians. The game world of *Nusantra* is broadly based on a reconstruction of Indonesian history, and "many elements of the game such as the language used and the game settings are deeply rooted in—or limited only to—the Indonesian context."[8] In it, players collaborate to both play through narrative 'quests' and actively develop the world in which the game takes place.[9] *Nusantra* illustrates the ways nationalisms circulate through intimate arenas in cyberspace. First, it shows how the construction of these arenas is imbued with the geopolitical imaginations that subjects bring into them. In this case, Nusantra itself is based on Indonesian national narratives that were embedded prior in the imaginations of its developers and players. As well, through interaction with the game, participants further develop their collective and individual conceptions of national history and identity to build an "imagined sense of solidarity and pride."[10] Thus, instead of undermining nationalism, the connectivity of intimate cyberspaces becomes a means through which it is nurtured and reproduced.

Of course, the fact that participants in such spaces embody their 'offline' contexts also means that they bring with them the asymmetries of traditional space. Access to the internet is unequally distributed across space, and, along with other variables like gender, "class markers such as income and education are strongly correlated with internet use."[11] Consequently, participants in intimate cyberspaces—and the discourses they construct—collectively embody such classed, gendered, and spatialized divides in access. This is substantiated by research on Eritrean nationalism on internet forums. Because people within Eritrea largely did not have access to the Internet in the 1990s and early 2000s, "Eritrean activities in cyberspace were largely confined to the diaspora in the early years."[12] This shaped many of the nationalist discourses on Eritrean forums, which came to be heavily influenced by the experiences of diasporas living in the West. As a result, the notions of Eritrean national identity that circulated in these spaces drew inspiration from the "institutions and ideals of the West."[13] Evidently, material patterns of access do therefore shape the way such spaces are constructed by shaping which embodied perspectives enter them.

CYBERSPACES AS PLURAL, CONTESTED, AND DYNAMIC

While discourses within intimate cyberspaces are not detached from their offline counterparts, it is also important to note that cyberspace does not merely reproduce hegemonic

geopolitical representations in a uniform manner. First and foremost, geopolitical imaginations and normativities are themselves rarely ever consolidated or singular. Instead, they are usually contested.[14] This necessarily means that the embodied flow of nationalisms from traditional space to cyberspace is not uniform either, which is exemplified by the fact that many of the nationalisms that proliferate throughout forums and alternative media sites – such as Kurdish, Tamil, or even Afrikaner nationalism – are stateless, dispersed, or displaced.[15] Even those nationalisms which are broadly institutionalized at the level of states take numerous contesting forms. Essentially, while intimate cyberspaces provide room for consensus, they also provide room for "political dissensus."[16] For example, Szulc documents the way Turkish LGBT internet communities often come into conflict with the heterosexism of many Turkish nationalist discourses.[17] Yet, rather than disavowing nationalist discourses altogether, these communities put forward their own inclusive nationalisms, and use Turkish symbols (such as national figures and even internet country codes) to challenge hegemonic discourses.[18] All of these examples illustrate the more significant point that cyberspace is not a "singular ontic entity" as it is commonly spoken of, but is instead plural and polycentric.[19]

Furthermore, cyberspaces do not merely act as containers that passively receive the contesting geopolitical representations produced in traditional space. Instead, representations are actively produced throughout intimate cyberspaces in novel ways. Since such spaces are contested, the nationalisms within them are also constantly negotiated and revised to produce new formulations that may not have existed prior offline. Studies of diasporic cyberspaces show that participants in them end up "fusing and mixing different cultural elements to create new notions of identity."[20] For example, several Dutch-Moroccan online communities neither seek to preserve or return to existing archetypes of 'Moroccan-ness,' nor assimilate into a homogenized 'Dutch-ness.' Instead, these communities seek "recognition and respect as a new kind of Dutchmen."[21] Similarly, on the aforementioned Eritrean forums spirited debates yield new interpretations of national history and identity. These spaces articulate not only criticisms of government policies (such as constitutional drafts) and media representations (such as regional maps) but also of prominent members of the forums.[22] These intimate, embodied cyberspaces thus synthesize new meanings and discourses of nationalism. Rather than being static, they are unfinished and constantly becoming.

THE ROLE OF CYBERSPACES IN GEOPOLITICAL REPRODUCTION AND TRANSFORMATION

So far, it might seem as though intimate cyberspaces, though dynamic, are nonetheless self-contained and geopolitically trivial. This is untrue. Firstly, as shown, these spaces are embodied productions that are actively inhabited and performed by subjects.

Consequently, the participation of subjects in them actively contributes to what Paasi calls their "spatial socialization" and the formation of "political subjectivity."[23] The discourses and geopolitical representations formed in intimate cyberspaces, then, are not only constructed by participants, but come to constitute the political imaginations of those participants. Thus, just as participants embody their offline contexts, they come to learn from and embody these online contexts.

Cumulatively, the individual and geopolitical representations that form draw from both technological and non-technological sources; from both traditional space and cyberspace. The products can be understood as 'cyborg' nationalisms, in "which telecommunications and information technologies become closely enrolled with human actors."[24] This is perfectly illustrated by the previously discussed example of *Nusantra Online*. The game itself is constructed through players' and developers' imaginations of Indonesian national history, but, through their active participation in its 'playable nationalism,' it also contributes to the construction of their political imaginations and aspirations.[25]

As the discourses produced in intimate cyberspaces are embodied by participants, it necessarily follows that they cannot be contained within these spaces. Instead, these cyborg nationalisms can be carried into "offline" contexts by their participants and have material implications. The Eritrean forums discussed earlier, for instance, have had substantive impacts on Eritrean state-building processes.

There is evidence not only that Eritrean governments monitor these forums, but that many "government leaders are also believed to participate in Internet debates under assumed names."[26] Subsequently, many of the novel discourses produced on the forums are internalized and embodied by such participants, who then carry and circulate them in the institutional contexts they inhabit. The consequence of this has been that, soon after novel criticisms have been popularized on these sites, the Eritrean government has moved to modify policies accordingly.[27] These are clear and macro-level manifestations of this phenomenon, but the impact of geopolitical discourses produced in cyberspace can transform broader geopolitical imaginations in endless subtle ways. Research on Tamil nationalism within Sri Lanka has shown that Tamil Eelam nationalist websites and online communities heavily contributed to the broader construction and proliferation of a distinct and territorial Tamil identity. Through the circulation of these discourses across and beyond cyberspace, it culminated that "although Eelam was yet to be realized on the ground it had already taken root in the minds of the people," as mappings of Eelam territory that were forged in online communities entered mainstream, "offline" discussion.[28] The flow of such representations is, therefore, not unidirectional but omnidirectional, and the geopolitics of intimate cyberspaces are intimately interwoven with the geopolitics of traditional space.

CONCLUSIONS

The reproduction of nationalisms within intimate cyberspaces and their subsequent circulation beyond these spaces problematizes dichotomous conceptions of the "online" and the "offline." It illustrates the contingency of each on the other, and the fact, as per Graham, that cyberspace is not a singular "abstract space"[29] that is external to traditional space. Furthermore, it illustrates a specific mechanism through which the geopolitics of traditional space and the geopolitics of cyberspace are integrated: through the participants that embody and constitute both of them. It is thus important to understand the political relationships between the "online" and "offline" as networked, relational, and taking shape at the level of intimate and everyday interaction.

NOTES

[1] Robert M. Kitchin, "Towards Geographies of Cyberspace," *Progress in Human Geography* 22, no. 3 (Sep 1, 1998): 385.

[2] Kitchin, "Towards Geographies of Cyberspace," 386-387.

[3] Stephen Graham, "The End of Geography Or the Explosion of Place? Conceptualizing Space, Place and Information Technology," *Progress in Human Geography* 22, no. 2 (1998): 167-169.

[4] Barney Warf, "Alternative Geographies of Cyberspace," In *The Net and the Nation State*, (Cambridge University Press, 2017): 148-150.

[5] Kitchin, "Towards Geographies of Cyberspace," 386.

[6] Anssi Paasi, "Bounded Spaces in a 'Borderless World': Border Studies, Power and the Anatomy of Territory," *Journal of Power* 2, no. 2 (Aug 1, 2009): 217.

[7] Paasi, "Bounded Spaces in a 'Borderless World,'" 226.

[8] Iskandar Zulkarnain, "'Playable' Nationalism: "Nusantara Online" and the 'Gamic' Reconstructions of National History," *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 29, no. 1 (2014): 48.

[9] Zulkarnain, "'Playable' Nationalism," 32-33, 50.

[10] Zulkarnain, "'Playable' Nationalism," 34.

[11] Warf, "Alternative Geographies of Cyberspace," 155.

[12] Victoria Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination: The Eritrean Diaspora Online," *Global Networks* 6, no. 2 (Apr, 2006): 170.

[13] Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination," 169.

[14] Paasi, "Bounded Spaces in a 'Borderless World,'" 226.

[15] Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "*Nationalism and the Internet,*" Nations and Nationalism 13, no. 1 (2007): 8-13.

[16] Tariq Jazeel, "Sri Lanka Inside-Out: Cyberspace and the Mediated Geographies of Political Engagement," *Contemporary South Asia* 18, no. 4 (2010): 446.

[17] Lukasz Szulc, "Banal Nationalism and Queers Online: Enforcing and Resisting Cultural Meanings of .Tr," *New Media & Society* 17, no. 9 (2015): 1532-1534

[18] Szulc, "Banal Nationalism and Queers Online," 1535, 1542.

[19] Mark Graham, "Geography/Internet: Ethereal Alternate Dimensions of Cyberspace Or Grounded Augmented Realities?" *The Geographical Journal* 179, no. 2 (Jun, 2013): 180.

[20] Emily Skop and Paul C. Adams. "Creating and Inhabiting Virtual Places: Indian Immigrants in Cyberspace," *National Identities* 11, no. 2 (Jun 1, 2009): 143.

[21] Eriksen, "Nationalism and the Internet," 11.

[22] Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination," 171-172.

[23] Paasi, "Bounded Spaces in a 'Borderless World,'" 226.

[24] Graham, "The End of Geography," 178.

[25] Zulkarnain, "'Playable' Nationalism."

[26] Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination," 173.

[27] Bernal, "Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination," 173.

[28] Maya Ranganathan, "Experiencing Eelam.Com: Terror Online," *South Asian History and Culture* 1, no. 1 (2009): 74.

[29] Graham, "Geography/Internet," 180.

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