The Journal of Political Studies

23rd Edition

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The Journal of Political Studies has been produced in its entirety on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territories of the Coast Salish peoples. In particular, we recognize the Musqueam (xWməθkWə yəm), Squamish sḵwx̱wú7mesh and Tsleil-Waututh First Nations.

Specifically, UBC's Vancouver campus exists on xWməθkWə yəm territory. As guests who work, study, and live on these lands, the UBC community has a responsibility to use the skills and knowledge we develop here to give back to our hosts. To learn more, please visit; https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/.

All opinions expressed herein are solely those of the individual authors.

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The Journal of Political Studies has been produced in its entirety on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territories of the Coast Salish peoples. UBC Vancouver is located on the traditional, ancestral, and unceded territory of the Musqueam people. The land it is situated on has always been a place of learning for the Musqueam, who for millennia have passed on their culture, history, and traditions from one generation to the next on this site.

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Foreward

This edition of the UBC Journal of Political Studies is unlike any that have come before it. Created amidst the global COVID-19 pandemic, our editors and authors built a fantastic collection of articles entirely online. As we all did, these collaborators spent many hours interacting on video calls and emails without the opportunity to experience the distinct benefits of being in the same room together in the process of completing a large and significant task. Moreover, they did so in the context of a year where nearly everything else, especially their courses and learning, was different and often more challenging.

While the process of creating this journal was novel, many critical things remain the same: students took the risk of exposing their course papers to peers and potentially much broader audiences, editors engaged in the careful reading of hundreds of pages and thoughtful discussions of the attributes and potential of each manuscript. I congratulate them all for volunteering to do this challenging work in uncertain times (with special thanks to the editor Claire Sarson). Their collective perseverance means we have another fantastic edition of this journal.

Andrew Owen
Director of Undergraduate Programs
Department of Political Science

Letter from the Editor

Dear Reader,

As you hold this page in your hands or on your screen, I want to take a moment to say thank you. This edition of the Journal of Political Studies was produced by an eloquent and hardworking group of authors and editors whose commitment circumvented the obstructions to collaboration brought on by the events of this past year. These papers were written and edited by colleagues working across the world from one another in living rooms, coffee shops, libraries, bedrooms, and home offices in which we have spent the past year, often alone.

That is not to say, however, that this edition is the work of individual efforts. The successful publication of this edition is indicative of the often unspoken and undervalued work done by communities and individuals. The work completed to produce this edition has been supported by parents, grandparents, partners, children, siblings, and friends—some of whom may even be reading this right now. To you, I wish to express my gratitude. This edition has been made possible by the baristas, agriculture workers, cleaners, and service workers who have kept the public spaces where this edition was produced safe for our use and whose work should not go unnoted. Thank you to you all.

On an individual level, this edition would not have come together without our faculty sponsor, Dr. Andrew Owen's commitment to this project, ever-present and wise advice, and expedient replies to my panicked emails. Additionally, the support of Department Head Dr. Richard Price has been invaluable and endowed the Journal of Political Studies with the courage and determination to continue this work. Thanks also to the faculty reviewers who kindly lent us their time and read yet another undergraduate essay in the hopes of improving this year's edition. This generosity of time and effort has and will continue to be invaluable to the Journal of Political Studies. Amy Becir and Richard Price have also been patient and supportive of this work. They have tolerated my frequently misdirected and occasionally incomprehensible emails, and for this, I am very grateful.

I also wish to extend my gratitude to the community of undergraduate journals of which the Journal of Political Studies is a part. I am grateful to the other editors-in-chief and their willingness to share institutional knowledge so that we together might advance excellent undergraduate research and writing in our community. In particular, I'd like to extend my gratitude to Editor-in-Chief Hannah Exley of the Journal of International Affairs at UBC and the staff of UBC's Iona Journal of Economics. In

recognition of the long-term relationship between the Political Science Students' Association and the Journal of Political Studies, I would also like to extend my thanks to this year's executives, notably Kantat Lee, Kevin Wong, and Chelsea Parker, for their support.

I wish to extend my sincerest gratitude to the authors who have been plucky and tenacious enough to share their work with the Journal of Political Studies. Of a record-high number of submissions nearing 200, this edition publishes only eight, but the courage and dedication necessary to submit in the first place merits acknowledgement. It is my hope that these authors, and perhaps you, reader, continue to submit and promote your work with passion and commitment.

This year's edition seeks to highlight under-told stories and redefine the voices and methods embraced by academia. With this in mind, this edition features work that embraces the local, as Stephanie Brook's piece features oral histories of harm reduction and drug use. Paulina Schwartz's work examines the role of police as claims-makers in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside. Dylan Annandale then delves into the theoretical, examining contemporary and age-old anti-intellectualism through Montaigne and Cavendish. An assessment of the potential for restorative justice to mitigate the school-to-prison pipeline for Black students in the United States by Lilah Brenowitz follows. Subsequently, Sage Broomfield examines the consultation processes for nuclear development with Indigenous communities. Gwendolyn Culver analyzes France's use of vaccination to control populations subject to French colonialism. Tyler Lynch then assesses the costs of Chinese ecological resettlement. Lastly, Edward Yuan writes about shifting ideals of masculinity in Iran amidst pervasive conflict. To these authors, for sharing their work and stories, and completing the often heart-wrenching and always relentless work that followed, I extend my deepest gratitude.

Lastly, my most wholehearted appreciation goes to the Editorial Board and administrative team behind this year's edition. Aleena, Alex, Anmol, Bowen, Brendan, Chris H., Chris S., Christina, Danilo, Elise, Gurman, Hannah, Isabella, Jack, Jacy, Joseph, Katie, Kevin, Lisa, Liza, Marna, Miles, Panthea, Sarah, and Suki: it has been a privilege to work alongside you. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

With gratitude,
Claire Sarson
Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Staff Bios

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Claire Sarson is a Political Science and Canadian Studies major focused on peace and diplomacy, Indigenous politics, and international advocacy. Her recent work is concentrated on human rights advocacy and post-conflict societies. She has worked as a teaching assistant since her third year at UBC, and this experience prompted her enthusiastic engagement with The Journal of Political Studies. In her free time, Claire enjoys reading and halfheartedly attempting Sunday crossword puzzles. Following her graduation, Claire hopes to pursue a graduate degree and then a career in international advocacy.

MANAGING EDITOR

Aleena Sharma

PUBLISHING DIRECTOR

Christina Song is a fourth-year Political Science and Economics major. She likes to dabble in many different areas within those two subjects because she does not know herself. The unexamined life is not worth living, says Socrates, yet she keeps on keeping on. She is interested in comparative political economy and has recently worked on a project about institutional and social factors determining immigration policy. She loves reading about food—a biography on James Beard at the moment—but does not cook because she toils not, neither does she spin.

Editorial Board Bios

SENIOR EDITORS

Isabella Preite is a fourth-year Political Science major. Her research interests include social movements and political communication, interested in quantitative methods and textual analysis. After graduating, she hopes to pursue a graduate degree researching the role of algorithms in relation to digital publics. Isabella is also currently working as a research assistant on a project about refugees in Uganda. Outside of her academics, Isabella spends copious amounts of time listening to music and using UBC's Criterion service as a way to learn more about classic cinema.

Kevin Wong is a fourth-year Political Science major and Law and Society minor whose interests lie in collective identity, Canadian politics, and public policy. He currently researches emotional discourse around major events and has worked as a cog in the provincial and federal public service machines. He hopes to be hired back as a very efficient cog. Kevin is excited to return to the JPS this year and read more quality submissions from his peers. In his free time, he socially distances himself from his readings.

Sukitha Bandaranayake is a fourth-year international student from Sri Lanka majoring in Honours Political Science. His honours thesis explores the strategies small powers employ to survive and maintain their national interests in the face of great power politics, with an emphasis on small Asian states like Taiwan, Sri Lanka and Singapore. Sukitha is also an avid musician. A classically trained pianist and rock/metal guitarist, he loves composing music and is trying to teach himself music production. He also enjoys writing limericks and daydreaming. Sukitha is thrilled to return to the editorial board this year.

EDITORS

Alexandra Son is a fourth-year Political Science and Economics student with a particular interest in legal theory, political economy and the foreign policies of East Asia. She enjoys seeing the cross-section of politics and economics and how they interconnect in our society. Outside of UBC, Alexandra volunteers for the British Columbia Regiment band as the lead percussionist and goes hiking around BC. After graduation, she hopes to attend law school and work for the Canadian Forces as a military lawyer.

Anmol Mann is a Political Science and Law & Society student focused on the political economy of digital capitalism. She is interested in understanding how technology-based corporations influence economic governance, specifically in the development of labour welfare. Outside this primary interest, she is interested in quantitative methodologies in Political Science and how data analysis influences policy creation. For fun, she likes exploring BC and watching movies. She is grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the JPS Editorial Board and looks forward to working with her peers to publish a terrific edition.

Bowen Wright is a third-year student majoring in International Relations and minoring in Spanish. Her research interests include the politics of public health, Indigenous politics, the polarization of political communities, and environmental policy. She is particularly interested in Canadian, American, and Latin American politics. Last year, Bowen was inspired to minor in Spanish while taking classes in Quito, Ecuador, and completing a research paper on Ecuadorian youth's access to public health resources. Outside of school, she can often be found spending time at the beach, listening to music, and exploring new podcasts.

Brendan Bayer is a fourth-year undergraduate from Maine, US majoring in Political Science and minoring in International Relations. His principal research interests are mostly in security studies; specifically, the roots of terrorism & insurgencies, separatist states and territories, authoritarianism, kleptocracy/corruption, misinformation, state control of populations, the former Soviet Union, displacement/ alienation from globalization, and AI-based automation. After UBC, he plans on entering grad school in the USA and would like to enter a career in the national security community or academia.

Chris Haun is a third-year Political Science and Economics major focused on international political economy and econometrics. He was born and raised in Calgary, Alberta, but his heart lies anywhere but. His interests pertain to international crisis management and empirical policy research more generally. After graduating, he hopes to travel abroad to Southeast Asia and ultimately pursue a career in policy analysis. Apart from politics, Chris is interested in public health, biology, and anything and everything musical.

Christopher Small is a fourth-year undergraduate student pursuing a combined major in Political Science and Philosophy. His current research interests in political theory centre on how existentialist thought articulates political milieu and how humanity's confrontation with the absurd frames constructions of power, tradition, and sovereignty. Aside from the journal, Chris also volunteers as an editor and project writer for the Vancouver Arts Colloquium Society and is a part of the men's Ultimate Frisbee team at UBC.

Danilo Angulo Molina is a third-year Honours Political Sciences and International Relations double-major student. Conflict is a concept that has always been present in his life and shaped it significantly, including growing up as an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) in the oldest armed conflict of the Americas in Colombia and living in the Middle East, experiencing and learning about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These experiences have motivated Danilo to focus on the application of restorative justice and transitional justice in conflicts and post-armed conflicts, the role of international institutions such as international tribunals in conflict resolution through international law, and the patterns of violent conflicts to fill knowledge gaps that can contribute to the scholarly conversation. In his spare time, Danilo likes learning new languages, helping asylum seekers in their application process, moderating dialogue talks, watching sunsets, and dancing salsa.

Elise Juncker is a third-year International Relations student with a minor in Law and Society. She is mostly interested in grassroots movements and political theory concerning post-colonialism and intersectional feminism. She enjoys taking an interdisciplinary approach and takes a lot of Philosophy, Sociology and GRSJ classes. After graduating, she would love to pursue a Master's in International Law and Human Rights in Europe, where she is from. She is currently stuck in Germany due to COVID-19 and used the opportunity to move to Berlin and explore the city's rich history and culture. Otherwise, she is an executive of the UBC Equestrian Club and a Kappa Alpha Theta member, serving on UBC's Panhellenic Council.

Gurman Kaloya is a fourth-year Political Science student interested in comparative politics, government, and democratization. She has recently taken an interest in Latin American politics, specifically, the role civil society, institutions, and political actors play in the processes of democratization. In the future, she hopes to pursue a career in law or work in government. During her free time, she enjoys completing puzzles, watching Wheel of Fortune, and reading. She is excited to be a part of the Editorial Board and is looking forward to the coming year!

Hannah Stojicevic is a third-year Honours Political Science Major in the Dual Degree with UBC and Sciences Po. Born in Vancouver to Israeli and Serbian parents, Hannah spent the first two years of her undergrad at Sciences Po's Menton Campus in the South of France, where she specialized in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Her interests are primarily focused on political theory, especially in relation to political thought in the Middle East and Arab World, and how to build more endogenous

frameworks of political participation in the region. Apart from the JPS, Hannah is passionate about Turkish history, Semitic languages, French literature, and definitely not sports.

Jack Magnus is a fourth-year Honours Political Science Major. In his first two years at UBC, he pursued a minor in Environmental Sciences before focusing on the Honours program. In all academic capacities, Jack emphasizes the importance of multi-disciplinarity, particularly between political & environmental science, natural resources conservation, and anthropology. Although diverse in methods and intended audiences, these disciplines provide critical academic guidance to a generation facing existential threats that transcend disciplinary boundaries. Currently, Jack's research lies in the realm of Canadian and Indigenous politics, with a focus on racialized minority rights and dynamics of imbalanced negotiations between racialized minorities and the colonial state. Outside of academia, Jack volunteers for Royal Canadian Marine Search and Rescue and plays soccer and hockey. After graduation, he hopes to attend law school and eventually specialize in environmental law.

Jacy Chan is a fourth-year Political Science Major and History Minor from Louisiana, USA. Her interests primarily focus on the significance of political theory in the context of transformative historical revolutions, such as the American Revolution. She has gained a recent interest in Southeast Asian history and politics, specifically how SE Asian government frameworks were formed and maintain legitimacy. Aside from JPS, Jacy loves searching out new places for coffee and is currently the team captain of the UBC Women's Tennis Team.

Joseph Bouchard is a fourth-year International Relations and Latin American Studies major from Québec. His work focuses on the participatory role of Canada and the United States in international peace and security missions abroad, particularly in Latin America and the former Soviet bloc. His desire to challenge his own ideas and to further student research involvement led him to want to serve at The Journal of Political Studies. He will devote his career to federal public service, working to increase economic, cultural, trade, defence, and security relationships between countries in the Americas. In his free time, Joseph hosts the monthly "Realpolitik" podcast, where he discusses international affairs issues and proposes pragmatic policy solutions to the Canadian and United States governments. He is also an avid tennis player and drummer.

Katie Howe is a fourth-year International Relations student whose research interests focus on immigration policies, specifically regarding refugees and IDPs. Her work focuses primarily on Latin America, researching topics such as the contemporary implications of structural adjustment programs and the emergence of troubling asylum cooperative agreements between the US and Central America. Outside of the JPS, Katie works with an international policy centre based in Brazil, and she hopes to continue her work there after graduation.

Lisa Basil is a fourth-year Honours Political Science student with a minor in English Literature. She is particularly interested in US politics and political psychology. She is currently working on a thesis about the driving forces behind independent political identification among US voters. Outside of political science, she works in the First Year Programs department and writes for the Ubyssey. In her free time, she likes to dote on her 15-year-old foster cat and nap more than an adult human being probably should.

Liza Shushkovsky

Marna Swart is a fourth-year Honours Political Science student and teaching assistant, currently writing her undergraduate thesis. Her research interests include European integration and disintegration, political ideology, and political movements. Her thesis will examine the complex relationship between immigration and right-wing populist traction in Europe. Born to two South African immigrants, Marna is fluent in Afrikaans, in addition to proficiency in French and beginner-status German and Spanish. When she is not cooped up in her room on Zoom class, you would find Marna at her local coffee shop or running in the trails at Pacific Spirit Park.

Miles Schaffrick is a third-year undergraduate student pursuing an Honours

degree in Political Science and Law & Society. His research focuses on the politicization of disease and the role of social movements as a form of political participation. Aside from his work at The Journal of Political Studies, Miles serves as a Writing Consultant at the Centre for Writing and Scholarly Communication.

Panthea Pourmalek is a fourth-year student majoring in Political Science and International Relations. She is most interested in the study of armed conflicts, constructivist and post-positivist theories of international relations, and European political economy. Currently working on her thesis, Panthea researches the various governance functions and structures of non-state armed groups and the impact of rebel governance on the use of violence against civilians in conflict. Outside of school, Panthea is involved in policy research and advocacy focused on creating space for youth and gender minorities in political and academic circles.

Sarah Thomas is a fourth-year Political Science student. As an Honours student, her research focuses on the institutional underpinnings of inequality and the policy response to it. Outside of the classroom, she currently works as a teaching assistant and has extensive experience working in multiple roles with the Government of Canada. In her free time, Sarah enjoys reading about things other than politics and has recently taken up running.

Author Bios

Dylan Annandale is a third-year Honours English student at the University of British Columbia. His academic interests are literary-driven, globally focused, and have recently converged on the rhetoric of science, medicine, and technology. Alongside his studies, Dylan is an ex-rower turned cyclist on the UBC cycling team and has a penchant for the outdoors. After graduation, he will continue to connect his literary interests with contemporary issues and further his research in graduate studies.

Lilah Brenowitz is a fourth-year student from Seattle who will be graduating from UBC this spring with a degree in Political Science and Economics. Inspired by a desire to make a difference in her community, Lilah's primary research areas are education and social policy in the US. Lilah looks forward to using the skills in policy analysis she has learned at UBC to work at a social policy research firm in the US after graduation, before eventually returning to school to pursue her MPA. When she is not attempting to resolve today's most pressing social problems, Lilah enjoys running, skiing, and watching baseball.

Stephanie Brook is in her final year at UBC completing a double major in International Relations and Economics. Originally from Vancouver Island, she is passionate about supporting social and economic justice both in Canada and internationally. Her academic interests include the history of US Imperialism with a focus on Latin America and labour economics. After graduation, she plans to continue to engage in harm reduction activism in her community and pursue a career in law.

Sage Broomfield is of mixed *nehiyaw* (Cree), English, and Irish ancestry and has been an uninvited guest on Musqueam, Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh territories while studying at UBC. A recent International Relations graduate, Sage focused her studies on the intersections of policy and technology. Sage will be continuing her studies in the fall on Treaty 1 territory at the University of Winnipeg in the Masters of Development Practice - Indigenous Development program focusing on alternative energy sources for Indigenous communities.

Gwendolyn Culver is in her fourth year of a BA Honours Political Science with International Relations at UBC. Her thesis uses a critical constructivist approach to examine resiliency dynamics of norm clusters in the Law of the Sea. Her research interests include international relations theory, natural resource sovereignty, and regional geopolitics in the Arctic Circle and the South China Sea. Prior to her studies at UBC, Gwendolyn served as a Parliamentary Page in the Canadian House of Commons from 2017 to 2018. Gwendolyn is excited to pursue graduate studies at the University of Toronto this fall.

Tyler Lynch is in his fourth year majoring in political science; his research interests centre on modern Chinese politics, authoritarianism, and human rights. Following his 2021 graduation, he will commit to attaining his graduate degrees and, ultimately, a career centred on humanitarianism. The chair of media at Anti-Racism Coalition Vancouver, he continues to work in anti-racist activism in British Columbia; his personal interests include writing, portraiture, and mixed martial arts.

Paulina Schwartz (she/her) is a 4th-year Political Science major at UBC, with particular interests in public policy, social justice studies, and environmental politics. Having moved around the US for much of her life, Paulina is grateful to now call Vancouver home and to be able to experience the beautiful nature that surrounds the city while remaining deeply aware of her position

as a white settler on unceded Indigenous land. Upon graduating this Spring, Paulina intends to continue working in political organizing and advocacy. Her other plans for the future include getting vaccinated for COVID-19 so that she can finally go back to travelling and hugging her friends.

Edward Yuan is a third-year BA student majoring in history with a minor in Asian Studies. While he is interested in modern histories of decolonization in Asia, he hopes to specialize in the history of cultural diffusion and shifting identities in the multi-state period of the Song, particularly in the Western Xia. In his spare time, he could be found practicing the Erhu, watching obscure movies, or listening to podcasts.

"To Hell with the Police, Safety First"

Drug User Activism in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside From an Oral History Perspective

Stephanie Brook

Abstract: From the AIDS epidemic to the current overdose crisis, deaths related to illicit drugs have been ongoing in Vancouver for decades, exacerbated by law enforcement practices and unsafe supply. In 1997, the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU), a grassroots drug user activist organization, arose to establish harm reduction measures and fight for political and economic justice for people who use drugs. Taking an oral history approach, this paper explores the ways that VANDU activists have experienced and responded to criminalization, shedding light on how policymakers can finally end the 'War on Drugs' and focus instead on harm reduction.

Introduction

In his book *The Careless Society: Community and Its Counterfeits,* John McKnight writes, "revolutions begin when people who are defined as problems achieve the power to redefine the problem."[1] Nowhere is this idea more relevant than in the area of drug user activism. While public policy has long tried to "fix" or eliminate people who use illicit drugs through criminalization and abstinence-based treatment, it is only by organizing politically that drug users have been able to shift the focus from simply addiction to the structural production of harm. By instituting unsanctioned harm reduction measures themselves and pushing back against an unjust policing system, activists at the Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users (VANDU) have been able to save lives and empower people who use drugs in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside.

Criminalization is now widely understood by activists and policy researchers as a fundamental producer of harm for people who use drugs through factors such as unsafe supply in the informal market, stigmatization, and risks from law enforcement.[2] In addition, certain populations of drug users can be even more vulnerable to risk due to

1 John McKnight, *Careless Society: Community and Its Counterfeits,* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), 16
2 Susan Boyd and Donald MacPherson, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition: Ongoing Resistance in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside," *BC Studies,* (2019): 4.

inequities around race, class, gender, ability, and sexuality. As leading Canadian drug policy scholar Susan Boyd describes, drug laws that produce harm have, in a circular way, led to a growing need for harm reduction.[3] She explains harm reduction services in the context of grassroots unions such as VANDU as not a panacea but "on the ground responses to the changing needs of their members, who experience ongoing structural violence stemming from drug prohibition, colonialism, and economic and social policies that shape their everyday lives."[4] This is not a new idea, and harm reduction measures in Vancouver have been pushed for by both drug user activists and healthcare workers since the 1990s, with the two groups often working together. As early as 1994, in response to rising overdose deaths, a task force led by British Columbia's (BC) then-Chief Coroner Vince Cain reported that the "War on Drugs" was an "expensive failure" and linked overdoses to prohibitionist policies.[5] Due to widespread unsafe consumption practices at the time—such as needle sharing—and policing practices that discouraged access to harm reduction services, the AIDS epidemic was spreading simultaneously in the Downtown Eastside. By 1997, HIV rates in this neighbourhood were the highest in the western world, and a public health emergency was declared.[6]

It was in this environment that VANDU was first established in 1997 by drug user activists to combat these overlapping crises and reduce harm for their peers. In 1998, VANDU received a few small grants, including from the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, and opened a storefront with an unsanctioned injection room on Hastings Street. This storefront served as a place for drug users to gather and socialize, access safe equipment, hold revolutionary reading groups, and voice their concerns.[7] The core of VANDU's power is their peer-based system. The Board of Directors is made up of current and former drug users and is democratically elected by VANDU's members. Harm reduction programs are also peer-led. Because peers have lived experience of drug use, they are seen as more understanding of the struggles of members and less judgmental relative to a non-peer.[8] As a result, engaging with peers has been shown to more effectively encourage risk reduction practices among members, and empower drug users to develop a positive collective identity.[9] VANDU is considered one of the most successful peer-based drug user organizations

3 Boyd, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition," 4.
4 Boyd, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition," 5.
5 Susan Boyd, Dave Murray, and Donald MacPherson, "Telling our stories: heroin-assisted treatment and SNAP activism in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver," *Harm Reduction Journal* 14, (2017): 2.
6 Ehsan Jozaghi, "The role of drug users' advocacy group in changing the dynamics of life in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, Canada," *Journal of Substance Use*, 19, no. 2 (2014); Elaine Hyshka et al., "Needle Exchange and the HIV Epidemic in Vancouver: Lessons Learned from 15 years of research," *International Journal of Drug Policy* 23, no. 4 (2012).
7 Garth Mullins, host, "Episode 3: Unsanctioned," Crackdown (podcast), March 30, 2019.
8 Jozaghi, "The role of drug users' advocacy group."
9 Jozaghi, "The role of drug users' advocacy group."

internationally, and for their work in harm reduction during the AIDS epidemic, VANDU received the 2002 Canadian Award for Action on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights from Human Rights Watch.[10]

Harm reduction at VANDU goes beyond individual practices and shifts the focus to achieving justice at a social-structural level in their community. The introduction of the VANDU Manifesto states:

> VANDU is part of a liberation movement of people who use drugs and part of a movement for social and economic justice. We recognize that systemic factors shape how and why people use drugs. Criminalization, poverty and a lack of power are the fundamental problems facing our community. We need access to the resources necessary to live a dignified life, starting with decent housing and health care. Our liberation will come when we have real power in decisions that affect us, starting with, but not limited to, laws and policies having to do with drugs and drug use.[11]

The Manifesto clearly outlines the goals of the organization and emphasizes that this movement is not isolated to drug use in the context of "public health" but seeks to empower people who use drugs in political decision-making. In the face of drug criminalization and other structural harm-producing factors, VANDU, as a peer-run drug user union, provides holistic harm reduction for people who use drugs in Vancouver.

By taking an oral history approach, I will discuss both the formal and informal ways in which organized drug user activists in Vancouver have worked to mitigate and structurally oppose the harms present for people who use drugs in the Downtown Eastside. Harm-producing factors largely stem from drug criminalization and economic inequity and include unsafe drug supply and consumption environments, the police, and ongoing gentrification. While limited in scope, through in-depth interviews with three leading activists at VANDU, this paper will explore individual perspectives on how the organization has made an impact. Three VANDU activists, Brian O'Donnell, 'Hannah,' and 'Cecyle' volunteered to share stories of what they have observed in their communities and the work they have done.[12] Hannah has been an upper-level administrator at VANDU since 2009. Brian leads weekly education groups and is on the Board of Directors. Cecyle is a VANDU and Western Aboriginal Harm Reduction Society Board Member and injection room worker who has been working at

10 Evan Wood et al., "An external evaluation of peer-run 'unsanctioned' syringe exchange program," *Journal of Urban Health* 80, no. 3, (2003); Camille Bains, "Vancouver drug users' group once considered militant has led prevention policy," *The Globe and Mail*, July 16, 2017.

11 Vancouver Area Network of Drug Users, "VANDU Manifesto for a Drug User Liberation Movement," July 2010.

12 Hannah and Cecyle prefer to remain anonymous and are going by pseudonyms.

VANDU in various roles since 2013. This research uses qualitative, semi-structured expert interviews with the participants and has been approved by both the University of British Columbia (UBC) Behavioral Research Ethics Board and the VANDU Board of Directors. All three participants have provided consent for the information gathered during their interviews to be used in this paper.

Safer Consumption

"We have little recipe cards with all the ways to cook different drugs"

The term 'harm reduction' is often thought of simply as safer consumption practices, and while these are certainly not the extent of the concept, they are an important manifestation of it. In interviews on the podcast *Crackdown*, host and activist Garth Mullins speaks about his experiences injecting heroin before there were accessible, safe consumption measures in Vancouver. He recalls injecting in places such as McDonald's bathrooms, empty apartments, or abandoned warehouses.[13] Healthcare workers did not give out new syringes, saying that it would encourage drug use, so Mullins was forced to use the same needle for sometimes a month at a time, repeatedly sharpening it himself.[14] Furthermore, as drug paraphernalia such as pipes and needles were confiscated by police, this encouraged unsafe consumption like sharing needles and re-using broken pipes.[15] But even with access to safe equipment, injecting alone is dangerous. In the case of overdose, having someone nearby to administer first aid or Naloxone—a medication used to counteract the effects of an opioid overdose—is the difference between life and death. Safer consumption of drugs comes in many forms, but three important aspects frequently noted in harm reduction literature are a supervised consumption setting, sterile and effective equipment, and education on safer consumption practices.[16] These harm reduction measures can take place formally, such as through education groups and supervised injection rooms, or informally through word-of-mouth education, and simply consuming drugs with others.[17] Since its inception, VANDU has worked to address all of these aspects, from holding education groups to selling cheap "Crack Kits" with sterile pipes and equipment to repeatedly establishing perhaps their most contentious harm reduction measure: a supervised injection room.

The VANDU injection room is peer-run and today is formally known

13 Mullins, "Episode 3."
14 Mullins, "Episode 3."
15 Mullins, "Episode 3."
16 Tim Rhodes et al., "Public injecting and the need for 'safer environment interventions' in the reduction of drug-related harm," *Society for the Study of Addiction 101,* (2006); Ingrid Emilia Handlovsky. "The process of safer crack use amongst women in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside," Master's thesis, (University of British Columbia, 2011).
17 Handlovsky, "The process of safer crack use."

as an Overdose Prevention Site (OPS). This is a space where people can come to inject using sterile needles, under the supervision and assistance of staff like Cecyle who are trained in first aid in case of an overdose. At various points in VANDU's history, the injection room has been opened and subsequently shut down due to legal constraints. In 2012 it was opened in response to rising overdose rates and a dearth of locations to inject safely in the Downtown Eastside.[18] However, it was forced to shut down in 2013 after Vancouver Coastal Health threatened to pull funding due to the room's illegality.[19] To this day, the only federally sanctioned Supervised Injection Site (SIF) in Vancouver is Insite, which was set up in 2003 and "operates under an exemption to the Canadian Controlled Drugs and Substances Act."[20]

But in 2016, as fentanyl poisoning became increasingly common in Vancouver's drug supplies and a public health emergency was declared due to the overdose crisis, VANDU set up two more unsanctioned OPS tents in the Downtown Eastside. In December 2017, the BC provincial government finally gave approval for these overdose prevention sites, distinguishing them as different from SIFs because they do not necessarily have nursing staff, thus avoiding the slow process of gaining federal approval.[21] VANDU immediately reinstated their injection room as a sanctioned OPS, which Brian helped to set up. As he describes, "that was a slow battle in the beginning because of some illegalities with it, but we didn't care . . . we were doing it anyways . . . so basically to hell with the police . . . we just thought, safety first, it's much more important."

Although the injection room is now authorized, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, VANDU has had to increase restrictions around its use. As Cecyle describes, masks, hand sanitizer, and social distancing are mandatory in order to keep the room open and keep people safe during this new health crisis. She fears what could happen if the VANDU injection room is forced to close: "If it's a few more people that get sick at VANDU, we're gonna have to shut down! That's the scary part . . . where are they gonna go, what are they gonna do? And we don't want them using alone . . . look what happened with the COVID-19 like, how many people have OD'd." This is a legitimate fear. As more people are forced to consume drugs alone due to social distancing measures, overdose rates have skyrocketed. Even excluding unreleased numbers from December 2020, 1,548 people have died due to drug overdoses in BC in 2020.[22] At

18 Boyd, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition," 5.
19 Mullins, "Episode 3."
20 Ryan McNeil et al., "'People Knew They Could Come Here to Get Help': An Ethnographic Study of Assisted Injection Practices at a Peer-Run 'Unsanctioned' Supervised Drug Consumption Room in a Canadian Setting," *AIDS and Behavior* 18, (2014): 473.
21 Thomas Kerr et al., "Supervised injection facilities in Canada: past, present, and future," *Harm Reduction Journal* 14, (2017).
22 British Columbia Coroners Service, "Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC January 1, 2010 - November 30,

32.9 people per 100,000, this is the highest overdose death rate since the beginning of recorded data in 1994.[23] However, no deaths this year occurred at a SIF or OPS. In the current pandemic, access to supervised consumption sites has become more important than ever, and more precarious.

However, providing a supervised setting for people to consume drugs is not the only way that VANDU promotes safer consumption; all three activists interviewed emphasized the importance of education as harm reduction. Hannah speaks of several educational groups that would meet up when she first joined VANDU. One was the Rock Group, which educated members on safer ways to smoke crack. For instance, they encouraged members to smoke using copper screens in the crack pipes rather than Brillo, steel wool, which was popular to use as a filter but dangerous as metal fibres could burn off and be inhaled. Hannah describes the group as fun; they shared "little recipe cards with all the ways to cook different drugs" and talked about individual rituals around preparing and consuming drugs. And it achieved results—a study on women who smoke crack who attended VANDU education groups found that these forms of formal education, as well as informal "word of mouth" education, were fundamental in minimizing harm from smoking crack.[24] However, due to a lack of funding, the Rock Group was discontinued around 2012. Despite VANDU's success with their OPS and education programs in promoting safer drug consumption, the organization has long had to navigate financial constraints and legal backlash as a result of prohibitionist drug laws.

Safer Supply

"We can get the information out there of like . . . this person is or that person is giving out bad batches"

But even with accessible education, effective equipment, and supervised settings for people to consume drugs more safely, due to their criminalization, the safety and composition of the drugs themselves is uncertain. As Boyd puts it, "drug prohibitionist policies create a lethal environment. Without access to safe legal drugs, people who use criminalized drugs buy on the illegal market. In the illegal market, drug quality and quantity are always in question."[25] Some of the more dangerous additions to drug supplies are fentanyl and benzodiazepines or "benzos," and the identity of the dealers selling drugs like heroin or cocaine tainted with these additives is vital information to those buying them. Poisoned drug supplies mean that drug users are at a much greater risk of overdose,

2020," *Ministry of Public Safety & Solicitor General*, December 21, 2020.
23 BC Coroners Service, "Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths,"
24 Handlovsky, "The process of safer crack use."
25 Boyd, "The Harms of Drug Prohibition," 4.

especially if they are unaware their drug supply is contaminated and do not adjust the quantity they consume. In response to this dangerous uncertainty, VANDU offers drug testing strips—"basically litmus papers," says Brian—to test for fentanyl. Cecyle encourages people to bring in their drugs for testing, especially if they are buying from someone new. She recounts a time when two of VANDU's volunteer staff members overdosed after buying from someone they did not know. This information on which suppliers can be trusted is important, as the dealers in the area change frequently. As Cecyle says:

> That's the biggest worry . . . because you get so many different people that come around downtown there that are selling, and you don't exactly know what it is that they've mixed their stuff with, or where they're bringing it from. So I've become very . . . leery . . . There's no territorial mark anywhere around VANDU there so there's a lot of people that come and go.

With so much turnover in dealers, workers at VANDU need to monitor safer suppliers to reduce this uncertainty stemming from criminalization. As Cecyle describes, most drugs tested come out negative for fentanyl, but when there are positive results, workers at VANDU ask for a description of the dealer they were bought from. This allows them to pass on the information of who is giving out "bad batches" to other drug users. This word-of-mouth education is a valuable form of harm reduction, but according to Cecyle, fewer people have been testing their drugs at VANDU compared to previous years. "They were doing it at first with, when the fentanyl first started hitting, they were checking and checking," she says, "but then after a while, they didn't bother." Cecyle hypothesizes this is because drug users are building up a tolerance to fentanyl as it becomes more common in Vancouver's drug supplies. "I think now . . . a lot of them have gotten immune to the fentanyl, so it's like, they'd rather have fentanyl now!" But she continues to urge people to test their drugs, and the VANDU workers keep a lookout for dealers they do not trust. The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated this problem, because with international borders closed, local dealers cannot get the same supply as before and often have to make their own products.[26] As a result, according to the BC Coroners Service, there has been an extreme increase in the concentration of fentanyl in drug supplies of overdose victims.[27] While workers at VANDU do what they can to find safe suppliers, they have long been fighting for access to safe, pharmaceutical-grade drugs in Canada as it is only through drug legalization that the harm from the current uncertain

26 Kendra Mangione, "B.C.'s other health crisis: 162 illicit drug overdose deaths, or about 5 people a day, last month," *CTV News Vancouver*, November 25, 2020.
27 BC Coroners Service, "Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths."

supply can truly be avoided.

Police

"They are ruthless and taunting to the people on the street, while they're doing their jobs, I guess it's the only way they can rationalize doing it."[28]

In their enforcement of drug criminalization, the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) acts as a fundamental producer of harm that VANDU has been working to change on an institutional level. One of the first meetings I attended at VANDU was in November 2019, and the topic was working to cut the next year's VPD budget. At that time, VANDU members were preparing to present at a City Council budget hearing for 2020. Even before the resurgence of the Black Lives Matter movement in the US and Canada brought the idea of defunding the police into the mainstream, grassroots organizations like VANDU had been working for decades to do the same here in Vancouver. In 2019, their efforts did not succeed. Despite holding rallies and giving presentations at the city budget hearing, the VPD budget increased by $17 million from $323.5 million in 2019 to $340.4 million in 2020, making up over one-fifth of Vancouver's overall budget.[29]

When I spoke with Brian, he was preparing to attend a City Council budget hearing for 2021; this year held over Zoom. "As long as I can show the public that they're [the VPD] overpaid. There's far too much money being wasted, y'know?" he said. But the bloated budget is just one of the problems with the VPD. In a multitude of studies, street policing has been found to increase harm to people who use drugs by limiting access to OPSs and encouraging rushed injections, which leads to an increased risk of overdose and disease transmission.[30] As police in the Downtown Eastside are regularly observed to wait outside OPS locations and stop and search people in the immediate vicinity, drug users are often intimidated away from using an OPS and forced to consume drugs in less safe environments.[31] Policing in street-based drug scenes is also linked to increased violence and found to disproportionately impact Black and Indigenous persons.[32]

In 2006, the VPD announced their official support for harm reduction as part of their four-pillar drug strategy of prevention, enforcement, treatment, and harm reduction. There is some evidence of this strategy

28 Hannah, interview by author.
29 Justin McElroy, "Vancouver police budget to be scrutinized as part of city's 8.2% tax ask for 2020," CBC News, December 3, 2019; Nathan Crompton, "VANDU: As VPD budget spirals out of control, defunding police is our community alternative to drug war," The Georgia Straight, December 2, 2019.
30 Alexandra B. Collins et al., "Policing space in the overdose crisis: A rapid ethnographic study of the impact of law enforcement practices on the effectiveness of overdose prevention sites," International Journal of Drug Policy 73, (2019).
31 Collins et al., "Policing space," 203.
32 Collins et al., "Policing space."

being effective in reducing arrest rates and police confrontations with people who use drugs. According to a 2016 study on policing practices in Vancouver, "the rates of experiencing police confiscation of drug use paraphernalia declined from 22.3% in 2002 to 2.8% in 2014, and the rates of experiencing physical violence by the police also declined from 14.1% in 2004 to 2.9% in 2014."[33] However, this study is limited in its survey scope and also reports that nearly one-third of participants who experienced police violence reported engaging in nothing prior to the confrontation.[34] Although this study offers an optimistic perspective on the four-pillar strategy, from listening to activists at VANDU, I argue that the inherent tension between law enforcement and people who use criminalized drugs has persisted and taken new forms even as rates of police interactions appear to decline.

One of the more insidious ways in which VPD officers have been targeting people who use drugs is through "jacking up," where police take the money, drugs, and possessions from a person without arresting them. While on the surface, this seems less harmful than an arrest, here, the victim has no way to prove what happened to them and has no receipt for their confiscated money and possessions. Caitlin Shane, a lawyer with Pivot Legal Society, describes the effects of this method, saying, "so ultimately, the stats around arrests for drug possession can remain quite low, while at the same time people are experiencing the same thing on the ground, which is having their stuff taken from them, and then having to find it somewhere else."[35] Cecyle speaks about her experience being jacked up around 2007 before she joined VANDU and was working selling cocaine. The police officers picked her out of a crowd and took from her "two half balls" (a small quantity of cocaine) and close to $400, without giving her any proof that the incident happened. "So it's just like, well where did the money go? Like, I thought they were supposed to give you a slip as to how much they took from you. They don't do that anymore," she says. Fortunately, there were witnesses to the incident who could prove the jacking up occurred to Cecyle's boss. She did not get in any further trouble for this incident but was forced to pay back the lost money and drugs in installments. Jacking up is a common phenomenon even over a decade later; as Cecyle describes, "we've seen that a lot. Even in VANDU, you'll have some people come in and say, 'fuck I just got jacked up, I don't know what I'm gonna do!'" She advises them to find any witnesses who can vouch for them and prove that the incident occurred.

As Mullins and Shane discuss, jacking up might lower arrest rates and make the VPD appear more progressive in their interpretation of drug

33 Adina Landsberg et al., "Declining trends in exposures to harmful policing among people who inject drugs in Vancouver Canada," *Journal of the International AIDS Society* 19, no. 2, (2016).
34 Landsberg, "Declining trends in exposures to harmful policing."
35 Garth Mullins, host, "Episode 7: Stand Down," *Crackdown* (podcast), July 31, 2019.

laws, but the dichotomy between "the kingpin" and "the marginalized drug user" is not always clear cut, and removing anyone along the supply chain can hurt those at the bottom. As Mullins points out, "the more you go enforce heroin, the more you incentivize people to come up with something smaller and more potent like fentanyl. And then now we're seeing the emergence of carfentanil because there's been enforcement and actions to limit fentanyl. It's like they're driving us towards the next worst thing."[36] With this influx of new and more potent drugs into the Vancouver market in the efforts of dealers to evade police, the danger to drug users has increased, and the task of harm reduction workers like Cecyle to identify trusted suppliers has become more difficult.

As seen by drug user activists, police practices are still either barriers to harm reduction or directly harm-producing. Many researchers, including harm reduction scholar Ehsan Jozaghi, support this perspective. Jozaghi argues that the police have played an overall harmful role in the Downtown Eastside, including through police brutality and over-policing in the area. As Brain describes the police, "I think they're way overpaid, . . . which makes them bullies . . . and showing the amount of crimes, which are majority panhandling tickets, jaywalking, vagrancy, it just shows how little crime there is in Vancouver." VANDU is a place of resistance to unfair policing and has been instrumental in connecting people with legal support and protesting unfair ticketing. In collaboration with Pivot Legal Society, VANDU coordinated with the Crown and the City of Vancouver to have 600 to 800 of their members' jaywalking tickets completely thrown out.[37] Brian also describes how through the Tuesdays Education Group he leads, he has been "helping educate people on the street and showing them just not to back down. To film as much police brutality as possible." VANDU as an organization consistently confronts the role that the VPD plays through fighting for justice within the legal system and in individual interactions with police officers.

But progress at a structural level has been slow. The 2021 police budget was not cut as the activists interviewed had hoped and remains at $340.9 million, even while overall City of Vancouver revenue has fallen by $20 million due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[38] In a joint statement, Pivot Legal Society, VANDU, Black Lives Matter Vancouver, and multiple other progressive grassroots organizations condemn City Council and the Vancouver Police Board for failing to both defund and hold accountable the VPD.[39] This statement calls for the City to invest in communities rather than law enforcement to address social crises. However, as factors

36 Mullins, "Episode 7."
37 Jozaghi, "The role of drug users' advocacy group."
38 Justin McElroy, "City of Vancouver freezes police department funding as part of 2021 budget," *CBC News*, December 8, 2020.
39 Pivot Legal Society et al., "Joint Statement Re: Vancouver Police Department 2021 Operating Budget," December 14, 2020.

like gentrification in Vancouver encourage greater police presence, these demands are not being met.

Gentrification

"It's the attitude, just go away"

Police play a fundamental role in the continued gentrification of the Downtown Eastside neighbourhood, a process which Kate Parizeau defines as "the production of urban space for progressively more affluent users."[40] This process has been ongoing in Vancouver for decades, but there are a few instrumental events. Between 2006 and 2010, then-mayor Sam Sullivan introduced 'Project Civil City' targeting homelessness and the drug trade in preparation for the 2010 Winter Olympics.[41] This led to greater surveillance measures in Vancouver and street policing in an attempt to fix "public disorder."[42] The subsequent investment in infrastructure and public transport not only drove up housing prices, but with the influx of new affluent residents in the Downtown Eastside, certain spaces became restricted by "the social exclusion of othered bodies."[43] At the same time, affordable housing in the area had been declining. Living in Vancouver in the 1990s, Hannah blames this on the 1993 federal decision to cut all funding towards new affordable housing in Canada ". . . since that time it's been going downhill in the Downtown Eastside." Many scholars agree that the contractionary federal and provincial policies instituted in the 1990s, including cuts to income assistance and a depressed real minimum wage, were responsible for the drastic rise in homelessness into the 21st century.[44] And this trend has continued well into recent decades, with homelessness rates in Vancouver increasing by 60% from 2005 to 2018.[45] This combination of the decrease in public funding, increase in housing prices, and subsequent encroachment of wealthier residents in neighbourhoods around the Downtown Eastside means that these "othered bodies" are often people marginalized by homelessness or drug use.

Hannah describes the attitude that police have towards people on the streets of the Downtown Eastside: "They just want to get rid of people. Like, if you're old, drug-addicted, poor, get out of our sight. Go over that next ridge and die there. Get away from this main street. It's the

40 Kate Parizeau, "Witnessing urban change: Insights from informal recyclers in Vancouver, BC," *Urban Studies* 54, no. 8, (2017): 1923.

41 Wendy Au and Amanda Chapman, "Project Civil City - Progress Update," *City Of Vancouver Administrative Report from City Manager in consultation with Corporate Management Team, to Vancouver City Counci*l, RTS No. 6590, VanRIMS No. 08-9000-30, March 27, 2007.

42 Sophy Chan, "Unveiling the 'Olympic Kidnapping Act': Examining Public Policy and Homelessness in the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games," *Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository,* (2014).

43 Parizeau, "Witnessing urban change," 1921.

44 Michael Shapcott, "Where are we going? Recent federal and provincial housing policy, Chapter 12," in *Finding Room: Policy Options for a Canadian Rental Housing Strategy, eds. J.D. Hulchanski and M. Shapcott*. (Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 2004).

45 Collins, "Policing space."

attitude, just go away." This attitude observed in police officers towards these "othered bodies" manifests itself in regular morning "sweeps" of the Downtown Eastside.[46] These are when police and City of Vancouver officials come through and take the belongings of people on the street, sometimes items being sold, but often sleeping bags, tents, and other personal necessities. As Hannah explains,

> And they're [the City of Vancouver] . . . raking things into the truck, and the police are standing by, and they [people on the street] don't have a hope in hell of saving their stuff. And it was stuff that they were gonna sell and use for drugs, or y'know use for themselves, or maybe save for their kid who they might see at some point. None of that's taken into consideration.

Similar to jacking up, no bylaw tickets or proof of police interaction are given out when possessions are confiscated; thus, no paper trail exists.[47] Both Hannah and Brian say that this problem was made worse when lockers that were once available through the United Church in the Downtown Eastside were taken away. This leaves people more vulnerable to this theft and more easily identifiable as homeless.[48] Furthermore, multiple studies have found that due to the gentrification of this neighbourhood, there has been an increase in complaints to police from businesses, residents, and visitors, which further increases police presence in the area.[49]

With the risks posed by over-policing, people who use drugs often seek out safe environments to avoid these harms, and the VANDU building, with its central location in the Downtown Eastside, serves as a shelter from these risks. Researcher Thomas Kerr describes the demand for safe consumption spaces as stemming from a need to "minimize exposure to policing, drug scene violence, and stigma" and that these spaces foster harm reduction practices by reshaping the sociocultural context of drug use.[50] But from speaking to Cecyle, Hannah, and Brian, it seems that even beyond the injection room, the VANDU building with its large, welcoming common room functions as a safe place to avoid the risks presented by police. As Cecyle states, unless they are chasing someone, police officers are not welcomed inside the building—"and they know it, too." This way, drug users can come inside to relax "without worrying about cops wanting to jack them up." However, more places like this are needed; Cecyle speaks of the lack of locations in the Downtown Eastside where people who use

46 Crompton, "As VPD budget spirals"; Collins, "Policing space."
47 Crompton, "As VPD budget spirals."
48 Brian, interview by author.
49 Collins, "Policing space"; Mullins, "Episode 7."
50 Kerr, "Supervised injection facilities," 4.

drugs can go to simply relax and let their guard down. The reconstruction of public space in the Downtown Eastside to better suit the preferences of wealthier residents is especially harmful to people who are homeless or who use drugs living in the area; VANDU is one of few safe places available.

Conclusion

In November 2020, Vancouver City Council voted unanimously to decriminalize possession of all illicit drugs in the city, a major step forward that drug user activists have been working towards for decades.[51] Rather than target individual behaviour as current prohibitionist drug laws do, decriminalization would address the structural production of harm for people who use criminalized drugs and remove an incentive behind law enforcement.[52] Through organizing to establish harm reduction measures, both formally and informally, activists at VANDU have increased the capacity for safer drug consumption in the Downtown Eastside, and decriminalization would further help to reduce the stigma around their work.

However, an exemption to the Criminal Code of Canada still must be granted by the federal government before decriminalization can come into effect in Vancouver, and harm reduction remains an uphill battle. Despite changes in rhetoric such as the Four Pillar Strategy, the role of the VPD has not fundamentally changed for people who use drugs. Gentrification too continues to be a problem, and while VANDU has been working for housing justice, the root issues remain. One area that presents a new challenge for harm reduction activists, and that I would urge more research be focused on, is the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for people who use drugs. In 2020 more people overdosed than died of COVID-19 in BC, and early data shows that the pandemic has heightened the risks to people who use drugs by cutting off global drug supply chains and restricting access to supervised consumption sites. Still, more research must be conducted to determine all the ways in which COVID-19 has impacted people who use drugs and the ramifications of this health crisis into the future. Cecyle speaks of the many people who formerly came to the VANDU injection room, who have since died during the pandemic: "And we knew them . . . it devastates all of us because we see them all the time and we get to know them, talk to them, and learn a bit about them, and then when they go . . . it really does devastate us." From listening to the stories of Hannah, Brian, and Cecyle, it becomes clear that VANDU is not just a political organization but a place of community. And at the end

51 Jesse Winter. "Vancouver plan to decriminalize street drugs sets up battle with Ottawa." *The Guardian*, December 3, 2020.
52 Alexandra B. Collins et al., "The intersectional risk environment of people who use drugs." *Social Science and Medicine*, vol. 234, (2019).

of each meeting held there, everyone stands for a moment of silence to honour community members who have passed away and speak their names out loud. In remembrance of those lost, they continue to fight for justice.

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Who Said Homelessness Is Criminal?

The Police as Claims-Makers for Vancouver's Downtown Eastside and the Dangers of Over-Policing

Paulina Schwartz

Abstract: The central question that this paper answers is: What role do the police play in perpetuating the stigma around homelessness-related drug use and mental illness in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES), and to what extent do police direct policy decisions around these issues? The findings of this paper demonstrate that the VPD acts as primary claims-makers for homelessness-related drug use and mental illness in the DTES by deliberately framing them as threats to social order and public security, and that this framing plays a crucial role in directing policy decisions around these issues. These findings support calls for defunding the police and reallocating the city's resources to strengthen harm reduction and mental health services.

Introduction

Vancouver's Downtown Eastside (DTES) has been the focus of a great deal of research around homelessness, people who use drugs (PWUD), and mental health crises among scholars of urban issues and urban policy. Much of the available research focuses on issues such as the causes of migration to the DTES, the effectiveness of harm reduction services—especially those dedicated to reducing harm related to drug use, including safe injection sites—and existing policy initiatives.[1] However, the impact of law enforcement policy in the DTES community receives little attention in the literature on the issues facing the DTES. There is also a lack of extensive research on mental illness and mental health treatment in the DTES, which is likely due to the fact that mental illness in the DTES only began to receive widespread attention after reports made by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) called attention to the issue in 2008.[2]

1 Julian M. Somers, Akm Moniruzzaman, and Stefanie N. Rezansoff, "Migration to the Downtown Eastside Neighbourhood of Vancouver and Changes in Service Use in a Cohort of Mentally Ill Homeless Adults: A 10-Year Retrospective Study," *BMJ Open* 6, no. 1 (2016); Nikki Bozinoff et al., "Still 'at Risk': An Examination of How Street-Involved Young People Understand, Experience, and Engage with 'Harm Reduction' in Vancouver's Inner City," *International Journal on Drug Policy* 45 (2017): 33-39; Kanna Hayashi et al., "Moving into an urban drug scene among people who use drugs in Vancouver, Canada: Latent class growth analysis," *PLoS ONE* 14, no. 11 (2019).

2 Isabelle Aube Linden et al., "Research on a Vulnerable Neighborhood—The Vancouver Downtown

Though there had always been an extremely high prevalence of mental illness among drug users in the DTES, not much attention was paid to the inadequacy of mental health services in the area until this police report highlighted that it caused "significant drains on police resources."[3] What almost all of the available literature on homelessness, drug use, and mental illness in the DTES does highlight is that these issues of mental illness are each accompanied by a great deal of stigma.[4] The question that I seek to answer in this paper is: what role do police play as contributors to and perpetrators of this stigma, and how has this affected the lives of those living on Vancouver's DTES?

The literature that exists on the role of law enforcement in the DTES largely agrees that the police act as influential claims-makers for the DTES, meaning that the police wield their power to direct the narrative around the issues prevalent in the area through their own reports and through the media.[5] The gap in this research is a lack of focus on how the intentional framing of issues in the DTES by influential actors such as police contributes to the way that the public and the local government respond to these issues. This paper aims to fill this knowledge gap by creating an understanding of where—or rather, whom—the intentional framing of poverty, drug use, and mental illness as threats to public safety comes from. This understanding is a necessary part of both the academic and public discourse around these issues as it helps dismantle the stigma that exists around these issues as a result of their deliberate framing. Ultimately, the findings of this paper demonstrate that the police have acted as one of the primary claims-makers for homelessness-related drug use and mental illness in the DTES as criminal issues, deliberately framing them as threats to social order and public security. This paper also argues that the deliberate framing of the issues in the DTES by the police plays a crucial role in directing policy decisions around this issue.

Following the introduction, this paper will outline the VPD's policing practices in the DTES and provide evidence that the VPD has been over-policing the DTES population as a means of framing this population as criminal. This paper will then focus on the role of the police as claims-makers for harm reduction with regards to drug use in the DTES and how police have framed drug use as inherently criminal. Next, it focuses on the specific role of the police as claims-makers for mental illness in the DTES and how this role has contributed to the framing of mental

Eastside from 2001 to 2011," *J Urban Health* 90, no. 3 (2013): 559-573.

3 Linden et al., "Research on a Vulnerable Neighbourhood," 561.

4 Jade Boyde and Thomas Kerr. "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis': A Critical Discourse Analysis," Critical Public Health 26, no. 4 (2016): 418-33.; Sikee Liu and Nicholas Blomley, "Making News and Making Space: Framing Vancouver's Downtown Eastside," *The Canadian Geographer* 57, no. 2 (2013): 119-32; Bozinoff et al., "Still 'at Risk.'"

5 Liu and Blomley, "Making News and Making Space"; Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis.'"

illness as a criminal issue. Finally, this paper will discuss some of the progress that has been made in shifting Vancouver's policy for issues in the DTES away from police and toward more effective social services. This discussion stems from the recent movement to defund the police, which gained political salience in the summer of 2020 with the growing Black Lives Matter movement. In each of the sections of this paper, I will draw on both academic works and grey literature such as news articles and webpages as well as multiple official VPD policy reports in order to provide a holistic and balanced understanding of the issues at hand. As the issue of policing in the DTES is not a theoretical one, but one that has real political implications and consequences for those living in the DTES, it is necessary to collect evidence from a diverse body of sources in order to come to the most accurate conclusions.

An Overview of Policing Practices in the DTES

Chronic homelessness, a situation that deeply affects many people living in the DTES, is associated with mental illness and drug addiction, as well as higher rates of crime.[6] However, since drug use and crime are the two most visible problems facing the DTES, "the majority of research and policy has focused on substance abuse and public order challenges of the neighbourhood."[7] This section demonstrates that action to address the issues in the DTES is deeply rooted in law enforcement and that this has resulted in the over-policing of the DTES. Law enforcement is even embedded within the city's response to substance use problems, as demonstrated by Vancouver's 'Four Pillars' drug strategy: (a) harm reduction, (b) prevention, (c) treatment, (d) enforcement.[8] While "enforcement" is the last pillar of Vancouver's drug strategy and follows the pillars focused on helping those dealing with substance addiction, the fact that enforcement acts as one of four main pillars of Vancouver's drug strategy speaks to how much the city relies on law enforcement as a key way of dealing with the problems facing the DTES community.

Another example of Vancouver turning to law enforcement to handle problems regarding the DTES was the implementation of the Citywide Enforcement Team (CET) in 2003 as a new policing policy strategy to disrupt the street drug market in the DTES.[9] Most notably, however, is that the DTES is specifically subject to the Beat Enforcement Team (BET), a section of VPD's District Two, which is assigned to constantly patrol

6 Somers, Moniruzzaman, and Rezanoff, 'Migration to the Downtown Eastside"; Linden et al., "Research on a Vulnerable Neighbourhood."

7 Linden et al., "Research on a Vulnerable Neighborhood," 561.

8 City of Vancouver, "Four Pillars drug strategy," https://vancouver.ca/people-programs/four-pillars-drug-strategy.aspx.

9 Strathcona Research Group and PHS Community Services Society, *Policing Homelessness: The Report on the Research Project on the Regulation of Public Space and the Criminalization of Homelessness in Vancouver* (2005), xii.

the DTES both by car and foot.[10] According to a 2018 VPD police report (1809C03), BET responds to crime and public safety concerns "through proactive project work that is aimed at various criminal and social challenges within the DTES."[11] This language—specifically, the use of the word "proactive" to describe their style of policing—conjures an image of poverty and homelessness in the DTES as criminal by nature. However, when one examines how exactly VPD's BET enforces the rule of law in the DTES, it is evident that much of the work that BET does is simply criminalizing poverty itself.

In an article written for the self-proclaimed 'insurgent journal' Radical Criminology, Aiyana Ormond outlines how the VPD over-criminalizes people living in the DTES by charging people with crimes for behaviours associated with poverty and homelessness, such as street vending, jaywalking, and public urination.[12] From this perspective, one cannot help but see an agenda of intentionally criminalizing homelessness and poverty when the VPD speaks of their "proactive project work."[13] This view is supported by the fact that it is in the VPD's financial interest to perpetuate the criminalization of homelessness, drug use, and mental illness. If the VPD is easily able to point to crime and disorder in the DTES, this can be used to justify a police budget increase from the city, which continues to rise in Vancouver.[14] The over-policing—referred to as 'proactive' policing by the VPD—of the DTES allows the VPD to perpetuate the narrative that homeless people and PWUD are inherently criminal, which is in the financial interest of the VPD. The police thus act as primary claims-makers for the DTES, acting as the driving force of the framing of homelessness-related drug use and mental illness in the DTES as criminal issues that require law enforcement. Moreover, since the police have been successful in Vancouver at acquiring more and more funding from the municipal government, and since the VPD are continually put at the frontlines of tackling issues in the DTES, the framing of these issues by the police heavily influence and direct policy decisions regarding the DTES in Vancouver.

Police as Claims-Makers for Harm Reduction

Upon close examination, it becomes clear that policing as a means of harm reduction for PWUD is not nearly as effective as the police and city make it out to be in their reports. In fact, extensive research on the effect of law enforcement on drug-market violence has shown that law enforcement

10 Aiyanas Ormond, "Jaywalking to Jail: Capitalism, mass incarceration and social control on the streets of Vancouver," Radical Criminology 3 (2014): 102; Richard Rabinovitch, *Report to the Vancouver Police Board*, September 17, 2018, 3.
11 Rabinovitch, *Report to the Vancouver Police Board*, 3.
12 Ormond, "Jaywalking to Jail."
13 Rabinovitch, *Report to the Vancouver Police Board*, 3.
14 Ormond, "Jaywalking to Jail," 108.

actually has adverse effects on violent crime, often increasing the levels of violent crime in the area.[15] Despite this evidence, punitive law enforcement has historically been front and center in the approach to illicit drug use problems within inner cities, including the DTES of Vancouver, while long-term health and social services have "taken a back seat."[16] Moreover, it is increasingly becoming salient in Canada that drug addiction is a form of illness that calls for compassionate harm reduction and mental health services.

The growing awareness that drug addiction should be treated as an issue of public health calls into question why the current opioid epidemic is being addressed with strong law enforcement rather than stronger health services at the forefront. The heavy focus on law enforcement rather than health services, despite evidence that law enforcement can lead to an increase in violent drug-related crimes, also highlights the immense power that the police hold in framing the issue of drug use in inner cities, including the DTES. Since the beginning of the "war on drugs" that began in the United States in the 1970s, police have been "at the center of broad social imaginaries of crime, identity, and urban space."[17] While the VPD have continuously argued that their methods are effective in reducing the harm caused by drug use and the drug market in the DTES,[18] research focusing specifically on the street-involved community in the DTES also shows that policing has adverse effects on harm reduction in this area.

Many people who use drugs in the DTES have noted that they have engaged in unsafe and hasty injections of drugs in order to avoid harmful interactions with the police, as found in a study of street-involved young people in this area and how they interact with harm-reduction measures.[19] This study also found that, while policing created more drug-related harm in the DTES, increased availability of stable housing in this community would be a much more effective method of harm reduction.[20] Yet, despite the overwhelming evidence that strict law enforcement increases rather than reduces harm, both with a broad focus on urban police practices and with a specific focus on policing the DTES, the city of Vancouver still puts policing front and center in dealing with drug-related issues in the DTES. This phenomenon highlights the fact that the VPD acts as a primary claims-maker for harm reduction practices in the DTES, continually framing drug use in this area as a criminal issue in order to continue to

15 Dan Werb et al., "Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: a systematic review," *International Drug Policy* 22, no. 2 (2011): 87-94.
16 Hayashi et al., "Moving into an Urban Drug Scene," 3.
17 Travis Linnemann and Don L. Kurtz, "Beyond the Ghetto: Police Power, Methamphetamine and the Rural War on Drugs," *Critical Criminology* 22, no. 3 (2014): 339.
18 Bill Spearn, Journey to Hope: An Update Report on the VPD's Continued Fight Against the Opioid Crisis (2019); Rabinovitch, *Report to the Vancouver Police Board*.
19 Bozinoff, "Still 'at Risk,'" 36.
20 Bozinoff, "Still 'at Risk,'" 37.

exert power over the DTES.

An Examination of VPD Policy Reports

To support the argument that the VPD plays a key role in framing the issue of drug use in the DTES as criminal, I will examine some VPD policy reports regarding this issue. The VPD's official drug policy, adopted in 2006, begins by outlining their adherence to the Four Pillars Drug Strategy, with "Enforcement" listed as the second pillar following a very brief discussion of "Prevention." This report also repeatedly highlights the importance of "Enforcement" and how it can lead to the success of other pillars, such as treatment.[21] Yet, at the same time, this report completely undermines the importance of harm reduction, stating that "the very fact there is a need for harm reduction is a reflection of the failure of the other pillars."[22] After a brief acknowledgement that enforcement may have a negative impact on harm reduction implementation, the report states:

> However, it is understood that there will be some tension between the need of substance abusers to access harm reduction measures and the rights of other citizens who simply want to freely access public spaces free of crime and disorder.[23]

This statement implies that "substance abusers"—a term that already carries far more negative connotations than the more accurate and respectful "people who use drugs"—are inherently criminal, as it assumes that the presence of PWUD on the streets is a form of public disorder. The statement thus acts as evidence that the VPD is a key claims-maker for harm reduction in the DTES, framing substance abuse as inherently criminal and dangerous. Another VPD policy report from 2019 titled, *A Journey to Hope: An Update Report on the VPD's Continued Fight Against the Opioid Crisis* notably frames drug use as a criminal issue by once again highlighting the importance of law enforcement in Vancouver's drug strategy.[24] The executive summary of the report outlines the many efforts made by the VPD to "lead the fight to end this [opioid] epidemic," illustrating how the VPD explicitly presents itself as the leader in the city's efforts to address drug problems in the city, and especially in the DTES.[25] This policy report acts as further evidence that the VPD is a central claims-maker for drug use and harm reduction in Vancouver's DTES. The report also acts as evidence that the VPD's claims direct policy decisions around harm reduction in Vancouver, as it describes the plethora of ways in which

21 Vancouver Police Department, *Vancouver Police Department Drug Policy* (2006), 9.
22 Vancouver Police Department, *Vancouver Police Department Drug Policy*, 8.
23 Vancouver Police Department, *Vancouver Police Department Drug Policy*, 8.
24 Spearn, *Journey to Hope*.
25 Spearn, *Journey to Hope*, 5.

the VPD is engrained in Vancouver's policy approach to harm reduction and ending the opioid epidemic, despite the overwhelming evidence that increased policing creates even greater harm within the drug market and toward PWUD.[26]

Police as Claims-Makers for Mental Illness

Drug use and harm reduction are not the only homelessness-related issues in the DTES for which the police act as primary claims-makers. This section will specifically focus on how police also act as claims-makers for mental illness amongst the DTES community by framing it as a criminal issue, when this issue is mainly the result of a lack of capacity in the current mental health system, forcing the city to turn to police as the group at the forefront of dealing with the mental health crisis in the DTES.[27] Though this framing of mental illness as a criminal issue is done to a lesser degree than the VPD's framing of drug use in the DTES as criminal, these two issues are deeply interconnected. In the aforementioned study of street-involved youth in the DTES by Bozinoff et al., a large number of the participants spoke about mental illness being the root of their drug dependencies.[28] The study also found that untreated mental illness can sometimes make safe drug consumption very difficult, as for those experiencing psychosis, for example, safe and sterile drug injection is usually not on their mind.[29] These findings suggest that harm reduction, in order to be effective, must include mental health services since mental illness is often at the root of drug dependency for those living in the DTES. Additionally, it is important to understand that the vulnerability of the community in the DTES also stems from the fact that members of this community are often part of marginalized minority groups, including Indigenous people, people of colour, and sex workers.[30] These people thus often struggle with the additional trauma of systemic violence, oppression, and stigmatization, and this trauma should be taken into consideration within harm reduction measures and should be addressed with appropriate mental health services. Yet, the VPD's framing of drug use as a criminal issue means that the associated mental health problems are often overlooked. Although the VPD does not completely ignore the mental health crisis, there is little consistency on this issue by the VPD as they simultaneously attempt to address the mental health crisis while stigmatizing the issue. The mental health crisis as a matter of public health

26 Werb et al., "Effect of Drug law Enforcement"; Hayashi et al., "Moving into an Urban Drug Scene"; Bozinoff et al., "Still 'at Risk.'"

27 Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis'"; Fiona Wilson-Bates, Lost in Transition: How a Lack of Capacity in the Mental Health System is Failing Vancouver's Mentally Ill and Draining Police Resources (2008).

28 Bozinoff et al., "Still 'at Risk,'" 35.

29 Bozinoff et al., "Still 'at Risk,'" 36.

30 Liu and Blomley, "Making News and Making Space"; Ormond, "Jaywalking to Jail."

is framed as being a separate issue by the police, and police are still placed at the forefront of dealing with mental health crises in the DTES, thus resulting in the criminalization of mental illness.[31]

Despite the fact that the VPD has long acknowledged that mental health crises should be addressed by mental health professionals and that police are too often the first responders in mental health crises,[32] there has still not been nearly enough progress in removing the police from the forefront of dealing with the mental health crisis.[33] The Mental Health Commission of Canada, too, acknowledged that police are too often the ones responding to mental health crises and that police are too often ill-equipped to respond to people with mental illness or mental health crises in the necessary compassionate ways.[34] Yet, not nearly enough has been done to make sure that police are removed from responding to mental health crises in the DTES and that these crises are instead responded to by mental health professionals and the strengthening of long-term mental health care. This problem can be partially explained by the way in which the VPD has framed the mental health crisis and mental illness in the DTES as a criminal issue.

An Examination of VPD Policy Reports

Although the VPD has acknowledged that they should not be the primary responders on the front lines of the mental health crisis, the VPD still plays a crucial role in framing mentally ill people as a threat to public safety.[35] Here, I will present certain VPD policy reports as evidence of their continued framing of mental illness as a dangerous criminal issue, therefore contributing to the stigmatization of mental illness that further threatens the lives of those struggling with mental illness. The first and most notable report on police interaction with mental illness in the DTES was released in 2008 and is titled *Lost in Transition: How a Lack of Capacity in the Mental Health System is Failing Vancouver's Mentally Ill and Draining Police Resources*.[36] The report points out that, in the time frame that was studied, nearly half of the calls made to District Two of the VPD, which includes the DTES, involved mental health-related incidents.[37] Throughout this report, the VPD essentially blames the increase in police interactions with mentally ill people on failures in the mental health system and suggests

31 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation; Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis.'"
32 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation.
33 Daryl Wiebe, Vancouver Police Mental Health Strategy: A Comprehensive Approach for a Proportional Police Response to Persons Living with Mental Illness (20160.
34 Mental Health Commission of Canada, "Moving from crisis to Creating Fundamental Change," March 26, 2014, https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/English/article/23756/march-26-2014-moving-crisis-creating-fundamental-change-improving-interactions-between
35 Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis,'" 425.
36 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation.
37 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation, 12.

that these shortcomings of the mental health system have left the VPD with no choice but to further criminalize the mentally ill.[38] However, the framing of mental illness as criminal and a threat to public safety lies mostly in its language of this VPD report, as I will demonstrate shortly.

As Boyd & Kerr argue, this report, along with many other VPD reports on the same subject, repeats and pronounces "stereotypes and representations that uncritically align dangerousness with mental illness."[39] They also identify that, in the 2008 VPD report, the term 'danger' in relation to the 'mentally ill' was employed 15 times, and that this framing intensified in the VPD's 2013 report, *Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis: An Update Report*, which repeated the term 'violence' 22 times.[40] Even more recently, the 2016 VPD policy report also uses language that frames those living with mental illness in the DTES as criminal by nature, as is evident in the following excerpt:

> The VPD is intent on diverting persons living with mental illness away from the criminal justice system when the circumstances of the criminal activity are minor in nature, have little immediate impact on the community at large, and are grounded in the individual's mental illness.[41]

This language is a prime example of how the VPD intentionally frames mental illness in the DTES as a criminal issue, despite the fact that mental illness is, first and foremost, an issue of public health. These VPD policy reports are also further examples of how much power the police have in directing policy decisions regarding the DTES, as each report highlights how integrated the police are in the city's response to mental illness in the DTES, despite the growing common knowledge that police are ill-equipped to adequately respond to mental health crises.

Conclusion and Calls for Action

As this paper has demonstrated, the police act as primary claims-makers for drug use and mental illness in the DTES and that the VPD plays a key role in framing these issues as criminal. This paper also illustrated that the VPD's enforcement-minded framing of these issues directs policy decisions around addressing these issues in the DTES. These findings are most evident in how the VPD frames drug use and related harm reduction practices, as well as how it frames mental illness in the DTES, likely because these issues are the most visible issues that exist within

38 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation; Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis,'" 422.
39 Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis,'" 425.
40 Boyd and Kerr, "Policing 'Vancouver's Mental Health Crisis,'" 425.
41 Wiebe, "Vancouver Police Mental Health Strategy," 7.

the homeless population in the DTES and are thus easiest for the VPD to criminalize. The framing of drug use and mental illness as criminal issues is most relevant when examining the language of VPD policy reports, as these have acted as primary evidence for the main arguments of this paper. This paper employed the research and analysis of a number of academics, as well as some grey literature, in order to solidify and support my arguments and to provide meaningful context in which I could effectively analyze how the VPD has perpetuated a false framing of homelessness-related drug use and mental illness as criminal issues, through the language employed in the VPD reports.

The findings of this paper suggest that, when it comes to the DTES, the VPD is failing to adequately protect the citizens of Vancouver by increasing harm among PWUD and people with mental illnesses living in the DTES through both stigmatization and criminalization. The findings also suggest that the VPD is instilling and perpetuating fear of the DTES community in citizens living throughout Greater Vancouver. Ultimately, it seems that these efforts to frame homelessness, drug use, and mental illness in the DTES as criminal do not benefit anybody except for the VPD itself, as its budget continues to increase. This raises the question of what should and can be done to make sure that the police play a much smaller role in addressing issues related to drug use and mental illness in the DTES. With the increased political salience around the issue of policing in marginalized communities related to the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement, which sparked worldwide mass protests throughout the summer of 2020, many have called for defunding the police and reallocating these resources to other social and health services.[42] I will close this paper with a brief discussion of these calls for defunding the VPD and the progress that has been made since this movement gained traction in the summer of 2020, as this paper has solidified an understanding of why and how such defunding should take place. With the realization that current policing practices are unacceptable, discussion around defunding the police is important, for both policymakers and constituents, in imagining what the future of the relationship between DTES community members and police might look like.

Calls for Defunding the Police

As the Black Lives Matter movement gained enormous traction in the summer of 2020, public awareness and discussion on the matter of defunding the police rose dramatically. Many of the issues I have raised in this paper, such as the over-policing of marginalized communities

42 UBC Social Justice Centre, "Letter: It's Time to Defund the Vancouver Police Department," *The Ubyssey*, July 20, 2020; CBC News, "Vancouver city councillor, police union president respond to calls to defund the VPD," *CBC*, June 8, 2020; Jen St. Denis, "Vancouver Votes to 'Decriminalize Poverty.' Over to You, Police and Province," *The Tyee*, July 29, 2020.

and continually growing police budgets despite evidence that harsher law enforcement has adverse effects on violence and crime, have suddenly become a significant part of public discourse. In cities around the world, many politically active citizens began demanding that their local governments reduce funding for police and reallocate those funds to community services such as social work and mental health care, and Vancouver has been no exception.[43] As a result of the increased awareness and discussion of such issues, progress within Vancouver toward decriminalizing poverty, especially in the DTES, has already begun. In July of 2020, Vancouver City Council voted unanimously to call on the police board to end street checks, which have been shown to have disproportionately harmful effects on homeless people, people of colour, drug users, and sex workers.[44] Shortly thereafter, Vancouver City Council also voted unanimously to "decriminalize poverty" by replacing some policing with social services.[45] These motions illustrate the power of collective action and public engagement on political issues, despite the immense power that the police board holds in terms of influencing policy. However, one could argue that despite these positive emotions, the power of the police board as policy influencers remains prevalent as the VPD continues to demand a larger budget,[46] and as the council's motion to "decriminalize poverty" was not a concrete action, it merely set the stage for eventual police budget cuts.[47] Nevertheless, the salience of this debate and the public pressure that has been placed on the city council to take action toward defunding the police highlights the political struggle between powerful actors such as police and public collective action. The results of this power struggle have yet to be seen, and the upcoming months—perhaps years—will be crucial in possibly ending the reign of terror that police have had over the DTES.

Assuming that the City of Vancouver will follow through on their intent and replace some policing with improved social and health services in the near future, the work of researchers will be to examine the effectiveness of these services in terms of harm reduction and mental health care. While it can be assumed based on the amalgamation of research I have presented in this paper that social services and health services will be much more effective than law enforcement in these respects, this can ultimately only be corroborated by thorough research. A shift from policing toward social services will also hopefully lead to a similar shift in claims-making power for the DTES. The power of local

43 UBC Social Justice Centre, "Letter: It's Time to Defund the Vancouver Police Department"; St. Denis, "Vancouver Votes to 'Decriminalize Poverty.'"

44 Jen St. Denis, "Vancouver Takes the First Step to Ban Street Checks," *The Tyee*, July 23, 2020.

45 St. Denis, "Vancouver Votes to 'Decriminalize Poverty.'"

46 CBC News, "Vancouver city councillor, police union president respond to calls to defund the VPD."

47 St. Denis, "Vancouver Votes to 'Decriminalize Poverty.'"

community services and politically engaged citizens to eliminate the framing of homelessness, drug use, and mental illness as dangerous criminal issues will also need to be reassessed by researchers. Additionally, an important area for future research on this topic should focus on the economic implications of defunding the police and moving these resources toward better social and health services. Even the VPD acknowledges that the over-policing of mental illness in the DTES is wasteful in terms of their own resources.[48] Although the VPD has not acknowledged this, the evidence this paper has provided illustrates that the same is likely true for the VPD's over-policing of drug use in the DTES. However, if research were to prove that a policy focus on social services and health services, rather than a focus on policing, has real economic benefits for the city, the incentive for defunding the police would be much greater than through public pressure alone. This paper has argued that police have acted and currently act as primary claims-makers for the issues in the DTES and have framed these issues as criminal when, in reality, they are not. With this paper, I hope to have contributed to the dismantling of this framing through exposing the deliberate self-interested claims-making that has been done by the VPD for the marginalized communities in the DTES.

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48 Wilson-Bates, Lost in Translation.

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Echoes of Pandemic-Era Anti-Intellectualism in Renaissance Literature

Montaigne, Cavendish, and a Critique of Hegemonic Knowledge-Making

Abstract: This paper argues that the shortcomings of COVID-19 communication leave room for anti-intellectualist dissent: a distrust and disapproval of expert opinion that places common epistemologies on par with formal knowledge and research. Considering the unprecedented nature of COVID-19, I analyze the stances of two Renaissance authors, Michel de Montaigne and Margaret Cavendish, who oppose the hegemonic governance of early science amid the Renaissance plague outbreak. I find their stances echoed in COVID-19 anti-intellectualism and use them to articulate the role of expert consensus, specialized language, and misinformation in pandemic discourse. Together, Montaigne and Cavendish present a novel yet valuable opportunity to reconfigure pandemic communication and understand the nuances of anti-intellectualism.

Dylan Annandale

Introduction

In his 1580 collection *Essais*, Michel de Montaigne argues that he "would have every one write what he knows . . . but no more; and not in this only but in all other subjects."[1] Montaigne imagines an alternative to Renaissance knowledge-making in which everyone is concerned solely with their own experience.[2] Writing in 1666, Margaret Cavendish's *The Blazing World* looks to upend contemporaneous modes of philosophical and scientific experimentation. While Montaigne writes amidst sixteenth-century musings of alchemy, astronomy, and medicine, Cavendish responds to the pervasion of empiricism into seventeenth-century scientific discourse. Empiricism sparked a rational, observation-based pursuit of knowledge that was subsumed into the newly-formed Royal Society of

1 Michel de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," *The Works of Michel de Montaigne*, ed. William Carew Hazlett and trans. Charles Cotton (Charlottesville, NC: InteLex Corporation, 2017), 195-196.
2 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 31.

London—England's 'learned society' that looked to govern scientific discourse. Cavendish is critical of the Royal Society and its Renaissance predecessors, including "Galileo . . . Descartes . . . [and] Hobbes," all of whom she deems "self-conceited."[3]

Both Montaigne and Cavendish notice a centralized, competitive egotism that governs early science as those with 'learned' status grapple for authority. Montaigne reports a failure of philosophers as they investigate 'nature's rules': "they falsify them, and present us her face painted . . . whence spring so many different pictures of so uniform a subject."[4] Similarly, Cavendish notes that "philosophers may err in searching and enquiring after the causes of natural effects, and many times embrace falsehoods for truths."[5] Although the intent of each text differs, both authors argue that the hegemonic governance of early science promotes competing opinions and has grossly mishandled the pursuit of truth.

If writing in the present day, Cavendish and Montaigne would face a new form of scientific discourse. The topic of COVID-19 is discursively unmatched in the twenty-first century. The Renaissance, however, was well accustomed to recurrent disease outbreaks. Cavendish's *The Blazing World* was published one year after 1665's Great Plague of London, while Montaigne continued to revise his *Essais* throughout Bordeaux's plague outbreak until 1586.[6] This paper argues that Montaigne and Cavendish's challenge to scientific authority continues to echo in current pandemic discourse. Specifically, their critique of hegemony resonates with the current competitive, politicized discourse that differentiates between experts and the general public. Additionally, their critique of disciplinary specialization questions the efficacy of technocratic language in current health communication. Finally, the rise of misinformation is explored through their claim that natural phenomena evade a logical, scientific understanding and that personal experience trumps expert opinion.

When considered together, Montaigne and Cavendish's critique mirrors what researchers Merkley and Loewen define as COVID-era anti-intellectualism. Referencing US historian Richard Hofstadter, they characterize the concept as a behaviour in which "people distrust and dislike experts and intellectuals 'because of a view that the plain sense of the common man . . . is an altogether adequate substitute for . . . formal knowledge and expertise.'"[7] In turn, the following analysis interprets

3 Margaret Cavendish, *The Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World*, ed. Sarah H. Mendelson (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2016), 119.
4 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 30.
5 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.
6 *Collier's New Encyclopedia: Volume Six*. "Montaigne, Michel, Seigneur," (New York, NY: P.F. Collier and Son Company, 1921).
7 Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Random House Inc., 1963), 19, quoted in Eric Merkley and Peter John Loewen, "Anti-Intellectualism and the Mass Public's Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic," *OSF Preprints* (2020): 3.

Montaigne and Cavendish's anti-intellectualist dissent and examines its underpinnings in COVID-19 discourse. The common impulse may be to dismiss anti-intellectual criticism; however, refusing to engage may only strain the rapport between health experts and the public. To explain, if accused of elitist or hegemonic governance, scientists may inadvertently confirm the charges levelled against them by refusing to acknowledge non-expert perspectives. Therefore, Montaigne and Cavendish provide an opportunity to evaluate current pandemic discourse and consider how subsequent COVID-19 communication might account for opposing epistemologies.

Critique of Hegemony

Cavendish and Montaigne question who should control scientific knowledge and, in turn, the power and authority that accrues to those who govern its discourses. Specifically, *The Blazing World* questions the newly-formed Royal Society as its constituents work to monopolize the production of knowledge. The Royal Society—originally known as 'The Royal Society of London for Improving Natural Knowledge'—aimed to "establish a demarcation between professional scientists and mere amateurs."[8] Montaigne notes a similar demarcation between "a man . . . so simple" and those of specialized fields such as the "cosmographers . . . [and] topographers."[9] Montaigne considers a 'simple man' to be "more likely to tell the truth" as he will not "give a color of truth to false relations . . . [nor have] ends in forging an untruth."[10] In short, Montaigne considers a "man of irreproachable veracity" as one who has a minimal stake in what he purveys.[11]

Within the competitive sphere of intellectualism, Montaigne argues that philosophers try to "gain the reputation of men of judgement" as they embellish their findings with "something more than is really true . . . [to] give the greater weight to [what] they deliver."[12] Similarly, Cavendish claims that competition consists "only in contradicting . . . and obscuring Truth, instead of clearing it."[13] Sir Isaac Newton's 1687 *Principia Mathematica* serves as an unexpected manifestation of Montaigne and Cavendish's criticism. To support his theory of gravitation, Newton altered his data to purport the 'truth' of his findings.[14] In turn, Newton exemplifies the "obscuring [of] Truth"[15] discussed by Cavendish and the falsification of data discussed by Montaigne. Together, both authors criticize scientific

8 Cavendish, introduction to *Blazing World* by Sarah H. Mendelson, 13.
9 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 195.
10 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 196.
11 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 195.
12 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 194-5
13 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 99.
14 Cavendish, introduction to *Blazing World* by Sarah H. Mendelson, 38.
15 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 99.

authority and suggest competing philosophies lose sight of truth.

Cavendish and Montaigne's question of control is maintained in current pandemic discourse. Opponents of federal and regional health orders have been quick to portray scientists and policymakers as looking to control the general public. Merkley and Loewen claim that many see "experts as a class of elites that [look to] exercise power over virtuous ordinary citizens."[16]Attempting to understand the current "demarcation between scientists and mere amateurs," front-line doctor Lisa Rosenbaum agrees with Merkley and Loewen in her definition of "the 'expert' or 'elite' class" who maintain a disconnect between themselves and the public.[17] The question, then, is whether a disconnect between the expert class and the general public is necessary to deploy effective measures against COVID-19. Rosenbaum suggests that the answer is a matter of trust. When questioned by Rosenbaum, a patient who opposed mandated safety measures "trusted [her doctor] far more than other experts because they had an open mind and no agenda."[18] The lack of agenda echoes Montaigne's claim that "a man . . . so simple" is a "man of irreproachable veracity."[19]

Perhaps a twenty-first-century recontextualization of Montaigne's propensity to "give a color of truth to false relations," Merkley describes the pitfalls of pandemic politicization: "More problematic is the tendency of journalists to situate messages from experts amidst claims and counterclaims by polarizing political actors . . . which may prime citizens to resist messages signaling expert agreement."[20] Merkley concludes that political partisanship complicates an otherwise clear understanding of health policy coverage. Rosenbaum adds to the discussion of competitive, polarized discourse in a way that resonates with Newton's aforementioned altered data: "Whereas the hallmark of scientific reasoning is the capacity to change your mind when the evidence evolves, the nature of dialogue in our polluted information environment generally rewards the opposite: make up your mind and then find evidence to support it."[21] Akin to Newton, the oversaturated nature of current discourse may motivate political actors to purport the 'truth' of their findings before finding a convenient string of supporting logic to follow. As such, Montaigne and Cavendish's critique of scientific hegemony remains relevant to current discourse. Their challenge of authority paints a competitive pursuit of 'truth finding' that echoes contemporary struggles to enforce health

16 Merkley and Loewen, "Anti-Intellectualism," 3.
17 Cavendish, introduction to *Blazing World* by Sarah H. Mendelson, 13; Lisa Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce — How Can We Bridge the Partisan Divide and Conquer Covid?" *The New England Journal of Medicine* 383, no. 17 (2020): 1684.
18 Rosenbaum, 1685.
19 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 195.
20 de Montaigne, 195; Eric Merkley, "Are Experts (News)Worthy? Balance, Conflict, and Mass Media Coverage of Expert Consensus," *Political Communication* 37, no. 4 (2020): 531.
21 Rosenbaum, 1683.

mandates amidst the politicized claims of experts, the media, and the public. In turn, Montaigne and Cavendish illustrate the need for clear, apolitical communication that fosters trust in expert consensus and scientific governance.

Specialization & Competing Truths

Cavendish parodies scientific specialization through her portrayal of hybrid animal-men as empirical scientists. The inhabitants of her fictional setting—the 'Blazing World'—are shown to be "men of several different sorts [and] shapes," which include the likes of "Bear-men, Worm-men, [and] Fish-men."[22] Cavendish states that "each followed a [specific] profession" where "to that end she erected schools, and founded several societies."[23] The allocation of species-specific study reflects the overspecialization of philosophy into competing schools of thought. As specialization relies on "reason being divisible," Cavendish suggests that such division opposes a uniform consensus.[24] For example, in their attempt to understand the properties of the sun, Cavendish's "Bird-men" were "not of one opinion."[25] Cavendish implies that their specialization led to inter-disagreement and the constant refutation of their own opinions. Montaigne professes a more literal contempt for specialization through his disapproval of medical science; he claims that Renaissance doctors are consumed by the "vanity of [their] art" to suggest they are motivated by their specialized status rather than genuine practice.[26] In turn, Cavendish and Montaigne oppose specialization and argue that participation in scientific inquiry should not be barred to those without a learned discipline.

The nature of specialization remains pertinent to twenty-first-century discourse. In his inquiry into education during COVID-19, Michael Tan relates the current status and limitations of specialization: "disciplinary specialization means we can afford to engage in reductionist practices such as dividing holistic phenomena . . . into . . . various sub-disciplines."[27] Tan warns that "what we may gain in-depth, we may lose in interconnectivity and interaction."[28] In line with Cavendish's claim that the division of reason limited the consensus of her "bird-men," Tan's thoughts on specialization highlight the importance of consensus in current communication.[29]

To complement Tan's discussion of "interconnectivity and

22 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 71.
23 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 71.
24 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.
25 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 73-74.
26 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 82.
27 Michael Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times: An Opportunity for Collective Reflection?" *Learning: Research and Practice* 6, no. 2 (2020): 112.
28 Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times," 112.
29 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.

interaction," Merkley claims that "a growing experimental literature has shown that experts, when in consensus, can be persuasive to citizens."[30] The overspecialization of the expert class breeds competing claims of truth and muddies the differentiation between scientific fact and unsubstantiated conspiracy. In order for the general public to avoid "embrac[ing] falsehoods for truths," there is a need for communication that mitigates the loss of interconnectivity as a result of overspecialization.[31] To that end, Tan asks: "Can we develop better ways of bringing about humanistic learning? Can we have more holistic research approaches rather than the technocratic and reductionist?"[32] Without conforming to an anti-intellectual rejection of disciplinary science, the opinions of Cavendish and Montaigne are echoed in Tan's assertion that specialization is limited by its own divisiveness. Regarding current methods of COVID-19 communication, presenting the public with specialized, esoteric discourse may merely be a palliative solution that neglects the underlying sources of falsehood and conspiracy that arise when expert consensus fails to neutralize them.

Natural Complexities

To supplement their critique on scientific authority, Cavendish and Montaigne propose an alternate form of knowledge-making that accounts for the intricacies of nature and focuses on individual experience. Their consideration of society's natural variance is echoed in the complexity of COVID-19 as a universal issue; however, as Cavendish and Montaigne suggest, universal issues do not facilitate a universal experience. Therefore, the following analysis examines the incompatibilities of institutionalized logic with the infinite complexities of COVID-19 and human experience.

Cavendish and Montaigne imagine nature's variance as incompatible with the confines of reason. Cavendish finds that "nature is but one infinite self-moving body, which by vertue of its self-motion, is divided into infinite parts . . . [and] compositions."[33] Montaigne grants an example of nature's "self-movement" through his description of rivers: "[They] alter their course, sometimes beating against the one side, and sometimes the other, and sometimes quietly keeping the channel."[34] It is nature's variance and inconsistency that opposes the rationality of Cavendish's contemporary philosophers. She claims that "since there is but one truth in nature, all those that hit not this truth, do err, some more, some less; though some may come nearer the mark then others, which makes their opinions seem more probable."[35] The competing opinions from "different motions of reason" may often—and sometimes by chance—align with an

30 Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times," 112; Merkley, "Expert Consensus," 530.
31 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.
32 Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times," 113.
33 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 92.
34 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 92; de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 193.
35 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.

observable truth and therefore gain credibility and justification.[36] As a result, the alignment of a single truth and observation creates the illusion of a superior hypothesis. Montaigne notes that such an illusion may lead to inflated credibility: "For [one] may have particular knowledge of the nature of [one] river . . . [but] in other things [know] no more than what everybody does, and yet . . . will undertake to write the whole body of physics."[37] Montaigne and Cavendish suggest that even the most rational thinkers are incapable of comprehending the entirety of nature's truth. As a result, a single justified observation is not grounds for a larger pattern of understanding.

Like Montaigne and Cavendish, current research studies the efficacy of standardized knowledge in the face of complex situations. Michael Tan notes a disconnect between the industrialized logic of science and the real complexities of the COVID-19 pandemic: "Yes we understand epidemiological rules, the structure and genetic sequence of viruses, human psychology and organisational culture. But should we reopen schools? Wear masks? 'Keep calm and carry on?'"[38] Tan claims that "we seek control, predictability, and the ability to standardize"[39]; however, as Rosenbaum argues, "the pandemic, with its myriad of uncertainties, well-publicized retractions, and shifting recommendations'' negates any attempt to restrict pandemic discourse to the confines of logic.[40] The complexity of pandemic discourse leaves room for Montaigne's man who "in other things [knows] no more than what everybody does, and yet . . . will undertake to write the whole body of physics."[41] Montaigne describes someone who professes baseless claims that fall outside of their realm of expertise. If reimagined in the twenty-first century, Montaigne's false professor echoes the likes of a 'conspiracy theorist—many of which have permeated mainstream pandemic discourse. According to Uscinski *et al*., conspiracy thinking is "oftentimes the product of [an] . . . epistemic . . . desire for understanding, accuracy, and subjective certainty."[42] The shortcomings of standardized knowledge leave the general public to apply their own epistemologies to the unanswered questions left by the inevitable uncertainties and "necessary self-corrections involved in the scientific process."[43] While Cavendish considers nature "one infinite self-moving body," the COVID-19 pandemic may warrant a similar description.[44] In order to account for the 'self-moving' nature of the pandemic, current

36 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 59.
37 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 196.
38 Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times," 112.
39 Tan, "Learning during Interesting Times," 112.
40 Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce," 1683.
41 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 196.
42 Uscinski, Joseph E. *et al*., "Why Do People Believe COVID-19 Conspiracy Theories?" The Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) *Misinformation Review* 1, *Special Issue on COVID-19 and Misinformation* (2020): 2.
43 Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce," 1683.
44 Cavendish, *Blazing World,* 92.

communication must achieve similar flexibility. Whereas conspiracy theories may outpace the communication of substantiated fact, health policies may regain the necessary agility through clarity, concision, and adaptability.

Experience as Truth

Paraphrasing Plato, Montaigne claims that "all things . . . are produced, either by nature, by fortune, or by art. The greatest and fairest by . . . the first two, the least and imperfect by the last.''[45] Montaigne delineates between nature and man-made artifice. Cavendish agrees, claiming "art is, for the most part, irregular, and disorders mens understandings more than it rectifies them."[46] Their assessment is critical of those who "follow too much the rules of art," which, according to Cavendish, "spoil[s] all natural wit."[47] In place of artificial means of understanding, both authors propose an experience-based inquiry into the natural world. To that end, Montaigne claims that "when reason is wanting, we therein employ experience."[48] Cavendish echoes Montaigne through her investigation into the properties of air. As Cavendish considers air to be "subject to none of our exterior senses," she employs her 'bird-men' to observe its properties.[49] Once returned, "the bird-men answered that they could have no other perception of the air, but by their own respiration."[50] When observable reason failed, the experience of breathing afforded the bird-men an understanding of air. Through such experiences, Montaigne claims that "to commit one's self to nature is to do [so] most wisely."[51] Cavendish agrees in her companion volume, *Observations upon Experimental Philosophy*, claiming that humans "have no power over natural causes and effects'' and that we "must be as nature is pleased to order [us]."[52] In this light, Montaigne and Cavendish deem natural order and experience inexplicable by means of man-made reason. As a result, both authors condemn artificial means of observation and support an experience-based approach to understanding nature's truths.

Montaigne considers the power of experience in medical discourse: "To be a right physician, it would be necessary that [doctors] should first [themselves] have passed through all the diseases [they work] to cure."[53] While intended to slander Renaissance medical science, Montaigne's comment holds stock in current COVID-19 discourse. For example, Dr.

45 Plato, "Book X," Laws, quoted in de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 198.
46 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 99.
47 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 98-99.
48 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 11.
49 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 76.
50 Cavendish, *Blazing World*, 76.
51 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 31.
52 Cavendish, introduction to *Blazing World* by Sarah H. Mendelson, 39.
53 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 44.

Rosenbaum recounts an exchange with a fellow physician: "I was struck not just by the brutality of this disease that left people to die alone, but also by the difficulty of appreciating its destructive potential until you experience it firsthand."[54] In practice, the experience-based path to knowledge is incompatible with a global health threat; knowledge by means of experience requires infection. Consequently, a disconnect between those who can and cannot "appreciate [COVID-19's] destructive potential" should be accounted for in forthcoming health policies[55]—whether that be lockdowns, mask mandates, or forthcoming vaccine rollouts. Rosenbaum considers how such disconnects are exacerbated by the impersonal nature of current policies:

> Imagine you are an American who works with his hands . . . a truck driver or a construction worker . . . and you've just lost your job because of the lockdowns. What's it like . . . to be one of these 36 million jobless Americans and to turn on your TV only to hear the medical experts, technocrats, [and] journalists explain that we must keep the economy closed.[56]

Perhaps inevitable, the universal complexities of COVID-19 impede any attempt to hand-tailor health policies. In turn, the judgements of health experts may not align with the lived experiences of those affected by them. To conclude, the contrarian responses to such misalignments mirror those of Montaigne: "I only judge myself by actual sensation, not by reasoning."[57] While the pandemic may confound 'knowledge via true sensation,' perhaps there is room to facilitate greater inclusion—and in turn, greater experience—in the knowledge-making process: is there a way that expert decision-making may be informed by the experiences of those subjected to their health policies? Might community engagement help gauge the future responses and unforeseen repercussions of health mandates? Montaigne and Cavendish bring such questions to the forefront.

Conclusion

Both authors write unfavourably regarding the scientific and philosophical authority of their times. Montaigne's vision where "every one write[s] what he knows" introduces the concept of 'self-study' that negates philosophical modes of reason and empiricism.[58] Montaigne's sentiments are echoed in Cavendish's The Blazing World as she attempts to penetrate the inner workings of nature. Together, Montaigne and Cavendish notice a monopolization of knowledge-making where reason and empirical logic reign over its discourse. Specifically, they argue that Renaissance scientific

54 Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce," 1682.
55 Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce," 1682.
56 Rosenbaum, "Tribal Truce," 1684.
57 de Montaigne, "Of Experience," 82.
58 de Montaigne, "Of Cannibals," 196.

hegemony breeds competing opinions, misaligned truths, and inflated credibility. To supplement their critique of authority, they propose an alternative mode of inquiry that employs individual experience over the 'art' of reason.

Considering the lack of formal analysis regarding the social implications of COVID-19, the perspectives of Cavendish and Montaigne are a novel yet valuable resource that illuminates the shortcomings of current pandemic discourse—many, perhaps, that we have yet to recognize. As examined in the preceding analysis, current shortcomings include the politicized nature of pandemic discourse, the divisiveness of specialized language, and the misalignment of pandemic policy with individual experience. As proven by Cavendish and Montaigne, anti-intellectualism is not a new phenomenon; as of recent, anti-intellectual discourse has been fueled and magnified by the increased permeation of scientific judgement into our daily lives. Instead of considering Cavendish and Montaigne as Renaissance models of modern-day 'COVID deniers,' their perspectives can be seen as testimony from those who have lived through plague outbreaks at the dawn of institutionalized science. As the COVID-19 pandemic is new to us, the rise of empirical observation, codified learning, and specialized discourse was new to them. As greater scientific literacy has enabled the exploitation of scientific data's inevitable uncertainties, a calculated reconfiguration of pandemic communication may prove valuable in neutralizing harmful conspiracies and polarized discourse. In turn, Cavendish and Montaigne's critique of hegemonic knowledge-making grants a unique opportunity to reanalyze the constraints that limit consensus on safe practice, effective policy, and equitable compliance in current pandemic communication.

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It is Easier to Build Strong Children than Repair Broken Men

The School to Prison Pipeline, Restorative Justice, and the Broken Promise of Liberty and Justice For All in the United States

Abstract: In the United States, over 70,000 students are arrested in schools each year for trivial misbehaviours few would consider acts of criminality, such as talking back or skipping class, in what is known as the "school to prison pipeline." This investigation suggests that the emergence of the school-to-prison pipeline can be traced to the overzealous use of zero-tolerance policies and discretionary suspensions, in addition to the over-policing of American schools. To dismantle this pipeline, I suggest that American schools adopt an approach to discipline rooted in the principles of restorative justice, which seeks to keep students in the classroom and out of the jail cell.

Lilah Brenowitz

Today at school, your child… got handcuffed

In 1963, Martin Luther King Jr. told a cheering crowd his dream "that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood."[1] In 2012, however, Georgia student Salecia Johnson threw a minor tantrum and found herself handcuffed and arrested for disorderly conduct at six years old.[2]

Johnson is one of the nearly 70,000 students arrested each year in classrooms for behaviour many would hardly consider criminal.[3] Her story is shared by students across the United States and is part of what is known as the school-to-prison pipeline (STPP). The STPP refers to the criminalization of misbehaviour in a way that disproportionately affects racial minorities, creating an inevitable pathway of academic

1 Stanford University Martin Luther King Jr. Institute, "'I Have a Dream' Delivered at the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom." https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/i-have-dream-address-delivered-march-washington-jobs-and-freedom.

2 Antoinette Campbell, "Police Handcuff 6-Year Old Student in Georgia," *CNN*, last modified April 17, 2012.

3 Libby Nelson and Dara Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained," *Vox News*, last modified October 27, 2015.

failure and recurrent incarceration.[4] Students who enter the STPP have an increased likelihood of missing valuable hours of classroom instruction, experiencing increased contact with law enforcement, and being labelled a "troublemaker" or "bad kid" in a manner that proves self-fulfilling.[5]

Despite a 41% decrease in juvenile crime rates between 1995 and 2010, out-of-school suspensions—which dramatically increase the risk of a student dropping out of school entirely —have risen by 10%.[6] More alarmingly, research also indicates that Black students are nearly three times more likely to receive an out-of-school suspension than their White peers.[7] While proving causality in social science is challenging, it is evident that the increasingly punitive disciplinary codes of American schools are disproportionately causing harm to African American students. Thus, I contend that the STPP is a perturbing example of the persistent discrimination faced by African Americans in the era of legal equality. To truly dismantle this pipeline, it is imperative that schools across the nation incorporate the flexible principles of Restorative Justice (RJ) into disciplinary policies in order to create equitable and compassionate classrooms.

Suspending over three million children a school year, many of whom present a minimal threat to the safety of their school, the American system of educational discipline has gone tragically awry.[8] Each of these suspensions represents a step backwards in a child's educational journey and directly harms the leaders of tomorrow. One policy that has emerged in an effort to dismantle the STPP and ensure all children are treated justly in schools is restorative justice. This framework, which seeks to challenge the principles of retributive justice that define the American legal system, views crime as a function of social dimensions, not solely individual deviance.[9] Putting these principles into action, schools that adopt an RJ approach to discipline over traditional retributive justice approaches offer students the opportunity to connect to social services, participate in reconciliation activities, and focus on wellness through meditation, among other activities.[10] RJ is valuable in its ability to be flexibly implemented according to the specific cultures and priorities of different schools across the US. Yet, in some circumstances, it can be challenging to ascertain what is or is not RJ. In regard to the STPP, RJ attempts to make school a place where students view their time in the classroom as "too important to risk being suspended, expelled, or referred to law enforcement, or too special to

4 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
5 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
6 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
7 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
8 NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, "Dismantling the School-to-Prison-Pipeline."
9 Mara Schiff, "Can Restorative Justice Disrupt the 'School to Prison Pipeline,'" *Contemporary Justice Review* 21, no. 2 (2018): 121-139.
10 Schiff, "Can Restorative Justice Disrupt the 'School to Prison Pipeline.'"

be spoiled by crime or violence."[11]

Given the contemporary and ongoing nature of the STPP and RJ, existing literature tends to investigate policy interventions and the causes of the STPP separately. This study seeks to bridge that gap and demonstrate the importance of causal factors in determining what reforms work and why. To explore what factors contributed to the emergence of the STPP and evaluate the efficacy of RJ among other policy interventions, this study will draw evidence from government reports, academic research across disciplines, contemporary news articles, and auto-ethnographic interviews of students at risk of entering the STPP. Most significantly, this investigation will be framed by Michelle Alexander's seminal *The New Jim Crow*, which provides analysis of both implicit and explicit racism against African Americans, despite the entrenchment of formal equality under the law.

To begin, I will discuss three key mechanisms that have contributed to the emergence of the STPP: zero-tolerance policies, discretionary suspensions, and the presence of school resource officers (SRO). I will juxtapose these factors against the commentary of Alexander in The New Jim Crow, who claims the STPP is a "peculiar institution" imposed by the majority to subjugate African Americans rather than the accidental consequence of poor policy-making.[12] In response to this radical idea posited by Alexander, I will explore other causal accounts of the STPP that look beyond racial bias and the implications of these explanations for policy reform. Before analyzing empirical evidence, I will provide a brief treatment to the theoretical considerations underlying RJ to uncover whether this approach truly has the potential to reduce racial disparities in school disciplinary practices. I will also discuss policy interventions that offer an alternative to RJ approaches, such as those related to social services or jurisprudence. Ultimately, I will discuss how the way in which we frame the STPP and its causes have profound implications for the policy interventions we deem sufficient.

Today at school, your child… learned about racism in a colorblind world

While this investigation dives deepest into the 'school' part of the STPP, it is important to look at the prison part of the pipeline as well. The mass incarceration crisis of the United States is unparalleled across time and space; nearly seven million Americans are currently behind bars.[13] Despite only constituting 13% of the general population, African Americans represent nearly 40% of the incarcerated population.[14] In The

11 Jason Nance, "Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change," *Arizona State Law Journal* 48, no. 313 (2016): 372.

12 Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York, NY: New Press, 2010), 2.

13 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 3.

14 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 3.

New Jim Crow, Alexander argues that after the election of Barack Obama in 2008, many scholars naively proclaimed that racism had finally subsided, eclipsed by a "colorblind" world.[15] Yet, boasting an incarceration rate six to eight times higher than that of any other industrialized nation, the United States has moved away from overt racial discrimination towards a more discrete system where incarceration operates as a taut body of laws, policies, customs, and institutions that collectively act in a way as to subjugate African Americans.[16]

To support her claim that the institution of incarceration in the United States acts as to disenfranchise African Americans, Alexander reports that despite a less than 1% difference in usage rates between racial groups (per data from the Federal Bureau of Investigations), Black Americans are six times more likely to be charged with a drug-related felony.[17] With this felony charge, often for trivial quantities of marijuana, it is now legal for the US government to disenfranchise this individual, as well as deny them public benefits such as food stamps.[18] Alexander argues that this discrimination is not new, but it is now under the guise of discriminating against a former felon rather than an African American.[19] Moreover, Alexander contends that this discrimination is endemic to the American system—it is not the result of poor drug policy. It is the result of an America that has not moved past racism but has gotten better at disguising it.[20]

Today at school, your child… got suspended

The emergence of the STPP can be explained by three critical mechanisms: the rise of zero-tolerance policies, the use of discretionary suspensions, and the presence of SROs in American schools. These factors are amplified by the racism endemic to American society and create a culture of discipline in schools that over-punishes students by default. To dismantle the STPP, it is critical that we understand how it began.

One factor implicated in the STPP is the emergence of zero-tolerance policies and the application of this policy framework to offences that do not pose a public safety threat. After a string of tragic mass shootings in American schools across the 1990s, policymakers agreed: it was time to crack down on violence in schools.[21] In light of this goal, the 1994 *Gun-Free Schools Act* was implemented in the hopes that it would make schools safer so students could learn in peace.[22] This policy dictated that there would be

15 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 3.
16 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 4.
17 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 4.
18 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 4.
19 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 4.
20 Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*, 4.
21 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
22 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."

zero tolerance for weapons at school, and any student found in violation of this injunction would receive a mandatory 365-day suspension.[23]

Scholars widely agree that the *Gun-Free Schools Act* in itself was a necessary measure to increase student safety, but it set a dangerous precedent for subsequent disciplinary policy that directly resulted in the STPP.[24] School administrators soon realized they could apply a zero-tolerance approach to almost any form of misbehaviour, including offences that present little to no harm, such as talking back in class and truancy.[25] Without any regulatory body to deem what could and could not be classified as a zero-tolerance offence, administrators found themselves virtually unchecked in the implementation of zero-tolerance policies.[26]

Many scholars have observed that zero-tolerance policies are actually ineffective at reducing student misbehaviour, citing empirical data suggesting that these harsh disciplinary codes do not reduce the prevalence of violence in schools.[27] It is also important to note that the issue at hand is not administrators' desire to make schools a safer space that is more conducive to learning but instead the removal of due process for students.[28] Most importantly, research suggests that zero-tolerance policies disproportionately impact African American students who are commonly stereotyped as "disruptive" or "disrespectful."[29] For these at-risk students, punishment stemming from zero-tolerance policies results in a decreased sense of belonging at school, increasingly risky behaviour, and stagnant academic performance, thus exacerbating their risk of entering the STPP.[30]

Beyond zero-tolerance policies, the literature suggests that "discretionary suspensions" for nonviolent offences are a significant causal factor in the emergence of the STPP. Recent analysis of New York City public schools indicates that 74% of school-based arrests were for misdemeanour charges that presented little to no public safety threat.[31] Moreover, a similar analysis conducted in Texas finds that 97% of suspensions are administered not due to a violation of a criminal statute but rather at the discretion of a school administrator or local police officer who deems the behaviour unbecoming.[32] In both Texas and New York City, it is evident that school administrators are turning to legal action or removal from the classroom to remedy misbehaviour, even for offences that are not violent in nature. Discretionary suspensions frequently punish

23 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
24 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
25 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
26 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
27 Nance, "Tools for Change."
28 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
29 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
30 Schiff, "School to Prison Pipeline," 124.
31 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
32 Susan Ferriss, "Study Finds Stunning Rates of Discipline Among Texas Students," *The Center for Public Integrity*, last modified May 9, 2014.

student misbehaviour few would deem to be an act of criminality and do not deter students from engaging in disruptive behaviour in the future.[33] Much like zero-tolerance policies, discretionary suspensions are both ineffective and a violation of a student's right to avoid arbitrary arrest.

Often amplifying these discretionary suspensions and therefore augmenting the STPP is the response of school resource officers. Under an often ambiguous mandate, SROs are sworn police officers tasked with protecting American schools in a post-Columbine world.[34] SROs frequently hyper-criminalize trivial student misbehaviour, create a culture of heavy-handed control, and directly involve students in the justice system by defaulting to over-punishing rather than under-punishing.[35] SROs are also given nearly unlimited jurisdiction, creating a climate where student misbehaviour is viewed by default as devious, which frequently pushes students into the justice system for offences that can be remedied at the school level.[36]

For the students at the highest risk of entering the STPP, school is often the last remaining place of stability. As Mike Owens, a student who found himself arrested by an SRO for "disrupting class" at age 16, explains: "School served as a refuge away from the chaos of home and the peer pressures of neighbourhood politics. I felt safe at school because my sibling abusers were not there . . . I never wanted to be home."[37] Suspensions, especially when superfluous, not only stunt academic progress but can force students to spend increased time in volatile settings that school previously helped limit exposure to.

Today at school, your child… got racially profiled

When Texas policymakers took a closer look at their state's suspension record, they uncovered an unsettling trend. When controlling for 83 other variables, such as income and previous record of misbehaviour, they noticed African American students were still 31% more likely to receive a discretionary suspension.[38] Similarly, 51% of suspensions for using profane language in New York City public schools were given to Black students, despite African Americans only constituting 26% of the student body.[39] Perhaps most shockingly, a US Department of Education Civil Rights Office report recently revealed that 58% of suspensions in preschools across the country were given to Black students.[40] The

33 Amanda Ripley, "How America Outlawed Adolescence," *The Atlantic*, last modified November 1, 2016.
34 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
35 Caitlin Lynch, "School Resource Officers and the School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Mixed Methods Application of the Behavior of Law in Schools," *Masters' Thesis*, (Old Dominion University, 2017)
36 Lynch, "School Resource Officers."
37 Kalinda Jones *et al*., "Seen But Not Heard: Personal Narratives of Systemic Failure Within the School-to-Prison Pipeline," *Taboo: The Journal of Culture and Education* 17, no.4 (2018): 49-68.
38 Ferriss, "Discipline Among Texas Students."
39 Nelson and Lind, "The School-to-Prison Pipeline, explained."
40 "Civil Rights Data Collection Data Snapshot: School Discipline," *US Department of Education Office for*

percentage of Black students in preschools across the nation? 18%.[41]

With these unnerving statistics in mind, it is difficult to claim that explicit racism does not play a role in the formation of the STPP. However, one counter-argument emerging from the literature is that it is not explicit racism propagated by SROs and school administrators that is responsible for the STPP, but rather demographic factors that are correlated with race.[42] For example, Ian Tuttle argues that White students are more likely to attend schools with more lenient disciplinary codes than Black students, which he believes explains the difference in suspension rates across racial lines.[43] With this explanation in mind, the logical solution is to ease disciplinary policy at the stricter schools, which would consequently reduce unjust suspensions, therefore diminishing the STPP. However, Tuttle argues that much like a tradeoff between economic redistribution and total productivity of an economy exists, loosening disciplinary practices reduces net academic achievement for a school.[44]

Another point raised by Tuttle is that if predominantly Black schools impose harsher discipline, then naturally more Black students will enter the justice system than their White peers who attend more lenient schools.[45] Again, emphasizing the tradeoff between softening disciplinary policy and reducing academic achievement, he argues that students whose education is disrupted by their misbehaving peers are the real victims.[46] Simply put, Tuttle reasons that if large numbers of Black students are misbehaving, then it is not discrimination to discipline these students in an effort to ensure their peers have a classroom conducive to learning.[47]

While Tuttle raises a cogent point regarding the tradeoff between academic progress and disciplinary rigour, the author fails to provide any compelling evidence that disproves the role of explicit and systemic racism in the formation of the STPP. While cross-school variation in disciplinary policy certainly influences entry into the STPP, this claim only holds true if one assumes that Black and White children attend fundamentally different schools. If we adopt the more realistic assumption that many American schools are racially diverse, Tuttle's line of argument loses its explanatory prowess.

Repeatedly stressed is the notion that students who misbehave, regardless of race, are more likely to be suspended than their well-behaved peers. Yet, turning to a meta-analysis of US public schools for the year of 2008, we see that there is a less than 1% difference in the rates of

Civil Rights, last modified March 1, 2014.
41 Civil Rights Data Collection Data Snapshot: School Discipline."
42 Ian Tuttle, "A School-to-Prison Pipeline?" The National Review, last modified August 21, 2014.
43 Tuttle, "School to Prison Pipeline?"
44 Tuttle, "School to Prison Pipeline?"
45 Tuttle, "School to Prison Pipeline?"
46 Tuttle, "School to Prison Pipeline?"
47 Tuttle, "School to Prison Pipeline?"

offences that trigger a zero-tolerance punishment between Black and White students.[48] Given that White and Black students engage in misbehaviour that triggers a zero-tolerance response at analogous rates, yet Black students are suspended disproportionately more, evidence clearly suggests that racism is a key determinant of entry into the STPP.

Today at school, your child… learned that if crime hurts, justice should heal

RJ seeks to change the way we view crime, and in the case of the STPP, misbehaviour. It is important to note that RJ is not a magic bullet for disciplinary policy, nor is it a replacement for retributive justice in cases of serious harm. If a student brings a firearm to class with the intent to hurt their peers, even the staunchest of RJ advocates would agree that the child should receive a traditional punishment, such as expulsion or an out-of-school suspension. For less serious violations, such as talking back to teachers or using profanity, RJ seeks to re-contextualize misbehaviour as a violation of community norms rather than criminal deviance.[49] This framework seeks to engage students in critical thinking about why their behaviour violated community norms through activities such as reconciliation circles and peer conflict mediation and views discipline as a chance to stimulate reflection instead of simply being punished.[50]

In a general sense, RJ seeks to make school a safe and empowering space for students to learn by actively fighting against the criminalization of misbehaviour and providing a trauma-informed approach to justice.[51] By acknowledging the impact experiences outside the classroom, such as exposure to violence or housing insecurity, may have on behaviour in school, RJ has the potential to revolutionize how American schools respond to misbehaviour.[52] In addition to providing a trauma-informed approach to justice, such as connecting a misbehaving student to trained counsellors, RJ broadly engages community stakeholders.[53] In instances of misbehaviour where traditional disciplinary policy suggests suspension, RJ aims to only turn to conventional punishment if the broader school community agrees that this is the just course of action, therefore decreasing the incidence rate of discretionary suspensions applied by a single school administrator.[54]

RJ is ambiguously actualized, ranging from meditation, reconciliation

48 Russell Shikba and Natasha Williams, "Are Black Kids Worse: Myths and Facts about Racial Differences in Behavior," *The Equity Project* at Indiana University, last modified March 1, 2014.
49 Schiff, "School to Prison Pipeline."
50 Schiff, "School to Prison Pipeline."
51 Nance, "Tools for Change."
52 Nance, "Tools for Change."
53 Nance, "Tools for Change."
54 Schiff, "School to Prison Pipeline."

circles, diversion programs, and teacher-administrator panels.[55] This is a strength, as schools have a high degree of autonomy in how restorative practices are incorporated in their disciplinary policy, but also a weakness, as it can be difficult to ascertain what is and is not RJ. Nonetheless, RJ demonstrates a viable policy alternative to the current paradigm of discipline in American schools by seeking to engage the broader community, pursuing justice in a trauma-informed manner, and allowing flexibility in implementation.

Today at school, your child… participated in a reconciliation circle

To understand the impact of RJ on the STPP, I identify two goals to guide analysis: Does it reduce the racial disparity in suspensions, and does it increase academic achievement across schools? It is difficult to make a broad policy recommendation given the eclectic nature of American schools, but these two goals are widely shared by schools across the nation and are a useful tool for evaluating the potential efficacy of RJ.

Given that the STPP and RJ are relatively contemporary areas of concern, it is challenging to find investigations that are peer-reviewed and utilize randomized-control trials. Much of the existing literature surrounding RJ tends to qualitatively analyze one school or focus on the legal theory of restorative vs. retributive justice. Furthermore, given the ambiguity of what policies constitute RJ, it is challenging to compare the success of programs across schools or regions.

In the 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 school years, RJ programs were instituted in randomly selected Pittsburgh public schools and empirically analyzed by the RAND Corporation.[56] The RJ program instituted in treatment schools was standardized. It included ongoing training for school staff to implement practices such as conflict resolution circles and the use of affective statements to enforce community norms.[57] Control schools continued their use of traditional school discipline, and data on a variety of metrics were collected for every school in the district over a two-year period.[58]

One ethical concern raised by the authors of this study was that if RJ proved successful in mitigating outcomes associated with the STPP, would students in control schools be missing out on valuable interventions? In response to this concern, the authors argue that if RJ proved life-changing, students in the control group would quickly see RJ implemented in their classrooms.[59] If this pilot program was ineffective or even detrimental,

55 Schiff, "School to Prison Pipeline."
56 Catherine Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspensions? An Evaluation of the Impact of Restorative Practices in a Mid-Sized Urban School District,* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018).
57 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
58 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
59 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*

students in the control group would see no change, nor would they be less well off than before the study began. Ultimately, the authors of the study concluded that the potential benefits of a well-controlled investigation of restorative justice outweighed the potential costs the control group could experience.

In regard to the first goal of reducing the racial gap in suspensions, Pittsburgh showed the world that RJ could indeed begin to dismantle the STPP.[60] When compared to control schools, schools that instituted the RJ program showed a 16% reduction in school days missed by students due to out-of-school suspensions.[61] For African American students, the drop in suspensions was even greater, thereby dramatically shrinking the gap in suspensions between White and Black students.[62] The results of the Pittsburgh study were an exciting affirmation of RJ's ability to reduce racial inequity in school discipline and presented compelling evidence that the STPP could indeed be dismantled by a reconfiguration of the disciplinary paradigm in American schools.

Unfortunately, RJ and its ability to reduce racial inequity in school discipline appears to come at a cost, evidenced in the Pittsburgh program's inability to achieve the second goal of increased academic achievement. For treatment schools, the authors of the Pittsburgh study found that academic achievement measured via performance on standardized tests flatlined and even decreased slightly for the African American subgroup.[63] Given that this negative impact on academic achievement was observed only in treatment schools, the authors of the Pittsburgh study posit that it is possibly the way RJ was implemented in schools that is responsible for this decline in performance, rather than factors pertaining to the students themselves or RJ as an alternative to traditional disciplinary policy.[64]

Perhaps this drop in academic achievement is simply due to the volatility of introducing a new code of discipline and does not reflect factors related to the core principles of RJ.[65] Thus, future investigations must study schools that implement RJ over a longer period to capture more than just the transition period and rule out factors possibly confounding the relationship between RJ and academic achievement.[66]

Nonetheless, the decrease in academic achievement is a troubling prospect for RJ and corroborates the notion of a tradeoff between equity and achievement in school disciplinary policy suggested by Tuttle.[67]

60 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
61 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
62 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
63 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
64 Augustine *et al., Can Restorative Practices Improve School Climate and Curb Suspension?*
65 Jessie McBirney, "The Effects of Pittsburgh's New Restorative Justice Program," Thomas B. Fordham Institute, last modified January 9, 2019.
66 McBirney, "The Effects of Pittsburgh's New Restorative Justice Program."
67 Tuttle, "A School-to-Prison Pipeline?"

Beyond the academic achievement critique, proponents of RJ are divided on whether programs must actively address racial inequity to achieve the goal of reducing racial disparities in suspensions. Many scholars argue that until this point of contention is resolved, it is ineffective to institute RJ in schools and claim it reduces the STPP.[68] Ultimately, it is critical to listen to student voices in this debate, as "those deemed to be the 'problem' have the greatest insights into powerful solutions."[69] We must allow students to self-determine the policy they believe most effective, and the mixed quantitative results regarding the efficacy of RJ implore us to continue engaging in student-focused research in the hopes of one day dismantling the STPP.

Today at school, your child… was connected to social services

Alexander asserts that the STPP is not the result of poorly informed policy decisions but is instead the culmination of a system functioning exactly as it was intended to.[70] She echoes the tradition of racial realism, which contends that given racial subjugation persists despite the achievement of complete legal equality, African Americans can no longer rely on incremental policy change to ensure genuine equality.[71] Thus, many scholars argue that well-intentioned policy reforms such as RJ are largely ineffective as they fail to attack the systemic racism endemic to the United States educational system.[72]

If this is the case, then it is only the complete reconfiguration of the larger political economy of schooling, incarceration, and the free-market economy in the United States that can truly dismantle the STPP.[73] This systemic reconstruction is unlikely to occur overnight. Until then, we must take pragmatic steps to fight the hyper-criminalization of schools, even if it requires treating the symptoms instead of the disease.

Beyond RJ, the American Bar Association suggests two policy reforms that can be instituted at the local level in schools in order to fight the STPP. One such approach, demonstrated in Philadelphia, calls on law enforcement officers to re-engage with their role in the community and develop an approach to arresting students that is trauma-informed.[74] This strategy, championed by former police commissioner Kevin Bethel, only allows the arrests of students who commit legitimately criminal acts,

68 Samuel Song and Susan Swearer, "The Cart Before the Horse: The Challenge and Promise of Restorative Justice Consultation in Schools," *Journal of Educational and Psychological Consultation* 26, no.4 (2016): 313-324.
69 Carla Shedd, "How the School-to-Prison Pipeline is Created," *The Atlantic*, last modified October 27, 2015.
70 Kenneth Fasching-Varner *et al.*, "Beyond School-to-Prison Pipeline and Toward an Educational and Penal Realism," *Equity and Excellence in Education* 47, no. 4 (2014): 410-429.
71 Fasching-Varner *et al.*, "Beyond School-to-Prison Pipeline."
72 Fasching-Varner *et al.*, "Beyond School-to-Prison Pipeline."
73 Fasching-Varner *et al.*, "Beyond School-to-Prison Pipeline." 425.
74 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline," last modified August 11, 2019.

attempting to divert students to social services whenever possible.[75] After imprisoning nearly 1,580 students a year, Bethel called on his officers to reserve incarceration for only the most devious students, arguing that most cases of misbehaviour were due to unmet needs or a traumatic upbringing.[76] By connecting those students to social services in the community, Bethel's program reduced the number of students arrested a year to 250.[77]

Looking beyond schools to reduce the number of students exposed to the STPP, Georgia's Clayton County has seen an 82% reduction in entry to the juvenile justice system by reforming the way courts respond to arrests made in schools.[78] Troubled by the number of students entering the justice system at increasingly young ages, Chief Presiding Judge Steven Teske called on prosecutors to base their sentencing decisions on adolescent brain research and push themselves to think critically about the types of offences that necessitate incarceration.[79] Furthermore, Judge Teske sought to engage various stakeholders in the community, such as religious leaders, teachers, parents, and social service professionals, in discussions of the STPP to create policies that looked beyond schools and courts to make schools safe and just spaces for students.[80] This approach proved successful in Georgia, resulting in a great reduction of students entering the justice system, as well as allowing prosecutors to spend more time on cases that represent a valid threat to public safety.[81]

On the school level, intentional steps can be taken to make school a welcoming place. Jason Nance suggests that:

> We need more schools where children want to attend because they feel part of a special community that cares for one another, helps each other succeed, and expects the best from one another. These schools do not rely on SROs, metal detectors, zero-tolerance policies, suspensions, expulsions, and referrals to law enforcement to create a climate where students can learn.[82]

Schools can reallocate resources to achieve this goal, taking steps such as using SRO funding to hire more mental health specialists as well as abolishing zero-tolerance policies for all but the most serious of offences.[83] By creating a supportive environment conducive to learning, where

75 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
76 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
77 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
78 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
79 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
80 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
81 American Bar Association, "Three Programs Breaking Down the School to Prison Pipeline."
82 Nance, "Tools For Change," 372.
83 Nance, "Tools For Change," 372.

students are not in constant fear of authority, we can create a world where the STPP is a distant memory.

As demonstrated by the successes of Philadelphia and Clayton County, Georgia, as well as reforms on the school level, it is evident RJ is not the only tool available to dismantle the STPP. By broadly engaging the community and ascribing to norms prioritizing empathy and circumspection, we can take proactive action in eradicating the STPP and ensuring no child is impeded from completing their education by the hyper-criminalization of schools.

Today at school, your child… imagined a better future

In a recent op-ed, Senator Elizabeth Warren called on policymakers to invest over $800 billion in public schools and declare a commitment to ensuring every student has "the right to a safe and welcoming place to learn."[84] Dedicated to ending the STPP for good, Warren also calls for SROs to receive anti-bias and de-escalation training, the decriminalization of discretionary offences, and evidence-based alternative disciplinary practices to be instituted in schools across the country.[85] Warren's proactive approach to fighting the STPP reflects a broader political awareness that we are failing the leaders of tomorrow and must rethink our approach to making schools a safe space. Her commentary further reminds us of the importance of evidence-based policy and thinking creatively to solve this modern-day civil rights crisis.

In this study, I have endeavoured to comb existing research for eclectic perspectives on the causes and solutions to the STPP. Guided by Alexander's account of this new "peculiar institution," I have demonstrated how the proximal causes of zero-tolerance policies, discretionary suspensions, and the installation of SROs belong to a larger narrative of endemic racism and social control in the United States. To corroborate this seemingly radical argument, I have provided commentary from Tuttle that seeks to identify causal factors beyond race that have contributed to the STPP. Ultimately, statistical evidence prevails, suggesting there is indeed a racial gap in suspensions and, therefore, entry to the STPP. However, I acknowledge that more research is needed to understand how exactly this mechanism operates.

In an effort to provide guidance for those concerned with crippling the STPP, a brief discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of RJ has been included, as well as a discussion of the difficulties of empirically studying the efficacy of this approach. We have observed that RJ is certainly no elixir, but preliminary research has shown a positive impact on reducing the racial gap in suspensions. As theorized by Tuttle, it is evident that a

84 Elizabeth Warren, "On Closing the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Good," *Essence*, last modified November 6, 2019.
85 Warren, "On Closing the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Good."

tradeoff between academic achievement and pursuing racial equity exists, although further investigation is necessary to explain why this is and if it is simply a function of research design.

While scholars such as Alexander draw upon the theoretical framework of racial realism, arguing that only an overhaul of the American justice and education systems can achieve meaningful change for African Americans, I have outlined evidence-based policies that have been successful on the local level. These policies look to the broader community to critically think about the meaning of criminality and exercise discretion when involving students in the justice system. This reform cannot be achieved by schools, courts, or law enforcement alone—but rather requires collaboration across institutional lines.

What this ultimately suggests is that we have many tools to begin dismantling the STPP. No solution proposed in this investigation is a panacea, but we cannot claim we do not know where to begin. Despite its contemporary nature, scholars have a rich understanding of how the STPP emerged and every year, we learn more about how to dismantle it for good. Yet, we have failed to act. The lurking variable is concern. If the American public cared about students being handcuffed for throwing a tantrum as much as we pretend to, we would not see nearly 70,000 students arrested in American classrooms each year. But until we make a commitment backed by resources to ensure every student feels safe and respected in the classroom, the STPP is here to stay.

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The Politics of Consultation

Indigenous-Nuclear Relations Regarding Small Modular Reactors

Sage Broomfield

Abstract: Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (SMRs) have been named the future of the Canadian nuclear industry, and Indigenous communities have been identified as an end-user for this technology. However, the nuclear industry has a complicated colonial history that has left indelible effects on Indigenous peoples and their lands. This paper evaluates the consultation processes for SMR implementation in Canada, including those of the first SMR demonstration site proposed for Ontario's Chalk River Laboratories. The argument is made that the consultation efforts performed by the Canadian government ultimately conceal and uphold colonial dynamics of power to dispossess land and undermine Indigenous governance.

Introduction

In March 2019, the nuclear energy company Global First Power submitted a license application for the construction of a Small Modular Reactor (SMR) in Ontario's Chalk River Laboratories.[1] The latest in nuclear energy technology, SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors in output and physical size.[2] The federal government has identified this new technology as part of Canada's 'low-carbon future' and has identified remote off-grid Indigenous communities as one of three end-user groups.[3] It is argued that implementing SMRs in these communities will eliminate their dependency on diesel generators, a costly and cumbersome form of energy production.[4] Instead of being implemented into these communities directly, the proposed Chalk River SMR project would be located in Southern Ontario on the Algonquins of Ontario land claim, threatening the health, traditional, and commercial land-use practices of the Algonquin people as well as other Nations.[5] These Nations and organizations would

1 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Global First Power Micro Modular Reactor Project," Government of Canada, last modified May 28, 2020, http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/reactors/research-reactors/nuclear-facilities/chalk-river/global-first-micro-modular-reactor-project.cfm.

2 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action: A Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular Reactors. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada," 2018, https://smrroadmap.ca/.

3 Government of Canada, "Canada's Small Nuclear Reactor Action Plan," 2020, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sources-distribution/nuclear-energy-uranium/canadas-small-nuclear-reactor-action-plan/21183.

4 Government of Canada, "Canada's Small Nuclear Reactor Action Plan."

5 Algonquins of Ontario, "Oral Presentation Submission from the Algonquins of Ontario," last modified January 25, 2018, http://www.tanakiwin.com/wp-system/uploads/2018/01/CMD18-H2_51-SubmissionfromtheAlgonquinsofOntario-1.pdf.

experience the negative environmental, social, and cultural effects of the nuclear project without the benefits of energy production. The nuclear industry has historically targeted Indigenous lands and communities to be the sites of extractive energy processes, such as uranium mining.[6] This Chalk River project SMR will continue a long colonial history of asymmetrical and exploitive effects on Indigenous peoples perpetrated by the nuclear industry.[7]

The Duty to Consult is the legal responsibility of the federal and provincial governments to consult and 'where appropriate, accommodate' Indigenous groups affected by Crown activity.[8] Resource development projects such as the Chalk River SMR trigger the Duty to Consult. This Supreme Court-affirmed instrument is supposed to protect inherent Aboriginal and Treaty rights of Indigenous peoples and is therefore included in the processes of Environmental and Impact Assessments which occur in resource projects.[9] As a part of the federal government, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is responsible for upholding the Duty to Consult in all of its nuclear projects.[10]

This paper will argue that the consultation efforts performed by the Canadian government through the CNSC for the implementation of SMRs pander to what Dene scholar Glen Sean Coulthard has termed the *politics of recognition*. This framework is reinforced by legal and political instruments of recognition, such as the Duty to Consult, which ultimately conceal and uphold colonial dynamics of power to dispossess land and undermine Indigenous governance.

I will first discuss the colonial underpinnings of the Canadian nuclear industry. Using uranium mining as an example, I will establish the existence of an asymmetric and detrimental relationship between the nuclear industry and Indigenous peoples. Next, I will outline the *politics of recognition* and establish the Duty to Consult as an instrument of an oppressive colonial system. I will then evaluate Canadian-Indigenous consultation processes through critical textual analysis of *The Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular Reactors*. The following section will use the Chalk River consultation proceedings as a case study to evaluate SMR consultation in practice. Finally, I will provide an assessment of future research and concluding remarks.

6 Landrie-Parker Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy," Fedoruk Centre, 2016, https://fedorukcentre.ca/documents/resources/coates_landrie-parker2016-nippne.pdf.
7 Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy."
8 Government of Canada, "Government of Canada and the duty to consult," 2019, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1331832510888/1609421255810.
9 Library of Parliament, "The Duty to Consult Indigenous Peoples," 2019, https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201917E.
10 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Indigenous consultation, engagement, and reconciliation," 2020, http://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/aboriginal-consultation/index.cfm#:~:text=The%20duty%20to%20consult%20is,to%20Indigenous%20Consultation%20and%20Engagement.

Indigenous-Nuclear Relations and Their Colonial Past

Language used by the nuclear industry is often imbued with futuristic fantasies—more akin to utopian science fiction narratives than realistic evaluations of future impacts.[11] In order to meaningfully engage with a nuclear future, it is important to also engage with the history of the nuclear industry. The nuclear industry is intricately tied with the colonial-capitalist expansion of Canada. Since the 1930s, the negative impacts of the nuclear industry's activities like uranium mining have disproportionately impacted Indigenous peoples in Canada.[12] Indigenous communities have seen the negative effects of the nuclear industry without being the benefactors of nuclear energy production.[13] The history of Indigenous-nuclear relations illuminates patterns of inconsideration of Indigenous communities that underpin current industry developments, including SMR technology.

Many Canadian nuclear projects began operating in the 1930s and 40s, and many of these projects were built on Indigenous territory without consent—the Chalk River Laboratories being one of many examples.[14] Another example is the Port Radium Mine, located on Dene Land in the Northwest Territories, which extracted uranium between 1940 to 1982.[15] Following the mine's closure in the 1990s, detrimental effects to both health and social patterns for the surrounding Dene communities as well as environmental degradation were recognized.[16] In addition to the Port Radium Mine, the McArthur River and Cigar Lake mines were also highly profitable for the nuclear industry and are located in Northern Saskatchewan on Treaty 8 and 10 territory.[17] The political history of uranium mining illustrates the asymmetry in Indigenous-nuclear relations. Indigenous communities and their lands saw undue harm caused by colonial capitalistic pursuit of extractive energy processes. The inception of Canada's nuclear energy industry highlights its colonial past and provides important context for current nuclear projects.

Theoretical Framework

Through bureaucratic consultation processes, the federal government is able to check reconciliatory boxes while actively undermining Indigenous governance and Indigenous land claims. The *politics of*

11 Benjamin K. Sovacool and M. V. Ramana, "Back to the Future: Small Modular Reactors, Nuclear Fantasies, and Symbolic Convergence," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 40, no.1 (2015): 96–125.
12 Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy."
13 Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy."
14 Lance Haymond and Verna Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council to the Prime Minister Requesting an Overarching Indigenous Cooperation Agreement with the Algonquin Nation for the Chalk River Nuclear Site Proposed Developments," 2020, https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/evaluations/document/135033.
15 Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy."
16 Coates, "Northern Indigenous Peoples & the Prospects for Nuclear Energy."
17 Deline First Nation and Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada, "Canada-Déline Uranium Table Final Report Concerning Health and Environmental Issues Related to the Port Radium Mine," 2005, https://assembly.nu.ca/library/Edocs/2005/001195-e.pdf.

recognition is a framework proposed by Glen Sean Coulthard. In his book, *Red Skin, White Masks*, Coulthard discusses the ways in which Canadian colonialism functions in relation to Indigenous governance by building on Frantz Fanon's famous work *Black Skin, White Masks*.[18] Fanon asserts that in cases where colonial state power does not depend on overt state violence, it will instead entice the oppressed to identify with asymmetric forms of recognition.[19] Building on Fanon's work, Coulthard makes two broad claims, first that the colonial power of the Canadian state has shifted from a system of unconcealed domination to being exercised through mechanisms of accommodation and recognition.[20] The second of Coulthard's claims is that despite this new veneer of recognition, the tyrannical nature of Canadian state power remains unchanged.[21]

Previous to the 1970s, the system of Canadian settler-colonialism was supported by uncontrolled and paternalistic policies.[22] The *1876 Indian Act* is an example of pre-shift legislation, one that is overt in its oppressive policies.[23] The *Act* gave sweeping regulatory powers over "Indians and Lands reserved for Indians" to the federal government, which included but was not limited by any means to housing, land ownership, and the residential school system.[24] Further, the *Indian Act* eroded Indigenous self-determination through mechanisms that banned important ceremonies, as well as cultural and governance practices.[25] The *Act* also put in place the Status Indian system, a legal distinction that afforded Status Indians rights not afforded to Metis, Non-Status, Inuit or other Canadians.[26] In order to receive rights, First Nations people were coerced into identifying with colonial recognitions of Indigeneity. The *Indian Act* remains in effect today, controlling and regulating Indigenous life and serves as the foundation for Indigenous-Canadian relations.

The 1960s and 1970s saw an increase of Indigenous activism in Canada and North America.[27] Coulthard identifies three watershed moments for Indigenous activism in Canada. First, the widespread pushback against the 1969 *Statement of The Government of Canada on Indian Policy* or *White Paper*, which was largely viewed as the completion

18 Glen S. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: rejecting the colonial politics of recognition* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 221.
19 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
20 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
21 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
22 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
23 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
24 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, "An Act to amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians," 2010, https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010252/1100100010254.
25 Sheryl Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics: A Subtle Revolution* (Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2016), 171.
26 Government of Canada, "What is Indian Status," 2020, https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032463/1572459644986.
27 Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics*.

of Canada's cultural genocide.[28] Second, the Calder case and its partial recognition of Aboriginal rights and title.[29] Despite the Nisga peoples loss of the case, the decision paved the way for the government's *1973 Statement on Claims of Indian and Inuit People: A Federal Native Claims Policy*, which essentially undid the state's refusal to recognize Indigenous claims to land rights where the existence of rights remained open to interpretation.[30] Following these landmark moments, policies which emphasized recognition began to appear.

Documents produced after the shift emphasize recognition and accommodation of Indigenous peoples, including Section 35 of the *1982 Constitutional Act* and the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)*.[31] Yet, Coulthard argues that these documents, while written with accommodating language, fail to undo the colonial system of dispossession and assimilation.[32] Heralded as a progressive piece of legislation, Section 35 of the Canadian *Constitution* establishes inherent Aboriginal rights and title.[33] This 'constitutional breakthrough' paved the way for the 1995 recognition by the state of 'the inherent right to self-government of Indigenous peoples.[34] However, international Indigenous scholar Sheryl Lightfoot argues that the law does not go far enough to protect collective land ownership, which continues to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.[35] An example of this type of land negotiation can be seen at the Algonquin Land claim on which the Chalk River laboratory is located.[36] Canada has also been condemned internationally for its oppositional attitudes towards UNDRIP and coming under fire from Indigenous peoples at home.[37] Coulthard's conclusion is that while the forms of colonial power have changed, the intentions of the state to dispossess Indigenous peoples of their land and right to self-determination remain unchanged.[38] The tangibility of Indigenous governance begins and ends in these documents, which provide a new vocabulary, but few tools or protocols. Nuclear Impact Assessments emphasize Indigenous consultation however, as I will discuss, are illustrative of Coulthard's conclusion that the dispossession of Indigenous lands remains a focus of government activity.

28 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
29 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
30 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
31 Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics*.
32 Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics*.
33 Government of Canada, "Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982," 2021, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-16.html#:~:text=35.,are%20hereby%20recognized%20and%20affirmed.&text=(2)%20In%20this%20Act%2C,and%20M%C3%A9tis%20peoples%20of%20Canada.
34 Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*.
35 Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics*.
36 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council."
37 Lightfoot, *Global Indigenous Politics*.
38 Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council and Kebaowek First Nation, "Letter to Prime Minister."

Consultation and the *Politics of Recognition*

Legal instruments such as the Duty to Consult assist in creating an illusion of reconciliatory practices within the nuclear industry while the dispossession and degradation of Indigenous lands continue. Through cosmetic statements of recognition, the inclusive language used during consultation processes dilutes the linguistic, cultural and political identities of Indigenous populations in Canada. In 2018 Natural Resources Canada facilitated a pan-Canadian conversation on the potential of SMRs in the Canadian nuclear industry with stakeholders, including heavy industry and Indigenous communities. *The Roadmap* was the resulting document.[39] The following section reviews the Canada-wide consultation process summarized in *The Canadian Roadmap to Small Modular Reactors*.

This consultation process was an initial step in implementing SMRs and did not include a project proposal; the Duty to Consult was not triggered, nor was an Impact Assessment. However, the document makes clear that the Canadian government has a Duty to Consult on nuclear projects and that Indigenous consultation is, therefore, a priority. While the legal obligations differ from the Chalk River proceedings, *The Roadmap* highlights important characteristics and misgivings of nuclear consultation efforts.

The consultation documents produced by the nuclear industry make a point to isolate Indigenous consultation to highlight its importance.[40] However, the tendency to amalgamate Indigenous and public consultation processes is exemplified in *The Roadmap*.[41] While public engagement is an important process, it cannot be considered on par with Indigenous consultation. The Duty to Consult establishes a unique responsibility of the Canadian government to consult Indigenous populations and their governments. Amalgamating the two processes ignores the inherent right to self-governance outlined in Section 35 of the Constitution. When consolidated, these processes allow for an erasure of the legal identity of Indigenous peoples and a devaluation of First Nations governments and organizations. These documents claim to establish and respect Indigenous inherent rights. However, in practice, they fail to go beyond recognition and continue to uphold the *politics of recognition*.

Communication is a key component of consultation processes, and language barriers, especially in Inuit communities, present a challenge.[42] Indigenous languages are tied to regions and can vary greatly within

39 Government of Canada, "Canada's Small Modular Reactor Action Plan," 2021, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/energy-sources-distribution/nuclear-energy-uranium/canadas-small-nuclear-reactor-action-plan/21183.
40 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
41 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
42 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."

one province.[43] The federal government has made efforts to provide *The Roadmap* consultation documents in languages such as Ojibwe, Inuktitut, Inuinnaqtun and Cree.[44] However, translation is only offered for one 'briefing document,' which is full of reader-friendly jargon.[45] Ultimately, the document over-simplifies a complicated subject, Indigenous-Nuclear relations, into short bulleted lists and sweeping statements.[46] The Indigenous engagement process is ironically summarized by saying: 'Indigenous [consultation] is not a one-time checklist.'[47] Ultimately, the document serves as an SMR brochure rather than providing helpful information for Indigenous language speakers. A translation is only as good as the original work; a consultation process that lacks socio-political forethought will not be improved by translation. This is an example of where accommodation, in this instance translation, presents one image of inclusivity but at the same time lacks substance and an intention to respond to Indigenous voices, reflecting the spirit of the process itself.

Terms used in consultation documents such as "Indigenous," or more specific terms such as "First Nations," "Metis," and "Inuit," have complicated and contextual histories. Without adequate explanation of terms such as "reserve," their use becomes insidious, working implicitly to reinforce biases. For example, the word "reserve" occurs only once in The Roadmap: "The high cost of [electrical] power-on reserve lands is a burden, and retaining capacity on reserve lands is a priority."[48] This reductive use of language results in a distortion of historical and systematic conditions. Reserve communities are characterized as a problem by the Canadian *Roadmap*, which allows for SMRs to be marketed as an easy fix to economic or infrastructure weaknesses. The Roadmap focuses on the problem of expensive energy on reserve land rather than the colonial structures that make energy bills high for on-reserve communities, including the government's failure to run power lines to these communities. The use of 'reserve' without appropriate context demonstrates how accommodating language can misconstrue both the histories and present-day realities of Indigenous-Canada relations. Without comprehensive consideration of the language used in consultation documents, misuse of complex terms can reinforce biases and create distortion.

Despite citing a study that concludes that the complicated history of Indigenous-nuclear relations together with its 'many mistakes and failures' warrants attention, The Roadmap does not go far enough in

43 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
44 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action: A Canadian Roadmap for Small Modular Reactors. Summary of Key Findings," November 2018, https://smrroadmap.ca/.
45 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action: Summary."
46 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
47 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
48 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."

cogitating on the consultation process itself.[49] Identifying colonialism as a variable is only step one, and the nuclear industry fails to go beyond this initial acknowledgement, pointing to a broader pattern of recognition that lacks actionability. Through bureaucratic consultation processes, the federal government is able to check reconciliatory boxes while actively undermining Indigenous governance and Indigenous land claims.

Case Study: Chalk River Consultation Processes

The Chalk River project will be the first demonstrative implementation of SMRs in Canada. Proponents have claimed that SMRs are significantly safer than larger reactor technology. However, many of the safety risks of conventional reactors remain an issue with SMRs, including radiation leaks caused by an influx of air into the reactor core.[50] Also, the novel designs of SMRs pose new safety and regulatory challenges. For example, their shared modular systems may create safety weaknesses.[51] The containment systems, which protect the radioactive material inside the reactor of SMRs, are less robust than larger reactors which can lead to safety concerns such as increased probability of hydrogen explosions.[52] In addition, the economies of scale associated with the implementation of the technology mean that larger reactors actually produce cheaper power, and the technology will require large-scale government investment to be successful.[53] Despite these issues, the Chalk River Project has gone ahead with government support.

As SMRs have entered the political discussion, the Federal government has shown that they value speedy economic development over careful and considerate environmental assessments. In 2019, the CNSC successfully lobbied the federal government to exempt SMRs from amendments made to the *Impact Assessment Act*,[54] formerly *The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*.[55] The *Impact Assessment Act* is the federal legislation that oversees impact assessments which aim to prevent serious environmental effects.[56] In pushing to exempt these nuclear reactors from the Act, lobbyists claimed that the effects of SMRs are 'well known';

49 Canadian Small Modular Reactor Roadmap Steering Committee, "A Call to Action."
50 M.V. Ramana, "Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regarding the Project Description for Global First Power's Micro Modular Reactor," 2019, https://ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/evaluations/proj/80182/contributions/id/2278.
51 International Atomic Energy Agency, "New Recommendations on Safety of SMRs from the SMR Regulatory Forum," 2020, https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/new-recommendations-on-safety-of-smrs-from-the-smr-regulators-forum.
52 Union of Concerned Scientists, "Safety, Security and Cost Concerns," 2013, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/small-modular-reactors.
53 Union of Concerned Scientists, "Safety, Security and Cost Concerns."
54 Government of Canada, "Justice Laws Website Canadian Environmental Assessment Act," 2012, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.21/page-1.html.
55 Government of Canada, "Justice Laws Website Canadian Environmental Assessment Act."
56 Government of Canada, "Justice Laws Website: Impact Assessment Act," last modified April 16, 2021, https://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-2.75/FullText.html.

however, many of the proposed SMRs use new, untested designs, and some use chemicals that have caused serious accidents during the prototype phase.[57] The amendments also failed to include impact assessments of the decommissioning phase of the reactors, which includes cleaning up, dismantling and removing radiation-contaminated facilities, disposing of radioactive wastes and returning sites to public use.[58] Lobbyists claimed that full-scale assessments would hinder the commercialization of SMR technology.[59] However, critics have warned that this choice will 'benefit the nuclear industry, but at the expense of the environment, public health and safety, and the rights of Indigenous communities."[60] Importantly, the Chalk River request was submitted under the predecessor to the *Impact Assessment Act*, the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, and as a result, requires a comprehensive environmental assessment.

The Indigenous consultation process for the Chalk River project began with an email sent in July 2019 to 30 affected Indigenous Nations and organizations who were given 60 days to comment on the project proposal and submit comments to the CNSC.[61] The Chalk River SMR project has come under legal and political criticism by Indigenous and legal organizations, as well as academics through consultation channels and other political avenues.[62] In response to the initial comments made by Indigenous organizations and Nations, the CNSC stated it had fulfilled the Duty to Consult and had intentions for Indigenous groups to be 'meaningfully involved' with the licensing process.[63] The CNSC's claims raise a crucial question: as to whether the notification of a project and a request for comments qualifies as 'meaningful consultation?' Notably, the Kebaowek First Nation, one of the 30 affected Nations and groups, asserted that the CNSC did not adequately consult with them, calling into question the Duty to Consult.[64]

57 Shawn McCarthy, "Federal nuclear regulator urges Liberals to exempt smaller reactors from full panel review," Globe and Mail, November 6, 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-federal-nuclear-regulator-urges-liberals-to-exempt-smaller-reactors/.
58 Sierra Club Foundation, "Groups Condemn Plans to Exempt Nuclear Reactors from Bill C-69," 2019, https://www.sierraclub.ca/en/civil-society-groups-condemn-plan-to-exempt-nuclear-reactors-from-bill-c-69-impact-assessment.
59 McCarthy, "Federal nuclear regulator urges Liberals."
60 Dr. Ole Henderson, as quoted in Sierra Club, "Groups Condemn Plans to Exempt Nuclear Reactors from Bill C-69."
61 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment for the proposed Micro Modular Reactor Project at the Chalk River Laboratories," 2020, http://www.suretenucleaire.gc.ca/eng/the-commission/pdf/Decision-GlobalFirstPowerEAScoping-CMD20-H102-e-Final.pdf.
62 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council"; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments on the Project Description– Micro Modular Reactor Project," 2020; M.V. Ramana, "Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Regarding the Project Description for Global First Power's Micro Modular Reactor," 2019.
63 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."
64 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation

In a press release in January of 2019, the Anishinabek Nation Chiefs-in-Assembly, who represent 39 First Nations across Ontario, objected to any and all applications of SMR technology on their territories.[65] Three months later, the license application for the construction of the SMR in the Chalk River Laboratories was submitted.[66] In July of the same year, the Government of Canada announced the commencement of the Environmental Assessment (E.A.) for the proposed site.[67] Indigenous consultation is an important component of the E.A. that is mandated by the Duty to Consult and is upheld by the CNSC, the federal component of the Canadian nuclear complex. It is important to note that the Indigenous consultation commenting process happened alongside and in conjunction with public engagement.

The SMR project termed the Micro Modular Reactor (MMR), an effort of the energy company Global First Power, will be located in the Chalk River Laboratories situated on the Algonquins of Ontario land claim, one of the largest and most complex land claims in the province.[68] This project comes two years after the facility's 2018 relicensing, which was done without the consent of the Algonquin people.[69] The initial Indigenous consultation comment period took place between July 2019 and January 2020.[70] A summary of Indigenous and public comments was published in May 2020.[71] A month earlier, the CNSC released a statement regarding the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and gave their staff an additional 30 days for the submission of their comments while the deadline for public and Indigenous consultation went unchanged.[72]

The timeline, as well as other details of the Chalk River project, were challenged by the 30 identified Indigenous Nations and organizations who are directly affected by the project.[73] There were considerable objections made by these Indigenous organizations and groups which explicitly outlined environmental and political concerns. The Algonquins of Ontario (AOO)'s comments note the effects that the Chalk River

Tribal Council."

65 Anishinabek News, "Anishinabek Chiefs-in-Assembly unanimously oppose small modular reactors on Anishinabek territory," 2019, https://anishinabeknews.ca/2019/06/12/anishinabek-chiefs-in-assembly-unanimously-oppose-small-modular-reactors-on-anishinabek-territory/.

66 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."

67 Global First Power, "Proposed Chalk River Project," 2019, https://www.globalfirstpower.com/proposed-project-at-chalk-river-ont.

68 Government of Canada, "Algonquins of Ontario Land Claim Negotiations," 2016, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1355436558998/1539789262384.

69 Algonquins of Ontario," Oral Presentation Submission from the Algonquins of Ontario."

70 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Request for Commission Decision Summary."

71 Government of Canada, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."

72 Kerrie Blaise and M.V. Ramana, "RE: COVID-19 Response and Public Intervention Deadline for Global First Power E.A.," Canadian Environmental Law Association 2020.

73 Government of Canada, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."

facility has had on their people since its initial 1944 licensing and called for formal consultation processes between the AOO and the CNSC.[74] The Anishinabek Nation raised concern that the current project description does not outline effects on Indigenous peoples, despite the site being on their lands as well as the AOO land claim.[75] Other Indigenous commenters included the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation (AOPFN) and the Métis Nation of Ontario (MNO), who raised similar concerns.[76] In addition to the documents published by the CNSC, the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council released a letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau on May 14th, 2020, with a list of grievances regarding the Chalk River project specifically, and highlighted the shortcomings of current consultation practices.[77] This letter expanded on broader objections to SMR technology made by the Anishinabek Nation Chiefs Council in the January 2019 press release.[78] The comments and critiques submitted by the Indigenous Nations and groups directly contradict the sustainable angle that Global First Power purports. This contradiction illustrates the Janus-faced nature of recognition-based consultation practices, which present as reconciliatory on one hand while upholding oppression and undermining Indigenous governance on the other.

The marketing for the Chalk River MMR project focuses on the sustainability of the technology and even goes so far as to say that SMRs produce power without the "environmental impact of greenhouse gas and carbon emissions."[79] This claim does not take into consideration the environmental impacts, including greenhouse gas emissions, during implementation. Further, many concerns expressed by Indigenous groups regarding the project are environmental in nature, including contamination of soil, vegetation, and harvested plants; surface and groundwater contamination; endangerment of wildlife and their habitats; and impacts to traditional land and resource uses.[80] Global First Power echoes the Canadian government by painting SMRs as part of a sustainable future, at the same time largely ignoring the environmental concerns of Indigenous peoples. Also, nuclear experts have pointed out the risk of accidents and

74 Government of Canada, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."
75 Government of Canada, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."
76 Government of Canada, "Disposition Table of Public and Indigenous Groups' and Organizations' Comments."
77 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council."
78 Anishinabek News, "Anishinabek Chiefs-in-Assembly unanimously oppose small modular reactors."
79 Global First Power Ltd, "Nuclear Energy & Small Modular Reactors," 2020, https://www.globalfirstpower.com/nuclear-energy-smr-s#:~:text=small%20modular%20reactors%E2%80%94or%20SMRs,electricity%20or%20for%20other%20uses.
80 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council."

other safety concerns.[81] For example, there is a risk of a malfunction in the event of an ingress of air into the reactor core, which may lead to a radiation leak.[82] There is also a lack of transparency regarding technical information, which has raised concerns from both Indigenous commenters and nuclear experts.[83] The choice to implement SMR technology in an existing site, such as Chalk River, means that the touted energy benefits for off-grid Indigenous communities will not be realized as part of this project, while the negative environmental impacts will still affect Indigenous lands.[84] This is yet another example of Indigenous peoples experiencing the dispossessing effects of industry without benefit and without political or legal control.

The CNSC and Global First Power make a point to join the public and Indigenous consultation processes. For example, the Global First Power website states that the project will be accompanied by 'ongoing public and Indigenous engagement.[85] As well, the summary of Environmental Assessment comments published by the CNSC contains comments by public and Indigenous groups.[86] The Duty to Consult clearly delineates a unique governmental responsibility to consult affected Indigenous peoples. Therefore the joining of public and Indigenous consultation processes is reductive and diminishes Indigenous governmental and legal legitimacy.

In July of 2020, the CNSC published the decision on the initial consultation process for the Environmental Assessment of the proposed MMR project.[87] The document summarizes the completed steps in the Environmental Assessment process thus far, highlighting that the initial Indigenous Engagement process was 'satisfactory and in accordance with [regulatory standards].'[88] The document also notes that the Kebaowek First Nation expressed that they had not been adequately consulted.[89] However, the objections to the consultation processes made by the Anishinabek Nation and the Algonquins of Pikwakanagan Nation are minimized or omitted.[90] The CNSC asserts that moving forward, efforts will be made to 'give timely project updates' and 'where appropriate' gather traditional land-use knowledge as the project moves forward.[91] The CNSC's response is illustrative of the *politics of recognition*, having fulfilled its consultatory duties to the standard set out in Canadian law, there is no further

81 M.V. Ramana, "Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission."
82 M.V. Ramana, "Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission."
83 Haymond and Polson, "Letter from the Kebaowek First Nation and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council."; M.V. Ramana, "Submission to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission."
84 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Canada," https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/canada-nuclear-power.aspx.
85 Global First Power, "Nuclear Energy & Small Modular Reactors."
86 Government of Canada (2020)
87 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment."
88 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment."
89 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment."
90 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment."
91 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, "Decision on the scope of the environmental assessment."

cogitation on the colonial system these processes uphold. The dismissive attitude of the CNSC towards Indigenous legal legitimacy is emphasized by the inadequate articulation and response to the concerns and comments of the Indigenous Nations and organizations during the consultation period. The CNSC's response illustrates their intentions to perform extractive land dispossession through SMR implementation.

Conclusion

The Duty to Consult as applied in the CNSC's consultation processes illustrates that superficial recognition-based approaches to Indigenous governance ignore and erode Indigenous legal legitimacy with broad and inclusive language lacking any semblance of actionability or historical awareness. Moreover, the Duty to Consult has been inconsistently applied, as evidenced by the relicensing of the Chalk River Laboratories, which was done without the consent of the Algonquin people.[92] In practice, projects like the Chalk River MMR project delegitimize Indigenous communities and governments, continuing a history of exploitative colonial capitalist practices. Thus, we cannot simply wait for the nuclear industry to take responsibility for its actions past or present.

The suppression of Indigenous voices is not unique to the nuclear industry itself; rather, the recognition-based form of Indigenous relations is a factor inherent to the colonial state. If the nuclear industry and the Canadian state are truly to move beyond recognition-based Indigenous relations, the political sphere must make room for the voices of Indigenous communities and make space for Indigenous governance that rejects colonial frameworks. Coulthard articulates that current Canadian reconciliation consists of hollow apologies and acknowledgements of hurt and past wrongs, with no further action.[93] Given that we cannot rely on colonial institutions or their consultation processes to empower Indigenous self-determination, we must instead support resurgent actions.[94] By supporting community initiatives, including protest actions, we legitimize Indigenous rights beyond colonial frameworks of recognition.

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92 Algonquins of Ontario, "Oral Presentation Submission from the Algonquins of Ontario."
93 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks.
94 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks.

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Anti-Tuberculosis Vaccination and the Civilizing Mission

Preventative Medicine as Imperial Policy in French Indochina, 1925-1935

Gwendolyn Culver

Abstract: Considering imperial powers' perceived need to reaffirm the legitimacy of their rule in overseas colonies in the Interwar period, I examine France's use of vaccinations as a means to control colonial populations and production outputs. I propose that preventative medicine was used as a domestic techno-political tool to uphold France's status as a progressive liberal democratic nation, and to legitimize their imperial power through the benevolence of their civilizing mission in the name of hygienic modernity. In this paper, I examine France's anti-tuberculosis movement from 1925 to 1935 to demonstrate how Republican rhetoric was used to justify vaccination as a response to depopulation concerns and anti-imperial sentiment.

The vast destruction of land and life in the Great War and subsequent bloody ethno-nationalist conflict in the empire revealed the emptiness of imperial nations' claims of superior civilization in relation to their imperial subjects, exposing global colour lines.[1] The aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference and anti-imperial resistance and independence movements contributed to a further sense of political insecurity among imperial powers, prompting them to reaffirm the legitimacy of their rule in their overseas colonies. For France, the narrative of a 'lost generation' and a depopulation crisis dominated French social memory in the interwar period due to the destruction of its industry in its Northern regions and dramatic reduction of its labour force due to the loss of 1.325 million men and 600,000 new widows.[2] Moreover, the depopulation crisis fuelled French politicians' Maginot mentality and claims of French insecurity

1 During the Great War, African, African American, and Asian soldiers fought alongside European soldiers in the trenches in nearly equal roles. Scholars conceptualize this phenomenon as the exposition of global 'colour lines' as it demonstrated both the global impact of the conflict and shifting distinctions of class and a blurring of Western conceptions of 'civility.' Amanda M. Brian, "The First World War and the Myth of the Young Man's War in Western Europe," *Literature & History* 27 (2018) no. 2: 149.
Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 291.
2 Brian, "The First World War," 149; Joan Tumblety, "France," in *Twisted Paths Europe 1914-1945*, edited by Robert Gerwarth (New York, NY; Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 114.

and political weakness because a large and fertile population had come to represent national strength and imperial prowess in the early twentieth century.[3] French politicians relied on a fear-based constructed framework–known as the Maginot mentality–which was both material, seen in the construction of defence along the French and Germany border in the early 1920s, and theoretical, as French politicians feared that low birth rates and population decline would fail to produce a strong army, resulting in failure if war did break out.[4] I argue that preventative medicine was used as a domestic techno-political tool to uphold France's status as a progressive liberal democratic nation, and to legitimize their imperial power through the benevolence of their civilizing mission in the interwar period.

I engage with existing scholarship on France's use of preventative medicine as a tool to respond to domestic depopulation concerns and reaffirm France's prestige in Europe. I also move beyond analyses of preventative medicine as a domestic political tool to examine how and why vaccination specifically was used as a techno-political tool in France's colonies during the interwar period. In the postwar years until the early 1940s, investments in preventative medicine came primarily from Western states and were only distributed to the rest of the world through Western powers' transportation and communication networks. During this time, France maintained the largest and most expansive network of scientific institutes across three continents. The network of institutes across Europe, West Africa, and South Asia was informed primarily by scientific research conducted in France and informed in part by research conducted through France's colonies and sometimes on French colonial subjects. Examining the network of France's institutes is crucial in understanding how exactly French health policy and new innovations in preventative medicine were actually distributed throughout France's large empire and how implementation of the policies varied from the European continent to the colonies.

By drawing on primary sources expressing the perspectives of French policymakers, colonial administrations, and imperial subjects, I examine how vaccination was used in practice to legitimize imperial control in the face of anti-French resentment in French Indochina. Moreover, I examine France's use of Republican rhetoric of humanitarian intervention to justify their use of vaccinations.

First, I discuss France's domestic political context in the interwar period and examine the use of preventative medicine as a novel means of reasserting France's status through scientific innovation post-Great War. Second, I examine the use of preventive medicine as a techno-political tool to legitimize French imperial control. Third, I argue that France sought to

3 Brian, "The First World War and the Myth of the Young Man's War in Western Europe," 144.
4 Tumblety, "France," 122.

reaffirm their civilizing mission through republican rhetoric of equality, progress, and modernity in the face of anti-colonial resentment. This paper will focus on the anti-tuberculosis movement from 1925-1935 due to the limited availability of primary sources. I draw on primary sources written from the perspectives of colonized persons, but in doing so, I acknowledge the censorship of anti-government voices in interwar French Indochina and recognize the potential limits of these sources.

Literature Review

This paper engages with existing literature on preventative medicine as a new means of foreign intervention in overseas colonies in the name of European scientific primacy and superiority in the early 1930s.[5] The existing body of literature on medicine as an imperial tool points to vaccinations and birth control as two novel mechanisms through which to control populations (either to expand or to reduce them, depending on different historical contexts).[6] This paper seeks to move beyond this relatively broad body of literature and engage with more recent studies on the role of tuberculosis vaccinations from a scientific perspective and the role of anti-tuberculosis campaigns from a political perspective.[7] I note that this conversation is a primarily European one, with European or Western scholars discussing Western imperial powers' use of preventative medicine and creation of international commissions and international networks for vaccine research.[8] I attempt to address this gap in the literature and move beyond these understandings by drawing on secondary sources from South Asian scholars and using primary sources from imperial subjects.[9] This paper also provides a timely reassessment of historic challenges and successes of the international nature of vaccine development and distribution campaigns in the context of the current coronavirus disease (SARS-CoV-2 virus).

Moreover, recent epidemiological studies have reported cross-protective effects of the BCG vaccine toward non-TB-related diseases, including the coronavirus disease.[10] The cross-protective effect is a sort of 'trained immunity'–a program of innate immune memory (for persons

5 Marie-Paule Ha, *French Women and the Empire: The Case of Indochina* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), 31; Aro Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire: Bacteriology and Politics in France, its Colonies, and the World* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 48.

6 Clifford Rosenberg, "The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers," *The American Historical Review* 117, no. 3 (2012): 670.

7 Orsini, "Tuberculosis in Siena: Evolution of the Disease and its Treatment, from the Unification of Italy to the 1930s," *Journal of Preventive Medicine and Hygiene* 61, no. 1 (2020): E19-E23.

8 Brazelton, Mary Augusta, "Coping with Danger in the Air: BCG Vaccination in the Republic of China and International Projects of Postwar Tuberculosis Control, 1930–1949," *Cross-Currents* (Honolulu, Hawaii) no. 30 (2019): 35-54.

9 Thuy Linh Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 19, no. 3 (2018): 5.

10 Nigel Curtis *et al*., "Considering BCG Vaccination to Reduce the Impact of COVID-19," *The Lancet (British Edition)* 395 (2020): 1564.

who have received the BCG vaccine)–is characterized by non-permanent epigenetic reprogramming of macrophages that leads to increased inflammatory cytokine production and consequently potent immune responses.[11]

Ultimately, this work seeks to engage with recent literature to provide a timely reassessment of challenges in vaccine development and distribution. In doing so, it aims to contribute to understandings of imperial history and international public health history by exposing the potential long-lasting impacts of France's legacy of anti-TB BCG vaccination campaigns in French Indochina, as young Indochinese children who received the vaccine in the late 1940s alive today may disproportionately benefit from such immune memory in the face of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

Preventative Medicine and Hygienic Modernity in Interwar France

After the Great War and the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, France experienced heightened anxieties about the low French birth rate and high infant mortality rate, both of which contributed to the social memory of a 'lost generation.'[12] These legacies were evident in France's perceived insecurity along its Eastern border with Germany – the Maginot mentality. Further, this informed France's sense of imperial insecurity abroad, expressed as fear of anti-imperial subjects' demands for independence after the contribution of manpower in the war.[13] The Spanish Flu in 1918-1920 also alerted policymakers to the potential of infectious diseases to spread through trade and transportation networks.[14] Thus, France reoriented its domestic policies towards society and child mortality in attempts to repopulate France by emphasizing sanitation to protect human life to rebuild a strong society.[15] France invested in the development of a tuberculosis vaccine as a tool to address child mortality and depopulation concerns as tuberculosis outbreaks spread in early 1920.[16] In July 1921, French epidemiologists Albert Calmette and Camille Guérin outcompeted Germans, their top competitors, to develop a tuberculosis vaccine–the Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) vaccine[17]–in a demonstration of ingenuity publicized internationally by the French government.

From May to June 1926, France held the International Sanitary Conference in Paris with the intention of promoting its epidemiological advances and highlighting the ability of French intellectuals to harness

11 Maria Gonzalez-Perez et al., "The BCG Vaccine for COVID-19: First Verdict and Future Directions," *Frontiers in Immunology* 12 (2021): 1.
12 Tumblety, "France," 118.
13 Brian, "The First World War and the Myth of the Young Man's War in Western Europe," 148.
14 Heidi J. S. Tworek, "Communicable Disease: Information, Health, and Globalization in the Interwar Period," The American Historical Review 124, no. 3 (2019): 824.
15 Ha, *French Women and the Empire*, 31.
16 Rosenberg, "The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers," 686.
17 Albert Calmette, *La vaccination préventive de la tuberculose par le B.C.G.* [Preventive Vaccination for Tuberculosis by BCG]. (Paris: Academy of Medicine Libraries, 1928), 14.

human ingenuity.[18] Delegations from imperial nations and their overseas colonies praised France's self-imposed narrative of saviourhood, with many using Republican rhetoric of progress and the civilizing mission. The Argentine delegation stated, "the civilized world has actualized a magnificent work for the defence of human life," with the Brazilian delegation agreeing, "[vaccination] has opened a new era that allows us to hope for a better humanity, with less suffering, and more happiness."[19] To further promote claims of moral superiority through hygienic modernity, pro-vaccination propaganda was distributed in the 1920s.[20] Postcards portrayed Calmette as a national hero[21] and a saviour of small children's lives.[22] Posters showed bar charts with increasing vaccinations and decreasing child mortality rates, one of which reflected the twenty-two thousand percent increase in vaccinations from 850 in 1924 to 189,909 in 1934 in Paris alone.[23] Pro-vaccination propaganda is widely regarded to have served France's domestic narrative of re-population as a principal means of strengthening the French nation.[24] By the mid-1920s, in light of successful anti-tuberculosis campaigns in France, French imperialists quickly sought to monopolize the novel tool at their disposal, too. As France struggled to maintain colonial legitimacy in its overseas colonies, policymakers in the metropole relied increasingly on France's expansive communications networks to convey any and all new governance tools to their imperial counterparts – in this case, the BCG vaccine.

BCG as a Techno-political Tool in French Indochina

French imperialists relied on France's network of Pasteur Institutes to promote the use of preventative medicine as a techno-political tool to legitimize French colonial administrations' control in French Indochina through the narrative of hygienic modernity[25]. In the mid to late 1920s, imperialists in French Indochina pursued harsh economic policies of monopolization of key industries, including opium and rice, and taxation of alcohol and salt, with the aim of increasing production and decreasing

18 Ministère des affaires étrangères, *Conférence sanitaire internationale de Paris: 10 mai-21 juin 1926: procès-verbaux*, 1927.

19 Ministère des affaires étrangères, 63

20 Laurence Monnais, *Preventive Medicine And "Mission Civilisatrice" Uses Of The Bcg Vaccine In French Colonial Vietnam Between The Two World Wars* (Penang, Malaysia: Universiti Sains Malaysia Press, 2006), 59.

21 Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Timbre 1934 Calmette Sauveur des Tout Petits.*

22 Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Timbre 1948 Premier Congres International Du B.C.G.*; Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Couverture de la revue "Guérir" du 15 juin 1935*.

23 Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Carte postale éditée par le Service de la Tuberculose vers 1935*; Mathematical proofs and revision of scientific bar charts provided by Julia Miles (University of Ottawa), March 2021.

24 Ha, *French Women and the Empire*, 31.

25 Christian Bréchot, "The Institut Pasteur International Network: A Century-Old Global Public Health Powerhouse," *The Lancet (British Edition)* 387, no. 10034 (2016): 2182; Pasteur Institutes were scientific research institutes established throughout France's overseas colonies, specifically in Africa and Asia, from the 1890s to the 1940s. These institutes aimed to provide public health service to local populations within the national health systems of the countries under French control. Bréchot, "The Institut Pasteur International Network," 2181.

purchasing power in the colonies.[26] These policies put pressure on the labour force and fuelled anti-colonial resentment.[27] Fearing backlash in French Indochina and acutely aware of Communist uprisings in Europe, French politicians sought new ways to reorient imperial policy to justify their increased demands on the labour force and increased imposition of social controls. In June 1924, France's Minister for the Colonies Édouard Daladier announced that the colonies' population problem was primarily a 'labour problem' and that increasing health and sanitation measures would decrease mortality rates and contribute to an abundant workforce.[28] In July 1924, France's National Committee of Defence Against Tuberculosis was founded, and Minister Daladier recommended the widespread distribution of the new BCG vaccine to colonial governors for immediate use.[29] Access to the vaccine enabled colonial administrations to reorient their imperial policy from economy to epidemiology, with an emphasis on free provision of medicine. France's extensive network of Pasteur Institutes was crucial to the success of the distribution of the vaccine because of its existing locations in Saigon and Hanoi.[30] The institutes enabled the vaccine to be used as a techno-political tool through the promotion of France's scientific advancements to the international community and by furthering the narrative of France's character as a benevolent actor within its colonies through the free distribution of BCG.

To understand the dynamic power inequalities in the colonizer and labourer relationship in French Indochina, one must first consider the international context of the early Interwar period. Amidst global economic meltdown from the Clutch Plague and European reconstruction and peace efforts, France's ambitions turned to economic production in the colonies as a means to reassert economic dominance and relied heavily on BCG vaccination to maintain an abundant labour force amidst global economic crises. In the mid-1920s, French Indochina underwent a rapid capitalist expansion with the exploitation of mines and plantations, and growth of the commercial sector, as imperialists aimed to expand production and export to reassert French imperial dominance. [31] Scholars contend that a robust and abundant Vietnamese workforce played an instrumental role in the sustainability of the French Empire, as a shrinking labour reservoir would derail production and threaten France's quest for global supremacy.[32] Historian of preventative medicine Laurence Monnais argued that French

26 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 48.
27 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 6.
28 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 154.
29 Monnais, *Preventive Medicine And "Mission Civilisatrice" Uses Of The Bcg Vaccine In French Colonial Vietnam Between The Two World Wars*, 49.
30 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 54.
31 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 153.
32 Thuy Linh Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 19, no. 3 (2018): 5.

imperialists targeted the distribution of BCG vaccinations specifically to colonial subjects who were crucial to French colonial interests – meaning labourers and women valued for their reproductive abilities.[33] Historian Thuy Linh Nguyen claimed that for French administrators, "the popular portrayal [in the metropole] of Vietnam as a "reservoir of labour" was correct only in quantity, not the quality of its workers."[34] Thus, imperialists' priorities were expanding production capacities for the metropole's benefit, regardless of the quality of labourers' work or their conditions. *The Report on the Administrative Economic and Financial Situation in Tokin, 1933-34* exemplifies French administrations' disregard for colonial subjects' wellbeing:

> We have reduced the advance given to contracted workers recruited for south Indochina, from 10 to 8 piasters for men, and from 8 to 5 piasters for women. This reduction can be explained as a *sensible diminishment of the cost of indigenous life* and will be maintained as long as circumstances permit.[35]

Crucially, this meant that colonial administration paid little attention to labourers' working and

living conditions as they were simply perceived as quantifiable inputs for production outputs. While French imperialists sought to overlook concerns regarding living conditions and social controls like media censorship in French Indochina, they were acutely aware of the continuing need to maintain a large and strong labour force to meet France's economic output priorities. Thus, French imperialists turned to preventative medicine, rather than workable policies for better living conditions, as means for securing an abundant labour force by targeting vaccinations to labourers.

French colonial administrations also used preventative medicine as a strategic tool to reject or deflect demands for workplace reform and social rights from their colonial subjects in French Indochina. In 1930 and 1931, colonial subjects reported increases in abuses and violence towards labourers due to increases in plantation labour and production output quota increases.[36] Rather than responding to labourers' demands or reports of abuse, French imperialists attempted to shift the narrative about the labourers' discontent and frame it as concerns about health more broadly.[37] Strategically re-framing the labourers' concerns allowed imperialists to

33 Monnais, Preventive Medicine And "Mission Civilisatrice" *Uses Of The Bcg Vaccine In French Colonial Vietnam Between The Two World Wars*, 45.
34 Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," 8.
35 Gouvernement Général De l'Indochine, *Rapport Sur La Situation Administrative, Économique Et Financière Du Tonkin Durant La Période 1933-34*, Protectorat Du Tonkin, Hanoï, Vietnam, 1934, 167.
36 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 161.
37 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 167.

portray themselves as saviours by providing free vaccinations from the Pasteur Institutes throughout French Indochina. Aro Velmet, a historian of imperial technology and science, contended that by shifting the narrative of labourers' concerns to their benefit, French imperialists were able to report to the French metropole that BCG was the colony's "first line of defence" to any concerns or demands.[38]

In the mid-1930s, French imperialists actively countered demands from colonial populations relating to the development of dispensaries, educational programs, and improved industrial hygiene. They justified their rejection of such demands through Republican rhetoric of equality, stating that Frenchmen and subjects alike had equal access to the vaccine.[39] In doing so, key issues of overwork, malnutrition, and unsanitary housing remained wholly unaddressed in the colonies.[40] This meant that poor working and living conditions persisted throughout French Indochina while French colonial administrations' tactics to reorient and promote the narrative of the primacy of hygienic modernity were accepted as a 'success' within France and quickly garnered legitimacy on the international stage among other Western powers. Ultimately, French imperialists used the vaccine as a tool to reject demands for better working conditions and sanitary housing, arguing instead that sharing the benefits of Western science was a hugely benevolent act.

The Civilizing Mission and Anti-Colonial Resentment

French imperialists' use of a Republican narrative of vaccination as humanitarian intervention in the name of equality represents a flawed attempt to respond to anti-colonial movements and resentment in French Indochina in the interwar period. Scholars posit that BCG vaccination served as a tool for legitimating the humanitarian role of imperialism for politicians in Paris worried about France's prestige,[41] and helped respond to questions of labour conditions posed by colonial forms of social hygiene and treatment.[42] Next, I build on these arguments and claim that French imperialists' so-called humanitarian aid furthered the narrative of the civilizing mission by promoting racialized hierarchies in the colonies, best seen in French propaganda.

First, French politicians promoted preventative medicine as an imperial tool at home, stating: "there is no better instrument of civilization in Indochina than the Pasteur Institutes" and "we must rush to establish more Institutes to expand the benefits of our civilization."[43]

38 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 167
39 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 167.
40 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 220.
41 Ha, *French Women and the Empire*, 183.
42 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 142.
43 Gallica Periodicals, "Journal Officiel De La République française. Débats Parlementaires. Sénat (28 Décembre 1929," *Journal Officiel de la République Française*. Débats Parlementaires, Sénat, 1929.

Upon his return to France from French Indochina, Calmette reported 45,000 vaccinations in French Indochina in 1928 and claimed that "BCG vaccination is easily accepted and even revered by indigenous families."[44] Widely distributed posters of Calmette and white male doctors administering vaccines to indigenous populations portrayed them as 'saviours' to civilization through modern science. [45]

Second, in French Indochina, imperialists reproduced racialized hierarchies, reinforcing the distinction between the civilized colonizer and the uncivilized colonized person to maintain the myth of a superior French civilization. Monnais affirmed that vaccination generally allowed the achievement of preventative medicine on a large scale and enabled a certain measure of control associated with the 'civilization' of indigenous populations.[46] French imperialists actively promoted the distribution of BCG as a civilizing act through propaganda, including posters and images from the Pasteur Institutes of Saigon and Hanoi. One common way imperialists sought to convey the power differential was to have white persons photographed in a visually dominant posture vis-à-vis colonized persons. Images taken at the height of the anti-TB movement from 1925 to 1935 show white scientists at Pasteur Institutes dressed in white lab coats in the center of the frame with colonial subjects sitting to the side.[47] Postcards emerged as the foremost new iconographic media in disseminating images of the colonies to the public that gave a veritable "glimpse of white hegemony in the colony" and were the ultimate "visual propagation of the empire."[48] Ultimately, French imperialists promoted themselves as civilized saviours in practice and in print to cover up local concerns and convince the metropole of the imperial project's success and re-establish the legitimacy of their colonial rule.

However, France's civilizing mission was not without ardent opposition by the mid-1930s. Anti-imperial movements spread throughout Vietnam, championed by labourers who rejected French imperialists' drug monopolization, censorship, and hands-off response to the inhospitable and unsanitary working and living conditions on plantations. Vietnamese mothers and women were at the core of the anti-French pushback in the 1930s, rejecting French pro-natalist policies and rejecting the use of BCG vaccinations as a tool to suppress indigenous voices.[49] Nguyen characterized the context of French surveillance and censorship as

44 Albert Calmette, *La vaccination préventive de la tuberculose par le B.C.G*, 1928, 52.
45 Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Albert Calmette entouré de la population lors d'une séance de vaccination antivariolique à Saigon en 1891*.
46 Monnais, *Preventive Medicine And "Mission Civilisatrice" Uses Of The Bcg Vaccine In French Colonial Vietnam Between The Two World Wars*, 62.
47 Pasteur Institute Archive Services, *Jacques Genevray (1891-1953) et l'Empereur Bao Daï à l'Institut Pasteur de Saïgon*.
48 Velmet, *Pasteur's Empire*, 89
49 Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," 26.

a humiliating context of national subjugation and weakness of local traditions and institutions, observing that historians are fortunate to have some Interwar period archival evidence of the voices of largely suppressed colonial subjects.[50] Thus, Vietnamese perspectives from the time are best seen in opinion pieces from prominent anti-imperial voices and birth control advocates which were published in Vietnamese journals, including two popular periodicals: *Phụ Nữ Tân Văn [New Literary Women]* and *Khoa Học Tạp Chí [Journal of Science]*.[51] In 1932, Bửu Đề, a colonial subject in Cochinchina critiqued French pro-natalist culture in *Khoa Học Tạp Chí [Journal of Science]*. Đề claimed women were subject to constant impregnation, sharing the story of a woman who succumbed to death in childbirth during her seventh pregnancy due to exhaustion, malnutrition, and poor medical care.[52] Articles like Đề's reveal that many Vietnamese anti-imperialists rejected the French thesis on surplus labour and identified French pro-natalism as the roots of national peril.[53]

Discussion

On the other hand, it could be argued that France's use of preventative medicine and—more broadly—French imperial health ambitions in French Indochina were not the worst policies and acts of France's imperial aggression and control during the 1920s to 1940s as it sought to regain its economic prosperity and status on the international stage. Examples of French imperial policy that scholars hold to be much worse than France's anti-tuberculosis campaign include significant efforts to dismantle any freely expressed opposition to French rule in the colonies. In 1935, the French Minister of the interior collaborated with the Minister of the Colonies to enact legislation against any and all 'acts of disorder and demonstrations against French sovereignty' including against Vietnamese activists and intellectuals[54] – effectively placing a moratorium on free speech and expression of colonial subjects.[55] Thus, it is possible to disapprove of French imperial policy in the interwar period while acknowledging that this specific anti-tuberculosis vaccination campaign was not the worst harm done, as it did benefit part of the local workforce as male labourers were vaccinated and thus protected from tuberculosis. Moreover, France's internationalization of its anti-tuberculosis vaccination campaign contributed to international advancements in preventative

50 Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," 3.
51 Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," 13.
52 Bửu Đề, "Sản dục hạn chế," Khoa Học Tạp Chí no. 15 (1932): 18–19.
53 Nguyen, "Overpopulation, Racial Degeneracy and Birth Control in French Colonial Vietnam," 26.
54 Meredith Terretta, "'In the Colonies, Black Lives Don't Matter.' Legalism and Rights Claims Across the French Empire." *Journal of Contemporary History* 53, no. 1 (2018): 34.
55 I respectfully acknowledge the use of violence by French imperialists to their subjects in French Indochina in the Interwar period. However, I have deliberately chosen a different example to illustrate my argument due to the availability of English language primary sources and the relevance of secondary sources to my research scope.

medicine. This campaign informed vaccination distribution and planning, which proved to be foundational for subsequent international vaccination campaigns such as the smallpox vaccination campaigns in the early Cold War period.

However, I reject these alternative explanations and contend that this work's thesis demonstrates the far-reaching societal impact and long-term legacy of France's aggressive and self-serving use of the BCG vaccine in its overseas colonies. This paper reveals that the use of techno-political tools–especially preventative medicine–by powerful actors deserves more serious scholarly consideration in order to accurately capture the far-reaching effects of discriminatory vaccination in the favour of those composing the labour force, as well as the long-lasting legacy of health inequalities across low-and-middle-income countries (LMICs) during the waves of decolonization throughout the Cold War.

Ultimately, the use of preventative medicine in the interwar period served as a powerful and far-reaching techno-political tool for nations who had both access to modern science and vaccine research and maintained or benefitted from a robust international network with deeply interconnected transportation and communication capacities. In the interwar period, France and the United Kingdom were the only two major imperial powers who had the scientific, political, and economic capacities necessary to use preventative medicine as a tool to control their imperial subjects abroad. Crucially, France's actions and anti-tuberculosis campaigns that were actualized and operationalized through the network of Pasteur Institutes provided a political model and created an institutional blueprint for future international preventative medicine campaigns. Most significantly, the U.S.-led Rockefeller Foundation benefitted from this institutional blueprint as it engaged in scientific innovation at home and vaccine distribution abroad to newly post-colonial states in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and in the early Cold War period. In doing so, the United States was able to engage in a veritable philanthrocapitalist international health mission through the delivery of yellow fever vaccinations to newly independent African states.

In sum, France's development and subsequent use of the BCG vaccine in the metropole was, for the most part, harmless and served to counter the social memory of a 'lost generation' and politicians' *Maginot* mentality. Yet, France's use of preventative medicine in its colonies produced more dire circumstances as imperialists often disregarded their subjects' quality of life in pursuit of France's economic goals, which were inextricably tied to the size and production capacities of the colonial labour force. While France's strategic use of the BCG vaccine successfully served domestic political interests in the Interwar period, it was at the immense cost of the poor quality of life, restricted freedom of speech, association, and

reproduction that imperial subjects endured during the interwar period. The harsh conditions continued for decades to follow until hard-fought independence from French rule in 1954 and shaped the enduring social memory of France's unjust policies of subjugation and humiliation.

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Ecomodernist Authoritarianism

The Costs and Motivations of Ecological Resettlement in China

Abstract: This paper will analyze the costs and motivations of ecological resettlement programs within modern China. I first argue that systematic programs of ecological resettlement, such as shengtai yimin, display ecomodernist motivations, merged with imperatives of authoritarian state control. Secondly, I argue that the costs of ecological resettlement have negatively impacted resettled populations and failed to combat the central causes of ecological degradation. Driven by imperatives of state control and erosion of minority autonomy, shengtai yimin has undermined the autonomy, well-being, and cultural patterns of minority groups through urbanisation and sedentarisation. Under its ecomodernist presuppositions, ecological resettlement has failed to adequately address broader causes of ecological degradation resulting from unchecked growth and modernisation. I conclude that ecological resettlement has successfully extended and increased state control but has largely failed as a means of ecological or economic improvement.

Tyler Lynch

I swallowed an iron moon
they called it a screw
I swallowed industrial wastewater and unemployment forms
bent over machines, our youth died young
I swallowed labor, I swallowed poverty
swallowed pedestrian bridges, swallowed this rusted-out life
I can't swallow any more
everything I've swallowed roils up in my throat
I spread across my country
a poem of shame

I Swallowed an Iron Moon, Xu Lizhi, 2013[1]

1 Xu (who committed suicide in 2014) was a migrant worker whose poetry captures much of the cost of China's industrialization incurred by marginalized groups, including ecological migrants. "I Swallowed an Iron Moon: The enduring legacy of worker poet Xu Lizhi," *China Labour Bulletin*, September 30, 2019, https://clb.org.hk/content/i-swallowed-iron-moon-enduring-legacy-worker-poet-xu-lizhi.

Introduction

In 2019 alone, over four million Chinese migrated in response to climatic disasters, including typhoons and earthquakes.[2] Millions more Chinese, however, have been intentionally resettled in state-run programs intended to alleviate poverty and improve the ecological state of fragile environments. These ecological resettlement programs are widely regarded as having "predominantly negative" consequences for both resettled migrants and de-settled environments.[3] Positive ecological effects have been underwhelming, while resettlement has often resulted in underemployment and lowered quality of life.[4]

This paper examines the costs of ecological resettlement in China. I first argue that the *motivations* of ecological resettlement are best conceived as ecomodernism merged with the imperatives of state control. Secondly, I argue that the *effects* of ecological resettlement have largely succeeded in extending state control and undermining the autonomy of minority groups while failing to address the principal drivers of environmental degradation.

This analysis consists of three sections. Firstly, an overview of the state of ecological resettlement within China since the mid-1990s is provided. Following this, the ecomodernist motivations behind ecological resettlement are examined, and the process whereby resettlement programs fulfill imperatives of state control is explained. Finally, this paper explains why ecological resettlement has failed to achieve either large-scale environmental or economic improvement. This analysis endeavours to tie together two central themes: (a) that misguided programs of ecological resettlement have wreaked massive human and environmental costs within China, and (b) that their failure to achieve positive outcomes stems from their dual ecomodernist and authoritarian aims.

The State of Ecological Resettlement in China

Ecological migration is the movement of a population due to climatic factors. In the Chinese context, these factors have included water scarcity, mining-induced land subsidence,[5] soil denudation and erosion,[6] land desertification,[7] and environmental disaster. Resettlement in response to urgent environmental degradation continues to occur, often in a temporary,

2 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *2020 Global Report on Internal Displacement*, Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020: 40.
3 Jarmila Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," *In The Routledge Handbook of Environmental Policy in China*, 1st Ed, (Routledge, 2017), 231.
4 Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environment Migration"; Emily Yeh, "Greening Western China: A Critical View," *Geoform* 40, no. 5 (2009), 884-894; Mingming Fan, Yanbo Li, and Wenjun Li, "Solving one problem by creating a bigger one: The consequences of ecological resettlement for grassland restoration and poverty alleviation in Northwestern China," *Land Use Policy* 42 (2014): 124-130.
5 Xiuyun Yang, Heng Zhao, and Peter Ho, "Mining-induced displacement and resettlement in China: A study covering 27 villages in 6 provinces," *Resources Policy*, 53 (September 2017): 408-418.
6 Yaozu Xue and Lei Huang, "Factors influencing the livelihoods of ecological migrants in coal mined-out areas in China," *Environment, Development, and Sustainability* 21 (2019): 1854.
7 Yaozu Xue and Lei Huang, "Factors influencing the livelihoods of ecological migrants," 1854.

local, and disorganized manner. Since 2000, however, the bulk of ecological resettlement within China has been actively initiated through systematic, state-organized programs.

Broadly described as *shengtai yimin* [ecological resettlement], resettlement programs have been implemented primarily in China's less-populated, less-developed northwestern regions.[8] Official statistics state that, by 2010, over 7.7 million people were resettled through *shengtai yimin*, from residents of coal mined-out areas in Shanxi to pastoralist ethnic groups in Tibet and Inner Mongolia.[9] Notwithstanding implementation problems, resettled populations are ideally given government subsidies and housing, enabling them to move from areas deemed ecologically fragile into areas where greater economic prospects may be found. However, the subsidies administered to resettled peoples are usually minor, and most migrants have to pay substantial "resettlement fees" and pay for or construct new houses without government aid.[10]

Ecomodernist Motivations Behind Ecological Resettlement

The main aims of *shengtai yimin* programs are twofold: "socioeconomic improvement, [and] environmental protection."[11] Resettlement schemes are intended to decouple economic growth from negative environmental impacts, as well as modernize and improve the economic standing of resettled populations. This dual emphasis on decoupling and modernization signals the major influence of ecomodernist principles in Chinese environmental policy.

"Ecological modernization," defined by its focus on modernization, agricultural intensification, poverty alleviation, and urbanization, has been the central goal of Chinese environmental policy for nearly two decades.[12] China's ecomodernist goals are illustrated by a 2007 report by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which emphasizes "decoupling," innovation, and the "pursuit of win-win results for both economy and environment."[13]

8 It must be reiterated that not every case of ecological resettlement within China, or even coerced or systematic ecological resettlement, falls directly under the *shengtai yimin* banner. *Shengtai yimin* will most often, in this essay, refer to the relocation of pastoral peoples from grassland habitats (such as steppe or taiga) to urban or near-urban environments. To further complicate matters, there have been conflicting reports as to the continuance of *shengtai yimin* in certain parts of China, with one report stating that it ended in Qinghai in 2015. What is certainly known is that "the state-controlled type of environmental migration initiatives, relocating and placing a large number of people in settlements, continues." Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 231.

9 Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 226.

10 Edward Wong, "Resettling China's Ecological Migrants," *New York Times*, October 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/25/world/asia/china-climate-change-resettlement.html, Jarmila Ptackova, "Sedentarisation of Tibetan nomads in China: Implementation of the Nomadic settlement project in the Tibetan Amdo area; Qinghai and Sichuan Provinces," *Pastoralism* 1, no. 4 (2011): 9.

11 Jarmila Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 224

12 Billions of dollars have also been spent in the past two decades in major projects of forest planting and protection, land retirement, and de-desertification. Yeh, "Greening Western China," 886.

13 Research Group for China Modernization Strategies, *Ecological Modernization Report 2007*, Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2007.

Ecomodernism has not become the dominant ecological framework of Chinese environmental policy by chance. Rather, ecomodernism is uniquely conducive to elements of China's political strategy, including rapid economic growth, an increase in state power, and the curbing of minority autonomy. Much as the Chinese Communist Party professes to espouse "socialism with Chinese characteristics" in the political realm, I argue that "ecomodernism with Chinese characteristics" has come to dominate the environmental front.

Ecological Resettlement as State Control: Motivations and Effects

In addition to ecomodernist principles, ecological resettlement programs fulfill imperatives of power and control for the authoritarian Chinese regime. Ecological resettlement enables the Chinese state to assert control over peripheral regions. While China's densely populated, heavily urbanized, ethnically homogenous coastal regions easily facilitate state machinery of control, taxation, education, and surveillance, these features are largely missing in China's west.[14] The regions of Qinghai, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet are geographically distant from China's major urban centres, sparsely-populated, largely rural or pastoral, and are largely composed of ethnic minorities such as the Hui and Tibetans.

These nomadic ethnic minorities are the main targets of resettlement programs such as *tuimu huancao* [converting grasslands into forest], which greatly allowed "the state to enhance its capacity to control the population" through sedentarisation and deculturation.[15] Sedentarization ostensibly aims at freeing grasslands from damage resulting from overgrazing; however, removing nomads from the steppe and installing them in urban environments also fulfills longstanding goals to erode the political and economic autonomy of ethnic minorities. These assimilatory goals were summarized by the former Minister of Agriculture's declaration: "It is the PRC's national policy to *end the nomadic way of life* for all herdsmen by the end of the century."[16]

Through removing ethnic minorities from traditional environments, *shengtai yimin* acts as a means of deculturation. Nomadic minorities have often been resettled into cities where Han Chinese is most frequently spoken, children are educated in state-run schools, and centralized control is far more powerful, which has a deleterious effect upon minority "cultural patterns, community structure and support systems."[17] Livestock herding,

14 These geographical distinctions are necessarily somewhat nebulous. By coastal China, I refer to the major centres of China's economy: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Tianjin, and others. China's West and North include the northern and Central Asian provinces: Xinjiang, Tibet, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and others.

15 Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 233

16 Emphasis mine. Richard Fraser, "Forced Relocation amongst the Reindeer-Evenki of Inner Mongolia," *Inner Asia* 12, no. 2 (2010): 321.

17 Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 231.

nomadic mobility, and ancestral habitat are more than incidental features of nomadic life, and their loss is often received by ethnic minorities as directly threatening their ways of being and existence. This fear was voiced by a Tibetan intellectual who stated, "I think that the ultimate reason for this policy is not environmental protection," but "to eliminate the *minzu* [ethnic group]" itself.[18]

Inherent within China's programs of ecological resettlement is a reductive understanding of nomadic life as primitive. Programs such as *tuimu huancao*, which aim to modernise animal husbandry, are explicitly predicated against a "traditional and backward way of Tibetan pastoralism."[19] The state's view of traditional cultural practices is often reductive, as evinced by one official's statement regarding resettled Tibetans: "nobody is stopping them from carrying out their culture . . . they can still sing and dance."[20] Research funded by China's Ministry of Education seems to contradict even this statement, urging ecological migrants to "leave behind traditional habits and customs and change their organizational old social customs and adapt to a new life."[21] Denigratory attitudes towards nomadic cultures are not peripheral to *shengtai yimin* but central to it, stemming directly from state imperatives of control and ecomodernist assumptions of the inferiority of traditional pastoralism.

"If we had known what it was like, we wouldn't have moved here": Economic Failures of Ecological Resettlement.

Personal accounts of migrant Hui Muslims, resettled under the world's largest ecological resettlement project in Ningxia, are instructive in examining the economic outcomes of *shengtai yimin*. While life in the water-deprived, desert regions left behind was certainly difficult, Hui were resettled into environments where living conditions were even harsher. Journalists describe migrants living like "penned-in animals, listless and uncertain of their future," housed in "cookie-cutter rows of small concrete-block houses."[22] Small plots of land 'given' to each family were instead leased out for $29 per year. Furthermore, due to a lack of economic infrastructure in resettled areas, the little work available was menial, physical, and low-paying. Some Hui migrants rejected jobs requiring them

18 This comment may not be far removed from the official statements of China's own government, as seen by Qi Jingfu's remark. Yeh, "Greening Western China," 892.
19 Ptackova, "Sedentarisation of Tibetan nomads in China," 9.
20 This remark recalls the rather glib conclusions of Guo et al. (whose research was, perhaps unsurprisingly, funded by the China Scholarship Council) that resettled migrants may organize "comprehensive cultural activities such as fun games, cultural performances, and nostalgia-recalling activities" to preserve their culture, a statement which ignores the extent to which culture is embodied and intimately connected to a sense of place, and interactions between human and environment. Yeh, "Greening Western China," 892; Shijie Guo *et al.*, "Improvement in the Poverty Status of Ecological Migrants Under the Urban Resettlement Model: An Empirical Study in China," *Sustainability* 12, no. 5 (2020): 13.
21 Xue and Huang, "Factors influencing the livelihoods of ecological migrants," 1865.
22 Wong, "Resettling China's Ecological Migrants."

to live in Han-majority cities where they would be marginalised within an ethnic, religious, and even linguistic context, which they perceive as alienating.[23]

Shengtai yimin has largely failed to alleviate migrant poverty for several reasons. Even when ecological resettlement programs aimed primarily at economic development rather than increased state control, they are severely hampered by underlying ecomodernist assumptions. While *shengtai yimin* aims at both poverty reduction and environmental improvement, the former goal often impedes the latter. Under the goal to alleviate poverty, "poor households with an insufficient number of livestock are the first targeted," despite these households contributing the least to ecological degradation.[24] Not only do poor households contribute the least to ecological degradation (owning few grazing animals), they are often the worst affected by the economic costs of resettlement, job search, and house construction.[25] While Fan, Li, and Li found that household income increased after resettlement, living expenses also increased greatly, and "net income available to improve quality of life was lower."[26]

Wealthier families are far less affected by environmental protection laws and ecological resettlement. After grassland protection measures in Inner Mongolia required all grazing animals to be fenced, the few families wealthy enough to afford fencing continued to graze their herds on common land, saving fenced land for emergencies.[27] Despite owning more animals and possessing a greater ecological impact, rich families are often not resettled at all, to fulfill the mandate of poverty alleviation. The ecological effectiveness of *shengtai yimin* is thus hampered by its own emphasis on economic improvement.

Environmentally Misguided: Ecological Outcomes of *Shengtai Yimin*

In addition to largely negative human impacts, ecological resettlement within China takes a misguided approach to effecting meaningful environmental improvement. Geographer Emily Yeh writes that "there is minimal evidence that removing herders will guarantee greatly improved grassland conditions."[28] Another study by Foggin and Phillips describes *shengtai yimin* as "unnecessary for the long-term sustainable utilisation and conservation of grasslands ecosystems."[29] Other studies are more critical,

23 Wong, "Resettling China's Ecological Migrants."
24 Ptackova, "Sedentarisation of Tibetan nomads in China," 6.
25 While, in certain regions, households designated as poor by the government get a fully-funded house, the extent to which subsidies succeed in providing a decent standard of living for migrants is almost certainly lacking. Studies show "subsidies are not high and can hardly cover the costs of basic needs, which rose enormously after the nomads gave up their livestock." Ptackova, "Sedentarisation of Tibetan nomads in China," 3.
26 Fan, Li, and Li, "Solving one problem by creating a bigger one," 129.
27 Yeh, "Greening Western China," 890.
28 Yeh, "Greening Western China," 892.
29 Ptackova, "Orchestrated Environmental Migration in Western China," 231.

finding that moderate grazing has *beneficial* environmental effects, even dampening the effects of global heating on "reduction of biodiversity and rangeland quality."[30]

Here, too, China's ecological resettlement programs (especially those directed at nomadic pastoralists) are hampered by their ecomodernist presuppositions. The ecomodernist focus on modernized, intensified agriculture has proven ill-suited to arid regions, many of which undergo resettlement precisely because of water scarcity. Despite being officially denigrated as primitive, traditional pastoralism is far more stable and resource-efficient in regions where resources are "subject to rapid spatial and temporal variability."[31] Compared to pastoralism, settlement agriculture has been found to increase water use while decreasing efficiency and exacerbating regional water shortages.[32]

Ecomodernism's focus on decoupling human economic activity from environmental impacts has ignored and eroded the "stewardship of interdependent ecosystems," which defines pastoralist life.[33] Moreover, ecomodernism argues that humans must be decoupled from nature, often ignoring the complex, mutually sustaining interactions possible between ecosystems and humans or the psychological and ecological damage produced from removing land-dependent people from their land.

Finally, China's ecomodernist resettlement schemes disproportionately focus on the environmental impacts of populations on its geographical peripheries - regions which are already harmed by resource extraction and human capital drain. This misguided focus ignores environmental degradation driven by unchecked consumption, urbanization, population increase, and industrialization in China's populated centres. Sedentarized pastoral populations are doubly harmed; first, by the effects of resource scarcity and ecological devastation fuelled by distant urban, industrial centres, and second, by the harms incurred during and after resettlement.

Conclusion

This analysis has argued that China's ecological resettlement programs display the merging of ecomodernist and authoritarian aims. This alliance is far from incidental. Ecomodernism presents an ideal framework for an authoritarian regime that seeks economic growth and political control over minority groups as imperative. The drive for ecomodernist aims of decoupling and urbanization have proven easy to merge with authoritarian aims of control, centralization, and deculturation.

30 Yeh, "Greening Western China," 892.
31 Fan, Li, and Li, "Solving one problem by creating a bigger one," 124
32 Fan, Li, and Li, "Solving one problem by creating a bigger one," 129
33 Xiaojing Zhou, "'Slow Violence' in Migrant Landscapes: 'Hollow Villages' and Tourist River Towns in China," *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment* 24, no. 2 (2017): 288.

Although *shengtai yimin* has largely failed on humanitarian, economic, or environmental grounds, it has succeeded in increasing and extending state control. Ecological resettlement in China comprises but one part of a nationwide apparatus of surveillance, censorship, and internment aimed at quelling the autonomy of potentially dissident ethnic groups in the interest of state hegemony.

The need for a humane, culturally sensitive, welfare-centred program of ecological resettlement within China is serious. Millions of China's citizens currently dwell in poverty, increasingly affected by industrial waste, pollution, land subsidence, water scarcity, and desertification. A genuinely beneficial system of ecological resettlement must not only combat acute causes of ecological degradation, but broader systems of unsustainable development and resource extraction as well, and aim at preserving the cultural patterns and ways of being of resettled populations. Given China's current strategic goals and political framework, one can be skeptical that such a program could foreseeably be implemented.

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"I Never Thought a Soldier Could Cry"

Iranian Youth, Martyrdom, and Hegemonic Masculinity during the Iran-Iraq War

Edward Yuan

Abstract: The idea of modernity, pushed by European political and cultural colonization, when combined with regional conflicts transformed how formerly colonized societies reinterpreted gender identities. This paper aims to define how the idealized masculinity of the young martyr in Iran arose during the Iran-Iraq war which followed an already-tumultuous gender landscape created by the pre-revolutionary modernizing states. The martyr as a hegemonic masculinity, based more in imagination than in reality, remains a key component in the social memory of many Iranians and is capable of adapting to different frameworks.

Introduction

In 1980, the Iran-Iraq War started, and by its end in 1988, over half a million Iranians were dead.[1] The brutality of 20th-century warfare combined with a revolutionary state that had just overthrown the Shah created profound changes in how Iranian society conceived of gender identity. In particular, the Iran-Iraq War was instrumental in shaping the modern Iranian man by radically shifting the ideals of hegemonic masculinity away from prior notions in dynastic Qajar and Pahlavi Iran. Hegemonic masculinity is defined as the dominant form of masculinity to which other gender identities are positioned in relation and subordinated to.[2] In the Iran-Iraq War, what it meant to be a man changed as the militarization of young men—some just boys even by contemporary standards—recast hegemonic masculinity away from maturity and towards youth.[3] Furthermore, Iranian women, who had carved out their own spaces in society during the Iranian Revolution, were once again subordinated to a masculine ideal.[4] Victimization and martyrdom also became defining

1 Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, "Introduction," in *The Iran–Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 1.
2 R. W. Connell, and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender and Society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 832, 835.
3 Shaherzad R. Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man': Poor and Working-Class Boy Soldiers in the Iran-Iraq War," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 14, no. 2 (2018): 184.
4 Jennifer Chandler, "No Man's Land: Representations of Masculinities in Iran-Iraq War Fiction," *PhD diss.*,

characteristics of the Iranian man and perpetuated their hegemony. Thirty years later, the Iran-Iraq War continues to loom over the collective memory of the Islamic Republic, and its ghosts have yet to be laid to rest.

Drawing upon English-language scholarship and Iranian primary sources of the Iran-Iraq War, this paper will start by introducing the state of gender identities in Iran prior to the Iranian Revolution. State-led efforts to impose different types of masculinities onto society will also be explained in order to contextualize the state of gender relations prior to the war. Then, the shift in the hegemonic masculinity over the course of the war will be shown through the remarkable youth of the war's combatants, subordination of unmasculine gender identities, and wartime narrative of martyrdom, both secular and Shia. Finally, this paper will explore the social memory, perpetuation, and continued relevance of the wartime hegemonic masculinity in present-day Iranian society. Recent history suggests that the memory of the martyrs—and thus the hegemonic gender identity—is no longer controlled by the state alone, even though the collective history of the Iran-Iraq War and its narratives have not weakened. Thus, while the significance and narratives of the imagined revolutionary martyr will endure, its features may continue to adapt to new political and social developments.

Masculinities in Pre-War Iran

Iranian masculinities prior to the Iran-Iraq War were heavily influenced by efforts to modernize Iranian society. In reality, this meant the indigenization of Western norms and ideas concerning masculinity among the urban elite. Two often-used terms of 19th and early 20th century Iran refer to this phenomenon: *farangimaab* and *fokoli*. *Farangimaab* translates to "one who leans towards the west" and was used to refer to those who advocated for and participated in the importation of Western knowledge in order to modernize Iran.[5] Among Western-educated Iranians, the idea of knowledge became masculinized as it became associated with men educated in the West, while Iran was feminized and associated with all things unmodern and uneducated.[6] To most Iranians, the *farangimaab* was a divisive concept in an age where patriotism was viewed as masculine.[7] Notions ascribed to him like the need for western-style progress made it seem like he thought Iran was weak, which distanced him from the ideals

(University of Manchester, 2012), 41.

5 Sivan Balslev, "Dressed for Success: Hegemonic Masculinity, Elite Men and Westernisation in Iran, c.1900–40," *Gender & History* 26, no. 3 (2014): 549.

6 Balslev, "Dressed for Success," 548; Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Mapping Transformations of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Iran," *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 49, no. 2 (2005): 69.

7 Sivan Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities: Gender and Sexuality in Late Qajar and Early Pahlavi Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) 147; Balslev, "Dressed for Success," 552.

of Iranian masculinity.[8] On the other hand, the *farangimaab* also directs to *fokoli*, the term for overly Westernized dandies focused on the superficial practices of Europeans, as being un-Iranian.[9] In time, these concepts became synonymous, indicating that abstract Western ideas which the *farangimaab* advocated for were linked to the social and cultural practices associated with the West. Moreover, with the decisive defeats of Qajar Iran in the 19th century Russo-Persian and Anglo-Persian Wars, the reality of European political and military domination forced much of the Iranian elite to rethink their prior patriotic aversions to Westernization.[10]

Given these dynamics, by the mid-20th century, the ideal man became something of a hybrid. He was to be proudly Iranian, yet dismissive of what he viewed as traditional and Western-educated, yet still patriotic. Above all, he was supposed to be an established mature figure with the connections and resources to help modernize his country. No figure better exemplifies this than the *javanmardi*, a traditional masculine figure who became associated with modernization beginning in the 20th century. A letter to a Tehrani newspaper from 1927 asked why there were not any *javanmardi* willing to help the country and enrich themselves by building a cement factory.[11] From this letter, hegemonic masculinity is revealed because a poor youth with no connections—no matter how virtuous—was not the idealized figure whom the reader invoked, but rather the *javanmardi* with his wealth, connections, and self-interest. This westernized *javanmardi*—who was mainly the creation of literate upper-classes—nevertheless became the masculine hegemon in the eyes of the state, which then sought to propagate the figure of the *javanmardi* as the ideal man.[12]

Even the act of martyrdom and the masculine figure of the martyr—highly revered in Shia Islam—was suppressed during the Pahlavi era, which undermined its place of gendered prestige in Iranian society.[13] Imam Hussein—a foundational figure in Shia Islam—was martyred in the historical Battle of Karbala where he died fighting Caliph Yazid.[14] Starting in the 10th century, practices to commemorate the day of Hussein's martyrdom coalesced into a set of rituals called the *Moharram* Procession, which usually takes place in a special building called a *tekyeh*.[15] Both the *Moharram* Procession and the *tekyeh* were important in reinforcing gender identity and affirming the masculine figure of the martyr. For example, reenacting the Battle of Karbala is an important

8 Balslev, Iranian Masculinities, 147; Balslev, "Dressed for Success, 552.
9 Balslev, "Dressed for Success, 554.
10 Anthony Shay, "Choreographing Hypermasculinity in Egypt, Iran, and Uzbekistan," *Dance Chronicle* 31, no. 2, (2008): 213.
11 Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities*, 31, 33.
12 Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities*, 32-34.
13 Kamran Scot Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2004): 9.
14 Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 8-9.
15 Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala*, 10-11.

part of these *Moharram* Processions, but male actors played male and female characters. Furthermore, while women still actively participated in the *Moharram* Processions, *tekyeh* were often segregated by gender, with women occupying the upper levels or the rooftop far from the main observances on the ground floor.[16] Therefore, men were both narratively and spatially closest to the act of martyrdom which demonstrates its associations with Shia masculinity. Upon taking power with the support of modernizing factions in the military, Reza Shah gradually stopped participating in *Moharram* Processions before banning them outright in the 1930s.[17] The Pahlavi's suppression of *Moharram* Processions shows that the pre-revolutionary Iranian state was eager to abandon older models of masculinity tied to martyrdom in favour of new Westernizing figures like the *javanmardi*.

However, new practices imposed from the top-down, which were based on a gender binary tied to sex as well as clearly delineated heteronormative relations, increasingly came into conflict with prior Iranian perspectives on gender. Unlike the upper-class Iranian urbanites coming back from Europe with new idealized forms of masculinity, the majority of Iranians—who were either rural or nomadic—were largely unaware of these changes until the state stepped in and saw no reason to drastically alter their worldview to conform to these new standards.[18] To them, the increasing adoption of Western practices challenged previous norms and perspectives on gender which they were hesitant to give up.[19] For example, those advocating Westernization and modernization often shaved their facial hair completely or only wore a mustache.[20] The practice of shaving one's face, in particular, was the object of much satirization and condemnation because it served as a proxy for broader questions about culture and because facial hair itself was crucial to Iranian masculine identity. [21] In the minds of most Iranians, shaving dangerously blurred the line between adolescent beauty—an important component in male desire for *hur* (beautiful young women) as well as *amrad* (beautiful young men)—and mature masculinity since mustaches represented *khatt*, a signifier of beauty in both *hur* and *amrad*.[22] Beards, in some contexts called *mahasen*—virtues—were often specific to a man's position in society, with merchants, clerics, and farmers all adopting different styles to indicate their specific identities as established men in Iranian society.* Mature men without beards were thought to be deliberately turning their backs

16 Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala,* 39-40.
17 Aghaie, *The Martyrs of Karbala,* 51.
18 Houchang E. Chehabi, "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah," *Iranian Studies* 26, no. 3/4 (1993): 211-212; Balslev, Iranian Masculinities, 25.
19 Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities*, 25.
20 Balslev, "Dressed for Success," 552.
21 Balslev, "Dressed for Success," 552.
22 Najmabadi, "Mapping Transformations of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Iran," 59.

on mature masculinity in order to remain an *amrad*.[23] In other words, the introduction of Western practices threatened to destroy important factors like facial hair in differentiating mature men, or their idealized hegemonic types, from boys. That being said, the beard was not regulated by the *Dress Laws* between 1927 and 1929, when the state was eager to impose the Western concepts of masculinity that the *farangimaab* exemplified while subordinating prior masculinities. Rather, its slow decline among the urban middle and upper classes was largely due to the choices made by individuals.[24]

Accordingly, the elite-led Westernization in the early 20th century was not absolute. Many segments of society were still keen to retain previous gender identities even as they morphed to fit the new, state-led reality. For example, the practice of dancing *amrad*, called *raqās*, was regarded as sexually deviant and backward by European Orientalists and many of the Westernizing Iranian elite.[25] The late Qajar and the Pahlavis were keen to stamp out these practices since they did not adhere to a heteronormative worldview.[26] Yet, the popularity of these androgynous dancers among the lower classes, both urban and rural, meant that *raqās* were often changed to fit the westernized worldview of the elite rather than banned entirely. Previous dances thought to be sexually suggestive were replaced with superficially hypermasculine moves replicating Iranian martial arts.[27] Even the name of the dancers, *raqās*—which was associated with the queer relations these dancers had with their audience—was replaced with a contextually neutral neologism, *raqsandeh*.[28]

Therefore, new Western-influenced masculinities did not completely replace prior gender identities. Instead, due to pressure from the Iranian state and elites, older gender identities were simply re-interpreted to fit into a heteronormative worldview. Western ideas of masculinity introduced by the Qajars and Pahlavis did not simply replace others. Both the urban upper-classes and the rural lower-classes adapted to state pressure and the influence of western perceptions of gender by adapting prior masculinities. A more comprehensive change to the way Iranian society viewed masculinity would only come with a truly collective experience that would impact a cross-section of society, and this came in the Iran-Iraq War.

Masculinities at War

The most noticeable change in Iranian society's hegemonic masculinity during wartime was how it began to idolize youth over maturity. The Iranian men fighting and dying in the Iran-Iraq War were

23 Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities*, 217.
24 Balslev, "Dressed for Success," 547; Balslev, *Iranian Masculinities*, 148, 219-20.
25 Shay, "Choreographing Hypermasculinity," 224, 233.
26 Shay, "Choreographing Hypermasculinity," 233.
27 Shay, "Choreographing Hypermasculinity," 233.
28 Shay, "Choreographing Hypermasculinity," 226.

young and often too young to grow facial hair, an important marker of Iranian masculinity. At the same time, they were too young to have been educated like the ideal modern man as constructed by Westernizers. There are many accounts of boys younger than fifteen—a fluid definition of around when boys become men in Iranian culture—volunteering for and participating in frontline battles.[29] The working-class background of most soldiers coupled with their age also meant that they often received little to no education: less than one percent of boys born in 1966 received more than an elementary school education.[30] Neither well-educated nor wealthy, frontline soldiers conflicted with ideas of what a modern man was supposed to be. Nor was he aligned with pre-20th century ideals of an Iranian man since, while he was no longer an object of desire like the *amrad*, he was nevertheless young, physically underdeveloped, and beardless.

However, due to their sacrifice fighting in the war, the state had to heroize them, thus inadvertently changing the hegemonic masculinity in Iran and how youth was perceived. For example, the case of Mohammad Hussein Fahmideh, a 13-year-old boy who threw himself under an Iraqi tank in 1981 with a bundle of grenades. This act has been immortalized in state propaganda and Iranian curriculum ever since as an example of the self-sacrifice of young Iranian soldiers as evidence for the righteousness of the Iranian cause.[31] When looking at a comic strip of Fahmideh's sacrifice in a present-day Iranian teen magazine, there are clear differences in how masculinity is presented in contrast to Qajar and Pahlavi Iran.[32] In the comic, Fahmideh's square jaw and simple but resolute gaze at an invader he intends to destroy stand in stark contrast to the rounded, feminine—from a Western perspective—face given to young men in Qajar art. Both contrast against the forward-looking, educated, modern *javanmardi* as exemplified by propaganda depicting Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[33] On one hand, the differences between Fahmideh and the Qajar *amrad* indicate that the prior definition of boyhood no longer applied to young soldiers like Fahmideh. On the other hand, while the Shah and Fahmideh were both meant to be lionized as great men in their respective art, the vast differences in their social status, age, and education show that the hegemonic masculinity no longer prioritized maturity during and after the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, Iranian soldiers representing youth—once a subordinate masculinity or not viewed in a simple gender binary at all—

29 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 184.
30 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 182.
31 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 175.
32 *Comic Strip of Mohammad Hussein Fahmideh*, July 4, 2019, *Middle East Eye*, https://www.middleeasteye.net/discover/pictures-iran-war-dead-martyr-mural-memorial
33 Najmabadi, "Mapping Transformations of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality in Modern Iran," 60, figure 3; *The White Revolution*, January 26, 1963, Hoover Poster Collection, Hoover Institution, https://www.hoover.org/research/creating-islamic-republic.

overtook maturity as the hegemonic masculinity in Iran during the war.

Moreover, masculinity does not exist in a vacuum. It is important to note that masculinities are often defined by their relation to femininities in societies with gender binaries, and it was no different during the Iran-Iraq War, where women were excluded from the acts that defined hegemonic masculinity.[34] During the Iranian Revolution, women were at the forefront of the coalition to topple the Shah's regime. Khomeini urged women to "face the machine guns and tanks of the executioners of this regime" and likened them to martyred prophets.[35] The brief period of peace after the Revolution was also marked by increased political participation of women from all classes under the guidelines laid out by the Islamic Republic.[36] Women were thus escaping the orbit of hegemonic masculinity and carving out new spaces in society during the Revolution.

However, during the war, femininities were once again repurposed to serve the war effort. In the process, dominant masculinity was able to subordinate them once again. Since women were not permitted to participate in the fighting—a long-standing policy in Shia jurisprudence that the Islamic Republic followed—the frontlines and the act of fighting became a thoroughly masculinized space where women were perceived to not belong.[37] That being said, women played vital roles in the frontlines and, in some cases, directly in the fighting.[38] However, since womens' martyrdom in the fighting itself is often overlooked by contemporary and present-day narratives of the war, the highest honour an Iranian woman could be acknowledged for in wartime was to have raised a martyred son or to have been wife to a martyred husband.[39] Even the father of a martyr was not viewed to have sacrificed as much as the mother.[40] Nevertheless, women's contributions to the war were only widely recognized when it was in relation to a man. Additionally, cities far from the frontlines were feminized as women-led demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and against Iraq further demarcated the different spaces men and women inhabited.[41] It is no surprise that state media and the public at that time regarded sacrifices made in the masculine space as the more important of the two.[42] Accordingly, in a wartime society that celebrated sacrifice in defence of Iran above all else, there was little space and time to

34 Chandler, "No Man's Land," 41.
35 Rose Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic: Commemorating Martyrs in Provincial Iran," *Muslim World* 105, no. 4 (2015): 567.
36 Chandler, "No Man's Land," 68-69.
37 Bill Rolston, "When Everywhere Is Karbala: Murals, Martyrdom and Propaganda in Iran," *Memory Studies* 13, no. 1 (2020): 17; David Cook, "Women Fighting in Jihad?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28 (2005), 377.
38 Elaheh Koolaee "The Impact of Iraq-Iran War on Social Roles of Iranian Women," *Middle East Critique* 23, no. 3, (2014): 287-88.
39 Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 572, 577.
40 Chandler, "No Man's Land," 71.
41 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 184.
42 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 184.

commemorate women who—unlike during the Revolution—were unable to become martyrs like men.

Perhaps the most important impact that the war had on the modern Iranian man was its victimization narrative, where Shia martyrdom in the Iran-Iraq War was constructed as the peak of hegemonic masculinity and the reason for its perpetuation. While the war itself was and still is referred to as "the Sacred Defense'' within Iran, religion was not a static factor that solely motivated martyrdom or created such strong feelings among the living for the martyrs.[43] Instead, in this Sacred Defense—defined by Khomeini as the struggle to protect the beliefs and values of Hussein at Karbala—Revolutionary Iran was gradually constructed as the sacred ideal which Shia Muslims of all nations and ethnicities were expected to view as worth sacrificing themselves for.[44] The creation of this Shia wartime narrative of martyrdom began around 1983 with the deployment of basij to the frontlines as well as the popularization of Revayat-e Fath, a TV show documenting the war with overtly religious themes. This is in contrast to the early Iranian war effort, influenced by the pluralistic forces that drove the Revolution, which was less fixated on religion and thus marshalled the support of Iran's religious minorities as well as leftist factions.[45]

The shift of the wartime narrative from a nationalistic to a Shia one also heralded two different processes: the expansion of Iranian war-aims as Iran's initial defeats began to turn around as well as the exclusion of non-Shia from the masculine ideal. As the Iraqi invasion of Iran stalled and reversed, narratives of the defence of the Iranian nation no longer made sense when Iranian troops started advancing into Iraq. Thus, the war was universalized with a Shia narrative centred on Karbala, a hub of Shia Islam in Iraq. This Shia narrative, sometimes called the Karbala paradigm, was heavily tied to Imam Hussein and the historical Battle of Karbala. Hussein was constructed to be the ideal martyr and, even though he was unjustly persecuted and defeated, the ideal man, contrary to modernizing masculine figures like the *javanmardi*, which idealized success and rejected victimization.[46] This narrative of the Battle of Karbala was transplanted onto Iran as a whole. Saddam Hussein was portrayed as a modern reincarnation of the Umayyad Caliphs while Iranians—who had been victimized by the Shah, the West, and now, Iraq—were continuing Hussein's struggle for all Shia.[47] This justified the continued Iranian advance into Iraq and legitimized the Sacred Defense even as they crossed national borders. Furthermore, since no one was more victimized than the

43 Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 566.
44 Neda Bolourchi, "The Sacred Defense: Sacrifice and Nationalism Across Minority Communities in Post-Revolutionary Iran," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 86, no. 3, (2018): 753; Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 566.
45 Bolourchi, "The Sacred Defense," 729.
46 Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 563-64.
47 Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 571.

young martyred men, they were viewed as inhabiting the space closest to Hussein.

This victimization and distinctly Shia martyrdom of young Iranian soldiers served to justify the new hegemonic masculinity. For example, in a propaganda poster from the war, a boy is depicted cradling the head of a dead soldier.[48] The soldier's leg had been blown off; his blood and tears flow into the dry, cracked ground. As for the boy, his hand grips the soldier's gun firmly, and his gaze at the unseen enemy is one of determined hatred. A banner carried by two disembodied arms, presumably from the Battle of Karbala, promises the vengeance of God.[49] Posters such as this, which were also used against the Shah during the Revolution, were a new and common form of communication used by the state to alter the physical spaces Iranians inhabited during the war.[50]

The message this specific poster has is twofold; firstly, a direct connection is made between the martyrs at Karbala to the martyrs during the Iran-Iraq War, and secondly, the soldier's body is equated to the nation as a whole. The direct connection to Hussein can be seen in how the dead soldier appears to be dissolving into the clouds in the background, which eventually form into the arms carrying a banner from Karbala, once again relating the sacrifice of Iranian soldiers to the persecution of Hussein. Furthermore, by bleeding into the cracked ground, a connection is made between the victimization of the physical land of Iran and the pain of the young men who died in the war, masculinizing the nation and its suffering. Due to the lionization of these martyrs and how their sacrifice is tied into the greater struggle of the Iranian nation, it becomes nearly impossible to separate the holiness, necessity, and justice of the sacred defence from the masculine ideal. From the poster, it is clear that the act of Shia martyrdom was viewed in a continuous narrative of victimhood stretching back to the Battle of Karbala and, by equating the martyred male body with the nation, remembrance of the martyrs and the war becomes the act of subordinating oneself to the dominant masculinity. Thus, the hegemonic masculinity in Iran is defined by a victimization narrative amplified and utilized during the Iran-Iraq War, which is further reinforced by the act of remembering the martyrs.

Compared to the various masculinities present in pre-war Iran, the young martyr may seem like a diminutive figure. The martyr in the modern Iranian imagination had neither wealth nor education and was likely a non-entity in society until his ascension into martyrdom. And yet, the power of this masculinity is precisely in its ability to resonate with every Iranian. Masculinities that the elite attempted to impose, such as the imagined

48 *Young Boy Cradling Dead Soldier*, 1980, Middle Eastern Posters Collection, The University of Chicago Library, https://www.lib.uchicago.edu/media/images/meposters-0003-074.original.jpg.
49 *Young Boy Cradling Dead Soldier*, 1980.
50 Rolston, "When Everywhere Is Karbala," 7.

masculine figures in Qajar and Pahlavi Iran, were simply that: imagination. But nearly every Iranian had a son, a husband, or a friend who was martyred in the war.[51] The Iran-Iraq War was truly a collective experience that spared no socio-economic class. Because of this universality, young men and boys who were martyred became deeply ingrained in the social memory of Iranians and the gender landscape in Iran.

Hegemonic masculinity is only exemplified by a tiny minority of men, and other gender identities are subordinated to what society's definition of the ideal man is. As a result of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's hegemonic masculinity underwent an immense change. Maturity was deemphasized and youth was idolized, women were once again forced under a paradigm where their achievements paled in comparison to the sacrifices the men made, and the remembrance of martyrdom and Iran's victimization became inextricably linked to what is now the hegemonic masculinity. It is hard to attribute vast societal changes like this in perceptions of masculinity to individual actors, but it was complementary to the centralization of power in new and revolutionary institutions following the Iranian Revolution. Khomeini's principle of *velayat-e faqih*—the theory that gives a single Islamic jurist absolute guardianship over people—and his overriding of the *mujtahid*—qualified individuals capable of reaching a ruling on Sharia independently—in favour of central courts through an appeals process shows how local institutions were disempowered following the Revolution.[52] Consequently, as the mature men who often led their communities lost political authority, they also lost their gendered authority as masculine hegemons and were replaced by new revolutionary youth capable of representing the interests of the central state in return for their sacrifice in one of the most destructive wars of the 20th century.

Masculinities and Memories in Post-War Iran

In modern-day Iran, the Iran-Iraq War and its martyrs remain a powerful part of Iranian social memory. The martyrs are perceived to have sacrificed so much in defence of everyone else that to forget them is out of the question. They are commemorated everywhere, from digital billboards in Tehran to quiet graves in mountain towns.[53] Even so, this narrative of the Iran-Iraq War, where the hegemonic masculinity was conceptualized to have made the ultimate sacrifice, is continuously complicated by Iranians. For example, in the 2000 Iranian film, *Born Under Libra*, veterans of the war are shown as unable to identify with the hegemonic masculine ideal that they are meant to exemplify.[54] Rather than the popular narrative of

51 Ahmadi, "'In My Eyes He Was a Man,'" 176, 186; Rolston, "When Everywhere Is Karbala," 8.
52 Sami Zubaida, "An Islamic State?: The Case of Iran," *Middle East Report* 153, (1988).
53 Wellman, "Regenerating the Islamic Republic," 562.
54 Minoo Moallem, "Staging Masculinity in Iran–Iraq War Movies," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Asian Cinema*, eds. Aaron Park, Gina Marchetti, and See Kam Tan (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 495-96.

willing sacrifice for the nation, their experience of war was one of fear, uncertainty, and emasculation. Similar stories are told by survivors of the war themselves. Zahra Soutoudeh, a medic during the war, said of her experience in the frontlines: "I never thought a soldier could cry. [. . .] It was so painful to see those powerless warriors." [55] Such stories show that the post-Iran Iraq War hegemonic masculinity in Iran is ultimately a social construct created out of wartime propaganda's need for heroes.

Yet, the act of remembering still generates strong emotions in Iranians because of the loss and victimization they justifiably feel even as the war seems increasingly distant. In 2016, the bodies of nearly 200 soldiers from Operation Karbala-4 in 1986 were found. It was revealed they were killed as prisoners of war, and some were buried alive.[56] Their state funeral drew huge impassioned crowds. One political banner at the funeral stated that the martyrs of Karbala-4 were opposed to women's attendance at volleyball games, an example of the gendered oppression exerted by the memory of dead martyrs.[57] The outpouring of grief whenever more martyrs are exhumed, and the prevalence of their imagery everywhere should not simply be explained as part of a state-led effort to push a single narrative of the war. Instead, there are real reasons for Iranians to believe that their victimization never ended and the Sacred Defense continues. While Saddam's Iraq may have been defeated, the United States—which participated in the coup of 1953 and gave banned chemical weapons to Iraq during the war—still generates feelings of unjust persecution in Iran.[58] Iran is also still suffering the effects of crippling sanctions targeted at Iranian society as a whole, and those who suffer the greatest effect are disproportionately young and lower-class, as were soldiers of the Iran-Iraq War.[59] The innocence associated with the young martyred soldiers and the victims of today's sanctions regime remains a symbol of the continued unjust persecution of Iran. Thus, even as the Iranian Revolution ossifies and the figures that participated in it grow old and pass away, the young revolutionary martyr still holds power in the social memories of Iranians for its continued relevance.

Moreover, it also does not help that the United States seems intent on creating more martyrs for the Iranian state to use. Continued American intervention is capable of keeping the social memory of martyrdom alive and even amplifying it. With a persistent foreign threat, the narrative

55 Minoo, "Staging Masculinity in Iran–Iraq War Movies," 498.

56 Pedestrian, "Iran's Memory of War," *Foreign Affairs*, December 1, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2016-12-01/irans-memory-war

57 Pedestrian, "Iran's Memory of War."

58 Donald Riegle, "U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Gulf War, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs," (1994) https://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/r_1_2.html#exports.

59 Fatemeh Kokabisagh, "Assessment of the Effects of Economic Sanctions on Iranians' Right to Health by Using Human Rights Impact Assessment Tool: A Systematic Review," *International Journal of Health Policy and Management* 7, no. 5, (2018): 385.

that martyrdom primarily was and continues to be an act to defend the victimized Iranian state retains its power. Perhaps the most recent and famous of the post-war martyrs is Qasem Soleimani, a general of the Revolutionary Guard Corps and a veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. Only 23 years old in 1980 and already an officer, Soleimani epitomized the young Iranian soldier. Soleimani was assassinated by an American drone early in 2020. After his assassination, the poetry of Hussein and Fatima's martyrdoms on Youtube, sung by Iranian lament singers, surged in popularity, garnering over ten million views and hundreds of thousands of likes.[60] Similar poetry was composed about and sung for Soleimani specifically.[61] During his life, Soleimani could not have been further from a victim. He led operations in support of the Syrian government, was integral in defeating ISIL, and projected Iranian power throughout West Asia. But by assassinating him, the United States perpetuates the ability for the Islamic Republic to claim that, like Hussein at Karbala and the young soldiers in the Iran-Iraq War, their unjust persecution has never ended, and that remembrance of the martyrs remains part of the sacred defence.

Conclusion

More than thirty years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iranian society is unable to forget the dead. The Iran-Iraq War and the half-a-million Iranian lives it claimed deeply impacted a cross-section of Iranian society. Young boys sent to war, mothers of martyrs crying over sons, and Hussein, fighting an eternal battle for the oppressed, are images that resonate with Iranians for good reason. By keeping the memories of an idealized version of those martyrs alive, they also keep that ideal's hegemonic masculinity and its systems of oppression alive. Yet this victimization is not solely imagined and has a basis in Iran's experience with colonization, the brutality of the Shah's regime, the devastation of the Iran-Iraq War, and continued American imperialism.

While this hegemonic masculinity's narrative firmly positions Iran as the victim, it is also capable of being co-opted by Iranians in spaces outside the state's control. In the Green Revolution following alleged fraud in the 2009 Iranian elections, the same imagery and language used for martyrs of the Iran-Iraq War were used to describe those who died in the crackdowns.[62] Both the government and protestors claimed that prominent martyrs like Mohammad Mokhtari, Zhaleh, and Neda were killed by the other side.[63] Neda was also notably a young woman, showing

60 "تسبيحات الزهراء | الحاج مهدي رسولي,"αأسفار الغدير, January 25, 2020, Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ch3bBvbwzwg; "سلام آقا"السلام عليك يا سيدي" | محمد حسين حداديان,"αأسفار الغدير, February 6, 2020, Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JInzMvxia3Y.
61 " حاج قاسم همه سرباز توییم (رجز خوانی حماسی) مجید بنی فاطمه| English Urdu Arabic Subtitles," Haider Nohe, January 6, 2020, Youtube Video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qjUglPdS52E.
62 Rolston, "When Everywhere Is Karbala," 17-18.
63 Elisabeth Jane Yarbakhsh, "Green martyrdom and the Iranian state," *Continuum* 28, no. 1, (2014): 83

that the increased political participation of Iranian women is subverting the masculine identity of the idealized martyr.[64] Thus, Iranians are increasingly challenging masculinity and the state's monopoly on memories of the martyrs. This suggests that the ideal of the young revolutionary martyr will not be replaced in the foreseeable future. Rather, it will be re-interpreted by new generations of Iranians and new political movements. Nevertheless, the strength of the image of the martyr will endure. When the act of martyrdom is treated as the highest virtue an Iranian can strive for, those who cannot sacrifice themselves must remember the young men who did, for that is all they can do.

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64 Yarbakhsh, "Green martyrdom and the Iranian state," 83.

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